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Introduction: Islamic Sects and Movements
Carole M. Cusack and M. Afzal Upal
Given the presentation of Islam in popular media, it is not surprising that most 
Westerners (including some scholars) view the faith as a static, monolithic 
religion that clings fiercely to its seventh century roots, resisting any attempt 
at change. This is, of course, far from the truth. In common with other faith 
traditions, Islam has been a dynamic force from the start, with adaptations 
stemming from individual leaders, diverse ethnic populations, and the cultural 
contexts in which the religion took root. Christians and Jews, among other rep-
resentatives of religious traditions, commented on Muḥammad, the prophet 
and founder of Islam, and identified resemblances between the new monothe-
istic religion and their own traditions (Hoyland 2000). Islamic tradition implic-
itly recognizes its own diversity; even as some groups label others heretical 
and denounce the inventions of so-called ‘liar prophets’ or fitna (‘strife’) spread 
by leaders who have succumbed to ungodly forces, they also acknowledge 
the relationship between these diverse interpretations and their own creed 
(van Ess 2001). In this way, Islamic literature tells the story of Musaylimah 
Kazzab (whose very name contains the word ‘liar’), who, along with his fol-
lowers, was killed by troops sent by Abū Bakr shortly after Muḥammad’s death 
(Makin 2010). The Khārijites and Muʿtazilites are also mentioned in standard 
Sunnī and Shīʿa narratives, being portrayed as falling so far outside of main-
stream Islam that their ideologies deserve to be wiped out of Islamic thought. 
Yet, their existence is clearly acknowledged (Timani 2017).
Such innovation in Islamic thought is not restricted to the past. Modern 
reformers have continued to push the envelope, sometimes being met with 
comparable disdain from certain Muslim groups as the ‘false prophets’ of 
the Prophet Muḥammad’s time. These reformers include the founders of the 
Aḥmadiyya Muslims Jamāʿat (Chapter 27) and the Bahāʾī Faith (Chapter 33). 
According to traditional Sunnī and Shīʿa accounts, such ‘heretical’ movements 
have little or no value for scholars interested in understanding ‘authentic 
Islam.’ Should scholars of Islam researching the current state of Islam confine 
themselves, then, to studying only those movements which modern-day main-
stream Shīʿa and Sunnī Muslims consider to be central to their faith? Do move-
ments that are deemed less than ‘fully’ Islamic by some Muslims tell us nothing 
about Islam past, present, or future? The answer for contemporary scholars is 
clear; Islam is not monolithic, and ideal typical images of the tradition that 
focus on texts and theology are partial at best, and misleading at worst (Neitz 
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2011). The study of lived religion, vernacular religion, and of the diverse Islams 
that are occasioned by gender, social status, ethnicity, geographical location, 
and other variables must of necessity enrich scholarly understanding of the 
Islamic tradition.
Thus, while traditional anthologies, encyclopedias, and handbooks of Islam 
to date have excluded the ‘heretical’ movements, related religions (except for 
Judaism and Christianity), and splinter groups, as well as ignoring political 
manifestations of the faith, this volume casts a broader net. The goal is to pres-
ent an overview of the wide variety of religious movements that have their 
origins in the Islamic world so that scholars and those interested in Islamic 
history can grasp the full extent of the diverse thought that exists under the 
name of Islam. We include Sunnī, Shīʿa and Ṣūfi groups, and examinations of 
movements that were born of the Islamic world but no longer consider them-
selves part of the Islamic community (for example, Bahāʾī), and movements 
that consider themselves Islamic but are rejected as such by many Sunnī and 
Shīʿa Muslims (such as the Aḥmadiyya Muslim Jamāʿat).
Perhaps it is inevitable for those who are faithful to slightly differing itera-
tions of a religious tradition to argue about whose beliefs are most valid. 
Arguably, no other religious quarrels match the longevity and intensity of 
the Muslim debate over what constitutes the ‘true’ faith. Who belongs to the 
‘circle of Islam’ (daira-e-Islam) and who is excluded from it? Almost every 
group has, at one time or another, been accused of being outside the circle 
of Islam. The heresiographical tradition in Islam appears to date back to its 
early days. In Chapter 19, Emin Poljarevic gives historical examples of takfīr 
including “ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) Mardin fatwā against Syria’s Mongol rul-
ers; the Ṣafavid (Shīʿī) Akhbāriyya’s takfīr of Muslim philosophers in the 1600s; 
and most notably, during the 1700s, the religious movement of Muḥammad 
ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s en masse excommunication of the Sunnī Ottoman and 
Shīʿī religious leaders” (Poljarevic 2020). As Najam Haider notes, Muslim her-
esiographers have often used a ḥadīth which in its most commonly employed 
variant suggests that 72 out of the 73 sects in Islam are hell-bound: “This frame-
work exercised a decisive influence on heresiographers, who sought to docu-
ment the proliferation of a predetermined number of sects and positioned 
their own group as the sole representative of the Prophet’s original message. 
Such a view did not allow for the doctrinal evolution of any single group. A sect 
was a cohesive and unchanging unit that held a discrete set of doctrines and 
beliefs” (Haider 2014: 104).
Viewing sects as static and unchanging is clearly unscientific. Sects are 
groups of individuals who share a set of beliefs. What is commonly referred 
to as a sect’s beliefs are a subset of these beliefs. Many sects start out with 
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an individual founder whose ideas evolve and change over time (typically 
from orthodox to unorthodox). As other individuals join and leave the group, 
their individually held ideas also change through interactions with each other 
(Swatos 2007). Thus, a group’s shared beliefs dynamically evolve over time. 
It is this belief change dynamic that makes these groups so fascinating to 
study. This also means that religious boundaries are more fluid than heresiog-
raphers (and even some scholars) have suggested. This includes boundaries 
between Islamic and non-Islamic movements as well as boundaries between 
various Islamic sects. Therefore, most of the movements that are considered 
non-Islamic now started out as strictly Islamic. For instance, founders of Bahāʾī 
and Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat started out holding orthodox Shīʿa and Sunnī Muslim 
views. Haider suggests that Zaydism may be an even more interesting case, 
where a sect’s beliefs have oscillated between Shīʿism and Sunnism (Haider 
2014: 105). In order to understand these groups in relation to Islam, we need 
to understand the evolution of their shared beliefs over time. For those move-
ments that originated in an Islamic milieu, this can be done by analyzing 
their shared beliefs in comparison with shared beliefs of Muslims in that his-
torical era.
Given the breadth of this volume and the extent of content not convention-
ally included in collections such as this, questions arise as to the most effective 
organization of chapters. The first part of the book has seven chapters focus-
ing on non-violent Sunnī movements. The second part contains six chapters 
on Shīʿa and Shīʿa-related movements. The third part has eight chapters on 
fundamentalist and extremist movements that are primarily Sunnī in orienta-
tion, ranging from the mostly non-violent (for example, Hizb ut-Tahrir) to the 
violent (culminating in Islamic State). The fourth part covers Ṣūfi movements 
and Ṣūfi-related movements. The fifth part has six chapters describing two dif-
ferent types of movements: first, those that mainstream Muslims do not con-
sider part of Islam, but followers of those movements consider themselves to 
be Muslims; and second, movements that have historical links to Islam but are 
separate (for example, Yezidis and Druze).
1 Survey of Contents
This volume is organized in five sections: Part 1, “Sunnī Traditions”; Part 2, “Shīʿa 
Traditions”; Part 3, “Fundamentalists and Extremists”; Part 4, “Ṣūfism and its 
Influences”; and Part 5, “In Between and On the Fringes of Islam.” Three of these 
sections are uncontroversial; the division of Islam into Sunnī and Shīʿa, with 
Ṣūfis forming a third grouping that crosses this sectarian divide, is traditional 
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(Husain 2018). The other two sections, however, may be less popular, although 
for different reasons. Fundamentalist instantiations of Islam undeniably exist; 
yet they are slippery and difficult to define, and it may be objected that there 
are significant differences between the movements in this section that vitiate 
any desire to strategically group them together. The final section is likely to be 
more controversial; of the seven movements covered, only two have a strong 
‘Islamic’ identity (Aḥmadiyya and the Nation of Islam), and both are regarded 
as ‘deviant’. The other five are not ‘Islamic’ sects, in the sense of unorthodox or 
theological offshoots, but are separate religious entities, both traditional and 
modern. A distinguishing feature of these groups is that they all have inter-
acted historically, culturally and socially with Islam and have (to some extent) 
shaped their identities accordingly.
Part 1 introduces the Sunnī tradition, beginning with a general overview and 
progressing through five specific institutions that are associated with differ-
ent modern nation-states. The section concludes with an overview chapter on 
women in (Sunnī) Islam. One of the issues facing scholars of Islam relates to 
the terminology available for characterizing the diversity within Islamic beliefs 
and behaviors (Sedgwick 2000). Should terms developed originally for the 
study of Christian movements, ‘sect’, for instance, be applied to Islamic subdi-
visions or movements? (Swatos 2007). Ron Geaves examines this question in 
the first chapter, “Sectarianism in Sunnī Islam.” He traces the history of various 
schisms in Islam, starting from the first century of Islam and the beliefs of early 
movements (such as the Khārijites), before moving forward to consider mod-
ern Sunnī movements (for example, Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood). Geaves’ conclusion identifies political and theological 
causes for the divisions that remain present in Sunnī Islam.
In Chapter 2, Zacharias Pieri reviews the history of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat from 
its origins in the nineteenth century India to the present. He describes a move-
ment dedicated to reviving and strengthening the faith of the existing faith-
ful by making Islam a part of every single aspects of life. Yet, the movement 
has splintered in recent years with at least two leaders vying for the top spot: 
Saad ul-Hasan and Zuhairul Hasan. Pieri also reports that the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi branches also appear to be moving away from the Indian center 
and “becoming increasingly powerful due to the large annual congregations 
held there and the ambitions of the leaders in those regions to have more say 
in TJ’S global operations. Violent clashes ensued between those loyal to the 
Indian branch of the movement and those who wanted an expanded leader-
ship” (Pieri 2020). The appeal of Tablīghī Jamāʿat in varied cultural contexts, 
including the West, is also examined.
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Sunnī conservatism perhaps best represents the monolithic interpretation 
of Islam made by many in the contemporary world. As such, Rickard Lagervall’s 
chapter on “The Muslim Brotherhood” and its history, from its origins in early 
twentieth century Egypt, to the proliferation of offshoots throughout the 
broader Middle East and North Africa, is enlightening (Chapter 3). Lagervall 
examines the Brotherhood’s founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906–1949) and the 
contribution of his contemporary, Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966). The Brotherhood’s 
intervention in Egyptian politics is covered, and the tensions between Saudi 
Wahhābism and the Muslim Brotherhood are analysed. It even becomes evi-
dent that offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood were, in fact, active on both 
sides of the Algerian Civil War that followed the suspension of the parliamen-
tary election by the military in 1992 (Willis 2012).
The Gülen Movement and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of 
Turkey are another case in point. The two movements appear to be similar; 
for example, both advocated a Sunnī political Islamic revival to remake the 
Kemalist secular Turkey into a modern Islamic welfare state. In Chapter 4 
Caroline Tee surveys the relationship between these two movements, noting 
they were close allies during the 1990s, but had a falling out as the AKP won elec-
tions and consolidated its power. Thus, while in the 2002 election, Fethullah 
Gülen asked his supporters to vote for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP (leading the 
AKP to its first majority government), tensions arose between the two allies in 
the AKP’s second term in office over issues such as Turkey’s relationship with 
Israel and how to respond to anti-government protests. The coup of 15 July 2016 
seemed to obviate any hope of reconciliation between the two movements. 
Erdoğan blamed Gülen for orchestrating the coup and ordered arrests of thou-
sands of Gülenists, the dissolution of Gülenist schools, and confiscation of the 
movement’s property.
Chapter 5, Hisanori Kato’s “The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia,” 
illustrates the difficulties associated with the traditional approach to study-
ing Islamic movements which insists on drawing clear boundaries. Kato 
argues that while there are minor differences between the two “modernist” 
Sunnī movements based in Indonesia, namely, Islam Nusantara and Islam 
Berkumajuan (such as Nusantara has a more advanced online presence), it is 
difficult to find genuine theological differences between them. However, these 
similarities far from making them uniform have only bred “mutual hatred since 
their establishment.” Furthermore, he argues that boundaries between Islam 
Nusantara and liberal (that is, Jaringan Islam Liberal) as well as more conserva-
tive “hardline” Islamists are also not as clearly drawn as some assume them to 
be. Thus, while some Nusantara leaders of argue against including LGBTQ and 
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Aḥmadiyya members in the fold of Islam, others argue that they should also be 
considered Muslims.
In Chapter 6, Faried Saenong reviews the origin and history of the 
Indonesia-based Sunnī movement Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which, with its esti-
mated 30–90 million members, claims to be one of the largest Muslim organi-
zations in the world. Like many movements across the Muslim world, NU was 
launched during the Dutch colonial period in 1926 by a group of ʿulamāʾ who 
wanted to voice their concerns to the new Saudi king following the Wahhābist 
revolution in Saudi Arabia and the launch of Wahhābist Muhammadiyah 
movement in Indonesia in 1912. Unlike similar movements that arose in other 
parts of the Muslim world (such as Aḥmad Riḍā Khān’s Barelwī Movement in 
South Asia) to defend traditional Ṣūfi practices, NU is unique in revering all 
four Sunnī madhhab founders equally. Saenong discusses how NU balances its 
insistence on a strict adherence to traditional Sunnī worldview with its pro-
gressivism on the issue of allowing local cultural practices. This focus on indi-
genization of Islam led to the launch of the Islam Nusantara movement, the 
subject of the previous chapter, in 2015.
In Chapter 7, Eva F. Nisa brings Section I to a conclusion with a review of 
the role of women in Islam. She commences with the origin of Islam focus-
ing on the role of Prophet Muḥammad’s wives who (known as ‘mothers of the 
believers’) are considered the epitome of Muslim women’s piety (Nisa 2020). 
She progresses through history to a discussion of the role of women in a range 
of modern movements including the Muslim Brotherhood, Tablīghī Jamāʿat, 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
She cautions against making assumptions about Muslim women’s roles and 
emphasizes the dizzying diversity in Muslim women’s voices. This is not new; 
Nisa presents the contrasting the roles played by the Prophet’s wives ʿĀʾisha, 
Khadīja and Umm Salama. While ʿĀʾisha led one of the first inter-Islamic 
battles and narrated over 1,500 aḥadīth, the Prophet’s other wives seemed to 
have played little to no public role in the formation of the new faith. Modern 
Muslims women’s voices range from Islamic feminists such as Fatima Mernissi, 
to ultra conservative Muslim Brotherhood leader Zaynab al-Ghazali, and 
everything in between. She concludes that “anyone who wants to understand 
Muslim women and their activism within diverse Islamic and Islamist move-
ments must avoid the inclination to make broad and unqualified generalisa-
tions. The wide geographical scope covered in this chapter also reminds us of 
the diversity within Muslim-majority countries.”
Part 2 of the book covers Shīʿa movements beginning with an overview chap-
ter (Chapter 8) by Mohammad Fazlhashemi. He argues that the Shīʿa-Sunnī 
conflict began as a contest over secular state power soon after the death of the 
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Prophet but, over time, has “widened to include theological, legal, philosophi-
cal, cultural, social, and not least political controversies.” He stresses, however, 
that the Shīʿite are far from forming a homogeneous group; the Twelvers are 
the majority, but there are Zaydīs, Ismāʿīlites, and a number of other branches. 
Fazlhashemi notes that “during a short period in the early history of Shīʿa, 
between 660–870, a dozen conflicting factions were formed, all of which laid 
claim to the correct interpretation within Shīʿa” (Fazlhashemi 2020). Even in 
modern-day Iran, which is under Shīʿa theocratic rule, not everyone agrees with 
Ayatollah Khomeni’s notion of vilayat-e-fiqah (the ‘guardianship of legal schol-
ars’); in fact, as Fazlhashemi explains, even “[o]ne of the foremost defenders of 
the doctrine, the Grand Ayatollah Montazeri (1922–2009), turned his back on 
it in the mid 1980s.” The chapter indicates that such opposition to Shīʿa power 
has led to demands for a democratic electoral system and the separation of 
religion and government.
Chapter 9 by Najam Haider tells the fascinating story of Zaydism or Fiver 
Shīʿism from being a proto-Sunnī group to a Shīʿa denomination in its first two 
centuries. He starts with the traditional narrative of the formation of Zaydīs as 
a merger of two sects: namely the proto-Sunnī Batrīs and proto-Shīʿa Jarudis. 
However, he quickly disposes it as a representation of two “theological orien-
tations as opposed to specific discernible groups” (Haider 2020). He argues 
that Zaydīs in the middle of the eighth century were predominantly Batrī and 
anti-Muʿtazilite while Zaydīs in the ninth century were increasingly Jarudi and 
pro Muʿtazilite. He devotes the first part of his two-part chapter to studying the 
sociocultural and political factors that caused this change prominent among 
them the leadership of Yaḥyā bin ʿAbd Allāh and the move of the Zaydī center 
of gravity from Iraq to Yemen. It was in Yemen in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries when the reverse trend towards Sunnī traditionalism among 
Zaydīs started under the leadership of Muhammad al-Shawkānī, chief judge 
appointed by a Zaydī Imam. This Sunnīfication process was only accelerated 
by the overthrow of the imāmate and its replacement by secular government 
which has oppressed traditional Zaydism for the fear that it would cause Zaydīs 
to seek revival of a Zaydī imāmate. This environment has sparked both a back-
lash and a reinterpretation of Zaydī traditions resulting in a broad diversity of 
voices ranging from Houthi rebels to interpretive efforts that seek legitimacy of 
modern Yemeni state through traditional Zaydism.
Farhad Daftary reviews the history of the Ismāʿīlī (Sevener Shīʿa) movement 
starting from the split of the Islam into Sunnī and Shīʿa camps after the death 
of the Prophet Muḥammad, with a particular focus on the history of the Nizari 
Ismāʿīlīs in Chapter 10. It was not, however, till the sixth Imam, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, 
argues Daftary that Shīʿas became a “major religious community with a distinct 
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identity” (Daftary 2020). The unity among the Shīʿite community did not last 
long. The issue of Ṣādiq’s succession led to one of many splits in the com-
munity. The pure Ismāʿīliyya believed that Ṣādiq’s older son Ismāʿīl had gone 
into hiding but was still the imām, while the Mubarakiyya took Ṣādiq’s grand-
son to be their imām. After the death of the grandson, Mubarakiyya further 
split into two more groups. The history of Ismāʿīlī movement is replete with 
dynamism in which dāʿīs from various factions compete with each other, with 
Imami Shīʿas, and with Sunnīs of various factions to convince people of their 
truths. As Ismāʿīlīs are getting pushed out of one region (e.g., North Africa), 
they establish themselves in another part of the world (Yemen and Central and 
Southern Asia).
Chapter 11 of this section reviews the history of Dāʾūdī the Bohra com-
munity of Ismāʿīlī Shīʿa Muslims. Being a minority, even among Indian Shīʿa 
Muslims, Jonah Blank describes the considerable efforts that the Bohras have 
engaged in to maintain their distinctiveness, and to ensure that they are not 
absorbed into the much large Hindu or Sunnī populations. These include the 
efforts by the clerical establishment to maintain their control over the laity, 
adoption of Western technologies especially telecommunication technologies, 
and Western education. While having a strong leader in the almost infallible 
dāʿī muṭlaq ensures remarkable amount of uniformity in beliefs and practices, 
it has not kept the community from splintering into subgroups of including 
Sulaymāni and ʿAlawī Bohras. The most recent split over the succession of 
Syedna Burhanuddin has not resulted in the formation of a new Bohra sub-
group, it has raised “the prospect of another community schism” (Blank 2020).
Yvette Talhamy in Chapter 12 describes the origins of two offshoots of Shīʿa 
Islam: the Alevīs and the ʿAlawīs (Dressler 2013; Faksh 1984). She explains that, 
while both groups revere ʿAlī and are concentrated in neighboring regions 
of Syria and Anatolia, there are a number of important differences between 
them: “While the ʿAlawī/Nuṣayrī creed developed in Iraq in the ninth century 
and is of Arab origin, the Alevī creed was born several centuries later, stem-
ming mainly of Turkoman tribes that settled in Anatolia during the thirteenth 
century” (Talhamy 2020). She elaborates on the ways in which the two groups’ 
views of ʿAlī and Muḥammad diverge, as well as pinpointing differences in 
their festivals, prayers, and practices. The matter of how ʿAlawīs and Alevīs are 
able to shift their identities from Nuṣayrī to Shīʿa Islam (and, in the case of 
the Dede Commission of the Federation of Alevī Communities in Germany, to 
non-Islamic identities, too) is deftly handled in this informative chapter.
Chapter 13 is David Thurfjell’s study of the heyʾati movement in Iran. This 
chapter is focused on charismatic eulogists or maddāhān and the youth move-
ment that has gathered around them in the past two decades. Thurfjell’s 
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fieldwork in Qom resulted in a multi-faceted characterisation of a move-
ment that has broad popular appeal, draws on Iranian folk religiosity, and 
has developed into a distinctive subculture expressed through lifestyle, ritual 
and aesthetics. The heyʾati movement is not explicitly political, but Thurfjell 
argues that “eulogists played a pivotal role in the mobilisation of popular sup-
port for former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” (Thurfjell 2020). In pre-
Revolutionary Iran a major activity of eulogists was the offering of prayers for 
the king, a practice that was discontinued after the downfall of the Shah, Reza 
Pahlavi. In contemporary Iran, eulogists are interesting as non-clerical sources 
of religious authority, and as supporters of conservative Islamic jurisprudence 
and opponents of reformist clergy.
Part 3, “Fundamentalisms and Extremists,” opens with Chapter 14, in which 
Joas Wagemakers defines Salafis as Muslims “who claim to have made being 
‘salaf-like’ the be-all and end-all of their ideology.” Salaf here refers to the first 
three generations of Muslims (the so-called “pious predecessors”). Wagemakers 
divides Salafis into three groups: quietists, political Salafis, and jihādist Salafis. 
While these groups are similar and share a belief in the ideological purity of 
the citadel of Islam, Wagemakers cautions against the tendency to generalize 
about them, pointing out that each group does not consider the others “true 
Salafis” or, indeed, even Muslims. Moreover, as he elucidates, the various Salafi 
factions are prone to attacking one another verbally. The quietists, who shun 
modern political discourse (not unlike the Tablīghīs), brand political Salafis 
Ikhwānīs, borrowing the name of the highly political Muslim Brotherhood 
(Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn); they also label jihādist Salafis takfīris or khawārij 
because of their views on takfīr. On the other hand, jihādist Salafis (and, to 
a lesser extent, political Salafis) accuse the quietists of being like the Murjiʾa 
because of their alleged tendency to exclude acts from their definition of faith, 
thereby overlooking the ‘sinful’ acts of supposedly apostate rulers (Lav 2012; 
Wagemakers 2012a). In this way, Salafis often deny each other the very label of 
‘Salafi’, indicating that, despite a common desire to emulate their predecessors, 
those within the citadel of Salafism are “deeply divided” (Wagemakers 2020).
In Chapter 15, Jon Armajani starts with an overview of Pakistan’s role in 
Afghanistan that intensified with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as mil-
lions of Afghan refugees poured across the border. Many of the refugee chil-
dren received education at Saudi funded madrasas. After the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops in 1989, the Afghanistan erupted further into chaos with a seem-
ingly endless infighting among the Mujahideen. Warlords fought with each 
other over all sort of issues including the fight over a boy. It was such a fight 
among two war lords that so irritated Mullā Omar, an imām of a village mosque 
in South Eastern Afghanistan, that he took thirty of his madrasa students to 
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rescue the boy. Local people saw him as a hero and joined his cause swelling 
his rag tag army. Aided by the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Omar 
first took over Kandahar region in the South and eventually Kabul in 1996. His 
Taliban followers elected his amīr-al-muʾminīn, commander of the faithful. He 
declared Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate and imposed a strict Islamic rule. The 
Taliban rule came to an end in 2001 when US supported their opponents in the 
aftermaths of 9/11 attacks. However, the Taliban, far from giving up the flight 
have gone back to their guerilla warfare roots and continue their attempt to 
restore their rule.
Chapter 16 by Shaul Bartal, expands on the links between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Palestinian movement Ḥamās. Bartal connects Ḥamās 
with the Palestinian national-resistance movement that began during the 
period of the British mandate. Even though Ḥamās was officially founded in 
1987, Bartal considers its foundation to have been the start of the organization’s 
second phase. This view is similar to the phase-development notions related to 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, but involves a shorter period for the preparation of society for 
jihād because, in contrast with Hizb, Ḥamās does not believe in the necessity 
of waiting for a khalīfa to declare jihād. The remainder of the chapter sum-
marizes the political and military developments within the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict since 1987, concentrating especially on the role of Ḥamās.
Chapter 17 shows how Hizb ut-Tahrir, founded in 1953 by a Palestinian 
scholar named Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, holds a similar outlook to Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, focusing on preaching and outreach (Chapter 2). As Meerim Aitkulova 
indicates, however, the movement also differs from the Tablīghīs, in that it has 
an intensely political nature. Indeed, its political goal is the reestablishment of 
the Islamic Caliphate system and the achievement of a wholly Muslim world. 
Notably, though, the movement is depicted as a peaceful one that denounces 
the use of violence as a means for achieving its goals. Despite this, Hizb ut-
Tahrir is banned in many countries around the world, perhaps because of its 
political involvement. Aitkulova also examines the view expounded by a num-
ber of counter-terrorism experts that the movement can act as a first step on 
the ladder toward violent extremism.
In Chapter 18, “Ungoverned or Alternatively Governed Spaces in North- 
Eastern Nigeria: A Critical Exploration of Boko Haram’s Ideological Motif,” 
Benson Igboin discusses sub-state organizations, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram, 
which move in to assume leadership of so-called “ungoverned spaces” that 
lack strong government. Igboin takes to task Nigerian President Muhammadu 
Buhari, critiquing his inaugural speech delivered on 29 May, 2015, in which 
he promised to wipe out Boko Haram and commission a sociological study to 
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examine its origins and causes. Igboin argues that President Buhari’s approach 
runs contrary to logic, stressing that a study of the causes of violence is needed 
before the movement can be eradicated. The thrust of the chapter is that 
some of the reasons behind Boko Haram’s violent tendencies are religious in 
nature and that, instead of killing all the movement’s members, the Nigerian 
Government should focus on using a narrative-based deradicalization strategy 
to win the war of ideas.
Chapter 19 by Steven Childs is an exposition of the Lebanese Shīʿa political 
movement, Hezbollah. The assertion of Shīʿa identity has perennial importance 
within Islam, where Sunnīs are in the majority. This identity was mobilized in 
Lebanon during the 1970s by the Lebanese-Iranian philosopher Musa al-Sadr 
(b. 1928, disappeared 1978), who acquired a following among the working class. 
Hezbollah came into existence in 1985, with three aims: to destroy Israel; to 
end Israel’s presence in South Lebanon; and to establish an Islamic regime in 
Lebanon (Childs 2011). Hezbollah’s eclipsing of the secular Amal party indi-
cated support for the Islamist position that religion and government should be 
united. Childs also discusses the combat style and militarization of Hezbollah 
and its implications for the region.
In Chapter 20, Kaarina Aitamurto examines the construction of the con-
cept of the “sect” by the Russian media, looking specifically at the depiction 
of the Muslim “sect” (Baran 2006). She argues that, “in contemporary Russia, 
the word ‘sect’ has even more negative connotations than it does in Western 
Europe or North America.” In this context, sects are often contrasted with tra-
ditional Russian Islam, which, in Soviet times, was under the control of the 
Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly. Movements such as Wahhābism, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, Nurdzhular, the National Organization of Russian Muslims (NORM), 
and Faizrakhmanisty, which are seen either as non-traditional or as having orig-
inated outside Russia, are labeled sects by the Russia-centric press (Aitamurto 
2018). This label, Aitamurto suggests, has real consequences for these move-
ments, in terms of societal opinion turning against them and legislative mea-
sures being adopted to hinder their activity, as the rubric of ‘security’ comes to 
dominate what were previously regarded as religious phenomena and issues.
The first part of Emin Poljarevic’s contribution (Chapter 21) traverses the 
same ground as Chapter 14, discussing the roots of takfirism in Islam, start-
ing with the Khawārij. He explains the similarities between the positions held 
by the Khawārij and ISIS that (as Wagemakers described) allow non-Jihādis 
to accuse ISIS of being like Khawārij. Poljarevic also provides far greater 
detail concerning the development of the Jihādi Salafi doctrine of takfīr and 
subtle variations of the belief held by various Jihādist Salafis such as ʿAzzām, 
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al-Maqdisī, bin Lādin, Al- Ẓawāhirī, and Al-Zarqawi. He describes the socio-
cultural and political developments that led to the development of ISIS includ-
ing the formation of al-Qāʿida in Iraq and its metamorphosis into ISIS under 
Al-Zarqawi’s leadership.
The fourth part of the Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements concerns 
Ṣūfism and its offshoots. Chapter 22, Marta Dominguez Diaz’s “Ṣūfism,” is a 
historical sketch tracing Ṣūfism’s emergence and routinization into established 
orders, and which culminates in a discuss of contemporary transnational 
Ṣūfism. Diaz discusses whether Ṣūfism belongs in the Islamic mainstream or 
at its periphery—or even completely outside of traditional Islam. She argues 
that for much of Islamic history, Ṣūfism was, indeed, part of the mainstream 
(Knysh 2010). This is despite the fact that modern reformist movements such 
as Wahhābism insist that many (if not most) Ṣūfi elements are bidʿa (‘inno-
vations’) imported from other religions (Weismann 2011; Ridgeon 2015). 
Dominguez Diaz contends that much of the original criticism of extrava-
gant Ṣūfi practices came from other Ṣūfis themselves, who were not against 
Ṣūfism per se but, rather, sought to reform Ṣūfism and curb what they saw as 
its excesses.
Chapter 23 by Milad Milani is a study of the charismatic leader Javād 
Nūrbakhsh (1926–2008) and the Niʿmatullāhī ‘Khaniqahi’ Order which held 
from 1956 to his death. Milani notes that the Niʿmatullāhī Order was estab-
lished in the fourteenth century (Algar 2012) and “is by far the most wide-
spread and significant Ṣūfi Order in Iran, since the time of its inception in 
the fourteenth century.” The Order took on more sectarian lineaments when 
Nūrbakhsh established Khaniqahi “Houses of Ṣūfism” in the West in the years 
prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the year in which he himself relocated 
to the United States. The type of Ṣūfism developed in the West by Nūrbakhsh, 
Milani avers, was significantly distanced from Islam, though in a less radical 
and overt way to that of Hazrat Inayat Khan (founder of Universal Ṣūfism) and 
Meher Baba (Milani 2012: 670). Thus, Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism is not Islamic mysti-
cism but rather a mystical system with historical links to Persian culture.
The next contribution to the volume is Antoon Geels’ study of the Indonesian 
new religion, Subud (Chapter 24). Geels looks at the life and beliefs of 
Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo (1901–1987), the founder of Subud, 
a mystical movement that, like so many of the other faith traditions exam-
ined in this book, inhabits the border region between Islam and other reli-
gions (Geels 1997). In the case of Subud, these include Ṣūfism, Javanese 
religions, and Hinduism. After identifying the key tenets of the Subud faith 
through a thorough examination of the original sources, Geels concludes that 
Sumohadiwidjojo’s ideas are similar to the “general consensus” about Islam 
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put forth by Ṣūfi Muslim scholars, even if they appear to be framed in terms of 
Javanese spirituality.
Chapter 25 by W. Rory Dickson considers a type of Ṣūfism that has moved 
even further from ‘official’ Islamic Ṣūfism, the Traditionalist Ṣūfism of René 
Guénon (1886–1951) and his followers. Dickson sketches Guénon’s interac-
tions with various esoteric movements, and how his spiritual quest was trans-
formed by his 1930 move to Cairo and 1934 marriage to Fatima Muhammad 
Ibrahim, with whom he had four children. Guénon lived an observant Muslim 
life but did not personally regard himself as a convert, as he believed that all 
Traditional religions were equally valid; “the essential unity of all traditions” 
rendered the possibility of conversion “meaningless and truly inconceivable” 
(Guénon 2004 [1952]: 63). Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998) established braches of 
the ʿAlawiyya Order in the West, which many Traditionalists joined. Schuon’s 
Ṣūfism was reformed in its ritual practices, and was informed by Vedanta, 
indigenous traditions and Catholicism. By the 1980s, the ʿAlawiyya Order had 
become the Maryamiyya, after the Virgin Mary (Fitzgerald 2010: 119).
Chapter 26 is an examination of the claim that the teaching lineage of 
George Ivanovich Gurdieff (c. 1866–1949) called the ‘Work’ or the ‘Fourth Way’ 
has its origins in Central Asian Ṣūfism. Carole M. Cusack considers the con-
tribution of Gurdjieff ’s pupil John Godolphin Bennett (1897–1974) who zeal-
ously pursued this interpretation of his teacher’s ideas and practices, travelling 
extensively in the Islamic world to seek “out the sources of Gurdjieff ’s teach-
ings from the Muslims that he met” (Pittman 2012: 123). Cusack concludes 
that the identification of Gurdjieff and his teachings as ‘Ṣūfi’ is erroneous, and 
the Work should not be regarded as an Islam-derived esoteric system. Rather, 
Gurdjieff ’s personal creativity, eclectic borrowing from a range of traditions, 
and Orthodox Christian upbringing are viewed as (probably) more important 
in the development of the Fourth Way.
The fifth part of this volume groups together two different types of move-
ments. These are groups that have members who believe themselves to be 
Muslims, despite the fact that ‘mainstream’ Muslims would deny them that 
status, and entirely separate religions that have co-existed with Islam over the 
centuries and have to some extent moulded their self-image and their pub-
lic presence in response to this. Chapter 27 sees Muhammad Afzal Upal trace 
the origins of the Aḥmadiyya Muslim Jamāʿat, which was founded in 1889 in 
Northwest India by Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad (1839–1908). Aḥmad’s enigmatic 
beliefs have puzzled scholars of religion, who have explored the various influ-
ences upon Aḥmad’s thoughts, from Ṣūfi Islam to the reformist Ahl-e-Ḥadīth. 
In this chapter, Upal discusses the influences of rationalist South-Asian Muslim 
thinkers, such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (Robinson 1988), upon the movement 
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under scrutiny. Aḥmadiyya members are persecuted in various Islamic coun-
tries, in particular Pakistan, where the movement was based until the adminis-
tration moved to London in 1984.
The next chapter is the first of three concerning African-American move-
ments of which members regard themselves as Muslims. Edward E. Curtis IV 
covers the founding of the Nation of Islam (NOI) by W.D. Fard Muhammad in 
1930 in Detroit (Chapter 28). Curtis credits Fard’s successor, Elijah Muhammad, 
with introducing NOI’s distinctive doctrine, including the notions that “Fard 
was God in the flesh,” Elijah was the “messenger of God,” and a “Mother Ship” 
(UFO) would play a role in Armageddon. These claims are unacceptable in the 
context of the Sunnī and Shīʿa traditions (Curtis 2006: 10–14). He also describes 
an attempt by Elijah’s son and successor, Wallace Muhammad, to move the NOI 
flock closer to mainstream Islam by de-emphasizing these features. However, 
as noted in M. Afzal Upal’s (2017) cognitive science of new religious move-
ments, these rollbacks have provided an opening for Louis Farrakhan (Wallace 
Muhammad’s competitor for NOI leadership) to capitalize on the very distinc-
tive features that Wallace sought to downplay, causing a split within the NOI. 
Thus, as Curtis shows, Wallace Muhammad’s faction has moved closer to main-
stream Sunnī Islam, while Farrakhan’s version of the NOI has maintained its 
more fringe qualities.
In Chapter 29, Fathie Ali Abdat examines the origins and history of the 
Moorish Science Temple of America (AMSTA), starting from its foundation in 
Chicago by the prophet Noble Drew Ali (1886–1929) on November 29, 1926 and 
moving forward to present times (Bowen 2017). He finds similar trends to those 
observed in relation to the Nation of Islam, with distinctive features typically 
not found in Sunnī Islam being prominent (such as the concept of divine status 
for leaders like Allah El). These, Abdat explains, have been emphasized more 
or less at different times in the group’s history, leading to the splintering of the 
group into multiple branches. As the chapter demonstrates, the group has had 
to negotiate the fine balance between being critical of the United States gov-
ernment (in order to connect with the Black community) and not being seen 
as seditious (McGee-Bey 1968: 4) in an effort to avoid legal issues). Unlike NOI, 
AMSTA has shied away, in the main, from the US Civil Rights struggle (and, in 
recent decades, has become associated with the idea of “Moorish sovereignty,” 
which, as Abdat notes, has led to the issuing of licenses and other documents 
to members which make spurious claims to exempt holders from taxation and 
to confer other benefits.
Chapter 30 is Susan J. Palmer’s “The Ansaaru Allah Community,” an analysis 
of the group also known as the United Nuwaubian Nation of Moors among 
other names, founded by Dwight D. York (b. 1945), known as Dr Malachi Z. York, 
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in 1967. Palmer focuses on the many transformations York’s sect has undergone, 
and the influences that York drew upon in articulating its eclectic doctrines. In 
addition to Islam, York was inspired by the ancient civilizations of Sumeria 
and Egypt, and espoused the “ancient astronaut” theory of Zecharia Sitchin 
(Sitchin 1976). With regard to Islam, York has also alleged that he was initiated 
into the Order of Al Khidr, and also into a Ṣūfi Order of Khalwatiyya (Gardell 
1996: 226), and between 1973 and 1992 claimed to be the Mahdi. In 2004, York 
was convicted of racketeering and criminal sexual activity, and received a sen-
tence with a release date of 2120.
In Chapter 31, Hussam Timani on the Druze begins with the efforts made by 
Ismāʿīlī missionaries in the eleventh century preaching of a fresh call to mono-
theism or Unitarianism (al-daʿwa al-tawḥīdiyya) (Halabi 2015: 16). Timani con-
cludes with the recent death of the Druze sage Shaykh Abu Hasan Arif in 2004. 
After reviewing various theories about the ethnic origins of the Druze (relating 
them, for example, to French, Persian, and Jewish histories), Timani suggests 
that they are, in fact, an Arabic group. He also dissects the specific beliefs of the 
Druze, including the prominence of reincarnation, the use of wisdom books, 
and the importance of taʿarruf (“erudition”), which are all elements that set 
the Druze apart from mainstream Shīʿa and Sunnī Islam (Firro 1992). Finally, 
he argues that, while the Druze are different from the aforementioned groups, 
many members do consider themselves Muslims.
Victoria Arakelova’s study of the history and beliefs of the Yezidi commu-
nity of the Middle East concentrates in particular on persecution of the group 
(Chapter 32). Named after Yazid bin Ummaya, a ‘villain’ in Shīʿa history who is 
often held responsible for the killing of Imām Hussain, the group is known for 
its deification of the traditional Islamic angel of death (Arakelova 2011: 35–36). 
It is perhaps little wonder, then, that Yezidis are labeled ‘devil worshippers’ by 
their Sunnī and Shīʿa neighbors. As Arakelova delineates, members are also 
known to pray to a pantheon of lesser beings, such as Sheikh Shams (the ‘Lord 
of the Sun’), and are accused by mainstream Muslims, therefore, of engaging in 
shirk (‘polytheism’). Arakelova also covers the persecution of Yezidis by various 
governments and groups, the most recent example being by ISIS (Asatrian and 
Arakelova 2014).
In Chapter 33 Lil Osborn considers the origins and belief system of the 
Bahāʾī community, beginning with its roots in the millennialism of nineteenth-
century Shīʿa Islam. Similar to the Aḥmadiyyas, the Bahāʾīs believe in a 
prophet who came after Muḥammad and are thus regarded as non-Muslims 
by most Sunnīs and Shīʿas (Warburg 2003). Interestingly, though, unlike the 
Aḥmadiyyas, the Bahāʾīs do not claim to be Muslims. This positionality does 
not enable them, however, to escape persecution in Muslim-majority countries, 
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where, as Osborn discusses, they are discriminated against in private work-
places, at educational institutions, and in governmental offices (Cooper 1985).
2 A Note on Translation
For convenience and consistency, we have aimed to systematise the spell-
ing and formulation of non-English words, particularly Arabic, throughout 
the chapters. Where and when appropriate, we have deferred to Brill’s highly 
regarded third edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI3), edited by Kate 
Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson and 
released progressively online from 2007, for the translation of Arabic to roman-
ised English. However, as this volume brings together discussions of examples 
and case studies that range time periods, geographic regions, and cultural as 
well as linguistic groups, and utilises a range of primary as well as scholarly 
sources, there are some natural deviations in the spelling of some names and 
terms notably in the chapters that reprint earlier works. 
3 Conclusion
The recent history of violence on the part of Islamic organisations and vio-
lence experienced by Muslims across the globe is another powerful driver for 
this volume. On 3 August 2014 Islamic State militants attacked the Kurdish area 
of Northern Iraq around Mount Sinjar and killed a number of its inhabitants 
as it had done elsewhere in Iraq (Chulov 2014). In a new low for Islamic State, 
women were kidnapped and openly sold as slaves. Responding to the horri-
fied reaction of the rest of the world, the August edition of the Islamic State 
mouthpiece Dabiq included a long article justifying the practice of slavery. 
After summarizing a discussion among medieval scholars about whether the 
inhabitants of the area, who referred to themselves as Yezidis, are better classi-
fied as mushrikeen (idolators), murtaddīn (apostates) or ahl al-Kitāb (people of 
the Book), it concluded with a fatwā by IS’s pre-eminent scholars that Yezidis 
were idolators. Thus, the enslavement and concubinage of Yezidi women was 
not only allowed, but required, according to Islamic tradition:
One should remember that enslaving the families of the (non-believers) 
and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of 
the Shariah, that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or 
mocking the verses of the Quran and the narrations of the Prophet.
Dabiq 2014
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This set up a flurry of activity among the Western decision makers and 
Middle East analysts to find any scholars or published material that could 
explain to them who Yezidis were and what their connections to Islam was. 
This search was not made easier by the fact that most modern scholarship 
on Islam limits itself to studying orthodox Sunnī and Shīʿa traditions at the 
expense of heterodox Islamic movements and religious traditions that origi-
nated in the Islamic world and the connections that these movements have 
with Islam. In the same year Garnik S. Asatrian and Victoria Arakelova pub-
lished The Religion of the Peacock Angel: The Yezidis and Their Spirit World, one 
of the first academic monographs on Yezidism and an important milestone 
in documenting this small, vulnerable community (Asatrian and Arakelova 
2014). To understand Islamic State’s actions in August 2014, we needed to 
understand Yezidis and their connections their faith has with Islam. To under-
stand the blockade of Pakistani capital Islamabad by Sunnī Tehrik-e-Labaik ya 
Rasoolullah in first three weeks of November 2017 and the subsequent capit-
ulation of the Pakistani state to the protesters one needs to understand the 
relationship between Aḥmadiyya Muslim Jamāʿat and its origin in Sunnī Islam 
(Daily Dawn 2017). To understand the attacks on Yemeni Bahāʾīs that took place 
following the capture of Sanaa by Houthi rebels in 2014, one needs to under-
stand the relationship between Shīʿite Islam and Bahāʾīsm (The National 2018). 
If scholars want to better understand Islam as well as religious movements 
originating in Islam (whether considered part of Islam by Muslims or not), 
they cannot afford to continue the current practice of artificially separating 
the two. Scholars of Islam need to pay more attention to religious movements 
that originated in Islam and scholars of these movements need to know more 
about Islam. Scholarships of both will improve from a continuous dialogue 
between them. Thus, we hope that the dialogue that this this book has initi-
ated between scholars of Islam and scholars of religious movements originat-
ing in Islam not only continues but flourishes, enriching us all.
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Introduction to Part 1
An overwhelming majority of today’s world’s 1.8 billion Muslims are Sunnī 
(Kettani 2019). A key doctrinal difference and cause for the divergence of the 
Shīʿa Muslims from the Sunnī is based on the contested leadership of the Islamic 
community following the death of the Prophet Muḥammad. Sunnīs believe 
that the four caliphs (Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿUthmān ibn 
ʿAffān, and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib) who led the umma after the death of Muḥammad 
were legitimate leaders of the Islamic community and were ‘rightly guided’ by 
Allāh. This contrasts with the Shīʿite view that only ʿAlī and his progeny were 
the rightful successors of Prophet Muḥammad and that the first three caliphs 
were thus illegitimate (Louer and Rundell 2020). Since their initial split, Sunnī 
and Shīʿa communities around the world have formed distinctive cultures and 
religious responses to their own changing circumstances.
While Sunnīs today are a diverse group, they generally hold fast to a shared 
set of tenets. According to the Sunnīs, the Qurʾān is the unchanged word of 
God. As such it is considered to be the highest authority for providing guid-
ance to Muslims. The ‘sound six’ (al-Ṣiḥāḥ al-Sitta) compilations of Prophet 
Muḥammad’s utterances (aḥadīth) and traditions (sunna) are the second 
highest authority in Sunnī Islam. Among these Bukhārī is considered to be 
the most authentic. The need for specialists to interpret Qurʾān and ḥadīth 
to guide various life decision for individual believers as well as for communi-
ties of believers arose early in Islamic history. Sunnīs accept rulings by one of 
the four schools of jurisprudence: Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Mālikī, and Shāfiʿī (Hallaq 
1997). While Sunnī mosques around the world usually do have a prayer leader, 
any Sunnī Muslim male can lead a ritual prayer, perform marriages, lead 
funeral rites.
This section consists of seven chapters describing various Sunnī sects, 
movements, and themes, some of which are locational and specific to particu-
lar countries and communities, while others are widespread, and international 
in scope. We open with a general overview of sectarianism within Sunnī Islam, 
before looking at Tablīghī Jamāʿat, the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey’s Gülen 
Movement, Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam Nusantara, both focused in Indonesia, 
and finally a discussion of women in Islamic movements.
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Chapter 1
Sectarianism in Sunnī Islam
Ronald Geaves
1 Introduction
Any attempt to understand sectarianism within the Sunnī tradition of Islam 
will require acknowledging the perceptions of those among the majority of 
Muslims that have formed Islamic political and religious reality over the cen-
turies into the present time, recognising the tensions between the real and the 
ideal, and the overriding conflict between the actual (schismatic division) and 
the perception (an undivided umma). Some may feel that the term ‘sectar-
ian’ does not accurately reflect the reality of Sunnī Islamic divisions.1 Yet an 
alternative term, such as the Arabic madhhab, poses similar problems as it is 
generally used to describe the four orthodox schools of law or jurisprudence 
( fīqh) in Sunnī Islam. The four Sunnī schools are Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Shāfiʿī, and 
Mālikī. They are joined by two Shīʿa schools, Jaʿfarī and Zaydī. These schools 
are predominantly regional and rule over questions of religious law and as 
such they cannot be described as ‘sects’. The same reasoning applies to the 
early historical theological schools (kalām). They were more a scholarly exer-
cise in theological questions, undertaken to correct or reassure those that 
doubted. Majid Fakhry defines kalām as an attempt to grapple with complex 
issues arising out of the Qurʾān’s understanding of God and creation; for exam-
ple, free will, predestination, the eternal as opposed to the temporal reality 
of the Qurʾān as Word of God (Fakhry 1983: xvii–xviii). It is true that although 
Ilm al-Kalām is not so much a sectarian activity, various divisions within both 
Sunnī and Shīʿa Islam may favour one interpretation over another.2 Most dif-
ficult perhaps is the notion that ‘sectarianness’ problematises the ideal of an 
undivided umma which remains a key element in the Islamic imagined com-
munity (Anderson 1991). A vision of non-sectarianism has often been used as a 
1 I was advised as such in 1990, when I began my doctoral thesis Sectarian Influences within 
Islam in Britain (Geaves 1996).
2 Since Sunnīs often define(d) themselves in opposition to the Shīʿa and emerged as a com-
peting theological and political grouping against the Shīʿa, arguably one cannot discuss sec-
tarianism within Sunnī Islam without consideration of the role of the Shīʿa. However, this 
volume locates Sunnī movements and Shīʿa movements in different parts of the text, and 
I have therefore omitted discussion of Shīʿa sectarianism in this chapter.
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critique of Christianity, especially in Muslim apologetics and found frequently 
amongst converts (Geaves 2010: 48–53; Gilham 2014: 130,154).
The issue is one of definition. Classical sociological theory defines a ‘sect’ 
as having various characteristics, mainly derived from early sociologists’ 
attempts to grapple with divisions in Christianity. It is precisely this aware-
ness of the multitude of various sects or denominations within Christianity 
that may make Sunnī Muslims wary of the term; yet an analysis of sociologi-
cal definitions does not, in my view, render such understandings of sectarian-
ism unfruitful in the context of the variety of Islamic movements that exist, 
sometimes uncomfortably, alongside each other in the Sunnī Muslim milieu. 
Nonetheless, critical engagement with the traditional academic usage of ‘sect’ 
is a needed endeavour should we continue to use the term to discuss Islamic 
movements in the twenty-first century.
2 Defining Sects
Early sociological attempts to analyse and define ‘sects’ began with Max Weber 
(1864–1920) who posited that people are born into a church but elect to join 
a sect (Weber 1973: 140–149). These ideas were developed by Ernst Troeltsch 
(1865–1923) in 1912 (Troeltsch 1931). In essence both sociologists work with a 
sect/church dichotomy in which sects branch away from a parent religion as 
a protest movement against perceived watering down or liberalisation of the 
initial charismatic moment that began a new ‘world religion’. In turn, founders 
of sects will usually demand a return to the ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ religion as they 
perceive it, whereas the parent religion will usually accuse the sect of aber-
ration, apostasy or heresy. Thus Fred Kniss and Paul Numrich can state that 
sects are best described with regard to what they oppose or are in tension with 
(Kniss and Numrich 2007). Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge agree 
with the Weberian approach and add that “sects claim to be authentic, purged, 
refurbished version of the faith from which they split” and often this expresses 
itself with a high level of opposition or resistance to the surrounding society 
(Stark and Bainbridge 1979: 117). Roy Wallis attributes to sects “epistemological 
authoritarianism,” meaning that sects justify their particular ‘heresy’ by claim-
ing to “possess unique and privileged access to the truth” or salvation, and adds 
that committed sectarians typically believe “that only error exists outside con-
fines of the collectivity” (Wallis 1975: 93). The awareness of elite access to truth, 
and the corruption inherent in the wider society or weakening of the parent 
faith, usually means that a sect is marked by a degree of boundary mainte-
nance tactics (McGuire 2002: 338).
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There are difficulties in applying the above Weberian-influenced analyses 
in Islam, but there are Muslim correspondences that can help identify Sunnī 
sectarianism. As already stated, the ideal of the umma as a singular, divinely 
revealed, and united Islamic community, tends to dominate in Sunnī Islam, 
with variations among different groups as to who should be included. Talal 
Asad draws upon a notion of a “discursive tradition” in which knowledge is 
historically and culturally constituted in the interactive space between people, 
texts and practice to describe such divisions (Asad 1986). The Sunnī ideal is 
encapsulated in the phrase Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿat (the party of the sunna), 
yet there have been, and continue to be, diverse interpretations of Sunnī Islam 
and each group is likely to lay claim to being the most ‘authentic’. The Muslim 
community was already torn by dissent and split into factions within the life-
time of the first generation of believers, and even the Qurʾān acknowledges the 
existence of sects (ṭāʾifa), signifying a smaller group that has broken away from 
a larger whole but which has also developed a discrete and coherent religious 
worldview of its own. As stated by Fuad Khuri, ṭāʾifa indicates a “split-off group 
possessing a religiously autonomous character” (Khuri 1990: 28). Khuri also 
cites terms like firqa (team) and nihla (religious order) as specific instances of 
such groups in Islamic discourse (Khuri 1990: 27–28). Firqa can be understood 
to mean a number of sub-divisions or groups within one ṭāʾifa; for example, 
the various movements within Shīʿa. However, nihla or firqa provide a different 
understanding of sectarianism that is more pertinent to divisions within the 
Sunnī mainstream. For example, Khuri notes that the twelfth century Persian 
scholar Muhammad al-Shahrastānī uses nihla in opposition to milla (a nation 
ruled over by a body of religious law). Thus, the nation of Israel, for example, 
is ruled over by one law revealed by God but may contain many religions or 
even different interpretations of the law within it (Khuri 1990: 28). These ter-
minologies have the benefit of utilising existing Arabic or Muslim understand-
ings of schism and will help to provide an analytical framework for the causes 
of schism within Sunnī Islam.
3 Sect and Community
Underlying this analysis of Sunnī sectarian is an awareness of what Sunnī 
scholars and activists have considered to be authenticity and remaining true 
to the primal message, or, on the other hand, what they considered to be devia-
tion (bidʿa) from an imagined ‘pristine’ message. If Shahrastānī’s use of milla 
corresponds in a Muslim framework to umma, an imagined unity of all believ-
ers, guided by the word of God and the actions of the Prophet Muḥammad, 
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and believed to possess a moral mission to create a new social order based on 
faith and obedience to the revelation, firqa or nihla can be utilised to corre-
spond to various movements and divisions within the umma, without recourse 
to the classic Western sociological understanding of sect. The umma is held 
together not by any formal organisation but by a collective act of will, inspired 
by personal conviction and embodied in the ritual duty of daily prayer, the 
month long fast of Ramadan and the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (Moten 1996: 
63–81). Five times a day, millions of Muslims face Mecca all at the same time to 
observe the same ritual prayers. This core of shared ritual practices combined 
with observances of sharīʿa is integral to Muslim life and creates the bonds that 
tie the umma together (Geaves 1996: 11).
These rifts are acknowledged in Islam’s sacred literature, for example, in the 
ḥadīth narrative credited to Muḥammad by Abū Hurayra: “The Prophet (peace 
be upon him) said: ‘The Jews were split up into seventy-one or seventy-two 
sects; and the Christians were split up into seventy-one or seventy-two sects; 
and my community will be split up into seventy-three sects’.”3 Another ver-
sion of the same theme is where the Prophet says of the sects: “ ‘Only one will 
be saved. The others will perish.’ When asked which was the one that would 
attain salvation, he replied: ‘Those who follow al-Sunnah wa-l-jamaʿah.’ He was 
further asked: ‘What is al-Sunnah wa-l-jamaʿah?’ He replied: ‘That which I and 
my companions practice’.”4 It is important to note that ḥadīth are not historical 
documents and like the Qurʾān are employed in ahistorical and ideal-typical 
fashion when discussed in relation to political and social issues.
The Qurʾān can also be drawn on as a source in support of the saved elect. 
Islam as a fully formed umma is a moral community which not only hears the 
Law but upholds and enforces it (Qurʾān 3:110). A Godly umma is obedient and 
faithful, and according to the Qurʾān it is bound to be successful (Qurʾān 3:179). 
The righteous umma is the saved umma. As far back as the early Meccan period, 
however, the Qurʾān warns that even within the umma of believers there will 
be varying reactions to the message. There will be those who will fall away, 
and there will be those who are half-hearted (Qurʾān 35:32). One verse of the 
Qurʾān highlights this problem, and appears to offer the solution to it, when it 
uses umma in a specialised sense. Although usually the term umma applies to 
the totality of Muslims, it is also used to mean a righteous group of believers 
3 S. Dawud (ND) Model Behaviour of the Prophet (Kitab al-Sunnah). At https://sunnah.com/
abudawud/42 accessed 27 October 2018.
4 Ssekamanya Siraje AbdAllāh, “Ibn Taymiyyah on the Ḥadīth of the 73 Sects.” Jurnal Akidah & 
Pemikiran Islam 7:1 (2006), 35–62.
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who have been selected from the wider community and who are charged with 
the duty of inviting other Muslims to obedience. The Qurʾān states “And let 
there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining 
what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful” 
(3:104). This righteous and faithful umma within the wider umma functions as 
a guide and arbiter. This particular passage could be used as a justification for 
sectarianism in Islam. A self-defined righteous group within the wider com-
munity could draw upon this verse to make the claim that they were the true 
umma and in recent times they have increasingly done so.
Clearly in any division within the Sunnī ranks is going to consider itself to 
be the ‘saved sect’ and all other groupings to be the seventy-two who perish. 
This ḥadīth has grown in prominence in the twentieth century, and the borders 
between the groups have become more distinct and aggressive as both claims 
of political leadership and religious legitimacy, have moved into one province 
of representation, the right to claim authentic or ‘pure’ Islam, a claim based on 
the belief that the Islam practised is sunna, the way followed by Muḥammad 
and his companions. Ahl al-Sunna, ‘people of tradition’, referring to Sunnī 
Muslims, is thus highly contested. A number of movements and strands of 
Islam use the title to define themselves, not in the neutral sense of Sunnī iden-
tity, but in a highly charged atmosphere of claiming legitimacy, authenticity 
and a sense of specialness. The appropriation of the title as a religious identity 
label also serves to fix rival movements as ‘other’: at best deviant or guilty of 
innovation, at worst, to be branded by the tool of fatwā as non-Muslim or even 
as idolators (Geaves 2009).
4 Routinisation
Major stress was placed on the umma by the spread of the Arab empire and its 
attendant rapid incorporation of older, more sophisticated cultures brought 
into the fold of Islam and the imperative to establish good and efficient gov-
ernance based upon God’s ordinances (Esposito 1988: 46). Any attempt to 
formulate an overriding theory of Sunnī schisms in Islam would need to take 
account of these factors and also acknowledge both religious and political 
tensions. Sunnīs have tended to disagree on matters of interpretation of law 
or to changes in a group’s doctrines and/or degree of strictness arising out of 
such processes of legal/religious interpretation but most deeply felt differ-
ences tend to occur historically within the context of debates on governance, 
especially the ‘true nature’ of the caliphate (Geaves 2009: 39). It is with these 
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divisions that this article is primarily concerned yet caution needs to be taken 
in these analyses as splits can also be driven by ethnic, tribal, racial, or national 
fault lines.
The rise of the Arab empire after the death of Muḥammad can be seen as 
a classic example of ‘mixed motivation’. Although Weber’s classic church-sect 
thesis is not very helpful in understanding divisions within Islam, his ideas on 
routinisation as developed by Thomas O’Dea are more fruitful. O’Dea posited 
five dilemmas that face new religions after the death of a founder: namely the 
dilemma of mixed motivation; the symbolic dilemma; the dilemma of admin-
istrative order; the dilemma of delimitation; and the dilemma of power (O’Dea 
1964: 71ff). The first dilemma identified is particularly useful for the arguments 
presented here. In the dilemma of mixed motivation, O’Dea argued that the 
only motivation of the founder-innovator is communicating his or her mes-
sage, but that successors will have additional motivations, such as personal 
power, prestige, status, and influence (Foy 1978: 300–301).
O’Dea’s notions of schism permit an historical analysis beginning with the 
origins of Islam, through to the foundation of the Umayyad Empire, and even 
have repercussions in the present day. The dominant group among the inhab-
itants of Mecca, were the Banū Umayya, a wealthy clan of the Quraysh tribe. 
Amongst the Meccan merchants, it had been the Quraysh who had most to 
lose from Muḥammad’s preaching on social justice. In addition, they feared 
the loss of income associated with the tribal pilgrimages into Mecca to worship 
the gods and goddesses installed in the ancient Kaʿba (Lapidus 1988: 25). Many 
of the most aggressive opponents of the new religion and its leader were mem-
bers of the Quraysh and had fought against the Muslims in the battles that took 
place before Muḥammad’s victorious entry into Mecca. Muḥammad’s final vic-
tory brought many of his enemies into the fold of Islam where they quickly 
established their position amongst the elite of Arab society (Lapidus 1988: 55).
By the time of the third caliph, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (576–656 CE) elected 
in 644 CE, the Arabs had expanded their territory to include much of Persia, 
Byzantine Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Jerusalem. ʿUthmān belonged to the 
Banū Umayya and favoured his relatives and supporters, appointing them to 
positions of authority throughout the expanding empire (Lapidus 1988: 56). 
In Damascus, Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (d. 680) became the most powerful 
of the Umayyad rulers, governing over Syria. Ironically much of the Muslim 
world was now ruled over by representatives of the old ruling Meccan clans 
that had for years opposed Muḥammad and his message (Geaves 2009: 40). 
After ʿUthmān’s assassination in 656 CE, Muḥammad’s cousin and son-in-
law, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (600–661 CE) of the Banū Hāshim (the only one of the 
first four caliphs recognised as legitimate by Shīʿa Muslims), succeeded to 
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the caliphate.5 However, this was disputed by the supporters of the Umayya 
clan who departed from Medina and took up residence in their power base of 
Damascus (Geaves 2009: 41). After ʿAlī’s death at the hands of an assassin in 
661 CE, Muʿāwiya took control of the caliphate, turning it into the first dynastic 
Muslim empire, the Umayyad era (Lapidus 1988: 56).
The succession of Muʿāwiya was to have two repercussions. First, no lon-
ger could the caliphate be considered a religious institution, a fact recognised 
by many later Sunnī Muslims who would come to declare only the first four 
caliphs to be divinely guided. The apparent loss of the Prophet’s and his com-
panions’ asceticism and religiosity amongst the new rulers led to many of the 
devout separating themselves from the activities of the court and living in 
semi-retreat in Medina where they attempted to recreate the lifestyles of the 
first Muslims. To this development can be traced the first roots of Ṣūfism or 
Islamic mysticism. But in addition, these issues of authority would dictate that 
politics and religious leadership were to play a role from the very beginning. 
Although the first armed struggles between Muslims to take place shortly after 
the death of Muḥammad were the so-called ridda wars (Wars of Apostasy) 
during the first caliphate of Abū Bakr (574–634 CE), it is difficult to ascertain 
whether these conflicts with Arab tribes were caused by a rejection of Islam 
or a rejection of the office of the caliphate, although they were later seen as 
religious (Afsaruddin 2015: 62–63). However, another factor may have been the 
issue of nominal allegiance to Islam that arose through accepting the tempo-
ral power of Muḥammad as a protector, a common practice among the tribes 
of Arabia.
A number of elements can contrive to form separatist or rebellious move-
ments against the unity of state and religion within Sunnī Islam. The degree 
to which Islam is actually practised by Muslims can be controversial and even 
a cause of political rebellion. The question of whether nominal Muslims were 
within the fold of Islam arose early in Islam’s development and is a continua-
tion of the hypocrite (al-munāfiqūn) concerns that arose in Medina. The first 
movements to declare war against the Umayyad state were the Khārijites, 
who were unequivocal that the defining feature of Muslim identity was piety, 
and who controversially claimed the right to declare jihād against nominal 
Muslims, stating they were kufr or unbelievers. The state was quick to recog-
nise that such a position led to unrest, civil wars and anarchy, and adopted 
the Ashʿarite position that only God could judge the condition of īmān (faith). 
5 Fred M. Donner has argued recently that the early leaders of the nascent Muslim community 
did not refer to themselves as caliph at all, but as amīr al-muʾminīn (Commander or Leader of 
the Believers). See Donner (2010: 98–99).
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Nevertheless, the Khārijite position has never disappeared and has re-emerged 
dramatically in the twentieth century amongst various jihād or takfīri (declar-
ing other Muslims to be unbelievers) movements (Timani 2008).
The Khārijite rebellion against the Umayyad state reveals the tensions that 
arose over leadership, resulting from concerns over the parameters between 
religious and temporal leadership. As rulers the Umayyads were able to utilise 
the state as the main means of organising religious life. Indeed, Khuri goes as 
far to state that Sunnīs feel “lost” when deprived of centralised power (Khuri 
1990: 99). The caliph or sultan has ideally embodied both governance and piety 
but ruling through the implementation and execution of sharīʿa, the divine 
law. Ideally, he is not there to create laws, as these have already been given 
in entirety by Allāh. Any difficulties of interpretation are resolved by bodies 
of ʿulamāʾ or religious scholars, experts in jurisprudence. Although the domi-
nant Sunnīs are more likely to speak of consensus and unity, even arguing that 
rebellion is not permitted against unjust rule, Khuri argues that sectarian divi-
sions can be a means to reject the centralised authority of the Muslim state 
(Khuri 1990: 40–41). Such action is justifiable if the state rejects the correct 
application of Islamic principles with regard to the role of religion in politics.
Similar to the Khārijite position on individual allegiance to Islam, rather 
than nominal state or tribal loyalty, is the issue of state loyalty to the religion. 
In practice the union of revelation and governance has not always been water-
tight. Many rulers have been at odds with the ʿulamāʾ with regard to author-
ity and not all have implemented the shar’ia. Most of today’s Muslim states 
have either discarded sharīʿa law or mixed it in varying degrees with legal 
systems adapted from various European codes. It is only family law that has 
remained sacrosanct (Geaves 2009: 50). The compromise with the political 
union of dīn (religion) and dunyā (world) has led to some movements and 
organisations that condemn the state and seek to implement an Islamic revo-
lution, sometimes through violent overthrow (Geaves 2009: 50), amongst such 
movements al-Qāʿida, and Daesh (Islamic State or ISIS) can be categorised. 
As noted already, the justification for such movements in Sunnī Islam is to 
reform (ʾiṣlāḥ) or revitalise Islam and they interpret the legitimacy to do so, as 
did the Khārijites, on the Qurʾānic passage al-Imran 104. Originally revealed in 
Medina, probably as a reaction to the recruiting of various tribes whose reli-
gious motives were suspect, the political and religious significance of this verse 
can be highly subversive for Muslim states who are seen by the devout to have 
compromised God’s revelation (Geaves 2009: 50). In the twentieth century, a 
number of revivalist movements have set themselves up as a righteous van-
guard to renew Islam and purge the community of anything that is perceived 
to be a threat to the religion. Not all use violence, but such groups compete 
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heavily with each other, as to which movement constitutes the righteous rem-
nant apparently spoken of in the Qurʾān (Geaves 2009: 50).
As stated, arguably sectarianism began with the Umayyad dynasty. The suc-
cession of Muʿāwiya led to questions over the nature of his rule and the rela-
tionship between religion and politics, both clearly part of the legitimacy or, at 
least, the methodology of Islamic power. The Ummayads were a fait accompli, 
and under their leadership the Arabs became a new force in the world, extend-
ing an empire throughout Persian and Byzantine territory (Lapidus 1988: 58). 
Theologically, such expansion could be justified as evidence of the doctrine of 
“Manifest Success” (Qurʾān 48), which asserts that divine favour is evidenced 
by political success, expansion or prosperity, but by some the Ummayad rulers 
were seen to be usurpers, in violation of the Sunnī precedent, that began with 
Abū Bakr, that is, the community chooses its rulers according to the principles 
of Islam. Muʿāwiya was perceived by many of the devout to be a tyrant, a ruler 
who transformed the Islamic caliphate into a “kingdom” (Qurʾān 67). The event 
would lead to considerable argument concerning the role of the caliph and 
even the nature of prophethood, at least, as exemplified by Muḥammad.
To some, the caliphate had to be governed by religious principles, in accor-
dance with Qurʾān and sunna. To other scholars, a tyrant could be pragmati-
cally accepted in order to maintain civil order and avoid bloodshed, but only 
as long as the people were permitted to practice Islam without hindrance. If 
the caliphate was a political office, such pragmatism was justified, and indeed 
became the normative mode of operation among Sunnī Muslims, but if the 
caliphate was perceived to be the Prophet’s deputyship, it then acquired reli-
gious authority, and disobedience to the caliph could be constituted to be dis-
obedience to God (Lapidus 1988: 228–289). Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Rāziq (1888–1966), 
an Egyptian scholar considered by some to be Islam’s first secularist, would 
embody the former position, arguing that the caliphate is strictly political, con-
cerned only with administration of empire. In Islam and the Foundations of 
Political Power (Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm) first published in 1925, he stated 
that new ways of governance were permitted, and that Islam has no role to 
play in political life (al-Raziq 1966 [1925]). Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī (d. 1935), the Grand 
Mufti of Egypt, took the opposite position.
In 1926, al-Muṭīʿī published his treatise in response, in which he argued 
that religious and political authority is embodied in Islam, a position that 
makes it unique from all other religions. The Prophet, he argued, combined 
in his person delivery of the divine message (al-risāla) and political office 
(al-ḥukm). He argued that al-Rāziq was wrong to argue that Muḥammad was 
only sent to establish religion and not a state. As the caliph acts as the deputy 
of the Prophet, his authority to govern is from God. In such thinking, one of 
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the fundamental objectives of Islam is the foundation of a state so that the 
legal system of Islam can be implemented and to avoid the loss of Muslim 
dignity implicit in being ruled by non-Muslims or, even tyrannical Muslims 
(Afsaruddin 2015: 63–66). These differences over the political and religious 
functions of the caliphate were able to radically divide the Sunnī community, 
especially when Muslim power was threatened, the caliphate dissolved, or the 
territory lost, all of which would take place after the advent of European power 
in the contemporary period.
5 The Ṣūfi Reaction
According to some assessments, for example, Reynold A. Nicholson (1989 
[1914]), Ṣūfi origins lie in a non-political or quietist reaction to the worldli-
ness of the Umayyad caliphate, an attempt to preserve the piety of the original 
community, through a retreat to Medina, and avoidance of Damascus and the 
new urban centres of the caliphate and its expanding empire. Any analysis of 
Ṣūfism as a sectarian movement within Sunnī Islam is complicated: first, by 
the academic study of mysticism, which distorts Ṣūfism through a lens focused 
on mystical individuals, often antinomian in their relationship with orthodoxy 
(Dressler et al 2009: 4); and second, as its critics within Sunnī traditions per-
ceive its origins to be outside Islam and who accuse it of bidʿa (innovation) 
and shirk (placing others before God). Both the orientalist approach and the 
vociferous criticism from within certain modes of Sunnī understanding would 
tend to reinforce views of Ṣūfism as a sect within the greater whole (Dressler 
et al 2009: 1). However, this focus loses sight of the reality that Ṣūfism has his-
torically been part and parcel of the normative interpretation of Sunnī under-
standings of Islam and remains so even today, especially outside of the Arab 
hinterlands. As such it deserves to be treated as a unique formation of ṭāʾifa 
consisting of many firqa. It is also the main avenue through which charismatic 
leadership continues to be part of Sunnī tradition.
As mentioned above, Ṣūfism, sometimes defined as Islamic mysticism, but 
more likely to be known as dhikr (remembrance of God) by its Sunnī practi-
tioners probably began as a ascetic reaction to Umayyad worldliness (Lapidus 
1988: 99). From these early examples of asceticism and withdrawal appeared 
a variety of movements composed of disciples to various spiritual guides who 
taught paths to self-purification based on the remembrance of Allāh’s names 
(taṣawwuf). As Ṣūfism formalised itself under the guidance of a number of 
skilled exponents of its disciplines, a variety of ‘maps’ appeared that are iden-
tified as ‘stages’ (maqāmāt) and ‘states’ (aḥwāl) on the progress within the 
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path to self-annihilation in God. Each of these variations on a theme became 
distinct orders (ṭarīqa) of Ṣūfism, each with a founding master (shaykh) and 
a lineage of masters that succeeded him (Haeri 1990: 19–20). Ṭarīqa are con-
sidered by most Ṣūfis to complement the outer practices of Islam (sharīʿa). 
Discipleship is central to Ṣūfism, to provide guidance to the murīd (student) 
along the way of transformation from a self-centred existence to one which is 
God-centred (Geaves 2005: 124).
These mystical doctrines and practices developed into a cult of sainthood, 
in which a hierarchy of deceased saints who are believed to maintain the spiri-
tual well-being of the world from outside time combined with popular belief 
and dependence upon living shaykhs, to create the doctrine of karāmāt or spe-
cial favour that was bestowed upon the saint to perform miracles and even 
intercede on behalf of those requiring Allāh’s mercy and assistance (Geaves 
2000: 17–18). This belief in miracles caught the imagination of the populace 
and led to extravagant and fantastic stories of the deeds of Ṣūfis. When the 
shaykhs died the religious piety of their followers was directed to their graves 
which would then develop as important shrine centres and the focus of the 
continuing development of the ṭarīqa. It was believed that the power to inter-
cede and perform miracles was contained within the remains of the saint 
who was in some way still alive awaiting Judgement Day (van der Veer 1992). 
Similar to the Shīʿa belief concerning their Imams, it was also believed that the 
Ṣūfi’s power was retained in his bloodline and it was usually his immediate 
remaining family who would take over the religious functions and administra-
tion of the shrine. The proliferation of shrines of deceased saints brought a 
new dynamic into Muslim belief and practices as millions of rural adherents 
concentrated their devotional practices and petitions around the tombs (Ernst 
1997: 73–74). The rapid expansion of Ṣūfi teachings infiltrated the Islamic con-
sciousness as the ṭarīqa networks spread throughout the Muslim world in a 
spider-web pattern. Although the silsila (lineage) chains functioned to ensure 
the legitimacy of the individual shaykh and the teachings that he promoted, 
time and distance enabled many teachers to attract followers with less cred-
ible claims of authority linking them back to the eminent awliyāʾ (lit. friends of 
God) and eventually the Prophet.
The loosely organised localised structures of the ṭarīqas around an individ-
ual shaykh and his followers allowed for no central control of either doctrine 
or practices. Even reputable shaykhs had little control over belief and prac-
tice outside the inner circle of followers. The classic pattern of Ṣūfi allegiance 
which still exists to the present day, consisted of an inner circle of initiates who 
resided with the shaykh and an outer circle who still maintained the shaykh’s 
teachings but also had other more worldly priorities. The shaykh could exercise 
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a considerable degree of control over these two groups of followers. However, 
outside of these groups of loyal and committed disciples there was a wider 
circle that took bai’at (initiation) with the shaykh as a means of acquiring sta-
tus and prestige in their social milieu. Over this group the shaykh would have 
little control, either over their behaviour or the way in which they promoted 
his teachings and spiritual prowess (Geaves 2000: 76–77). The more they com-
municated stories of miraculous powers to the credulous, the more their own 
reputations soared through vicarious holiness or sanctity. Outside these three 
groups of followers would have been an even larger group of the general pop-
ulace who would have used the shaykh to resolve a whole range of medical, 
social and psychological problems through access to his spiritual counsel or 
belief in his miraculous powers based on his proximity to Allāh. Finally, an 
even more nebulous connection to the shaykh existed in the wider popula-
tion, based on pride or status in having such an elevated figure in their locality 
(Geaves 2000: 17–18).
The development of a fully-fledged theosophy of sainthood, both living and 
in the tomb, troubled many orthodox Muslims, especially amongst the ranks 
of the ʿulamāʾ. There was considerable criticism of the need to submit to the 
authority of charismatic men who claimed a special relationship to Allāh 
through ecstasy (van der Veer 1992). Some believed that Islam was being sub-
verted through vicarious holiness arising out of dependence on saints, pilgrim-
age to their shrines, adoration of their relics and total commitment of physical 
and mental resources to their service (Nicholson 1989 [1914]: 146). Others 
argued that the emphasis on saints was foreign to Islam and offensive to teach-
ings of Muḥammad (Knysh 2017: 21).
The other major criticism of Ṣūfism appeared from both outside and within 
its own ranks. As observed above, some Ṣūfis began to assert that the intimate 
relationship with Allāh which is enjoyed by the walī (friend of God) negates 
the requirement of obedience to the outer laws of Islam, that is sharīʿa. Some 
suggested that obedience to the exoteric laws and requirements of Islam was 
a duty required only during the early stages of spiritual development. It was 
inevitable that a dichotomy should arise between the experience of those who 
claimed direct inner access to the divine and therefore felt themselves to be 
completely surrendered to the divine will and those who dutifully followed 
the external requirements of the sharīʿa. Although Ibn Arabi would argue that 
there is no contradiction with conventional Islamic doctrine, as it would not 
be possible for the man of self-knowledge to contradict the revelation brought 
to the messenger of God, such a doctrine is open to abuse by charlatans and 
religious impostors claiming to be such elevated beings. Although, for most, 
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the inner path complemented the outer, for others the experience of God’s 
presence within supplied an authority that overrode the historical revelation.
If such sentiments are followed through to their ultimate logical conclusion, 
Ṣūfism can be completely disconnected from its Islamic roots and perceived as 
a form of universal mysticism. Haeri, along with many other Muslims includ-
ing those from within the ṭarīqas, finds this view extremely problematic and 
labels it as “pseudo-Ṣūfism” (Haeri 1995: 41ff). It is important to acknowledge 
that the emphasis on such extreme viewpoints by Ṣūfis usually originates from 
members of the nineteenth and twentieth century Sunnī Muslim reform and 
revivalist movements who often blame Ṣūfism for the decline of the umma. 
However, most Ṣūfis have been equally critical of those who have departed 
from obedience to the sharīʿa. The vast majority of the ṭarīqas teach that inner 
development is not possible without the exoteric demands of Islam contained 
in the final Revelation to humankind from Allāh delivered to and fully mani-
fested in the behaviour of Muḥammad, the final prophet of God.
Today Ṣūfism remains strong in Egypt, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa, and is most threatened where secularism and 
modernity result in a reformed Islam where Ṣūfism is perceived as a super-
stitious innovation or relic from a pre-modern past. However, there are signs 
of a revival throughout the Muslim world, perhaps as a reaction to religious 
violence as manifested in contemporary jihadism (Geaves 2006; Geaves 2013). 
Although Ṣūfism organises itself through countless ṭarīqas owing loyalty to a 
living or deceased shaykh, the ṭarīqas tend to live in relative harmony with 
each other, recognising that they are part of a greater whole. Although each 
group of murīds will proclaim the pre-eminence of their founding teacher and 
his successors, there is a recognition of the affective bonds that lead to these 
loyalties. Increasingly groups of Ṣūfis are meeting together, either geographi-
cally or in the virtual to promote their version of Islam as normative and to 
find strength in the battle against secularism and adversaries in the Sunnī 
Muslim world. It is only Wahhābī and Salafi inspired movements with a takfīri 
mentality who are likely to brand Ṣūfism as sectarian. However, sharīʿa-based 
Ṣūfi movements are likely to be highly critical of Ṣūfi movements that are 
more antinomian.
6 Wahhābī and Salafi Reactions
As already indicated, within thirty years of the prophet’s death dynastic rule 
had become reality and increasingly accepted as the status quo among Sunnī 
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Muslims. In spite of internal conflicts created by dynastic change or aggres-
sion on the part of Muslim rulers and warlords towards other territories within 
the Muslim world, the Sunnī world would not face a serious crisis that would 
threaten the dominance of the theological position contained within “Manifest 
Success” until the disaster of the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century 
(Geaves 2005: 100). Although this event would herald the final destruction of 
the ʿAbbāsid Empire, the Sunnī Muslim world would rise again in the powerful 
empires of the Ottomans and the Mughals. Religious unity was maintained 
within the madrasa education system, the chains of transmission (isnād) that 
provided both legitimacy and authenticity to religious scholarship and to 
the legal decisions (fatwā) made by the ʿulamāʾ in localities across the Sunnī 
Muslim world (Saeed 2006: 123).
The relationship between political administration or governance and Islam 
was pragmatically reached through a truce, a balance of powers between rul-
ers and religious authorities, with the latter usually compliant to the former, 
developing Islamic law in a way that facilitated power. Such relations between 
religion and politics was able to work in majority Muslim populations where 
governance was maintained by Muslim rulers, with varying degrees of com-
pliance with sharīʿa (Esposito 1988: 58–59). The judges (qāḍī) in the courts 
were predominantly trained in the religious domains of the madrasa (Makdisi 
1981: 22) However, all of this would be severely strained by the loss of Muslim 
power to the rising nations of Europe and their respective imperial ambitions 
in the East and Africa from the eighteenth century onwards (Donohue and 
Esposito 1982: 5) .
The complete or partial loss of state power especially to non-Muslim invad-
ers would be the impulse that resulted in the eventual appearance of Sunnī 
radical or revolutionary reform movements (Tibi 2009: 164–165). In previ-
ous eras of crisis, the concept of a renewer of Islam, (mujaddid) follows on 
from Sunnī ideas of rejuvenation of the umma. As we have seen the doctrine 
of “Manifest Success” leads to a pattern of religious revival as a response to 
external crises. In addition, the Muslim worldview of Islam as the final revela-
tion gives an urgent need to protect the ‘purity’ of God’s revealed practices 
and beliefs. For all Muslims there can be no replacement of their revelation, as 
they believe happened to Judaism and Christianity (the revelations that were 
given before the advent of Muḥammad and the Qurʾān) for it is believed that 
Muḥammad was the “seal of the Prophets” and the Qurʾān is the co-eternal 
Word of God in its entirety. Thus it has come to be a part of traditional Sunnī 
Muslim belief that Allāh sends a reformer every hundred years to maintain the 
revelation and destroy any innovatory departure from it. Any movement with a 
new charismatic leader endowed with personal piety and the energy to impact 
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on the world around him can claim that their leader is the mujaddid. A special 
mujaddid is also believed to appear every thousand years (Geaves 2009b: 52). 
The followers of such a personality are likely to become sub-divisions of the 
Sunnī community but did not, however, divide their world into distinct reli-
gious factions or sects (Geaves 2009b: 52).
However, in previous eras of crises, this revival and reform of Sunnī Islam 
appeared in localised contexts, responding to local crises, but the eighteenth 
century witnessed Muslim revivals along similar lines across the gamut of the 
Muslim world. From South-East Asia, through Arabia to Africa, significant 
Muslim figures created movements to reform Islam. Out of these simultaneous 
revolutionary responses, perhaps influencing each other through significant 
meetings at the ḥajj, the most important has to be the radical attempt to reform 
the original heartlands of Islam—Arabia—by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
(1703–1792). The successful cleansing of Arabia of its countless shrines, tombs, 
and sacred objects associated with popular Ṣūfism was linked to the Prophet’s 
cleansing of the pagan gods from the Kaʿba and was achieved by joining the 
religious zeal of al-Wahhāb with the temporal power of Muḥammad ibn 
Saʿūd, a local tribal chieftain. The combination was to create the first modern 
Islamic state, Saudi Arabia, but more significantly a global religious movement 
that to this day remains influential as it promotes the ideals of its founder 
throughout the Muslim world as the ‘authentic’ and ‘pure’ version of Islam 
(Geaves 2009b: 50–51).
Ṣūfism came to be regarded as the traditional enemy of these neo-orthodox 
movements long before they perceived the West as a threat and they were pre-
pared to use takfīri tactics on their opponents in the Muslim world. Before the 
domination of Muslim territory by European powers, any sign of decline in the 
Muslim community was blamed on inner lapses within the umma and often 
laid at the door of Ṣūfism by its critics. With the belief that they were the cus-
todians of the final revelation for humankind from God, the representatives of 
Islam zealously guarded the community from deviation or innovation. Either 
of these could lead the community from the straight path and result in a failure 
to protect the revelation in the original purity of its genesis. Internal political 
failure or conquest by non-Muslims were both likely to be interpreted as pun-
ishment for failing to maintain pristine Islam. Events such as the invasion of the 
Mongols, which destroyed the ʿAbbāsid Empire, or the rise of European domi-
nation from the eighteenth century onwards, drove Muslims in upon them-
selves to examine their own religious belief and practice (Lewis 1968: 52). As a 
consequence a number of neo-orthodox movements were born that puritani-
cally tried to purge the Muslim community of religious and cultural accretions 
said to be the influence of foreign cultures or other religions. Such movements 
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were highly critical of Ṣūfism and attempted to present it as a corrupted form 
of Islam influenced by Buddhists, Neo-Platonists, Hindus, or Christian mystics, 
depending on the prevalent traditions within a given geographical region. For 
the neo-orthodox reformers, Ṣūfism was the cause of Islam’s decline and to be 
eliminated (Geaves 2009b: 56).
Following on from the armed struggle to purge first Arabia and then the 
Ottoman Empire by al-Wahhāb, such movements were likely to endorse vio-
lence against fellow Muslims. The justification for such jihadist activities was 
the Khārijite doctrine that Muslims who opposed Islamic reform (ʾiṣlāḥ) and 
supported regimes in the Muslim world that compromised with either the 
sharīʿa, the Muḥammadan model of rule in Medina, or adopted cultural prac-
tices from outside of the Qurʾān and sunna, could be deemed to be kāfir or 
non-Muslim, apostates or hypocrites who had rejected or corrupted the truth 
of the final revelation. The tactic of takfīr, using fatwā to declare rival move-
ments or Muslims who did not declare allegiance to them as outside the world 
of Islam would radically divide the Muslim world (Esposito 2002: 59–60). 
Although sects had existed prior to the advent of these movements in the early 
modern period, they had not divided the Sunnī world. It can be argued that 
it was the various forms of takfīri movements that gave the impetus to Sunnī 
sectarianism, dividing and killing other Muslims.
7 South Asian Sectarianism
In the nineteenth century, India would experience a proliferation of Islamic 
movements, some of which would develop into global phenomena. In part 
these movements would develop as various reactions to the loss of Muslim 
power in the subcontinent. The thousands of fatwās issued by various ʿulamāʾ 
would help maintain the boundaries of the various movements that appeared 
throughout this period. Fatwās were issued to condemn the beliefs and prac-
tices of other groups and to give authority to one’s own. The fatwās functioned 
to form group identity and they also allowed for some control over keeping 
Muslim life within the bounds of the sharīʿa when there was no Muslim state 
to enforce the law (Geaves 1996: 133–134). The delivery of fatwā would become 
the main vehicle to call upon the Muslim masses for loyalty to a particular 
movement and to define the boundaries between movements. For example, 
in India, the founders of Deoband chose to protect Islam in India through a 
dual strategy of first providing educational institutions that could supply 
graduates capable of protecting and maintaining a conservative scripturalist 
interpretation of Islam in the absence of a Muslim-governed state, and second 
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by promoting a deliberate policy of isolation that protected India’s Muslims 
against both Hindu and British cultural influence (Geaves 2015: 193–194). From 
1911 the Deobandī movement would maintain a register of its fatwā and in the 
first century of the college’s existence 269, 215 fatwās were issued, most of which 
focused on belief and ritual (Geaves 1996: 157). In particular, the Deobandī 
ʿulamāʾ closely examined customs and beliefs associated with Ṣūfism to see if 
they contained bidʿa or innovation. In response, the Ṣūfis were organised into a 
rival movement by Mawlānā Aḥmad Rizā Khān (1856–1921) which came to be 
known as the Barelwīs. Aḥmad Rizā Khān and the Barelwī ʿulamāʾ used their 
status and legal scholarship consciously to justify a mediatory, custom-laden 
Islam that was closely linked to the intercession of shrine-based pīrs. The aim 
was to revive and maintain the Islamic status quo as it existed currently. The 
reformers of Deoband were accused of practising an idealised Islam that was 
based on texts and historical past and was not properly aligned to the present 
(Geaves 1996: 95). The two movements still compete with each other globally 
wherever South Asian Muslims have settled.
In addition to fatwās the Deobandīs took part in preaching and reli-
gious debates, and although much of this activity was often directed against 
Christian missionaries and militant Hindu organisations like the Arya Samaj, 
another dimension of this debating was between groups within Islam on 
points of custom and law. These debates helped to establish the boundaries 
between different Muslim points of view, and assisted the growth of diverse 
reform movements such as Ahl-i Ḥadīth and Ahl-i Qurʾān, two smaller move-
ments that appeared in the Indian subcontinent and demonstrate how appar-
ently trivial matters regarding textual authority or minor differences in ritual 
activity could seriously divide Sunnī opinion and form sectarian movements. 
The Ahl-i Ḥadīth were more influenced by Arab reformers, particularly those 
inspired by Wahhābism. They were insistent that learned Muslims should 
study the Qurʾān and ḥadīth directly rather than through the commentaries of 
the four schools of law (fīqh) (Metcalf 2006: 58–59).
Closely associated with Deoband, was the preaching movement, Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, established by Muḥammad Ilyās in the late 1920s. Ilyās had studied 
ḥadīth in Deoband in 1908, and continued as a teacher in Saharanpur until 1910. 
In 1926 Ilyās visited Mecca and returned with the burning conviction that he 
should take on the task of teaching Islam to the Muslim masses. To achieve this 
he went on extensive preaching tours. Unlike the members of Deoband, Ilyās 
did not feel that it was necessary to be a member of the professional ʿulamāʾ 
in order to reform Islam. He believed that every Muslim had a responsibility 
to generate an awareness of Islam to others. He was not interested in reach-
ing out to non-Muslims, but wanted to create a grassroots movement amongst 
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Muslims to inspire religious renewal (Anwarul Haq 1972: 86ff). Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
has transcended its South Asian origins and has become a major global move-
ment committed to the revival of Islam.
The Deobandī movement is likely to be labelled as ‘Wahhābī’ within 
the milieu of sectarian conflicts between rival Sunnī groups. For example, 
Muhammad Raza goes on to say that “some Islamic groups under Wahhābī 
influence stopped their followers from paying respects to the saints in 
Indo-Pakistani history” (Raza 1993: 10). Perhaps more damning is the Deobandī 
link to the Taliban in Pakistan. William Maley notes that the Taliban’s lead-
ers were influenced by Deobandī “fundamentalism” (Maley 2001: 14). The link 
to the Taliban arises from the role that the Deobandī dar al-ʿulums played in 
the religious education of young Afghan refugees of Pashtun ethnicity on the 
North-West Frontier during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Leading 
Deobandīs in Pakistan have been connected to the Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan 
(SSP), which has been alleged to be involved in terrorist violence, primarily 
targeted against the minority Shīʿa community in Pakistan. The movement was 
also part of the alliance of Jamaʿat-i Islami (JeI), Jamaʿat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Pakistan 
(JUP), Jamaʿat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Islam, and Fazlur Rahman’s faction of JUI and 
Jamaʿat-i Ahl-i Ḥadīth in forming the Afghan Jehad Council, which claimed 
that the US action was not a war against Taliban but against Islam, and there-
fore, it was essential for the Muslims to declare jihād against the US and its 
allies. Jamaʿat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Pakistan (JUP) and Jamaʿat-i ʿUlamāʾ-i Islam are both 
official bodies of Deobandī ʿulamāʾ in Pakistan. From the early 1980s until the 
early 2000s the Deobandī movement in Pakistan was a major recipient of 
funding from Saudi Arabia until it ceased in favour of the rival Ahl-i Ḥadīth 
movement, who are today far more likely and accurately to be associated with 
the Salafi movement.
8 Mawdūdīan and Quṭbian Reactions
The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) founded in Egypt in 1928 
and Jamaat-e-Islami created in India in 1947 are vehicles for the vision of Ḥasan 
al-Bannā, later to be succeeded by Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966) and Mawlānā 
Mawdūdī (1903–1979). In each case, the primary thrust is political. Both organ-
isations work for an Islamic society based upon the teachings of the Qurʾān 
and the ḥadīth. They are essentially regional, with the Brotherhood dominant 
in the Middle East and Jamaat-Islami in South Asia. As both organisations were 
founded by non-clerics, their essential approach to interpreting Islam’s sources 
is ijtihād. They are suspicious of taqlīd, and consider that the ʿ ulamāʾ have been 
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partly responsible for Islam’s decline (Adams 1983: 100). However, it is their 
founders’ respective analyses of the Islamic state that has made each organisa-
tion so influential in the world of Sunnī contestation. I will focus on Mawlānā 
Mawdūdī as Quṭb’s ideas are essentially the same, although they would dif-
fer on the means to achieve the desired revolution in the Muslim world. Quṭb 
was more likely to permit violence ( jihād) whereas Mawdūdī predominantly 
favoured “gradualism,” that is, education and working within the existing polit-
ical framework (Khurshid and Ansari 1979: 362).
Mawdūdī consistently argued that the first step in bringing about a genuine 
Islamic renaissance was to convert the state to Islam. Sharīʿa had to be fully 
restored, and all laws from other sources repealed. Secular-minded officials 
had to be replaced, and all the media of education and mass communica-
tion had to be utilised towards the creation of an Islamic consciousness in the 
populaces (Mawdūdī 1986: 14). This is because Islam is more than just a per-
sonal faith; it is a complete way of life (dīn). He stressed that sharīʿa does not 
recognise any division between religion and other aspects of life, especially 
between religion and the state. He saw the division between religion and state 
as a Western invention. Mawdūdī argued that the need for an Islamic state 
arose from the nature of universal order. God’s law governs all creation, but 
man suffers from the delusion of independence. Nature is under the sway of 
Islam because it obeys God’s natural law, but human beings have the capacity 
to choose to obey or disobey (Geaves 1996: 183). In order that they may make 
the correct choice there is revelation. Human behaviour is governed, therefore, 
by revealed law just as the universe is ruled by natural law. The law which gov-
erns human behaviour is fully revealed in the Qurʾān and sunna of the Prophet 
(Mawdūdī 1985: 18). The key to understanding Mawdūdī’s ideas on the neces-
sity of the Islamic state is his interpretation of the kalima or ‘word’. He saw the 
major problem of history not as humankind’s denial of the existence of one 
God but as humankind’s unwillingness or refusal to recognise the sovereignty 
of God (Mawdūdī 1985: 15). Mawdūdī interpreted the kalima as a statement 
which not only proclaims the uniqueness of God as the Creator or sole object 
of worship, but also expresses the uniqueness of God as the Master, Sovereign, 
Lord and law-giver. God alone has the right to command (Mawdūdī 1985b: 72).
It is this revolutionary interpretation of the kalima which provided Mawdūdī 
with his main critique of the intrusion of Western ideas and philosophy into 
Muslim society. Secularism, nationalism and Western models for democracy 
are all based on the idea of the sovereignty of the people. Mawdūdī argued 
that the acceptance of any other authority as sovereign is a form of shirk, and 
as such raises that authority to the status of being a partner with Allāh (Adams 
1966: 382). The moral evil of the age, which all true Muslims should actively 
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oppose, consists of accepting other sovereigns such as “the will of the people” 
or the laws of worldly rulers and setting them over and above God. True Islamic 
faith must strive for the creation of an Islamic society as well as individual righ-
teousness. Islam leads individuals to develop a community of faith which pro-
motes social change by creating a society fully obedient to God’s law. Mawdūdī 
called this state “the caliphate based on the prophetic pattern” (Ahmad and 
Ansari 1979: 20). It is a human caliphate under the sovereignty of God with no 
power to make new laws, but it will work within the limits prescribed by Allāh 
by fully implementing sharīʿa. Ideally, the state would be ruled by an amīr in 
consultation with a council (shūrā) (Adams 1983: 127). Mawdūdī called this a 
“theo-democracy” as it was based on the equality of all Muslims under the sov-
ereignty of Allāh (Geaves 1996: 183ff). I have developed Mawdūdī’s ideology of 
an Islamic state as it is so influential among many of the movements that this 
chapter has explored. Along with Rashīd Riḍā who expressed his vision for the 
necessity of a reformed Sunnī caliphate in his work Al-Khilafa aw al-Imama 
al-‘Uzma (The Caliphate or the Paramount Imamate) written in 1923 (Rida 
1923), Mawdūdī and Quṭb have been a major influence on jihadist movements, 
for example Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, and IS who struggle to reconstitute a 
Sunnī caliphate based upon the prophetic model.
9 Conclusion
Few Muslim commentators are prepared to acknowledge that there are 
schisms amongst the dominant Sunnīs, despite the fact that for centuries vari-
ous movements have appeared and ulilised the vehicle of the fatwā to declare 
their religious opponents as non-Muslim (kufr) (Metcalf 1982:146). Any analy-
sis of these divisions would need to take account of mixed motivation between 
those who paid nominal allegiance to Islam and those who espoused piety and 
commitment to the faith. Such an analysis would lead to the post-Weberian 
sociologists Thomas O’Dea (1964) and Peter Berger (1974: 132), in which there 
is a constant or recurring tension between the forces which work for stability, 
even at the risk of distortion and the forces which work for a truer realisation 
of the initial charismatic moment, whether this is perceived to be the Qurʾān, 
the life of the prophets or the salaf. In Ṣūfism the charismatic moment occurs 
repeatedly throughout time and geographical locality through the renewal 
provided by the awliyāʾ (sainthood) (Geaves 2000: 17–18). However, in both 
Ṣūfi and non-Ṣūfi movements, the impetus to renewal is located in the concept 
of the mujahid, the reformer of the century, who is sent to preserve the Sunnī 
tradition from decay or innovation (Geaves 2009b: 52).
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Fundamental to this contestation of Sunnī authenticity, is the ḥadīth that 
proclaims that the Prophet’s community would divide into seventy-two sects 
with only one maintaining the true Islam. Obviously each movement feels 
itself to be that one and its competitors to be the heretical remainder. Yet, the 
saying itself provides the stimulus for sectarian movements to appear as each 
new reformer and his followers see themselves as the one that maintains true 
Islam. I have argued that these analyses of division tend to fall into two catego-
ries: those that seek political causes and those that explore theological or reli-
gious differences. Yet it becomes clear that in most cases, Sunnī contestations 
concern governance. Thus historically, any attempt to discover the causes of 
schism in the early community of Muslims would need to take account of the 
expansion of the Arab empire and the absorption of a variety of social groups 
into the religio-political entity (umma). The issue here is not only political and 
economic, but the fear of a dilution or a distortion of the original Arab revela-
tion. It has to be remembered that the religion of Islam was to turn into a body 
politic in a very short number of years. Tensions between the religious world-
view of the pious and their rulers, between those that offered their loyalty to 
the revelation and those who gave it primarily to the state were endemic. The 
link between religion and state was so powerful that those who broke away 
from the religion or deviated from orthodoxy were likely to be seen as traitors, 
punishable by legal codes.
The success of the Sunnī majority was to come at the price of religious life, 
and caused dreadful soul searching when territory was lost to non-Muslim 
forces. Khuri looks at Sunnī sectarian formation and assesses it in the context 
of state structures, centralised authority, the resort to coercive measures and 
the tendency to standardise. He argues that it is a “fabric fitted together by 
the logic of power and conquest” (Khuri 1990: 19). The logic of Khuri’s analy-
sis leads to a conclusion that sectarianism within the Muslim world can be 
explained as instruments of moral control operating outside the heartlands 
of the Arab empire, either outside the arena of state authority or consciously 
resisting it for either political or religious reasons. In Khuri’s argument sects 
and state stand in opposition to one another (Khuri 1990: 17–18). Such an analy-
sis would help to explain the ‘invented charisma’ of Imams, Ṣūfis, and one hun-
dred year renewers of the faith (mujaddid). Their miraculous powers, heroic 
personalities and hagiographies functioned to provide a different authority to 
that of the bureaucratic state; a resistance to the state monopoly of religion, 
all legitimised by an immediate access to the divine providing the means to 
negate all-powerful human authorities by the display of supernatural powers 
that even overturned the laws of nature (Geaves 2009a: 59). To such figures, 
invented or otherwise, flocked the dispossessed, the powerless, the seekers of 
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justice, ethnic and tribal minorities, the searchers for God or merely those that 
were too far from the centres of power to feel its influence (Geaves 2009a: 59).
The contemporary era has added the complication of the loss of Muslim 
power and the result has brought out far more sectarianism within the Sunnī 
world than in earlier centuries when Muslim civilisation remained dominant. 
As the fundamentals of the faith remain solidly the same, even in warring 
groups, Metcalf ’s contestation for religious authenticity in which she argues 
that ‘contestation’ indicates the degree to which Muslims have engaged in 
recent centuries in renewing and rethinking the historic traditions of their 
religion (Metcalf 2006: 3) or Asad’s (1986) imagined community may provide 
more scope for analysis of the current situation than sectarianism.
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Tablīghī Jamāʿat (henceforth TJ) is a transnational Islamist movement dedi-
cated to renewing the faith of Muslims around the world and re-orienting the 
religious practices of Muslims to what it believes is a more authentic form of 
Islam. The movement was founded in 1926 by Muḥammad Ilyās Kāndhlawī 
(1885–1944) in the Mewat province of India from where it expanded—first 
through India and the subcontinent, then through western countries with large 
Indian diaspora such as the UK, and eventually across the world. TJ operates in 
all countries where there are Muslims, and it is described as the world’s largest 
Muslim transnational movement of faith renewal (Ali 2006). While TJ does 
not keep official records of participants in its activities, its structures are flex-
ible, and theoretically any Sunnī Muslim may partake—dipping in and out as 
they please—though promotion through the ranks of the movement demands 
disciplined dedication. Its followers are encouraged to imitate the Prophet 
Muḥammad and the first generations of Muslims in all of their actions, and 
through donating their time to travel in small preaching groups to bring other 
Muslims to a similar way of life.
There are up to 80 million Muslims taking part in such activities at any 
given time across the globe (Pieri 2014: 101). Its annual gathering in Tongi, 
Bangladesh, is one of the Muslim world’s largest gatherings of people, at times 
exceeding even those who attend the annual ḥajj in Mecca, and since 2011 
has been divided into two phases to accommodate the large numbers who 
attend. In 2018, more than two million people from over 130 countries attended 
(Opu 2018).
Despite its large size, TJ is not well known among non-Muslims, and this 
is in part due to its eschewing of overt political activity, and in restricting the 
majority of its work among Muslims. Where TJ is known, it is often because of 
controversial projects such as an attempt to construct Europe’s largest mosque 
in London’s East End (DeHanas and Pieri 2012), or during the COVID-19 pan-
demic where the movement was accused of spreading the virus in India (BBC 
2020). TJ leaders explain that while they do not oppose preaching among non-
Muslims, the priority must first be to revive Islam in its authentic form among 
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Muslims, raising the consciousness of Islamic identity and practice. There is an 
order to ‘Islamising’ the world, and for TJ it starts among Muslims themselves.
TJ is an all-encompassing movement that aims to regulate every aspect of 
the lives of their followers. Participants in the movement are encouraged to 
model themselves after the Prophet Muḥammad in all actions, they are to 
build up communities of practicing believers as the path to salvation, and they 
should reject all non-Islamic pursuits (Pieri 2020). Because of this, the move-
ment can be analyzed through Charles Liebman’s (1983) framework of reli-
gious extremism, in which he argues that there are three characteristics that 
define such groups, including the desire to expand religious law, a desire for 
social isolation, and cultural rejection. It is important to note that in this case, 
extremism does not connote violence. Even among Muslim communities, 
there is some misunderstanding as to what TJ really does, and so it is worth 
saying a few words about the etymology of its name.
The word tablīgh is from the Arabic root b-l-gh, meaning “to reach one’s des-
tination, to arrive, to achieve one’s objective, to come to hear and to come of 
age” (Masud 2000: xx). In addition, the Arabic root also signifies “the transmis-
sion, conveyance or delivery of information” (Wehr 1960: 74). Tablīgh has come 
to have the stronger meaning of ‘propagation’ or ‘proselytisation’ (Nadwi 2002: 
43), while the word jamāʿat, simply means ‘party’ or ‘organised collectivity’. In 
its simplest form, Tablīghī Jamāʿat, can be translated as ‘propagation party’ or 
‘preaching party’ (Sikand 2002: 8). The name has stuck, but founder Ilyās did 
not refer to his movement as Tablīghī Jamāʿat, arguing that his aim was not to 
proselytise non-Muslims but to work among (lapsed) Muslims bringing them 
back into the fold of Islam.
The research drawn upon for this chapter is based on ethnographic field-
work among Tablīghī communities in the UK for almost a decade between 
2009 and 2018. The period between 2009 to 2012 included almost weekly 
attendance at Thursday evening preaching sessions, interviews with leaders 
and grassroots members, and collecting and analyzing Tablīghī literature (for 
example, Elahi 1992; Hasani 1982; Ilyās 1967; Kandhlawi 2007; Miah 2001; Nadwi 
2002). Between 2013 and 2018, occasional visits were made to Tablīghī mosques 
in the UK for Thursday evening sessions during the summer months. Elements 
of risk and security were important considerations in the research design and 
implementation. Anonymity was granted to all participants so as to mitigate 
“risks of harm,” except in instances where their role was a matter of public 
record and consent was forthcoming (Lambert 2010: 75). Any names used in 
this chapter are pseudonyms to protect the identity of individual participants.
This chapter will chart the emergence of TJ from its colonial context in 
India, arguing that to understand the movement today, knowledge is needed 
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of its early workings, its leadership structure, and its core texts and beliefs. 
The chapter will then examine how TJ’s focus on faith renewal and orthopraxy 
has allowed participants to provide meaningful structure to their lives, provid-
ing a counter-culture to modern secular societies, while also inviting charges 
of social isolationism and cultural rejection. Insight will be provided on how 
preaching groups are formed, how they invite Muslims to reorient their lives 
to a Tablīghī understanding of Islam, and the centrality that they have on 
helping to shape the subjectivities of those who immerse themselves in the 
process. TJ will be recognised as a movement that has found success in operat-
ing among Muslim communities across the world, demonstrating the trans-
national nature of the movement. Examples will be drawn from TJ’s activities 
in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The chapter concludes through arguing that if the 
movement is to maintain its growth, it may need to balance its message of 
faith renewal with greater flexibility to local and national structures, especially 
in areas of the world where governments are increasingly worried about the 
capacity of religious movements to exert influence over their followers.
2 The Colonial Context
TJ can only be understood when situated within the context from which it 
emerged in early twentieth century India. This was a period marked by the 
British colonisation of the continent, of rising Hindu nationalism, and a 
drive to assert the political and cultural presence of Islam. TJ stems from, 
and continues to be closely associated with the Deobandī tradition of Islam. 
Deobandism was established in 1867 in the aftermath of the First War of Indian 
Independence, and centered around Darul Uloom, an Islamic seminary in the 
Indian town of Deoband. Its founders were inspired by the theology of Shāh 
Walī Allāh (d. 1762), an Islamic scholar and reformer who sought to reposi-
tion Islamic theology in light of changes taking place at the time. He believed 
that it was the moral collapse of society—a deviation from the straight path 
of Islam—and the decaying of the social order that caused the decline of the 
Mughal Empire (Upadhyay 2003). Walī Allāh called for moral renewal among 
Muslims and advocated for a form of Islam free from what he saw as innovative 
practices. Muslims, he argued, should assert an independent identity liberated 
from the influence of Hinduism (Mortimer 1988: 67–69; Jones 1989: 51).
With emphasis on external markers of identity, the Deobandīs wanted to 
unite the Muslims of India, and to fashion a distinct Muslim identity that 
would separate them from their Hindu neighbors. It was argued, for instance, 
that dressing in the fashion of the prophet and abandoning local customary 
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practices such as celebrating Hindu festivals, a distinct communal and Muslim 
identity would solidify. Raising the consciousness of an Islamic identity would 
prevent Muslims from being assimilated into the Hindu fold (which was also 
reasserting itself), or becoming tainted by the western influences of British 
colonialism. Deobandī religious leaders were obdurate that through following 
what they categorised as orthopraxy, they would be defined as a group not only 
separate from, but also morally superior to the British (Metcalf 1982: 153).
A return to a strict implementation of sharīʿa was called for, and arguments 
were made that the decline of Muslim societies vis-à-vis the west was because 
Muslims “abandoned their dependence on Allāh and fallen into immorality” 
(Pieri 2012b: 15). The only way to revive Muslim societies and return Islam to 
a religion of socio-political significance, was through total rededication of 
each Muslim through direct imitation of the prophetic lifestyle. It was from 
this tradition that TJ would emerge in the mid 1920s, accentuating the con-
cepts around individual renewal and moral purity. TJ was driven by a desire 
to cleanse popular Islam of Hindu traces and bring it into greater conformity 
with orthodox interpretations of the scriptures.
In 1871 the British colonial government in India called for a decennial cen-
sus. One purpose was to allow the British to accord certain levels of power to 
communities in India on the basis of religion (Hardy 1972; Jones 1989: 184). 
The unintended consequence was that colonial policy politicised religious 
communities in India, locking them into competition. The fluid boundaries 
over religious practices that existed between Hindus and Muslims prior to 1871 
became taboo, as people were pushed to identify themselves as either exclu-
sively ‘Muslim’ or ‘Hindu’, creating a more concrete understanding of individ-
ual religious identity (Oberoi 1994: 17). Muslim revivalist groups, of which TJ 
was just one among others at the time, were born of an effort to increase the 
number of those who identified as Muslim, and as part of the effort to increase 
the Muslim community’s share of power.
The first several years of TJ’s faith renewal activities were carried out in 
Mewat, India. This proved to be an invaluable learning experience and devel-
oped TJ’s ability to establish strong roots in a context of socio-cultural and 
political upheaval, and would also be pivotal to the movement’s future opera-
tions. This is because the shifting contexts of Mewat in the late 1920s were 
in some ways similar to the changing dynamics in many societies today. The 
objectives established in Mewat still resonate for Tablīghīs in cities such as 
London, Auckland, and Cape Town. Ilyās saw Mewat as ‘backward’ and the 
inhabitants as nominally Muslim having lost touch with orthodox practices, 
with hybrid Muslim-Hindu identities. He wanted them to drop the remnants of 
Hindu culture and embrace Islam in its totality, arguing that the way to revive 
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the faith was through Muslims coming together each week to preach and lis-
ten to sermons in their own communities. For three days every month they 
should go to nearby villages to preach and hold meetings to persuade the local 
people to undertake similar tours, and for at least four months they should 
leave their homes and go to centers of religious studies (Haq 1972: 116). This has 
become the main method by which TJ operates. Small groups of Muslim men 
leave their locales to preach the ‘correct’ version of Islam to other Muslims and 
encourage them to do likewise.
3 Leadership
It was while on ḥajj in Mecca in 1925 that Ilyās is said to have received a divine 
vision instructing him to begin a movement for faith renewal among Muslims 
(Nadwi 2002: 42). He returned to India where he saw a state of moral degenera-
tion around him, and in particular Muslims who did not know how to pray, or 
keep to the dictates of Islam. For Ilyās, faith renewal had to start at home, in 
Mewat, and then expand to other areas. He remained at the helm of TJ until 
his death in 1944, seeing it take root and spread across India. After Ilyās, TJ had 
a succession of leaders all of whom were related to him, and which has led 
the movement to being characterised as “a total institution” (Gaborieau 2006). 
Ilyās wanted to ensure a smooth process, and so on his deathbed was active in 
promoting his son, Muḥammad Yusuf (1917–1965), as his designated successor.
Yusuf’s leadership allowed TJ to enter into a period of expansion beyond 
India with emphasis placed on the Arabian Peninsula. Mecca and Medina, due 
to the flow of pilgrims that visit each year, were seen as ripe areas for pro-
moting the movement. Tablīghī preaching groups were sent to the holy cities 
with instruction to teach pilgrims the message and methods of Tablīgh, and to 
encourage them to establish their own branches of the movement upon return 
to their own countries. After Yusuf’s death, leadership passed to Muḥammad 
In’āmul-Ḥasan (1980–1995), one of Ilyās’ nephews, and the architect of TJ’s 
internationalisation. In thirty years of his leadership, TJ developed into the 
mass movement that it is today. By the end of his tenure, it had grown so 
large that it was decided that a different type of leadership structure would be 
needed. This emerged in the form of an elected executive council tasked with 
overseeing the management and growth of the movement’s activities.
Members of this council included Izhar ul-Ḥasan, Zubayr ul-Ḥasan (son of 
In’āmul-Ḥasan) and Saad ul-Ḥasan (son of Muḥammad Yusuf). Since the pass-
ing of Izhar ul-Ḥasan, and then Zubayar ul-Ḥasan in 2014, Saad remained the 
sole leader of the movement. This had had major implications, causing a rift 
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in TJ, and sowing internal politics of division that had global consequences. 
This is because Zuhairul Ḥasan (the son of Zubayr), also laid claimed to the 
leadership, with a formal request to Saad to reconstitute the executive council, 
a move which was rejected by Saad (Ghazali 2018). The decision by Saad not 
to continue with an executive council was also seen as a move to relocate the 
center of the balance of power in the movement back to India, and which the 
branches of TJ in Pakistan and Bangladesh viewed as problematic. Both TJ’s 
regional centers in Pakistan and Bangladesh were becoming increasingly pow-
erful due to the large annual congregations held there, and the ambitions of 
the leaders in those regions to have more say in TJ’s global operations. Violent 
clashes ensued between those loyal to the Indian branch of the movement and 
those who wanted an expanded leadership.
Afroz Alam (2016) writing for TwoCircles.net, a publication with a history 
of accurate reporting on TJ, explained that in 2016 the groups belonging to 
Saad and Zuhairul were discussing the question of leadership at TJ’s headquar-
ter mosque in Nizamuddin, and soon it turned “into brawl leading to violent 
clashes inside the mosque.” The argument was over those who believed that 
it was unjust for Saad to inherit sole leadership of the movement, and were 
actively calling for an enlarged leadership council as had been practice in 
the past. So aggrieved are some in TJ that mass protests in Bangladesh during 
the time of the annual gathering in Tongi, lead to Saad being stopped from 
attending the event (Hossain 2018). Splits in the movement persist at the time 
of writing.
4 Core Texts and Principles
While open to all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, for the most part, 
Tablīghīs emphasise the Hanafi tradition. Along with the Qurʾān, the Faza’il- 
e-A’maal (also known as the Tablīgh Nisāb) is the movement’s core text, and 
one that each participant is required to study daily. This book is a compila-
tion of texts arranged by Mohammad Zakariyya (d. 1982), Ilyās’ cousin and 
son-in-law, and TJ’s most influential ideologue. Chapters focus on stories of 
the aṣ-ṣaḥābah—that is, the companions of the Prophet Muḥammad—
commentaries on the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, and advice on moral regeneration.
Zakariyya, in his introduction, explains that his book serves to inspire 
Islamic revival, helping to remedy the bad practices of millions of Muslims 
who have “indulged in manifest false worship” and who live in an “ignorance 
of Islam,” and to provide concrete examples of legitimate Islamic lives upon 
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which readers may base their own life (Kandhlawi 2007: 12). It is from this book 
that TJ participants read sections during study circles, expound upon during 
preaching, and which contains what they regard to be authentic examples 
of how Muḥammad and his companions lived their own lives, patterns that 
should be followed by each Tablīghī themselves. One issue, however, is that 
accusations have arisen that many ḥadīth in the book are “weak or fabricated, 
and that their selection reflects a bias towards Ilyās’ teaching” (Pieri 2012b: 18).
Ilya’s understood that the majority of those whom TJ was working amongst 
in the mid 1940s were mostly illiterate and without a deep intellectual under-
standing of Islam, its texts and traditions. Because of this, he called for the 
movement to center itself around six core principles which each individual 
could incorporate into their own daily lives, and which would bring them into 
accordance with prescriptions of the faith. His ‘Six Principles of Tablīgh’ are 
seen as fundamental to a correct practice of Islam, and easily understood by all 
Muslims irrespective of their level of education. Indeed, Ilyās wanted Muslims 
with little to no schooling to be able to propagate the faith to others. His six 
points are: 1. recitation of the kalima (Article of Faith); 2. ṣalāt (ordained 
prayers); 3. knowledge (of the principles of Islam) and remembrance (of God); 
4. respect for Muslims; 5. sincerity of intention; and 6. donation of, and good 
use of spare time in the path of God (Ilyās 1967).
For those who participate in TJ, the Six Points reflect the entirety of Islam, 
providing them with a complete framework for living in the world. With the 
exception of the sixth point, all others are based on the fundamental tenets of 
Islam, and some, for example, remembrance of God are also stressed among 
Sufi brotherhoods. It is the sixth point—that of the donation of time for the 
propagation of faith renewal through preaching groups—that is a distinctive 
feature of the movement. The belief is that if every Tablīghī spends time dis-
seminating TJ’s message, then every Muslim will be given the opportunity 
to rectify their religious practices, increase the depth of their faith, and ulti-
mately create a critical mass of faithful Muslims that could over time usher in 
an Islamic society.
At its core, TJ is salvation oriented. Its leaders and participants see life on 
earth as temporary and one in which each believer has to work at securing 
their own salvation. Failure to do so leads to an eternity in hell. Because of 
this Tablīghīs’ daily actions are structured to ensure that a highly ordered and 
moral path is followed in every activity, and thus maximising their chance of 
salvation. Notions of heaven and hell, or salvations and judgment are at the 
core many Tablīghī sermons. The imagery in many such sermons is graphic in 
detail, leaving those gathered in no doubt as to the consequences of failing to 
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reorient to a correct practice of the faith. The following excerpt from a Tablīghī 
sermon given at the movement’s annual gathering in Chicago in 2009 captures 
the typical image presented:
If a person is entered into paradise he will have luxuries and comfort for 
ever and ever, and if a person is entered into the fire of hell, the fire of 
juhanam [hell] then he’ll suffer for ever and ever; the suffering will never 
end  … Like a person who is traveling in the sea and when he sees the 
shore, he will want to go to the shore—in exactly the same manner this 
person will want to go to the edge of the fire of juhanam. And he will 
request of Allāh, ‘Grant me permission so that I can go to the edge of the 
fire of juhanam’. And this person will go to the edge of the fire and this 
person will go there to the border, there’ll be snakes. The snakes will be 
so huge like a palm tree. In the same manner over there, there’ll be scor-
pions, scorpions the size of a mule and a donkey. In the same manner 
other insects which will be huge and massive size—all of them will get 
on to this person and they will start biting him and this person will out 
of suffering say, ‘Oh Allāh I cannot take this I do not want to stay at the 
border of the fire of juhanam, I would rather go back to the center of the 
fire of juhanam’.
Such imagery is intended to inspire believers to rectify their lives by invoking 
a form of existentialist angst. Because no one knows their time of death, each 
Tablīghī must live each day as though it was their last. They are to constantly 
ponder on the hereafter and ensure that each action taken is another step 
towards salvation.
5 Creating a New Society
With such a strict focus on salvation, Tablīghī leaders have been active in call-
ing on their followers to abstain from engaging in the societies around them, 
and to retreat into Tablīghī communities where lives can be organised around 
Ilyās’ Six Principles. Tablīghīs are told to avoid interaction with the secular 
world, other than for the purposes of the propagation of Islam. Modern societ-
ies, especially those in the west, are seen as being in a state of jāhiliyya; that 
is, akin to the period of heathenry and moral disorder in Arabia prior to the 
revelation of the Qurʾān. Jan Ali (2018: 18) argues that this chimes with Islamic 
revivalism more generally, especially the stress that “modern values and ways 
57Tablīghī Jamāʿat
promote the idea that happiness and success lie in the possession of material 
wealth, which ultimately leads to a questioning of the value of religious fun-
damentals.” This argument is further advanced in the suggestion that “this way 
of life has lead to spiritual emptiness, and thus a desperate need to enforce a 
religious blueprint through which tradition can be reestablished, and meaning 
restored to lives” (Ali 2018: 18).
Tablīghī leaders, though, walk a tightrope, balancing blame for the cur-
rent state of society between the values of the west and Muslims themselves. 
Muslims as the vice-regents of Allāh, according to TJ leaders, became lackadai-
sical in their religious practice, abandoning their religious and social duties, 
and instead invested in the riches of this world (Ali 2006: 182). Ilyās believed 
that there was little point in engaging in the political and social systems of 
society, instead stressing individual Muslims with revived faith as “the agent 
of change, and that what was of first importance was to overcome the state of 
ignorance prevalent in society” (Pieri 2012a: 178). Consequently, TJ has found 
itself being accused of social isolationism, or at the very least viewing those 
who do not conform to a Tablīghī worldview as having the capacity to pollute 
those who do.
One of the things that TJ has become increasingly adept at doing is to take 
aspects of modern life that are seen as revolutionary and to highlight them as 
failing when compared to what is really important. In my work I have termed 
this as the “worldly unworldliness of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat” (Pieri 2012a, 2015). 
To use an example, TJ leaders argue that for all the conveniences of modern 
technology, it has failed to improve the moral character of individuals. They 
look to contemporary societies and highlight a rise in crime, in drug and alco-
hol abuse, and in television shows profiting from the exploitation of peoples’ 
misfortunes. TJ’s message of abandoning worldly attachments, turning inwards 
to re-examine one’s own life, and striving for salvation has been resonant 
amongst its adherents (Pieri 2012a: 184). The theme is part of a common thread 
to TJ’s narrative globally, and is evidenced in a sermon given by a Tablīghī elder 
at a gathering in France (Kepel 2000: 195–196):
Now there are people who go to the moon! And after that? There are 
more suicides in America than anywhere in the whole world. Every year 
more than 80,000 persons commit suicide there! That is the country that 
you find great and want to imitate! … Why are there more than 80,000 
people who hang themselves? This is because they have not found com-
fort in this world. Because they are farther from God. That is why they 
commit suicide.
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TJ speakers, such as the one above, invert values that are important to mod-
ern western societies to show that modernity is not the antidote to world prob-
lems, but rather part of the problem. Material wealth, physical possessions 
and modern conveniences are today seen as signifying success in life, but for 
Tablīghīs the opposite is true. Instead, materialism is regarded as promoting an 
attachment to ‘worldliness’, thus blocking spiritual engagement. For Tablīghīs 
the way to achieve success is through abandoning the pursuit of the material, 
instead focusing on bringing others to a Tablīghī understanding of Islam. This 
is captured in a sermon given at the movement’s Markaz Ilyās in London in 
January 2010: “The current system we live in is a perversion of the true order 
of society that is the society, which Allāh and his Prophet had envisioned for 
us. Everything which we are told is good for us is actually not. Working for 
success, for power, for money, for position is nothing. Only Allāh can grant 
those things.”
Because of such concerns, there is a strong emphasis among Tablīghīs of 
maintaining and protecting the purity of the community which has lead to 
isolationist positions as well as a rejection of non-Islamic culture. This is some-
thing discussed by Liebman (1983: 79) who explains that such a position is dif-
ficult to maintain but for the strictest sects, and that pursuing such goals would 
ultimately lead to “the creation of alternate channels of cultural transmission.” 
Groups like TJ advance a strict version of religious norms by which all believers 
must be bound.
Commentators often point to Savile Town near Dewsbury in the United 
Kingdom. This is the location of the Markazi Masjid, TJ’s UK and European 
headquarters. Savile Town is centered around the Markazi Masjid, one Europe’s 
largest mosques and a processing and dispatch center for Tablīghī preaching 
groups from all over the world. The exterior of the mosque when visited dur-
ing field research in 2007, 2009, and 2012, had large banners warning against 
photography and the prohibition of unauthorised visitors. Attached to the 
mosque is an Islamic boarding school, and all businesses within the vicinity of 
the mosque are ḥalāl enterprises. Savile Town has been the focus of investiga-
tive reports and attacks in the popular press, with the town being characterised 
as a ghetto and a “white-free area” due to there being almost no non-Tablīghī 
residents (Norfolk 2015).
TJ has not only sought seclusion in certain contexts from the wider soci-
ety, but has also fiercely rejected cultural norms in different locations that it 
operates in. This was evident in assertions by some TJ leaders that children 
are especially susceptible to moral corruption and as such should be pro-
tected from western influence. This is reflected in literature sold at TJ affili-
ated bookshops, where the advice is that “You should be convinced as to how 
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disastrous it is to send young children to these non-Muslim institutions and 
how harmful it is to their deen and character. Our children tend to become 
isolated from deen [dīn, faith], emblazoned by the emblem of disbelievers 
and become flagrant violators with regard to beliefs, actions and characters” 
(al-Mashaat 1993: 9).
Western education is presented as a tool used by the west to push Muslim 
children into unbelief and to take them away from Islam. Tablīghī parents are 
warned in the text that they have a responsibility to protect their children from 
the traps laid out in western schools to draw children away from Islam, and that 
even friendships with non-Muslims is enough to entrap one in the fires of hell 
for eternity (al-Mashaat 1993). At TJ’s boarding school in Savile Town, where 
only Muslim boys are accepted to study, parents are told that their children are 
not allowed to socialise with ‘outsiders’, and that television, cell phones, and 
social media are banned (Perring 2015).
Despite the characterisation of TJ as an isolationist movement, it is also clear 
that this is not always the way the movement operates, and it is important to 
strike a balance in the discussion. Barbara Metcalf (1982) for example, takes a 
positive view of Tablīghīs withdrawing from the wider society, arguing that this 
should be seen as a lifestyle choice, one that allows the expression of cultural 
identity. For Metcalf it is important for individuals to be afforded the opportu-
nity to exercise a disciplined life of sacrifice, and in pursuing the ability to live 
as part of a moral community of mutual acceptance. Moreover, where encour-
aged to become more socially engaged, for example in London while wanting 
to advance an ambitious mosque construction project, TJ leaders wanted to 
show that they were not isolationist. Senior TJ leaders indicated that they were 
“regularly in touch with parents who ask us to help their children and save 
them from falling into problems with crime, drugs or being manipulated by 
others and straying from the right path” (Mohammed 2011: 16). They were able 
to demonstrate that this role of being active in helping people to combat drug 
use was more than just talk, providing a letter from the Ministry of Justice, 
stating that TJ’s east London mosque was a place where people provide com-
munity service (Pieri 2012a: 283).
6 The Ritualisation of Everyday Life
TJ is not an organisation that seeks to implement their vision for society 
through active participation in politics. Instead, its leaders place emphasis 
on the strict and complete adherence to the prophetic lifestyle, which each 
individual participant is expected to follow. This means that those who choose 
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to become committed Tablīghīs must implement certain ways of acting in 
their lives that are taken from examples of Muḥammad and his companions. 
Individuals must implement the ‘law’ in their own lives irrespective of whether 
or not they live in a jurisdiction that enforces the law. TJ is also concerned with 
expanding the details of the law, making it clear to their followers exactly what 
is expected of them, so that no aspect of daily living is left to chance. This is in 
accordance with Liebman’s (1983: 77) discussion of the expansion of religious 
law as a component of religious extremism, and refers to expanding the scope 
of the law to “include the public as well as the private realm, and to matters of 
collective as well as private behavior within that realm.” There is a push for an 
elaboration of the details of the law and in demanding a “strictness” of the law 
referring to “greater restrictions and hardships.”
Acts that would be considered as mundane by many in society, for example 
drinking water, going to the bathroom, brushing one’s teeth, how long to grow 
one’s beard, and how to sleep in bed are regulated, and ritualised. This removes 
committed Tablīghīs from the prevailing secular (or un-Islamic) societies in 
which they would ordinarily function, and reinforces their identity as reori-
ented Muslims (Pieri 2020; 64). Self-enforcement of these practices, through 
encouragement from TJ, allows each believer to create their own moral uni-
verse in which they are linked to other Tablīghīs around the globe through 
knowledge that they are all striving for the same end goal.
Many of the rules that Tablīghīs follow are detailed in the movement’s lit-
erature, and it is claimed, directly based on examples of Muḥammad and his 
companions. Some of the rules outlined in TJ’s literature (Miah 2001: 69–74; 
Ilyās 1967: 47–50; Kandhlawi 2007), include always eating with the right hand 
and always from the corner of the dish—never from the center—and to lick 
one’s fingers to remove all food from them. When it comes to drinking water, 
one should do so while sitting down and holding the glass in the right hand; 
the water should be taken down in three gulps. Bedtime is another instance 
regulated by rules. Tablīghīs are instructed to dust the bed three times before 
laying down to sleep, and for sleeping, should lie on their right side, with the 
right hand under the right cheek and recite: “Oh Allāh in your name I live 
and die.”  
In order to encourage orthopraxy TJ leaders have devised a system of points 
and rewards, which Tablīghīs note as important to them, with some even car-
rying small notebooks with them to keep a tally of their points. Alexander 
Stewart (2018: 1201) notes that Ilyās stressed particular ḥadīth that “claim 
that reciting certain verses of praise specific numbers of times can earn spe-
cific, calculable blessings from Allāh” and that some Chinese Tablīghīs “even 
carry electronic counters to help tabulate their blessings.” One participant 
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in my research reported that depending on which action one follows, one is 
rewarded a certain amount of points. If one cleans their plate and licks their 
fingers they are awarded ‘x’ amount of points. If they sleep on their right side 
and dust their bed they are awarded a different amount of points. At the end 
of a Muslim’s life, “Allāh will tally up the points and decide on who can enter 
the hereafter.” In this way emulating the pious ancestors is not just a way of life 
while on earth, but also a way of ensuring entry into heaven.
During the month of Ramadan there are extra incentives for Tablīghīs to 
engage in the work of the movement, and this is encouraged through the accru-
ing of extra points. One Tablīghī elder I interviewed stated that “when a person 
performs something which is farḍ [religiously obligatory] during Ramadan it is 
multiplied by 70, but when he goes out in the path of Allāh in Ramadan all this 
is multiplied by thousands.” Because of this, many Tablīghīs take the month 
of Ramadan off from work to focus solely on the activities of the movement, 
including going out on preaching tours, and attending daily prayers and study 
circles. The same elder stated that, “going out in the path of Allāh is much more 
than virtue. We want to make an effort and a struggle in the path of Allāh so 
that we achieve paradise. And because of this struggle our ahirat [afterlife] 
will be made better.” These standardised everyday interactions serve to create 
a bond between practicing Tablīghīs because irrespective of one’s background 
all are united in a common system of praxis.
7 Khurūj
TJ stands out due to its resolute emphasis on the importance of donating time 
in the path of Allāh. For TJ this is specifically defined as time spent on preach-
ing tours, which every participant in the movement must take part in at least 
once a year, though preferably more often than that. The preaching tours, also 
known as khurūj, function as a form of proselytisation for lapsed Muslims, and 
are centered around small groups of men (and sometimes women), who go out 
into Muslim communities to spread TJ’s teachings. Khurūj is the ‘engine’ that 
drives the movement, and according to Ali (2018: 16) has three key elements—
“taʿlim (teaching), jola (preaching mission) and bayān (speech).” At its base 
are ordinary Muslims that have decided to commit themselves to donating a 
period of time to take part. Simply put, small groups of Muslims visit “other 
Muslims and then invite them to meetings at the mosque to discuss and prac-
tice the basics of Islam,” and it is this that is TJ’s “secret to success—its ability 
to form grass-roots cells of ‘evangelists’ anywhere in the globe to bring fellow 
Muslim back within the fold of an active faith” (Dickson 2009: 101).
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TJ is famous for its three-day preaching tours which ordinary Tablīghīs are 
encouraged to participate in regularly throughout the year, and often involve 
traveling to towns or cities not too far from one’s own location. In Britain for 
example, this may involve journeying from London to Bath, or in the US, from 
Atlanta to Chattanooga. These tours are designed to allow any Sunnī Muslim 
the opportunity to participate in TJ’s activities, without having to make a sub-
stantial commitment. The hope is that after an individual takes part in a three-
day tour, they will return for a longer one. There are tours that last for forty 
days (known as a chilla), and are designed to allow the individual to withdraw 
from worldly affairs and to rededicate themselves to Allāh, while also bring-
ing other Muslims back to what is regarded as correct religious practice. These 
tours often involve international travel, or travel at some distance from one’s 
own locale. Participants in TJ are recommended to take one forty-day tour on 
an annual basis. There are also options for tours that last 120 days (known as 
grand chilla), and for the most dedicated, year long tours that usually consist 
of travelling internationally to a set location, and from there journeying by 
foot from mosque to mosque calling other Muslims to TJ’s version of Islam 
(Hasani 1982: 772).
In the west, Tablīghī gatherings are usually held on Thursday evenings. 
The gathering typically opens with prayer, and then an invited speaker gives 
a motivational talk (bayān), which is centered around Ilyās’ Six Principles, or 
on moral regeneration. A bleak picture of the world is presented—societies in 
moral decline, Muslims have forgotten what it is to be Muslim, and that popu-
lar culture, gossip, and frivolity have triumphed. This message is then directly 
linked to judgment. The speaker often physically cries, bewailing that many 
people will be cast into the fires of hell, and that there will be no mercy. A way 
out is then offered to those gathered—it is not too late—if each believer reori-
ents themselves to a correct practice of Islam, and donates time to help their 
fellow Muslims reform—then salvation may be at hand. At the end of the talk, 
the speaker asks those present if they are ready to donate time. Individuals 
stand up, and names are entered into a book, along with the length of time 
each person wants to donate. Based on observation from many TJ meetings 
over the past decade, the rate of those volunteering ranges anywhere from 
three to twenty per cent, and this in part depends on the time of the year, with 
more people volunteering during Ramadan. It is important to note that though 
an individual has made an intention to take part in khurūj at this point, they 
are not locked in, and indeed, some do not follow through.
One of aspects of khurūj that stands out is not so much the experience of 
Islamising other Muslims, but rather the reorientation of the proselytiser to 
a more orthodox understanding of their own faith. Khurūj according to most 
Tablīghīs interviewed for my research, is a period in which they attest to have 
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pondered the purpose of earthly life, to raise their eyes to the divine, and to get 
their affairs in order as means of preparing for the hereafter (Pieri 2019: 374). 
The drive for salvation is a strong thread throughout TJ, and participants not 
only want to to ‘save’ themselves, but also their fellow Muslims. As Ali (2003: 
177) notes by doing away with the luxuries of life while on missionary tours and 
“sleeping on hardened floor instead of mattresses, doing own cooking, wash-
ing own clothes, and overcoming the reliance of material resources, Tablīghīs 
are able to gain self-abnegation, modesty and a new outlook on life which sets 
them apart from ordinary Muslims.”
The groups going out on khurūj have a hierarchical structure, with each 
position filled through consensus among those participating. An individual 
with experience in khurūj is often elected as the group’s leader, and if anyone 
in the group is knowledgeable of the local language or terrain, they are often 
elected to a scouting position to identify local Muslim homes. Other members 
are elected to remain at the mosque to receive those who decide to attend to 
hear more about TJ’s message, while others are elected to prepare food and 
take care of miscellaneous duties. While on khurūj members are not allowed 
to contact their families without permission, and should avoid contact with 
the profane, for example avoiding social media or anything that is not directly 
related to the work of the mission.
The preaching groups consist of around three to fifteen participants, with 
each expected to finance their own travel, and all commit to staying together, 
cooking, eating, and sleeping in Tablīghī affiliated mosques along the way. 
The more one participates in khurūj, the more opportunities open up to that 
individual for leadership roles within the organisation (Pieri 2019). Those who 
complete a four-month tour are given the title of purani sathi, meaning old 
comrades, and are rewarded with invitations to special Tablīghī gatherings, 
opportunities to meet with senior leaders of the movement, and eligibility to 
join some of TJ’s governance committees (Reetz 2008: 114).
Traditionally, khurūj was only an option for men, though in recent years this 
has changed. The primary concern among Tablīghī men relating to female par-
ticipation in khurūj had to do with logistics—for example, issues around how 
strict gender segregation might be maintained, and who would be responsible 
for female participants. Initial hesitation with allowing their wives to take part 
in missionary tours gave way as some men recognised the important work that 
women could do among other women. Because of this female Tablīghīs are 
now encouraged to organise teaching groups in order to spread the message of 
the movement among other women (Metcalf 1982: 56).
Such activities are strictly regulated. Only married women may participate 
in khurūj, explicit permission is needed from their husband, and husbands or 
male guardians are to accompany their wife. As Anindita Chakrabarti (2010: 
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602) notes, the emphasis of TJ for both men and women, is on performing one’s 
religious duty, and the ability to fulfil this outside of the home, is paramount 
for both. It is this stressing of mission that has acted as a catalyst to afford 
women the opportunity to leave the home, break from domestic chores and 
child rearing, to participate in religious duty. Though khurūj may seem a liber-
ating experience for women, Sikand (1999: 48) argues that all decisions during 
the missionary tour are taken by the men accompanying the women. Having 
said this, the mere experience of taking part in missionary activity, and leading 
religious teaching circles, can have profound effect for Tablīghī women. Many 
feel empowered, and the experience helps to set them apart and to achieve a 
level of personal elevation unknown to Muslim women in religiously orthodox 
divisions of Islam (Siddiqi 2012: 148).
8 Geographic Scope
TJ is a global movement with a presence in almost every country in world. 
It is strongest in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, where its largest mosques 
and congregations are located. The movement is still managed from its inter-
national headquarters in Nizamuddin, just outside of New Delhi, and this is 
where the leaders of the movement and advisory council reside. This (non-
executive) council has fifteen members and meets daily to discuss matters 
such as the planning of international meetings, and where preaching groups 
will be sent to globally. Despite TJ’s strong Deobandī influences and its percep-
tion as a South Asian movement, it has managed to to become a major force in 
some unlikely areas.
One such location is the small west African country of Gambia, which 
has become a strategic center in sending out Tablīghī preaching groups 
throughout Africa. According to Marloes Janson (2006: 45) Tablīghīs arrived 
in Gambia during the1960s but were not able to make a significant impact 
until the 1990s. This was a time of economic stagnation in Gambia, which 
when coupled with TJ’s message that investment in the spiritual and not 
the material realm would eventually bring the greatest rewards, appealed to 
young middle class Gambians. TJ gained in popularity because they provided 
a counter-culture and an alternative vision of society. “Tablīghī religiosity 
served as a protest against the religious festivities of the ‘old’ and their con-
spicuous consumption” (Janson 2006: 45). TJ encouraged the breakdown of 
traditional structures of authority in Gambia, and created space for scriptural-
ist Islam to emerge. Gambia became a base for TJ to spread throughout west 
Africa, including Niger, Chad, Mauritania and Mali. Janson (2014) presents a 
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picture of how young Gambians started to reform their lives in accordance 
within TJ’s framework of how to be an authentic Muslim, interpreted as a 
believer who is able to reconcile their religious practice with a ‘modern’ life-
style. The desire for Gambian Tablīghīs is the same as Tablīghīs in other parts 
of the world; “success in this life and in the hereafter, which distances them 
from established Muslim elders whom they call backward traditionalists” 
(Janson 2014).
TJ has also seen a mass expansion in Southeast Asia to the point where it 
is now not uncommon to see Indonesian or Malaysian participants attend its 
international gatherings, or even as part of preaching groups spending forty 
day tours in Europe. Much has been written about TJ in Indonesia (Nisa 2014; 
Noor 2012), Malaysia (Noor 2007) and Thailand (Horstman 2007). More inter-
esting are the ways in which TJ have managed to navigate in China, especially 
given the hostile stance towards religious organisations that falls outside of 
those accredited by the state. TJ first arrived in China in 1986 with the hope of 
asserting a fixed presence there. Unlike in other countries in which TJ oper-
ates, it has not managed to establish mosques and institutions dedicated to 
the movement, though it has been successful in using existing mosques to set 
up study sessions. According to Stewart (2018: 1204), the first Tablīghīs in the 
country were horrified at “the unorthodox practices and lack of gender separa-
tion among Muslims, and they also felt that local Muslims were reluctant to 
assist their movement for fear of the Chinese Communist Party.” It was not 
until after the early 2000s that TJ managed to gain traction among Chinese 
Muslims, and did so through reshaping “Chinese Islamic identity to empha-
size being a part of the transnational ummah instead of a local ethnic group” 
(Stewart 2018: 1209). Stewart (2018: 1210) found that Chinese followers of the 
movement regard the call to “individual action as a modern improvement on 
more passive forms of traditional religiosity that is also a return to the ways of 
the Sahaba [aṣ-ṣaḥābah].”
What is clear is that TJ has had a remarkable ability to enact a process of 
religious revival and purification irrespective of local contexts. Its narrative 
has remained consistent, and has focused on providing an alternative to mod-
ern ways of life which are seen as inauthentic and as leading to corruption of 
the soul. This alternative is a ‘turning inwards’, focusing on one’s own spiritual 
growth, but also as part of a wider group of people who have made an active 
choice to rededicate their lives to living in imitation of Muḥammad and his 
companions. The effects of this, across the world, have been evident. In Fiji, 
where Jan Ali (2018) studied TJ, he found “visible changes in the dressing styles 
of men and women who, under its influence abandoned traditional attire, 
and adopted more Arab-looking clothing.” In addition to this, TJ emphasises 
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purdah—the seclusion of women—complete gender segregation, and an 
avoidance of going to places that are not seen as furthering the faith, for exam-
ple cinemas and cafes (Ali 2018: 15).
This is something that was also evidenced in Mali where since 1999 TJ man-
aged to gain popularity among the Ifoghas clan of the Tuareg. The Ifoghas 
assert their legitimacy on the basis of religion, and especially the claim to be 
descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad, and with the traditional leader pre-
senting himself as ʾAmīr al-Muʾminīn commander of the faithful. The Tuareg 
traditionally also accorded women much freedom to be actively involved in 
public life, including the holding of public office. TJ’s ascent among the Tuareg 
coincided with mayoral elections in June 1999, in which a female candidate 
was expected to win the race. At first, the tribal chief was favorable to the 
female candidate, but “under the influence of the Tablīghī doctrine, in May, the 
local ʿulamāʾ decreed that it was impossible in Islam to have a female mayor. 
Should the tribal chief fail to revoke his support for Doe, they would no longer 
acknowledge him as ʾAmīr al-Muʾminīn. The chief complied, withdrawing his 
support” (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007: 149–150).
While the actions of the tribal chief in Mali could be seen as drastic, and as 
a sharp break with cultural norms, for participants of TJ it will have come as 
the triumph of correct practice. For those committed to a Tablīghī way of life, 
their belief is that taking part in the movement’s activities pushes Muslims to 
new “heights of religious consciousness: their piety has risen, their vigilance in 
gender roles and segregation has increased, and syncretistic elements from for-
mer religious practices have been removed” (Ali 2018: 17). The actions in Mali 
will have appeared as a manifestation of this and as a cause to be celebrated, 
especially as the chief ’s senior advisors had completed a 40-day course with 
TJ in Gambia, and his two sons had returned from a ten-day course in Bamako 
(Lecocq and Scrijver 2007: 149). In Fiji too, the consequences of Tablīghī 
activities have manifested in the appearance of Islam becoming more visible. 
“Muslim men sporting beards and wearing traditional Muslim attire  … and 
women donning ḥijāb, burqa, and niqāb. Islam’s public appearance has been 
made further visible through the emergence of a plethora of prayer halls and 
religious centers” (Ali 2018: 17).
It is the case with TJ in the UK, specifically its attempts to construct 
Europe’s largest mosque in east London, that attracted the greatest amount of 
publicity. The case is an important one because it shows how TJ had to engage 
with the British political establishment (something usually discouraged) as a 
means to advancing their project. TJ originally purchased an 18-acre piece of 
land in West Ham in 1996; a site that was once home to a chemical factory, and 
deemed to be of little value to the broader community. This was to change 
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after London was successful in its bid to host the Olympic Games in 2012, with 
the Olympic Village and many of the facilities to be located in the East End. TJ 
leaders saw this as an opportunity to capitalise on the development around 
the Games, and to advance the construction of their own mosque, which they 
hoped would act as a Muslim quarter.
Architects Ali Mangera and Ada Yvars were commissioned, and their initial 
design for the mosque sparked national outrage, after indicating plans for a 
mosque with the capacity for 40,000 worshippers, and with additional tent-
like extensions that could increase useable space to accommodate 70,000 indi-
viduals (DeHanas and Pieri 2011: 806). Newspapers across Britain decried that 
TJ’s mosque would be far larger than any of the Christian cathedrals in the UK, 
and vaguely linked the project to concerns around terrorism, especially in the 
aftermath of the 7 July 2005 Islamic terrorist attacks in London (Steyn 2005). 
TJ leaders in London were taken aback by the intense level of public debate 
around their project, as well as the increased public scrutiny of the nature of 
the movement that was to advance such a large project.
In March 2007, with public anxiety about the mosque heightening, TJ lead-
ers acted in an unprecedented way, making an attempt to take control of the 
situation. A public relations firm, Indigo Public Affairs, was hired by the move-
ment to manage the discourse around the project and to improve the image of 
TJ itself. Indigo advised a fresh start for the project, and this involved dropping 
the architectural plans by Ali Mangera in favor of architectural firm Allies and 
Morrison. Indigo created a stylish website for the mosque project, as well as 
a YouTube page in which nervous TJ leaders were filmed talking about TJ as 
an open and inclusive group (Pieri 2015). TJ leaders announced that the scale 
of the mosque would be downsized from the 70,000 capacity to one called 
“medium sized,” at a 12,000 capacity (BBC News, 2007). The mosque would 
still be the largest religious building in the UK, but it would not be “Wembley 
Stadium” (Amanullah, 2007).
TJ’s abrupt change of strategy backfired, with opposition to its plans emerg-
ing from Muslim communities in London and within the local authority. 
Despite their efforts at reframing, TJ proved incapable of quelling the contro-
versy. Indeed, some of its new rhetoric on the mosque and about TJ’s own reli-
gious diversity and inclusiveness was overstated, and challenged. Numerous 
court cases were heard on TJ’s project, each time with TJ being told that the 
use of their site was not in compliance of the law, and that they needed to 
vacate the preemies. This is because TJ had built a temporary mosque on the 
site that was in violation of local planning law, and which was deemed as 
unsafe for users. Eventually the case came before the High Court in 2018. Judge 
Walden-Smith stated that:
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Despite the five-and-a-half months that had passed since the adjourn-
ment [of the last court case], there had been no progress in entering an 
agreement with a developer, no steps regarding a site investigation or 
decontamination of the land, no application for outline planning permis-
sion, no consultation with the local authority, and no solicitors instructed 
to deal with due diligence or license agreements with a developer … The 
trustees were very far from agreeing any sort of development for the site. 
They were continuing to procrastinate.
Taylor 2018
Because of this, the Judge allowed the for the demolition of TJ’s existing struc-
tures on the site. TJ surprised the court by announcing that they will move the 
fight to Strasbourg and filed an application to the European Court of Human 
Rights for a restraining order. Planning lawyers advise that this is unlikely to 
succeed (Craig 2018).
9 Conclusion
TJ has seen exponential growth since its origins in India’s Mewat province in 
1926. Its annual revivals in Bangladesh are the Muslim word’s largest faith gath-
erings outside of the ḥajj, and while its membership structures are fluid, it is 
estimated that up to 80 million Muslims worldwide take part in its actives. 
Its success has centered on a consistent narrative on the urgency of Muslims 
needing to reorient to a correct practicing of Islam as a pathway to salva-
tion. The movement has also provided clear articulation of how each Muslim 
can achieve this, through direct imitation of the Prophet Muḥammad. The 
movement is a ‘total’ institution, regulating every aspect of those who com-
mit to a Tablīghī way of life. TJ seeks to ensure that Muslims understand 
sharīʿa and to implement religious rules into their everyday actions includ-
ing the exact length to which a man should grow his beard, how one should 
go to sleep, and how to eat from a plate. The intention is to carve out and to 
create a sacred space among profane contexts; to allow individual believ-
ers space in which to pursue salvation. It is the construction of a Tablīghī 
universe in which a community of believers are linked together through 
common cause.
Tablīghī attempts to live out such lifestyles have at times presented them-
selves as isolationist, and as a rejection of prevailing cultural norms. In seek-
ing to minimise interaction with what is considered to be impure, Tablīghīs in 
some western contexts have withdrawn their children from the state education 
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system, opting instead for a strictly Islamic upbringing. Yet, as TJ becomes 
more established in different parts of the world, and becoming more recog-
nised there, it will have to become more adept at navigating those contexts. 
The best example of this was TJ’s attempt to construct a large mosque in the 
East End of London. Having had no experience in community engagement or 
public relations, TJ were not able to advance the kind of narrative needed to 
succeed in pursuing such a large development. Increasingly, countries in west-
ern Europe are demanding that any form of large development be couched in 
the language and spirit of inclusivity and diversity, something that TJ will have 
to learn to navigate.
TJ stands out in that it calls on Muslims to donate time in pursuit of its goals, 
and specifically in going out on missionary tours as a means of reorienting 
Muslims back to what TJ regards as a correct understanding of Islam. More 
than this though, it is clear that participation in TJ’s missions has profound 
impacts on shaping those who become committed to the everyday rituals of 
the movement. It is this notion of TJ as an anchor in ambiguous and diverse 
contexts that explains the success of the movement in the west.
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The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by the schoolteacher Ḥasan 
al-Bannā, is one of the most controversial Islamic movements. Evaluations 
of it range from descriptions of it as an extremist movement and a funda-
mental threat to an important vehicle for democratic transition in Middle 
Eastern states. These various judgements depend to a large degree on underly-
ing assumptions of what religion, and specifically Islam, is, what constitutes 
democracy, and what role ideology plays in historical processes.
Some authors, who emphasise the role of ideas for historical change, assume 
that Islam in itself conflates religion and politics (Johnson 2010: 6). From that 
assumption there is a small step to the notion that an ideology based on Islam 
is essentially stable through time and place and that the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
goals can best be found in the writings of its founder Ḥasan al-Bannā, most 
notably in the movement’s slogan “Islam is the solution” (Besson 2005: 13). An 
understanding of the term ‘Islamism’ as a relatively stable and unified category 
tends to lead to a dismissal of the Brotherhood’s rejection of violence and its 
political participation, as well as its differences with jihādi groups, as pure tac-
tics (Vidino 2010: 17). If this is combined with an understanding of democracy 
as not only a set of rules for regulating political dissent, but as a set of values 
and virtues within individual citizens, the conclusion is close at hand that the 
eventual electoral victory of Brotherhood parties would inevitably mean the 
end of any democratic transition.
Authors who emphasise practice over ideology, and processes over ideo-
logical consistency, tend to be more open to the possibility of reform within 
the Brotherhood (Lia 2006: 297). This appears even more credible when the 
Brotherhood leaders’ behavior in the Middle East and North Africa is compared 
with other political actors in the same region rather than with those in mature 
democracies in Western Europe and North America. Samir Amghar (2008: 
75f.), for example, emphasises the need to consider the dynamic character of 
Islamism and to avoid essentialist definitions in order not to ascribe to actors 
opinions that they do not necessarily have. With the Brotherhood’s history now 
almost spanning a hundred years with local branches, or independent groups 
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inspired by it, in most states in the Middle East and North Africa, contradict-
ing evaluations of the movement can find empirical support in different coun-
tries and time periods. Carrie Wickham (2013: 2) argues that generalisations 
of the Brotherhood as for or against democracy miss the movement’s internal 
debates and inconsistencies.
Since its foundation in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread 
across the Middle East and North Africa through local branches and ideologi-
cal influence. However, it is hard to define a coherent Brotherhood ideology 
because of the movement’s tendency to adapt its message and policy to socio-
political circumstances. This article will present an overview of the various 
directions the Brotherhood has taken at different periods of time and in differ-
ent countries in the Middle east and North Africa.
2 The Egyptian Mother Branch
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in the city of Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928 
by Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906–1949), schoolteacher and son of a Ḥanbalī īmān and 
author of Ṣūfi texts, Shaykh Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Al-Bannā’s education 
included both government and Qurʾānic education as well as tutelage under 
Ṣūfi masters (Krämer 2015: 202). In his youth, he was influenced by nation-
alist and anti-colonial ideas and the Islamic reformist movement, ʾiṣlāḥ, that 
emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century with leaders such 
as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbdu, and Rashīd Riḍā. Al-Bannā and 
many of the members of the Brotherhood belonged to an emerging and newly 
urbanised educated lower middle class. His criticism was not only directed at 
the British colonial regime but also at the Egyptian upper classes’ monopoly on 
economic and political influence. Brynjar Lia has described the Brotherhood 
as part of the emergence of modern mass politics in Egypt in the 1930s (Lia 
2006: 13; Mitchell 1993: 321).
Al-Bannā’s initial focus was to educate a new generation of Muslims in what 
he considered to be a correct understanding of Islam. Since then, the concept 
of tarbiyya, (education), has been central to the movement (Lia 2006: 37). 
According to Brynjar Lia, the politisation of the movement’s message began 
in earnest with a speech of al-Bannā in 1938 in which he emphasised Islam 
as an all-encompassing system that covers all areas in life. He contrasted this 
understanding with what he called “traditional Islam,” which he described as 
submissive and serving colonial interests (Lia 2006: 202).
Even though al-Bannā called for an Islamic state, he never specified what 
this meant. He talked about social justice, redistribution of resources, an 
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elected assembly and a constitution that limits the prerogatives of powerhold-
ers and make them accountable to the people. An Islamic constitution would 
also, according to al-Bannā, limit lawmakers’ authority to make laws that vio-
late Islamic rules and norms. He had an ambiguous view on party politics. On 
the one hand, he criticised party politics with the pejorative term hizbiyya, 
‘partyism’, on the other he and other members contested for parliament on dif-
ferent occasions during the 1940s. The first time when he contested elections, 
he gave in to pressure from the government and withdrew his own and other 
members’ candidacies and supported the Wafd party, thereby accepting the 
result of rigged elections (Mitchell 1993: 219, 309).
Al-Bannā’s willingness to bargain caused frustration among many members 
who began to view revolutionary action as the only way for change. Already 
in the 1920s the two biggest political parties, the Wafd and the Young Egypt, 
had their own militias that clashed with each other. Another factor was the 
Palestinian uprising 1936–1939. The Brotherhood was only one among sev-
eral Egyptian groups that sent voluntary fighters to Palestine. In 1940, the 
Brotherhood’s military wing, al-tanẓīm al-khāṣṣ, ‘The Special Organisation’, was 
formed. Lia explains this as an attempt to diffuse the pressure from radicalised 
members and at the same time ensure that the violence did not escalate out of 
control (Lia 2006: 180, Mitchell 1993: 30ff). However, during the 1940s al-Bannā 
was increasingly challenged by the leaders of the armed wing to the extent that 
it appeared uncertain who really led the movement.
In December 1948, the Egyptian government dissolved the Brotherhood 
with a decree and two months later, in February 1949, al-Bannā was assassi-
nated by unknown perpetrators. Because of internal division, it took two years 
before Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī (1891–1973) was elected as a new leader as a compro-
mise candidate. This prominent jurist had until then not even been a member 
of the movement. His task was to consolidate the movement internally and 
to negotiate with the government and the royal court and later with the Free 
officers who took power in 1952. Al-Huḍaybī also had to face challenges from 
radicalised members whose most prominent ideologue was to be Sayyid Quṭb 
(1906–1966).
Sayyid Quṭb is, with al-Bannā, the Brotherhood’s most well-known thinker. 
It should however be stressed that he was never the leader of the movement, 
but the ideologue of a secret internal group within it, called Organisation 1965, 
which gathered members who had been radicalised in the prisons. Barbara 
Zollner divides Quṭb’s career into three phases. During the 1930s and 1940s he 
was a secular literary author and critic. After a stay in the United States 1948–
1950, where he was sent by the Egyptian ministry of education to study the 
American education system, his ideas had a more Islamic color and after his 
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return to Egypt he joined the Brotherhood and became the editor of its weekly 
al-Ikhwan al-muslimin. Quṭb now argued that a secular division of state and 
religion is a result of a specific Western historical development which is foreign 
for Muslim societies. During this phase, his texts focused on social justice from 
an Islamic perspective and it was during this period he published his book 
Social Justice in Islam (Zollner 2009: 51ff).
The third and last phase began with his first arrest in 1954. Under the influ-
ence of the Pakistani thinkers Abū l-Ḥasan al-Nadwī and Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, 
he formulated his theory that political sovereignty, ḥākimiyya, is located solely 
with God and that the society and political system in Egypt had relapsed into 
jāhiliyya, ‘ignorance of Islam’. Hence, jāhiliyya, traditionally referring to the 
Arabs’ ignorance of Islam before the revelation of the Prophet Muḥammad, 
for Quṭb became a timeless concept for criticising conditions in contemporary 
society. He argued that the Islamic profession of faith, shahāda, is a call for 
political action and that Muslims who do not combine faith with action are 
guilty of unbelief, kufr. Hence, Quṭb embraced the idea of takfīr, to designate 
as unbelievers other Muslims, who disagree with one’s own interpretation, a 
practice that has always been controversial among Muslim scholars. These 
ideas were laid out in the book Milestones which, according to Zollner, prob-
ably was written as an ideological program for members in the Organisation 
1965. Quṭb’s ideas became a source of inspiration for the Brotherhood’s armed 
wing and later also for well-known jihadist ideologues such as al-Qāʿida’s cur-
rent leader ʾAyman al-Ẓawāhirī; and the former spokesperson for the Islamic 
State ʾAbū Muḥammad al-ʿAdnānī. Both al-Qāʿida and the Islamic State usu-
ally makes an explicit exception for Quṭb when they accuse the Brother-
hood of apostasy because of its recognition of parliamentary democracy 
(Zollner 2009: 52ff).
In 1977, a book entitled Duʿāt lā quḍāt (Preachers not Judges) was pub-
lished under the name of the Supreme Guide Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī. According 
to Zollner, it had been completed and distributed to members already in 1969 
and was the result of a collective work that included Muslim scholars at the al-
Azhar University as well as members in the Brotherhood’s leadership. Several 
of the latter would eventually succeed each other as the movement’s supreme 
guide. The purpose of the book was to consolidate al-Huḍaybī’s authority 
over the Brotherhood and to refute Quṭb’s jihadist theory, although without 
naming him. Quṭb’s reinterpretation of the concept jāhiliyya is rejected with 
the argument that Muslims never lost the truth after Muḥammad’s revela-
tion. The establishment of an Islamic state, in which Islamic law is applied, 
is described as a secondary matter. What is central is instead that individual 
Muslims apply Islam in the own lives. Political ruler should be obeyed, even 
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if they violate Islamic rules, and active opposition should only be a last resort 
(Zollner 2009: 64ff).
Al-Huḍaybī did not have the charisma of al-Bannā and Quṭb and is described 
by Mitchell as a weak leader with a great deal of responsibility for the near 
destruction of the Brotherhood in 1954 (Mitchell 1993: 300). Zollner, on the 
other hand, claims that it is his ideas, to a significantly greater extent than the 
ideas of both al-Bannā and Quṭb, that have laid the foundation for the move-
ment’s development since the 1970s (Zollner 2009: 146). When Anwar Sadat 
succeeded Nasser as president in 1970, a great number of the movement’s 
members were released from prison and the Brotherhood was permitted to 
resume its activity. Al-Huḍaybī passed away in 1973 and was succeeded by 
ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī, who continued the former’s policy of nonviolent and grad-
ual Islamisation of society. In the 1970s, a number of Islamist groups emerged 
at Egyptian universities. These students were often influenced by Sayyid Quṭb 
and several of these groups eventually developed into armed jihadist groups. 
However, others joined the Muslim Brotherhood, where they were exposed 
to the reformist line of al-Huḍaybī and al-Tilmisānī. It was from this genera-
tion the leaders of the Brotherhood’s reformist wing in the 1990s sprang, who 
demonstrated a more unreserved support than al-Huḍaybī and al-Tilmisānī 
for a democratic multiparty system and the rights of religious minorities 
(Zollner 2009: 146).
In the 1980s, The Muslim Brotherhood appeared as the strongest opposition 
movement in Egypt and an internal discussion on whether to establish a politi-
cal party began, a discussion that would continue until the fall of President 
Hosni Mubarak in 2011. The reformist wing advocated a political party while the 
conservative wing advocated a focus on daʿwa, missionary activities. Already 
in 1996 Hizb al-Wasat, ‘the Center Party’, had been formed with the participa-
tion of some members of the reformist wing as well as non-members of the 
Brotherhood. The new party met resistance from both the regime and the 
Brotherhood leadership, which excluded the members who persisted to stay 
within the party. In 2007, the Brotherhood leadership and the reformist wing 
presented two party programs, still without having founded a party. Both pro-
grams demanded democratic reforms but the leadership’s version suggested a 
religious expert council with veto power over legislation and a provision that 
the chief of state must be male and Muslim. In the autumn 2009, the General 
Guide Muhammad Akif resigned. This was the first time anyone had resigned 
from this position: the previous general guides having stayed until death. 
Muhammad Badi´, a representative for the conservative wing, was elected as 
his successor and in the election to the Bureau of Guidance the reformist rep-
resentatives lost their seats.
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The new conservative leadership declared that it had no intention to form a 
political party and it was now expected the Brotherhood would distance itself 
from political activity. When street demonstrations against the regime broke 
out in the beginning of 2011 the Brotherhood leaders initially were cautious. 
However, younger members pressured them to back the protests which even-
tually led to the toppling of President Mubarak. The Brotherhood now finally 
formed a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, and forbade members 
to join rival parties. The party gained 43.4 per cent of the votes in the election 
to the constituent assembly. In 2012 the Brotherhood’s candidate Muhammad 
Mursī won the presidential election with a narrow margin over the military’s 
candidate but was toppled by the military only a year later.
3 The Structure of the Brotherhood
The precise form of the Brotherhood’s structure has varied over time but has 
to a great extent remained the same since the 1940s. On the grassroot level the 
movement is divided into usar, ‘families’, of about five members who are in 
intensive contact with each other to strengthen each other’s belief. This is the 
central level for ideological training and cohesion through common prayer. A 
handful of families form a shuʿba, ‘division’. Three to four divisions form a man-
tiq, ‘district’. Each Egyptian province has an administrative bureau that gathers 
all the districts in the province (al-Anani 2016: 103ff).
On the national level there is a majlis al-shūrā, shūrā council, which is the 
decision-making organ of the movement. It has ninety members elected from 
the provinces. There is also a guidance bureau with sixteen members elected 
from the shūrā council. The guidance bureau serves as the executive body. The 
Brotherhood’s leader has the title al-murshid al-ʾamm, the ‘General Guide’. He 
is elected by the shūrā council, after having received a bayʿa, oath of allegiance, 
from all members:
I contract with God  … to adhere firmly to the message of the Muslim 
brothers, to strive on its behalf, to live up to the conditions of its mem-
bership, to have complete confidence in its leadership and to obey abso-
lutely, under all circumstance ( fi-l-manshat wa-l-makra). I swear by God 
in that and make my oath of loyalty to Him. Of what I say, God is Witness.
quoted in Mitchell 1993: 165
However, there is disagreement among members what this oath really means 
and to whom or what the allegiance is pledged. Some argues that the loyalty 
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is towards the Brotherhood’s principles rather than the individual leader. The 
oath has been criticised by some members for being used to silence internal 
opposition (al-Anani 2016: 124f; Mitchell 1993: 304).
4 The Muslim Brotherhood in Other Middle Eastern Countries
In the 1950s, exiled members of the Brotherhood, mainly from Egypt but also 
from Syria and Iraq, found refuge in Saudi Arabia and positions at the newly 
opened universities there (Lacroix 2011: 37ff). During the 1950s and 1960s at 
least four rival Muslim Brotherhood groups were established in the kingdom 
and they never managed to unite under one national organisation. In spite 
of contacts with the Egyptian mother organisation, the Saudi members never 
swore an oath of allegiance to its leader. One problem for the Saudi Brotherhood 
has been the deep suspicion within the Wahhābī tradition against parties and 
groups as creating division among believers (Lacroix 2011: 62ff).
More important than these groups have been various ideologies that 
emerged as a result of the meeting between the internal Wahhābī tradition 
and foreign Muslim Brothers and which with time would challenge the Saudi 
political system. Jihadists, whose ideology is based on a selective reading of 
Sayyid Quṭb, turned against the Saudi regime when American troops were 
allowed on Saudi soil during the Gulf War in 1991. This war also led to the emer-
gence of a movement called al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya, ‘the Islamic awakening’, 
or The Sahwa, which demanded the evacuation of American troops but also 
political reforms, demands formulated in public petitions. In a country where 
any public criticism of the king is considered as treason, this led to a swathe 
of mass arrests in 1994 that lasted for five years. When the country was shaken 
by a waves of jihadist attack in 2003 and 2004, some of these representatives 
of The Sahwa were used to spread a nonviolent interpretation of Islam and in 
rehabilitation programs for jihadists (al-Rasheed: 2007: 82f, 170).
The Arab Spring 2011 was met with enthusiasm among many representatives 
of The Sahwa and led to a new flood of public petitions demanding political 
reforms and when the Egyptian President Mursī was toppled by the military 
in 2013 they condemned it as a violation of the popular will, which implicitly 
challenged the Saudi monarchical system (Al-Rasheed 2015: 35ff, 88ff). In the 
Spring of 2014, the Brotherhood was banned and categorised as extremist and 
a terrorist organisation.
The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1945. 
The first decades the movement was allied with the royal house against the 
leftist opposition (Wickham 2013: 197). When King Hussein lifted the state 
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of emergency, which had been introduced after the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank in 1967, and allowed political parties, the Brotherhood formed the 
party Islamic Action Front in 1992 and began during the 1990s to stress Islam’s 
compatibility with democracy (Wickham 2013: 209). According to Roald, there 
was a swift change after the political opening in 1992. Before that year, rep-
resentatives of the Brotherhood had talked about a specific form of Islamic 
democracy, distinctive from Western democracy, with reference to the Islamic 
concept shūrā, counsel, which they claimed meant that the ruler should listen 
to religious scholars. After 1992, the standard answer was instead to identify 
shūrā with Western democracy. In this period the Brotherhood also had begun 
to cooperate with secular leftist parties in opposition to a conservative gov-
ernment. In 2007, the same leaders had substituted the loanword dimuqrati-
yya for shūrā (Roald 2012a: 75; Roald 2012b: 99f). However, the party took a 
more conservative position on issues relating to reforms of women’s position. 
Wickham explains this with the party’s internal democratic structure which 
made the leaders more attentive to tribal norms among a conservative public 
opinion, which prompted dissatisfied members to leave in 2000 to form the 
more reformist Wasat party (Wickham 2013: 219ff).
After the Second World War, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was 
established in Jerusalem. When the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, the 
Brotherhood on the West Bank was incorporated into the Jordanian branch. 
While the Jordanian Brotherhood operated as a loyal opposition to the mon-
archy, the branch in Gaza, now under Egyptian rule, became involved in the 
conflict between the regime and the Egyptian Brotherhood. With the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 the two branches approached 
each other again. Until the first Intifada in 1987, the Palestinian Brotherhood 
focused on daʿwa, charity, and local politics, leaving militant resistance to sec-
ular groups. This prompted dissatisfied members to leave, some of whom par-
ticipated in the formation of Fatah in 1965 while others formed armed Islamist 
groups, such as Islamic Jihad at the end of the 1970s (Gunning 2007: 27f; 
Seurat 2015: 14f).
In Israel, the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 led to a revival of Islam 
with a renewed access to religious scholars educated on the West Bank. In 1984, 
the Islamic Movement was founded under the leadership of Shaykh Abdallah 
Nimr Darwish. He was newly released from a prison term for having being 
member in an armed group, but he now rejected violence and advocated sup-
port for Palestinian, Muslim, and Arab identity within the legal framework 
in Israel. The movement participated in local elections in 1984 and 1989 but 
split in 1996 into a northern and a southern branch. Under the leadership of 
Darwish, the southern branch joined other Palestinian parties in the Arab 
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Unity List, while the northern branch advocated a boycott of the Knesset, argu-
ing that campaigning for it would imply a recognition of the Israeli state’s legit-
imacy. Both branches reject violence, but the latter has used a harsher rhetoric 
towards Israel and occasionally defended Ḥamās (Göndör 2012: 53ff; Rosmer 
2012: 325ff; Daoud 2016: 22ff).
The expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Gaza led to 
the first Intifada in 1987 and to impatience among younger members of the 
Brotherhood with the movement’s inactivity in the resistance. In 1987, Ḥarakat 
al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic Resistance Movement), with the acro-
nym Ḥamās, was founded by older and younger leaders in Gaza. The younger 
leaders were allowed to form an armed branch of resistance separate from the 
Brotherhood (Gunning 2007: 39; Seurat 2015: 15f).
The Charter of Ḥamās, written by a young leader in 1988, defines Palestine 
as an Islamic charity, waqf, thereby describing resistance against the Israeli 
occupation as a religious duty. From this follows that the land is to be governed 
by Islamic law and Christians and Jews are allowed to live there as dhimmīs, 
‘protected people’, under Muslim sovereignty. The Charter also blames crusad-
ers and Zionists for obstructing the establishment of an Islamic state and even 
mentions a Jewish world conspiracy with a reference to the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion. These formulations have not only met external criticism but also 
from some leaders within Ḥamās, while other leaders have tried to ignore the 
text and describe it as of secondary importance or no longer relevant (Charter 
of Ḥamās 1996 [1988]; Seurat 2015: 22).
Since its foundation in 1987, Ḥamās has alternated between violence and 
diplomacy to achieve its interests. Between 1994 and 2005, the movement per-
formed a number of suicide attacks in Israel. Since then, the use of violence 
has been limited to rocket attacks on villages near Gaza and attacks on Israeli 
soldiers. Ḥamās has offered Israel limited truces and introduced unilateral 
ones when it has considered it politically motivated (Gunning 2007: 195; Hroub 
2010: 57; Brenner 2017: 30f).
In 2005, Ḥamās decided to participate in the elections to the Palestinian 
Legislative Assembly, which it surprisingly won. In the election campaign 
its political party toned down the religious rhetoric for the benefit of a more 
nationalist language. The election platform did not mention the idea of an 
Islamic state but did contain a passus that sharīʿa should be the main source of 
legislation (Hroub 2010: 20, 40, 136ff; Seurat 2015: 48f; Brenner 2017: 3).
While Ḥamās was founded by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
movements do not have formal ties and Ḥamās has described the link dif-
ferently according to the context. When Ḥamās’ external leadership was 
based in Amman, Jordan, in the 1990s, there was a rapprochement towards 
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the Jordanian Brotherhood but when it moved to Syria, where member-
ship in the Brotherhood entails capital punishment, the ties were dissolved. 
When Muhammad Mursī was elected president of Egypt in 2012, the ties were 
strengthened once again and Ḥamās added the phrase ‘section of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’ to its official name. After the military coup that toppled Mursī, 
Ḥamās distanced itself from the Brotherhood (Seurat 2015: 19, 95).
In May 2017, Ḥamās published a new document with general principles 
and policies in which Ḥamās is described as a national Palestinian liberation 
and resistance movement with Islam as a frame of reference. The Muslim 
Brotherhood is not mentioned and the founding Charter’s references to the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion has been replaced with assertions that the enemy 
is ‘the Zionist project’, not Jews because of their religion. In an ambiguous for-
mulation the document rejects any concession of the historical Palestine, ‘from 
the river to the sea’, while at the same time hinting to a sovereign Palestine 
state within the 1967 borders.
The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1945. During 
the two first decades, it advocated parliamentary democracy and the recog-
nition of the rights of religious minorities in more unambiguous terms than 
the Egyptian mother movement. The first leaders, Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī and Issam 
al-Attar, claimed that Islam only provides general principles for governance, 
leaving details to human reason (Lefèvre 2013: 23ff, 86).
After the Baathist coup in 1963, a jihadist wing within in the Brotherhood 
emerged in Hama, led by Marwan Hadid. Several members began to con-
demn the regime in sectarian terms because of the ʿAlawī origins of several 
military leaders in the new regime (Lefèvre 2013: 72ff, 97ff). Unrest and mass 
arrests during the 1970s culminated in a massacre on 83 ʿAlawite cadets at the 
Aleppo artillery school in 1979. The following days, thousands of members of 
the Brotherhood were arrested and tortured. In 1980, a law was passed ban-
ning membership in the movement under the penalty of death. In 1984, the 
regime cracked down on a rebellion in Hama by bombing the city, which 
resulted in between 10,000 and 40,000 deaths (Lefèvre 2013: 125ff). Surviving 
members of the armed wing fled the country and several of them were to join 
al-Qāʿida later (Lefèvre 2013: 138). At the end of the 1980s, the moderate wing 
regained dominance within the Brotherhood. It initially attempted to bargain 
with the regime but after 2000 initiated a dialogue with the secular opposi-
tion. In 2004, the Brotherhood published a political program demanding free 
and transparent elections and assured that it would accept a Christian or a 
woman as president if this would be the result of elections. When the rebel-
lion against the regime broke out in 2011, which was soon to develop into a 
civil war, the Brotherhood joined the Syrian National Council, while groups 
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within the former armed wing joined al-Qāʿida’s Syrian wing, the Nusra Front 
(Lefèvre 2013: 87f).
In Algeria in 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was on the brink of 
becoming the first Islamist party in the Middle East and North Africa to come 
to power in free elections. It had gained 55 per cent of the votes in the local elec-
tions in 1990 and 44 per cent in the first round of elections for the presidency 
in 1991. However, the military intervened, deposed the president, cancelled the 
second round of elections, and banned the party. This was the beginning of a 
bloody civil war that cost an estimated 200,000 lives between 1992 and 1999. 
FIS established an armed wing, AIS, which mainly attacked the police and 
military. However, a new armed group, which eventually would develop into 
al-Qāʿida in the Maghreb, also attacked civilians. It is still discussed to what 
extent groups within the regime were involved in the violence against civilians 
(Utvik 2016: 114ff).
FIS was founded in 1989 by members in various Islamist groups. However, 
some of the leader refused to join the new party. Ahmad Sahnoun founded the 
Islamic Nahḍa and Mahfuz Nahna the Movement for an Islamic Society (with 
the acronym HAMAS, without any relation to the Palestinian movement). Both 
were inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Bjørn Utvik, Nahna 
was a member in the international organisation of the Brotherhood and 
Sahnoun’s Nahḍa had a structure similar to that of the Brotherhood with a 
base of families where the members were socialised in the party’s ideology 
(Utvik 2016: 115ff; Boubekeur 2009: 168ff; Willis 1998: 170ff).
While the banned FIS went underground, both Nahḍa and HAMAS operated 
as a legal opposition during the civil war in the 1990s. Nahḍa had made more 
clear demands for the Islamisation of legislation and enforcing Islamic norms 
in society, thus attracting members from FIS. HAMAS entered a closer coop-
eration with the regime and even participated in some governments between 
2002 and 2007. The Algerian case illustrates how groups ideologically influ-
enced by the Muslim Brotherhood in some circumstances may end up on dif-
ferent side, even in a civil war (Utvik 2016: 116; Boubekeur 2009: 169f; Willis 
1998: 57ff).
In Tunisia, the Islamic Tendency Movement (harakat al-ittijah al-islami) was 
founded in the 1981 with the aim to Islamise society and counter Western influ-
ences on Tunisian society. After president Bourguiba had been toppled by Zine 
el Abidine Ben Ali in 1987, a short period of political opening followed, and 
the movement changed its name to al-Nahḍa (‘Renaissance’). In 1989, the most 
prominent of its leaders, Rachid Ghannouchi, was forced into exile in London, 
where he gradually began to emphasise Islam’s compatibility with democracy 
and human rights. He appears to the earliest Islamist leader who advocated 
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that women could be chiefs of state. While Ghannouchi in his youth had been 
an admirer of Sayyid Quṭb, he now talks about popular sovereignty instead of 
God’s sovereignty. He describes Islam as a normative system which provides a 
spiritual and moral dimension to what he considers the purely materialistic 
basis of Western democracy. This combination of Islam and democracy has 
made Ghannouchi a central point of reference for many Brotherhood sym-
pathisers in Europe (Roald 2001: 192f). After the fall of Ben Ali in 2011, al-Nahḍa 
has been part of succeeding governments. In 2016, the party declared that it 
considered itself as a purely political party and did not identify as Islamist.
5 Conclusion
The hierarchical structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has proved to be both 
a strength and a liability. It has helped to movement to survive under author-
itarian regimes, but the emphasis on members’ obligation to obey the lead-
ership has not prevented factionalism and splits within the movement, with 
some banished members still enjoying a status as its most prominent think-
ers. Strategically, Brotherhood branches have been involved in both armed and 
peaceful resistance, as well as being coopted by authoritarian regimes. Hence, 
the Brotherhood’s ideology is best seen as fluid and adaptable to different 
sociopolitical circumstances, having produced militant jihadist ideas as well 
as defenses for democratic values.
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Chapter 4




Since a failed attempt at a military coup on the night of 15 July 2016, the Gülen 
Movement (henceforth GM), which developed around the figure of Islamic 
preacher and social critic Fethullah Gülen (b. 1941), has been forcibly exiled 
from its homeland of Turkey.1 The events of that night marked the final, explo-
sive stage in Fethullah Gülen’s transition from powerful establishment ally to 
Turkey’s most wanted criminal (Esen and Gumuscu 2017; Yavuz and Balcı 2018; 
Zarakol 2016). The Turkish government holds Gülen directly responsible for 
masterminding the coup and the GM is referred to in Turkey today as FETÖ 
(Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation), and the unprecedented wave of arrests 
and state sector purges that have been witnessed since 2016 have ostensibly 
been aimed at its members. In reality, tens of thousands of people—many of 
whom have no connection to Gülen whatsoever—have lost their jobs, fled 
the country or are now languishing in prison. Those Gülenists who were able 
to escape have sought refuge overseas, many of them apparently in Western 
Europe and the United States of America (US), where the GM has an estab-
lished presence. With its considerable financial assets in Turkey confiscated 
by the state, febrile anti-Gülenism pervading the public mood and President 
Erdoğan’s grip on power consolidated through an executive presidency, 
there is little prospect of the GM ever recovering its once powerful position in 
its homeland.
Since 2016, the organisational contours of the GM have changed. Gülen con-
tinues to reside on his reclusive compound in Pennsylvania, US, where he has 
lived since 1999, and the efforts of the Turkish government to secure his extra-
dition to face charges for masterminding the coup have so far failed. However, 
while Gülen and his inner circle of followers remain intact, the rest of the global 
GM has experienced serious rupture. Searching for a future outside Turkey, the 
1 Some parts of this chapter have previously been published in the author’s monograph, The 
Gülen Movement in Turkey: The Politics of Islam and Modernity (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).
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GM has begun to regroup in nations including Germany, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the US, where for various reasons it is finding a relatively sym-
pathetic reception (Lesage 2019; Watmough and Öztürk 2018).
The victimisation of the GM by a now-authoritarian regime in Turkey is 
ironic, for it is widely recognised that between the late 1990s and early 2010s 
the movement was itself one of the foremost architects of that regime. There 
are numerous examples during that time of Gülenist involvement in political 
manoeuvring; what Simon Watmough and Ahmet Öztürk (2018) have referred 
to in the GM context as “parapolitics.” In the first two terms of the Justice and 
Development Party better known as the AK Parti (or AKP), founded by the cur-
rent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the GM acted as an unofficial ally to the 
government, sharing its conservative religious outlook and its desire to down-
grade the power of the Kemalist establishment responsible for the construc-
tion of the modern Turkish state from its Ottoman past (Taş 2017; Yavuz 2018). 
Although not openly engaged in party politics, Gülen nonetheless steered a 
political course for the AKP by mobilising his followers in the police service 
and the judiciary to conspire against senior secularist figures. The so-called 
Ergenekon, Balyoz and Poyrazköy trials saw 275 high ranking military officers, 
journalists, and opposition politicians imprisoned on trumped up charges, 
and replaced with government sympathisers. They were subsequently exoner-
ated and released, but the damage to Turkey’s secular institutional structure 
had already been done. Later on, the GM would turn its political manoeuvring 
against its former ally, most notably—although ultimately unsuccessfully—
with corruption allegations against the Prime Minister launched in December 
2013. Therefore, although the coup attempt in July 2016 was the first time the 
GM had been accused of violence (on the public record, Gülen is a pacifist), 
its track record of political meddling had already been common knowledge in 
Turkey for many years.
While the GM has always attracted sceptics and detractors in Turkey, it has 
strategically recruited support for its activities overseas. It has focused partic-
ularly on centres of global power such as Washington DC. Gülen’s residence 
in Pennsylvania has always been more than mere contingency: his followers 
have long been instructed to invest and settle in the US, a move that reflects 
the GM’s global ambition and strategic vision (Hendrick 2013; Tee 2016). That 
vision developed pragmatically in a post-9/11 era, when the appetite for repre-
sentations of ‘moderate’ Islam amongst western audiences and policy makers 
has been considerable. With its focus on secular education and inter-faith dia-
logue, its engagement in free market entrepreneurship, and its public support 
for political democracy, the GM has provided an attractive foil to the violent 
jihadi extremism emerging from other parts of the Muslim Middle East.
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International endorsements of the GM were especially common during its 
heyday, between 2002–2012, when optimism about the Turkey’s future under 
the AKP government was high. Turkey was ascribed then with the potential 
to serve as a ‘model’ of Islam successfully co-existing with modern, liberal 
democracy. The GM played an important part in the construction of that 
image. Academics were amongst those openly expressing their admiration 
and support for Gülen (Ebaugh 2009; Pandya and Gallagher 2012; Weller and 
Yılmaz 2012), and a body of largely uncritical pro-GM literature emerged, some 
of which was written and published by the GM itself from its publishing houses 
in New Jersey, US. More recently, and particularly since 2016, scholarship on 
the GM has taken a notably more critical turn. Currently, there are perhaps 
two major topics that occupy scholarly attention on the GM: the first of these 
concerns the contradictions between the GM’s public image and international 
presence, and its ‘parapolitical’ activities in Turkey (Watmough and Öztürk, 
2018), which—having been ignored by supporters for decades—are now 
beyond question; the second concerns the movement’s future as a diaspora 
movement in the wake of 2016.
The aim of this chapter is to offer an introductory overview of the ideas, 
organisational structure and activities of the GM, an explanation for its emer-
gence and rapid rise to power and influence in late twentieth and early twenty-
first century Turkey, and an analysis of the souring of its relationship with 
the AKP and its dramatic fall from grace. It will conclude with a brief analysis 
of the current state of the field in GM studies in light of the failed coup, and 
the new directions that the GM now faces as a movement seeking to regroup 
in exile.
2 Fethullah Gülen and the Origins of the GM
Fethullah Gülen was born in the village of Korucuk, Erzurum in 1938 (Mercan 
2008: 34–35). His origins in Erzurum help to explain his distinctive interpreta-
tion of Islam and the Turkish nationalist tenor of the GM (Yavuz 2013: 25–46). 
Erzurum is a socially conservative province known for its pious population, 
located high on the central Anatolian plateau, within a few hours’ drive of 
Turkey’s eastern frontiers with Iran, Armenia, and Georgia. Erzurum is there-
fore a strategic city and has a long military history, dictated in large part by 
its frontier position in both Ottoman and Republican eras. Military skirmishes 
with neighbouring powers have been a feature of life in Erzurum for centuries 
and have contributed to the development of a regional identity built on strong 
national as well as Muslim religious sentiment.
89The Gülen Movement
Typical of the time and place in which he was born, Gülen’s childhood in 
the 1940s and 1950s was characterised by rural, Turkish Sunnī Muslim prac-
tices and ways of learning. He attended the first four years of primary school, 
but thereafter had a traditional religious education in local Ṣūfi tekkes. In the 
tekkes, Gülen received religious instruction from shaykhs of the Naqshbandī 
Order (Weismann 2007), of which his father was a member, as well as from 
the Qādirī Order. On leaving the tekke, Gülen continued to pursue his study of 
Ṣūfism under the guidance of various local shaykhs in Erzurum, where he also 
embarked on the formal study of Islamic jurisprudence ( fīqh ).
While he was still a young man, Gülen became familiar with the teachings 
of Said Nursi, the Kurdish-Turkish Islamic thinker whose intellectual tradi-
tion he went on to follow (Abu Rabi 2003; Mardin 1989; Vahide 2005). Nursi 
(1877–1960) was a paradigmatic Turkish modernist thinker who authored the 
Risale-i Nur (Epistle of Light). The principle tenet of Nursi’s teachings is his 
vision of a revitalisation of Turkish religious culture, which he saw to be under 
threat from the rise of scientific scepticism and secularisation in the modern 
age (Abu Rabi 2008; Turner 2008). He envisaged this religious revival taking 
place, not through the medium of political activism or violent revolution, but 
rather through a principle that he defined as ‘positive action’ (müspet hareket). 
This principle allowed for pious believers to engage and contribute peaceably 
to society at large in all of its constituent parts, and through it Nursi foresaw 
an effective way of reintroducing Islamic mores back into the public sphere 
with the ultimate aim of reinstating Islam as the guiding principle of Turkish 
society. Nursian principles and the core intellectual themes from the Risale 
are clearly visible in Gülen’s own published works: indeed, members of the 
GM have appealed to the movement’s pacifist Nursi-inspired ideology, albeit 
to a sometimes sceptical audience, when speaking in defence of Gülen in the 
post-coup era.2
2.1 Gülen in Izmir
At the age of eighteen, Gülen passed the exam to become a state-appointed 
imam and was soon sent to the western coastal city of Izmir, where he assumed 
the directorship of a Qurʾānic school attached to the Kestanepazarı mosque in 
the city centre. It was in Izmir in the late 1960s that Gülen began to attract a 
following, and the GM had its genesis.




As well as preaching regularly at the Kestanepazarı mosque, Gülen began 
to visit local coffee-houses to preach and his message started to reach a wider 
demographic than the already religiously-observant sectors of the community. 
By reaching out beyond the traditional catchment of pious individuals, Gülen 
sought to take his message of moral and spiritual reform to a broader group 
of listeners in the public sphere. The teachings of Said Nursi constituted the 
foundations of his message, but, significantly, Gülen’s presentation of those 
teachings focused on their practical enactment in the local context of 1960s 
Izmir. He set out to show his early audience of students, small business owners 
and tradespeople how religious piety might complement, rather than compro-
mise, their professional activities and successfully be enacted in their various 
spheres of worldly influence.
A major factor behind Gülen’s success of these early years was his charis-
matic oratorical style, which he continued to manifest until 2016 through the 
publication of his sermons online. His use of a rather archaic Turkish is quite 
distinctive, and he has an extremely emotional style of delivery which often 
results in him being overcome and crying while preaching. This tendency 
to display emotion, for which he is well-known, is mocked by detractors but 
greatly admired by his followers, amongst whom it is interpreted as a sign of 
sincerity and spiritual depth.
3 Ṣūfi Motifs in Gülenist Thought
Gülen is a social activist and in some senses an entrepreneur, but primarily he 
is a teacher and preacher of Islam. His interpretation of the Sunnī tradition is 
distinctive in a number of ways. First, it is strongly influenced by the mystical 
conceits of Anatolian Ṣūfism (Sarıtoprak in Yavuz and Esposito 2003: 156–169). 
He has written four books which address Ṣūfi themes directly (Gülen 2011), 
although the same Ṣūfi idiom pervades all of his writings and sermons on other 
topics. This is an area of Gülen’s work in which he diverges somewhat from the 
precedent set by Said Nursi. The heavy emphasis on Ṣūfi themes and especially 
on the Ṣūfic concept of love is particular to Gülen and not something that is 
developed in the same way in Nursi’s Risale.
Gülen’s followers point out, however, that his reliance on mystical themes 
and ideas in order to communicate with his readers is entirely consistent with 
the Turkish cultural and religious context from which he emerged. Ṣūfism has 
been a central component of the Islam practiced in Anatolia since Ottoman 
times, when tarikat (Arab. tarīqat, ‘schools’) activity characterised every level 
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of society for hundreds of years. The official abolition of the tarikats in the 
1920s may have dramatically reduced their presence in public life, but the lan-
guage and motifs of Ṣūfism have continued to occupy a central place in Turkish 
Muslim consciousness, be it through familiarity with the folk poetry of Yunus 
Emre or the learned wisdom of Mevlana Rumi.
It is therefore within this framework of a broadly familiar Ṣūfi cultural tradi-
tion that Gülen communicates. Central to Ṣūfi thought is the concept of love; 
love for God and desire, ultimately, to be united with him. Love is also a central 
motif in Gülen’s theology:
Love is the most essential element of every being, and it is the most radi-
ant light, and it is the greatest power; able to resist and overcome all else. 
Love elevates every soul that absorbs it, and prepares those souls for the 
journey to eternity. Souls that have been able to make contact with eter-
nity through love exert themselves to inspire in all other souls what they 
have derived from eternity. They dedicate their lives to this sacred duty, a 
duty for the sake of which they endure every kind of hardship to the very 
end, and just as they pronounce ‘love’ with their last breath, they will also 
breathe ‘love’ while being raised on the Day of Judgment.
Gülen 2006: 1
Through the prism of this Ṣūfic interpretation of love, Gülen articulates his 
vision for the betterment of humanity. This is a key concern that underpins 
his social and religious teachings, and which has become gradually more 
expansive and ambitious over the past fifty years of his life and career. Love 
of God plays a crucial role in Gülen’s thought, and love of others for the sake 
of God is also ascribed with great importance. Altruism, which is highly 
praised, is therefore rooted by Gülen in Islamic spirituality and defined 
as, “devoting oneself to the lives of others in complete forgetfulness of all 
concerns of one’s own[;] it is self-annihilation in the interests of others” 
(Gülen 2004: 10).
While Gülen draws frequently on Ṣūfi-inspired ideas, and often references 
poetry from the mystical canon to elaborate his teachings, he is clear to dis-
tance himself from the organised nature of Ṣūfism, namely its tarikat structure. 
His followers are also often at pains to point out that the movement is not a 
Ṣūfi order, appealing to two points of evidence: first, the absence in the Gülen 
Movement of the ritual religious practice which is a central element of the Ṣūfi 
orders; and second, the lack of initiation rites or clear demarcation of member-
ship or belonging.
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The trope of love for God and humankind in Gülenist thought provides the 
context for his articulation of Said Nursi’s doctrine of positive action (müspet 
hareket). This concept provides the essential framework for Gülen’s under-
standing of how Islamic faith might best be enacted in the modern age and 
is based on the moral responsibility of believers to make a positive contribu-
tion to society in the service of Islam. The ultimate aim of positive action is 
the restoration of religious values to modern society, which is perceived in the 
Nursian (and Gülenist) imaginary to be under threat from secularisation and 
accompanying forces hostile to religion. Unlike other modern Muslim revival 
ideologies, however, which have espoused political activism and even violent 
revolution, positive action is a peaceful, apolitical and non-confrontational 
endeavour. It therefore requires of believers that they contribute to the pres-
ervation of public order and stability rather than directly challenge the status 
quo. The principle of positive action is explained in the following terms by a 
movement insider in Turkey:
In every society you might find radical challenge and violent movements—
in the USA, Africa, Russia, everywhere … But, speaking about this move-
ment, it is not anti-systemic. It is not a protest to the existing norms, 
authorities, state, tradition—and I am talking about every country in 
which it is present. In every decade of its maybe four-decade lifespan 
it has been non-contentious, non-violent. This is müspet hareket, in 
Hocaefendi’s terminology.3
Scholars and commentators in the post-coup era have recognised the obvious 
dissonance between the GM’s long-time public commitment to peaceful social 
activism, and the allegations of its involvement in the bloody events of 15 July 
2016 (Hendrick in Yavuz and Balcı 2017).
4 The Gülen Movement
4.1 Defining the Gülen Movement
The Gülen Movement defies easy categorisation, and points of comparison 
with other religious organisations or ideologies are hard to find. The movement 
itself is ambivalent about labelling itself and tends to reject the suggestion 
3 Author’s interview in English with a senior management figure at Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar 
Vakfı (Journalists and Writers Foundation) in Istanbul, March 2013.
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that it is an organised movement (hareket) at all. Insiders talk instead of the 
movement as Hizmet, which literally means ‘service’ and refers, in this usage, 
to the application of the abstract, philosophical concept that they say lies at 
the heart of Gülen’s vision of a better world. The Islamic rationale for this con-
cept is sometimes made explicit and sometimes not. Gülen’s own role within 
the movement is also the subject of considerable ambiguity. He is presented, 
not as the head of an organised, hierarchical structure, but rather as an ‘inspi-
ration’ to a loose network of altruistic volunteers who are united only by 
their commitment to universal principles of civic and humanitarian service. 
Insiders typically play down their connections with one another, and a com-
mon assertion is that there is no ‘organic connection’ (organik bağlantı), by 
which is meant an official tie, between them.
Joshua Hendrick has called this tendency towards opaqueness about the 
movement’s operational structure “strategic ambiguity,” and links it to its emer-
gence in late-twentieth century Turkey when limitations were in place on public 
religious identities (Hendrick 2013). It has attracted scepticism amongst detrac-
tors, who find it hard to countenance the spread of institutions and initiatives 
all around the world which bear the hallmark of Gülen and yet recognise no 
central organisational structure and have no official affiliation. These sceptics 
have tended also to infer an Islamist agenda at the movement’s core and found 
it unconvincing that its interests and aspirations lie purely in the realm of civil 
society. In this vein, in Turkey it is common for unsympathetic outsiders to use 
the term cemaat (religious community) to refer to the movement, in a some-
what pejorative sense. The term cemaat has connotations of subversion in that 
it refers to religious groups that are still legally banned under the 1925 law which 
forcibly closed the Ṣūfi tarikats. Movement insiders argue that it is an inappro-
priate label, partly because of its association with religious ritual activity, which 
is not a feature of the movement, and partly because of its closed, sectarian 
implications, which Gülenist actors invariably seek to play down.
The ambiguity surrounding the movement and the identities of its affiliates 
has lessened to some extent since the coup attempt of 2016. Movement insid-
ers have become rather less insistent on stating publicly that the movement is 
not, in fact, a movement at all and have discarded some of their earlier guarded 
reserve on this subject. They still, however, refer to Hizmet rather than using 
the term Gülen Movement, which is largely an appellation used in external, 
English-language sources. Insiders fluent in English might talk comfortably 
of ‘the movement’ in interviews in that language, reflecting their familiarity 
with the growing discourse and body of literature on Gülen in the West, but in 
Turkish they almost always revert back to simply ‘Hizmet’.
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4.2 Growth of a Movement in Science Education
Science focused education has been the principal activity of the GM since its 
inception. In the late 1960s, Gülen and a burgeoning group of followers who 
were attracted to his teachings started to organise summer revision camps in 
Izmir for local high school and university students. These early camps, which 
were the prototype for the global network of private schools that the Gülen 
Movement went on to operate, were inspired by Gülen’s vision for the educa-
tion of a ‘golden generation’ (altın nesil) equally well versed in modern science 
as in knowledge of Islam and Islamic ethics (Agai 2002; Tee and Shankland 
2014; Tee 2016).
This distinctive educational vision can be traced back to the thought of 
Said Nursi, who attempted in his own lifetime to establish a university teach-
ing both the secular and the religious sciences in the eastern city of Van. This 
plan encountered opposition from the state and was never realised, but the 
philosophical seed for the conception of such a project is contained within 
the pages of the Risale. Gülen articulated this educational vision in the follow-
ing way:
As stated by Bediüzzaman, there is an understanding of education that 
sees the illumination of the mind in science and knowledge, and the light 
of the heart in faith and virtue. This understanding, which makes the stu-
dent soar in the skies of humanity with these two wings and seek God’s 
approval through service to others, has many things to offer. It rescues 
science from materialism, from being a factor that is as harmful as it is 
beneficial from both material and spiritual perspectives, and from being a 
lethal weapon. Such an understanding, in Einstein’s words, will not allow 
religion to remain crippled. Nor will it allow religion to be perceived as 
cut off from intelligence, life, and scientific truth and as a fanatical insti-
tution that builds walls between individuals and nations.
Ünal and Williams 1999: 318
The Izmir camps were initially all-male and were characterised by a culture 
of strict discipline. The inculcation of Islamic ethics is a crucial component 
within Gülen’s educational vision, and typically takes place through the lived 
example of Gülenist educators and their demonstration of meritorious ethical 
practices (Vicini 2013). In Gülenist pedagogy, the role of the teacher is twofold: 
the transmission of scientific knowledge is one aspect of the teaching vocation, 
but of equal import is the informal mentoring of students in Islamic ethics 
and morality. The latter endeavour is not limited to the classroom setting but 
extends to extra-curricular time and space where close personal relationships 
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are formed between teachers and students, and—crucially—where new 
recruits to the GM are cultivated.
The importance of teachers in the Gülenist project cannot be overstated. 
These individuals are devoted followers of Gülen, who are deeply commit-
ted to their leader, their religion, and the project of hizmet (service), which 
is the central concept in Gülenist ideology. According to Gülen, working as a 
teacher in a secular school context, or indeed as an administrator in one of the 
GM’s dialogue or media organisations, is a manifestation of religious service 
and carries with it the promise of reward (sevap) in the afterlife. This reformu-
lated theology of religious duty underpins the entire GM project and explains 
the extraordinary hard work and commitment of the individuals employed at 
Gülen schools, and, to some extent, the success of the GM educational proj-
ect. It is entirely possible—indeed likely—that this cohort of loyal supporters 
have had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the GM’s political ambitions. 
The organisation is strictly hierarchical in structure, with chains of command 
stretching from Gülen down through a senior management cohort and beyond; 
to national, regional and local level leaders known as abis (lit. ‘big brother’) and 
ablas (‘big sister’) (Hendrick 2013; Watmough and Öztürk 2018). Gülen and his 
most senior circle of acolytes take decisions regarding national and interna-
tional strategy, and those further down the chains of transmission—the rank 
and file of loyal GM workers—are not necessarily party to them.
4.3 Expansion of the GM in Turkey
In the 1970s, Gülen’s fledgling group of followers began to establish a presence 
outside Izmir and opened further summer camps as well as dormitories and 
after-school revision centres (dershane) in other Turkish cities. In the 1980s, 
changing circumstances in domestic politics and their impact on Turkish 
society at large had an important effect on the development and growth of 
the young movement. Its activities expanded dramatically during this decade 
following the military coup of 1980 and the new constitution of 1982, events 
which ushered in an era of economic liberalisation under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal.
The tenor of Turkish society shifted markedly in the 1980s and the previously 
hegemonic authority of the self-consciously secular state began to concede to 
counter-hegemonic voices, namely those speaking for Islam (Lord 2018; Mango 
2004; Zurcher 2004). This followed a decade of severe unrest and social polari-
sation in the 1970s, during which violent clashes between right and left-wing 
factions were common and the loss of life had been considerable. The military 
coup of 1980, under the leadership of General (subsequently, President) Kenan 
Evren, sought to bring an end to this chaotic situation and did so by ushering in 
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an intellectual doctrine called the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’. Conscious at the 
time of internal currents of leftist dissent exacerbated by the keenly-felt threat 
of Soviet communism on Turkey’s near borders, the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ 
paved the way for Islam to re-emerge in the public sphere, and to be recognised 
as the key unifying feature of the Turkish nation. The size and scope of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), was increased dur-
ing this period accordingly, and religious themes began to re-emerge in various 
areas of national life.
During this decade, therefore, followers of Gülen benefitted from new social 
as well as economic conditions that were highly favourable to the flourishing 
of their schooling project. Private ‘Gülen schools’ were established in cities all 
over Turkey during this decade, including Yamanlar Koleji in Izmir, Samanyolu 
Koleji in Ankara, and Fatih Koleji in Istanbul, schools which were considered 
the most prestigious and academically-successful until their forced closures—
along with hundreds of other Gülen schools in Turkey—in 2016.
Followers of Gülen were also active in the 1980s in other fields. It was dur-
ing this decade that they began to invest in business as well as media, interests 
which later represented a significant share of the movement’s total financial 
and cultural assets.4 In the 1990s, the group started to branch out overseas, pri-
marily in the field of education but also in these other constituent areas. The 
first countries that the movement expanded into were the newly-independent 
states of Central Asia, where Gülen’s followers capitalised on the emergence of 
new markets following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Özdalga 2007; 
Turam 2003). They did so to some extent in collaboration with the Turkish 
state which, under the prime ministerships of Özal and later Tansu Çiller, was 
itself seeking to build on the cultural ties between Turkey and the Central 
Asian peoples and to establish itself with a diplomatic and trading presence 
in that part of the world. The movement grew rapidly internationally during 
this time, and by the end of the 1990s, it had schools and business interests in 
approximately eighty countries around the world.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Gülen attracted support from a new gen-
eration of pious Anatolian businessmen who established themselves during 
this period as successful manufacturers and exporters. Known colloquially 
as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, they emerged from religiously and socially con-
servative, medium-size towns such as Kayseri, Adana and Afyonkarahisar. 
4 The movement’s major media corporation was Feza Gazetecilik (Feza Media Group), which 
owned the national daily newspaper Zaman and its English-language counterpart, Today’s 
Zaman. Işık Sigorta was an insurance firm run by movement affiliates, and the Islamic lender 
Bank Asya was a Gülenist institution. All of these ventures are now closed.
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These pious entrepreneurs successfully capitalised on newly liberal condi-
tions instigated after the 1980 coup and joined a Turkish economic elite that 
had previously been largely off-limits to religiously-minded people in the 
Anatolian hinterland.
This new phenomenon in Turkish business and industry was, in turn, 
institutionalised. In 1971, TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association), a staunchly secularist business confederation dedicated to 
the principles of Kemalism, had been established by members of Turkey’s 
old industrial class. In 1990, MÜSIAD (Independent Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association) was founded by a new group of pious Turkish 
businessmen. It served as a religiously-minded alternative to TÜSIAD and has 
focused particularly on cultivating closer trade links with the Muslim coun-
tries of the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. Industrialists who were 
followers of Gülen later established their own Gülenist collective known as 
TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists in Turkey) in 2005. 
The Gülenists thus separated from MÜSIAD, and TUSKON became a transna-
tional organisational umbrella under which the businesses affiliated with the 
Gülen Movement came together for regular trade summits and networking 
(Hendrick 2013).
4.4 Commitment and Affiliation
It is impossible to say precisely how many individuals are, or have been, 
involved in the Gülen Movement, although an extremely approximate estima-
tion might put the number of close affiliates of Gülen in Turkey somewhere 
between 500,000 and 2 million people in the pre-2016 era. This ambiguity is 
partly because there are no official criteria for belonging; there are no initia-
tion rites and no clear membership status. It is also partly because individu-
als may be involved in different capacities and with greatly differing degrees 
of commitment. The movement is characterised by a multi-tiered nexus of 
engagement with three degrees of involvement. At the heart of the movement 
is a group who are dedicated and loyal followers of Gülen, some of whom may 
reside with him and receive religious instruction on his ranch in Pennsylvania, 
but the majority of whom live elsewhere. These individuals are committed dis-
ciples and keen consumers of Gülen’s teachings either through personal con-
tact or from a distance through print and digital media. They usually work or 
study in a Gülenist institution of some kind and are fully dedicated in every 
aspect of their lives to the furtherance of the movement’s vision. These individ-
uals display Muslim piety through their lifestyle, personal conduct and dress. 
Women adopt the modest, tesettür style of clothing that is favoured by conser-
vative, mainly urban women across Turkey, and men often favour smart suits 
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and ties. Inter-personal conduct is regulated by strict codes of Islamic morality 
and contact with the opposite sex is usually limited to verbal greetings and 
minimal interaction.
Individuals within this core group of movement affiliates express a strong 
commitment to the principle of dialogue and are consequently generally very 
open to engagement and conversation with outsiders. The public persona that 
is projected is extremely affable and helpful. The values of tolerance, hospital-
ity and hard work which are lauded in the work of Gülen are physically embod-
ied by this core group, who strive to apply those teachings on a practical level 
in their daily lives. The motivation for living in this way is described by Zehra,5 
a committed follower of Gülen who was a teacher at a (now closed) Gülen 
school in Turkey in 2013:
You’re not only Muslim when you’re praying, you’re Muslim when you’re 
living—twenty-four hours a day. That’s why I love him (Fethullah Gülen) 
so much, and that’s why I’m working here in this school. Because it’s 
something related to a sociable life, you know? I want to do something 
for this society. That’s why I’m working here.
This core group of committed individuals like Zehra is surrounded in more 
peripheral roles by a contingent who might be best described as sympathis-
ers (onaylayanlar), who are active yet more casual supporters of the Gülenist 
vision and the movement’s activities. This group includes, significantly, busi-
nessmen of a pious disposition who lend critical financial support to the move-
ment’s projects. It also includes individuals who might attend, either regularly 
or sporadically, the events known as sohbet (lit: ‘conversation’) at which the 
books and sermons of Fethullah Gülen are studied and expounded by follow-
ers in conjunction with the Risale of Said Nursi and the Qurʾān.6
The largest and most peripheral stratum of participation in the broad 
Gülenist project is occupied by those who consume the products and services 
offered by Gülenist institutions, and who may or may not be cognisant of the 
connection of those products and services to the movement. These might 
include readers and viewers of the various print, digital and visual media 
channels run by the movement, clients in the banking and insurance sector, 
patients in Gülen-run medical facilities, and parents of children studying at 
5 Not her real name.
6 The sohbet tradition is not unique to the Gülen Movement, but is practiced in many Islamic 
groups in Turkey and elsewhere. The focus of discussion is usually the Qurʾān and Sunna of 
the Prophet Muhammad. See Jassal 2013.
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Gülen schools. Within Turkey, when the GM was still operational there, it is 
most likely that these consumers were aware to some extent of the Gülenist 
origins of these products, but outside Turkey it is possible that these parents 
and consumers have not necessarily been aware of the existence of Fethullah 
Gülen or such a thing as the Gülen Movement at all.
5 Gülen’s Move to the US and Globalisation of the Movement
Partly as a culmination of domestic political shifts in the 1980s, the 1990s saw 
the rise to power in Turkey of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the 
precursor to the AKP, which was in office between 1996 and 1997 under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (White 2002). Erbakan and 
his government left office after a so-called ‘postmodern coup’ in 1997, which 
aimed to restore Turkey’s constitutionally secular principles to the national 
order. Gülen had not openly lent his support to the Welfare Party, choosing 
to retain his distance from the political Islamism of Erbakan’s group in much 
the same way that Nursi had kept his distance from Adnan Menderes and the 
Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi) in the 1950s.7 However, in the tense atmo-
sphere of the anti-Islamist period which followed the 1997 coup, Gülen was 
also implicated. He was wanted by the authorities for his involvement in what 
were perceived as anti-secular activities of his own, and a warrant was issued 
for his arrest. In 1999, Gülen left Turkey for America. Later on, during the hey-
day of his unofficial alliance with the AKP government, the charges against him 
were lifted, yet he chose not to return, always enigmatically citing ‘poor health’ 
as his reason for preferring to remain in the US.
The decade following Gülen’s move to America witnessed the movement’s 
fuller global expansion, as well as the rapid development of its activities in 
the USA itself. While Turkey remained central, the movement now managed 
a sizeable portfolio of interests in the USA including a number of major dia-
logue platforms (namely, the Rumi Forum in Washington D.C. and the Gülen 
Institute in Houston) and somewhere in the region of 150 charter schools 
(Hendrick 2013). Between 2000 and 2013, it also expanded its global activities 
to an estimated 160 countries all around the world, ranging from Europe (Balcı 
2018; Ozzano 2018; van Bruinessen 2014) to South America (Dumovich 2018), 
7 The political Islamist ideology of the Welfare Party inspired the development of Milli Görüş, 
a major Turkish diaspora movement quite distinctive from the global Gülen Movement, 
espousing a political vision for the future of Islam. The key founding members of the AKP 
were all previously members of the Welfare Party.
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and Sub-Saharan Africa to South East Asia (Dohrn 2014; Saleem and Osman 
2019) where it has run a global network of schools, medical facilities, dialogue 
platforms and business interests.
Since the coup attempt, elaborated on below, the Turkish government has 
made sustained attempts to force the closure of GM schools and businesses 
overseas. For the most part, it has been successful in those countries where 
Turkey wields cultural and/or economic influence (Azerbaijan was amongst 
the first to close all GM institutions, some of which have subsequently been 
taken over by the state), but generally less so elsewhere. The GM has mostly 
retained its freedom to operate in Western nations, which tend to be immune 
to Erdoğan’s appeals for the GM to be punished and expelled.
6 The GM and Political Turmoil
The context for the GM’s period of prosperity and wealth accumulation in the 
early 2000s was an unofficial alliance that it established with the AKP govern-
ment. Following its landslide electoral victory in 2002, the AKP was able to 
command a single-party majority in the Turkish Parliament for the first time 
since 1983. Gülen commanded his followers to vote for the AKP, but their num-
bers were not enough to significantly impact its electoral successes: the GM is 
an elitist rather than a grassroots organisation, and its primary source of useful-
ness to the AKP did not rest in the numbers of voters it attracted. Rather, shar-
ing a common commitment to religious conservatism and a desire to weaken 
the power of the Kemalist establishment, the GM was an essential ally to the 
government because it commanded a loyal support base scattered throughout 
the civil service, the police force and the judiciary. The AKP was therefore able 
to circumvent the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary by calling on Gülenist allies for help. The clearest example 
of this was in the Ergenekon, Balyoz and Poyrazköy trials beginning in 2008, 
when Gülenist prosecutors brought falsified charges against over a hundred 
key secularists and government detractors.
While the falsification of evidence which underpinned these trials is now 
acknowledged, it was, remarkably, almost entirely unquestioned at the time 
(an exception being Jenkins 2009). The trials commanded broad support, not 
only from a conservative religious constituency but also from the nation’s secu-
lar intellectuals, most of whom endorsed the narrative that calling the army 
generals to account, and reining in the political power of the military, paved 
the way for a new era of fuller democratisation in Turkey. Despite the dubious 
validity of the evidence presented, a popular narrative argued that by seeking 
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to downgrade the guardianship of the armed forces over the secular state, 
Turkey was coming into line with European Union requirements surrounding 
freedom of expression and the conditions associated with liberal democracy. In 
turn, there was much support in Europe and the US for these moves to appar-
ently liberalise the Turkish political landscape. A Brookings Institution brief-
ing from April 2012, for example, declared that “the AKP heralds democracy,” 
and described its potential (widely discussed at the time) to serve as a success-
ful model to Arab nations in the wake of the regional uprisings (Taşpınar 2012).
During the AKP’s second term in office, tensions began to appear in public 
between Prime Minister Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen. These tensions did not 
manifest themselves in the parliamentary context, for there were only very few 
Gülenists in cabinet positions. Rather, as tensions rose, they became apparent 
in broader power-struggles, as the movement exerted its considerable influ-
ence within the police force and the judiciary.
One of the earliest sources of conflict between the two men, and the sub-
ject of their first public disagreement, was in the realm of international affairs 
and concerned Turkey’s relationship with Israel. Throughout the twentieth 
century, Turkey had been a rare regional ally of Israel and relations between 
the two countries had been generally strong. Since Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
rise to power this relationship has deteriorated severely. Various diplomatic 
spats between the two countries have escalated rapidly, fuelled in part by an 
ideologically-driven anti-Israeli rhetoric from the Prime Minister himself. The 
failure of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel has been accompa-
nied by a surge in anti-Israeli sentiment in the general public. When Erdoğan 
publically stormed out of a debate on Gaza with Israeli President Shimon Peres 
at the Davos World Economic Forum in 2009, he was greeted as a returning hero 
on his arrival in Turkey, with cheering crowds waiting for him at the airport.
Gülen’s stance on Israel is markedly different from Erdoğan’s, and is 
shaped by his support for American neo-liberal values. The Prime Minister’s 
public rhetoric against Israel sat uneasily with Gülen, and while he did not 
speak out after the Davos affair he did intervene in the Mavi Marmara inci-
dent of the following year. This incident, in which nine Turkish activists on 
a humanitarian flotilla were killed at sea by Israeli soldiers in their attempt 
to break the blockade on Gaza, led to the expulsion of the Israeli ambassa-
dor from Ankara and the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Gülen spoke out publically, suggesting that the confrontational 
approach of the activists had been misplaced and that the pursuit of a diplo-
matic path would have been preferable, both before the crisis and in its after-
math (“Fethullah Gülen Mavi Marmara Baskını Hakkında Görüşleri”, 2013). 
His position brought him into direct conflict with the Prime Minister and 
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with public opinion more widely, and although there was only muted public 
response to an interview that he gave, it was a sign of further trouble to come.
The major deterioration in AKP-Gülenist relations came nearly two years 
later in February 2012, when Gülenist prosecuters sought the arrrest of Hakan 
Fidan, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (Millî İstihbarat 
Teşkilatı, MIT) and a close personal ally of Erdoğan. Fidan was engaged at the 
time in secret, high level talks with Abdullah Öcalan, the highly-controversial 
leader of the Kurdish PKK who is serving a life prison sentence. The Kurdish 
issue is a subject on which the movement had differed ideologically from the 
AKP: being strongly informed by Turkish nationalist ideology, the movement 
was not a keen supporter of the government’s tentative rapprochement with 
Kurdish separatists. Erdoğan was able to stop Fidan’s arrest by issuing emer-
gency legislation the following day, but the movement’s attack on such a high-
level AKP ally was perceived as a declaration of open warfare.
It was not long until the government hit back. In October of the same year, 
the Prime Minister announced his intention to forcibly close down the nation’s 
dershane network, an area in which followers of Gülen were heavily invested 
(“Dersaneler Kapanacak” 2012). According to this new plan, dershanes across 
the country were to be turned into private schools, ostensibly because the gov-
ernment no longer wished to tolerate a parallel system of education provision. 
The inefficiencies and inequalities of the dershane system were not in doubt, 
but the sudden anouncement of their impending closure came as a shock to 
many. The Gülen Movement was amongst the foremost providers of dershane 
education in Turkey; large national franchises such as FEM, as well as innumer-
able smaller operations, provided a valuable source of income to the move-
ment, and also acted as its primary recruitment ground. In threatening to close 
them down, the AKP government knew that it was targetting one of the major 
arteries of the movement’s social and economic power. Gülen recognised the 
severity of the threat and offered to voluntarily turn the movement’s dershanes 
over to state control, but the offer was rejected.
Against this backdrop of mounting tension, relations between the two 
groups failed irretrievably in 2013. In May and June of that year, the Gezi Park 
riots dominated the national news. Violent protests spread from a park in cen-
tral Istanbul to Ankara, Izmir and many other major cities across Turkey. The 
riots began as a small-scale, environmental protest but soon became a national 
movement focused on opposition to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Erdoğan 
responded by ordering a harsh police crackdown, which resulted in multiple 
deaths and many serious injuries. It also triggered widespread criticism of his 
handling of the crisis in the international media (Letsch 2013).
The protesters were drawn from a wide range of social and religious back-
grounds, including a group calling itself ‘Anti-Capitalist Muslims’, but were 
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dominated by individuals of a secular-leaning, educated and urban back-
ground. These are not the people of Gülen’s core constituency, and he voiced 
his criticism of the protesters, declaring that their actions were indicative of ‘a 
generation of moral and spiritual decay’ (“323.Nağme” 2013). Gülen was also, 
however, openly critical of the AKP’s response to the situation and publically 
condemned its excessive use of force to quash the riots. He was not alone 
in voicing criticism of Erdoğan’s heavy-handed approach—indeed, various 
senior members of the AKP did as well, namely incumbent president Abdullah 
Gül and deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç. Nonetheless, Gülen’s public criti-
cism of the then-Prime Minister did nothing to improve already deteriortating 
relations between the two men.
Escalation of the mounting power-struggle between Gülen and his fol-
lowers and Erdoğan’s AKP came with the corruption scandal that erupted on 
17 December 2013. The Gülenists played their best hand in revealing material 
that appeared to indicate endemic corruption within the AKP and embezzle-
ment of public funds on a shocking scale. It was a bold move. The record-
ings that were leaked a few months later on 24 February 2014, purporting to 
show the Prime Minister and his son conspiring to secrete away huge sums 
of money, were their strongest blow. The veracity of the recordings was never 
clearly established, although many, including opposition politicians, believed 
that they were genuine (Nakhoul and Tattersall 2014). What is certain, however, 
is that the Gülenists obtained them through illegal means by the sustained 
wire-tapping of encrypted government telephone lines, and their intention 
was clearly to fatally destabalise Erdoğan’s government. Nevertheless, while 
Erdoğan suffered some losses, he and his party still secured a majority in 
both local and presidential elections the following year: the Gülenists’ plot 
had failed.
6.1 The Coup Attempt of 15 July 2016 and its Aftermath
Two and a half years later, amidst on-going hostilities between Erdoğan and 
the GM, the country was shaken to the core by a military coup attempt. A 
bloody and chaotic night saw aircraft from a rebel faction within the armed 
forces attack, amongst other targets, the Turkish intelligence headquarters and 
the parliament in Ankara, and an embattled President Erdoğan addressing 
the nation via the ‘Facetime’ app on his mobile phone, inviting his support-
ers to come out onto the streets to resist the military takeover—something 
which hundreds of them duly did (Nakhoul and Tattersall 2014). The fren-
zied scenes of pro-government civilians overrunning military tanks on the 
Bosphorus Bridge (since renamed 15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü, ‘15 July Martyrs’ 
Bridge’) became emblematic of the night, and the triumph of Erdoğan over the 
coup plotters.
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Erdoğan made it clear immediately, during this address in the early hours of 
the morning and at the height of the crisis, that he held Fethullah Gülen and 
his followers to blame for the coup attempt, and for attempting to violently 
dismantle Turkey’s democratic tradition. Over the course of the night, the gov-
ernment and its supporters repudiated the coup and regained control, but not 
without the loss of almost 300 lives. Subsequently, close to 150,000 individuals 
were either arrested or suspended from their duties across an extremely wide 
section of Turkish civil society, and a state of emergency was instigated, which 
was to continue for two years, until July 2018. Turkey continues to formally 
request the extradition of Gülen by the US authorities amid suggestions that 
the death penalty could be re-introduced as punishment for the plotters. To 
date, this extradition request has not been granted.
The coup attempt signalled a catastrophic end for the GM in Turkey as well 
as a catalyst for Erdoğan to consolidate his power, capitalising on a paranoid 
narrative that posits the president as defender of the nation in the face of 
threats to its security from within and without. Following a public referen-
dum in 2017, Turkey will change from a parliamentary to presidential system 
with Erdoğan at the helm. The separation of powers has been almost entirely 
eroded, and executive power henceforth resides exclusively in the person of 
the president. Deteriorations in the economy in recent years have impacted 
somewhat on Erdoğan’s popularity, a fact that was reflected in the local elec-
tions of April 2019, in which the opposition unexpectedly took control of the 
Ankara as well as Istanbul municipalities for the first time in over 25 years.8 
While this turn away from the AKP at a local level in Turkey’s two major cities 
is significant, general elections are not scheduled until 2023 and it is unlikely 
that anything will loosen Erdoğan’s grip on power at a national level in the 
near future. The ramifications for the GM are severe: the government in Turkey 
continues to seek out Gülenist sympathisers, real or imagined, for punishment. 
7 Conclusion
The GM is now tasked with counting its considerable losses, adapting to its 
position in exile, and forging a new future for itself in the face of extreme 
hostility from the Turkish government. It has lost a considerable amount of 
financial wealth through the confiscations of the Turkish state since 2016, and 
there have been far fewer instances of the lavishly funded public engagement 
8 At the time of writing (April 2019), the outcome of the Istanbul ballot was being contested by 
the government.
105The Gülen Movement
activities that once characterised the global GM.9 Many followers of Gülen are 
imprisoned in Turkey, and those who managed to flee the country are depen-
dent on on-going asylum applications elsewhere. In the midst of these seismic 
changes, the internal integrity of the movement has suffered a blow: for the 
first time, GM insiders have spoken out critically about Fethullah Gülen and 
his leadership. Such criticisms had previously only been voiced by those who 
had left the GM, and they are indication of the potential for damaging internal 
divisions that could change the future course of the movement.
In sum, the post-coup GM is in many ways a fractured and diminished organ-
isation. Yet at the same time, entirely typically of the movement, it appears 
to be adapting to these new circumstances and finding a way to capitalise on 
them. Adaptation to local circumstance and opportunity is one of the hall-
marks of the GM. While the core activities of the movement have been the 
same in every location that it has been present in, the movement has nonethe-
less always endeavored to engage with the particular strategic opportunities 
of each place (Tee 2016: 119–139). In the West, and in the US especially, the 
strategic focus of the GM has always been public relations. It has run schools 
as well,10 but an equally important focus of its activities in the US and UK has 
been the establishment of debating and public engagement organisations 
such as Rumi Forum in Washington DC and the Dialogue Society in London. 
In the post-coup era, its investment in building up a credible presence for itself 
in Western nations as a Muslim voice of dialogue and moderation is paying 
dividends. The GM retains a lobbying presence in DC and London, as well as 
in Brussels, and its fight back against President Erdoğan is taking place partly 
through English-language publications of its PR organisations.11 Erdoğan has 
already lost almost all the international political support that he commanded 
in the first two terms of his office as PM, and is now regarded by western gov-
ernments as a volatile and dangerous ‘strongman’ leader. The GM’s ability 
9  For example, the GM funded and organised a number of large conferences in the UK and 
US in the first decade of this century, all of which were heavily subsidised and generously 
catered for. At a local level as well, spending seems to be diminished (Tee 2018).
10  In the UK, the GM has only ever had one school, North London Grammar school in 
Hendon (established 2014), previously Wisdom School in Haringey (established 2006). 
Elsewhere in the West, and especially in the US where the charter school system suits its 
ends, the GM’s schools have been greater in number.
11  See, for example, the publications of the Centre for Hizmet Studies, particularly an arti-
cle by Özcan Keleş of London’s Dialogue Society, published two months after the coup 
(Keleş 2016). The article is a compelling but blinkered defense of Gülen and the GM. The 
GM’s publishing houses in the US continue to produce hagiographic materials on Gülen, 
including most recently Jon Pahl’s Fethullah Gülen: A Life of Hizmet (New Jersey: Blue 
Dome, 2019).
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to communicate in excellent English and to circulate its self-representative 
accounts of the war with Erdoğan in the centers of western political power is 
very clearly advantageous.
The academic literature since 2016 has of course focused on the coup and 
its aftermath. The field has moved on rapidly in that time, and there is now a 
body of critical literature that is making inroads into analyzing the GM through 
sociological, anthropological, and political science lenses. This literature is 
well aware of the GM’s complexities and shows none of the ‘enchanted’ tone of 
some of the work that came before. Simon Watmough and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk’s 
article of 2018, which prefaced a special journal issue on the GM in post-coup 
exile, is an incisive and empirically informed analysis of the GM that focuses 
on its pursuit of power. This analytical approach is shared by Hakan Yavuz and 
Bayram Balcı, two long-time scholars of the GM, whose edited collection of 
2018 analyses the movement’s involvement in the coup and its aftermath. A 
broad scholarly consensus is emerging which sees the GM neither as the paci-
fist, dialogical voice for modern Islam that it presents itself as in the West, not 
as the sharīʿa-minded terrorist or revolutionary movement that many see it as 
in Turkey, but rather as an organisation inspired by religion but in pursuit of 
worldly power, wealth and influence. The next chapter of the GM’s life has yet 
to be written, but it is highly likely that its voracious appetite for such power, 
along with its successful negotiation of an amenable, post-9/11 political land-
scape in the West, will mean that, in spite of Erdoğan’s best efforts, we are far 
from seeing the end of it yet.
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Chapter 5
The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia
Hisanori Kato
1 Introduction
Indonesia is known as a country of socio-cultural diversity with approximately 
300 ethnic groups (Kewarganegaraan n.d.).1 The spiritual life of Indonesians is 
also rather heterogeneous, as various religious traditions are deeply rooted in 
the fourth most populous nation in the world today (World Population Review 
2020).2 Despite the fact that 87.2 per cent of the total population embraces the 
faith of Islam (Badan Pusat Statistik 2010), chronology shows that non-Islamic 
traditions were dominant in the Indonesian archipelago prior to the advent 
of Islam. The kings of a maritime empire called Srivijaya which flourished in 
southern Sumatra between the seventh and thirteenth centuries (Legge 1964: 
5–6), for instance, adopted Buddhism and contributed to cultural interchanges 
among Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Asia (Laffan 2011: 4). We also know 
that Borobudur, which is one of the oldest and largest single Buddhist monu-
ments in the world, was built by the Sailendra Kingdom, which was dominant 
in Central Java in the eighth century (Laffan 2011: 28). Prambanan temples in 
Central Java were built by an ancient Hindu kingdom called Old Mataram in 
the tenth century, and the eastern island of Bali, a famous tourist destination 
today, is also known as the homeland of the Indonesian version of Hinduism.
Apart from the organised religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, the 
local traditions and cultures have also profoundly exerted their influence over 
the spiritual life of Indonesians. This tendency is most noticeable in Java, 
which is the most populated island in the country. The customary traditions of 
Javanese cultures, including communal religious meals, traditional medicine, 
and the performance of aristocratic rituals in the residence of Sultan, are co-
related with Islam (Woodward 2011: 5). Some argue that Islam in Indonesia is 
syncretic and is by no means monolithic. Clifford Geertz, for example, stated 
1 This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant number 16K02004. An earlier version 
of this chapter was published as Hisanori Kato, 2018, “Religion and Locality: The Case of the 
Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia,” Fieldwork in Religion 13:2, 151–168.
2 The Indonesian government officially recognises six religions, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Confucianism.
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that Indonesian Islam is “multi-voiced” and takes “multi-forms” and “not all of 
them Koranic, and whatever it brought to the sprawling archipelago it was not 
uniformity” (Geertz 1968: 12).3
Islam has been a primary socio-political force in Indonesia, the country with 
the largest Muslim population in the world. When drafting a new constitution 
in the post-World War II era, there was a serious debate in Indonesia over the 
enforcement of sharīʿa or syariah,4 or Islamic law (Ricklefs 1993: 209–211). The 
country eventually opted for republicanism with the leadership of Sukarno, 
the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. However, that political choice 
has created a division among the umma or umat,5 (the Islamic community) 
between those wishing to realise a more religiously rigid society with the imple-
mentation of syariah and those upholding secular nationalism wherein faith is 
an individual matter. The latter group, nonetheless, has never abandoned the 
commitment to Islam and has emphasised its piousness. This religious stratum 
tends to be supportive of integrating indigenous Indonesian culture and local 
tradition into Islam. Nahdlatul Ulama,6 the largest Islamic organisation in the 
country (popularly known as NU), best represents this religious orientation and 
promotes this way of thinking as ‘Islam Nusantara’. While NU is branded as ‘tra-
ditionalist’ and is less hesitant to adopt local religious practices of Indonesia, 
Muhammadiyah—the second largest Islamic organisation, established by 
Ahmad Dahlan in 1912—is regarded as ‘modernist’. Muhammadiyah is more 
religiously rigid, and intends to bring about a more ‘authentic’ version of Islam 
than the syncretic form which has traditionally proliferated in Indonesia.
The establishment of NU was initiated by several Muslim scholars called 
kiai, such as Hasyim Asy’ari. It is a common practice for kiai to own Islamic 
boarding schools or pesantren, which has contributed to the organisational 
expansion of NU since its establishment. NU has exerted much political and 
cultural influence in Indonesian society. For example, Partai Nahdlatul Ulama, 
a political wing of NU, secured its second position in the parliamentary elec-
tion in 1971 after President Suharto’s powerful Golkar group. We should also 
remember that the members of NU played a significant role in the annihilation 
of the communist party of Indonesia (PKI) after the 1965 aborted coup d’etat.
Then chairperson of NU in the 1990s, Abdurrahaman Wahid, popularly 
known as Gus Dur, was a crucial figure in the process of transforming politically 
3 However, there is also an argument that some Javanese cultures such as selametan, which 
Geertz regarded as animistic, are also linked with authentic Islamic teachings (Woodward 
2011: Chapter 3).
4 In Indonesia, sharīʿa is usually spelled as syariah.
5 In Indonesia, umma is usually spelled as umat.
6 NU was established by some religious scholars, ʿulamāʾ, in 1926.
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oppressed Indonesia into a more democratic society after the fall of Suharto in 
1998. Gus Dur was elected as the fourth president of the Republic in 1999 and 
implemented policies that promoted cultural diversity in the nation. He lifted 
the prohibition against public displays of Chinese culture such as the dragon 
dance and Chinese characters after he took office. Religious as well as cultural 
diversity was promoted by Gus Dur, and he was termed guru bangsa or the 
‘teacher of the country’. NU also has been regarded as a safeguard of kebin-
nekaan (diversity) in Indonesia.
The NU drew widespread attention in August 2015 when it hosted its 
national congress in the Eastern Javanese town of Jombang with the theme 
of Islam Nusantara for Indonesia and the World (International Summit of 
the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.). NU intended to clarify Islam Nusantara’s 
uniqueness by linking it with the locality found in the archipelago, which dif-
ferentiates it from Arab-Islamic culture, and to promote tolerant and moderate 
attitudes for Muslims along with a nationalist message (International Summit 
of the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.).
This chapter will explore the nature and characteristics of the Islam 
Nusantara movement. This work contributes to deepening understanding of 
how the ideas of authenticity in Islam and local culture mutually interact. An 
attempt to answer these questions can bring about a better comprehension of 
the role of religion in Indonesian society.
2 Religion as Organism
As to whether the authenticity of religion remains unchanged regardless of 
the alteration of the social environment where a religion exists remains a 
pertinent question; does a religion itself adjust to the newfangled social, eco-
nomic, political, and historical situation? In relation to this query, we could ask 
whether the Buddhism taught by Siddhartha Gautama about 2,500 years ago 
in India can be the same Buddhism in Japan of the present day or whether the 
Christianity practiced clandestinely by Japanese peasants in the early 1600s 
can be the same religion as Jesus Christ conveyed to the people of Galilee 
(Endo 2016)?
By the same token, we are inquisitive about the authenticity of Islam in 
Indonesia, namely, as to whether it shares the same bearings with Islam in the 
Middle East. As Clifford Geertz has pointed out, Islam in Indonesia seems to 
exhibit its noticeable character as a result of socio-cultural encounters with 
local traditions (Geertz 1971: 12). At minimum, this suggests that Islam has been 
influenced by its surroundings and has manifested a unique outlook, which is 
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non-identical with the original form of the religion. However, this is not merely 
relevant to Islam in Indonesia but is also pertinent to any other religion that 
spans a significant time period.
For example, Japanese Buddhism, which has flourished with various schools 
since it was introduced in the sixth century, created its unique syncretic notion 
with Shinto (Eisenstadt 1996: 224). Shusaku Endo also points out that the long-
standing tradition of Japanese ancestor worship contributed to the preserva-
tion of the faith of Japanese Christians in the time of the Edo Period when 
Christianity was forbidden (Endo 2016: 135). These facts suggest that the fol-
lowers of the same religion recurrently exhibit contending attitudes and prac-
tices depending on where and when they exist.
In fact, the homogenisation of indigenous traditional cultures and original 
religion is ubiquitous, and the locality becomes a part of the religion. Islam in 
Indonesia is no stranger to this phenomenon. Although egalitarianism is cher-
ished in Islam, the approbation of Muslims towards venerated religious schol-
ars (ʿulamāʾ or kiai) is habitually observed in Indonesia. This specific attitude 
of Muslims can be found in Islamic boarding schools called pesantren, which 
are operated by kiai and ʿulamāʾ who belong to NU. Orthodox Muslim (santri) 
students at pesantren pay much respect to their teachers and treat them as 
touched by the divine. This attitude undoubtedly is derived from the appre-
ciation of seniority in Indonesian society that has existed for a long period 
of time.
Indonesian Muslims commonly pay a visit to the family grave (ziarah, 
Arab. ziyārāt), to recite the Qurʾān jointly (tahlilan, Arab. tahlīl), and to prac-
tice homecoming (mudik) in the time of Idul Fitri (Arab. ʿĪd al-Fiṭr) following 
Ramadan. The veneration of saints is another popular religious routine among 
Indonesian Muslims. The grave of Mbk Priok, which is one of the most famous 
and popular sites for saint worship in Indonesia, is located in the northern part 
of Jakarta. Habib Ali, the caretaker of the site and the self-claimed descen-
dant of Mbk Priok, is popular with visitors and attracts respect from pilgrims. 
The followers of Habib Ali even believe that he possesses supernatural power 
to bring about miracles. When Habib Ali recites the Qurʾān, the pilgrims put 
bottled water in front of him, believing that the water will become holy and be 
able to cure diseases (Kato 2012: 37–49).
None of these religious practices, in the eyes of Salafist-oriented fundamen-
talist Muslims, are in accordance with the authentic teachings of Islam. This 
discrepancy creates a wide division between those who are less hesitant to 
accept the locally influenced version of Islam and those who are firmly deter-
mined to maintain the theological authenticity of Islam, disregarding any non-
Islamic element in their behaviours.
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There appears to be two dominant approaches within the Islamic commu-
nity or umat in Indonesia, that is, theologically rigid Muslims and theologically 
moderate Muslims. The primary purpose of the former would be to implement 
syariah and to follow the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, the collection of the words and 
deeds of the Prophet Muḥammad. In other words, their absolute objective is 
to bring about a precise similitude between their modern lives and that which 
was the case in the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, struggling to create a so-
called ‘Islamic society’ which has not yet been realised. The latter, on the other 
hand, are more heedful to the changes of the socio-cultural situation; thus, 
they are more able to adjust to local peculiarities. It is possible to say that they 
reside in a so-called ‘Muslim society’, where the adjustability of local traditions 
with human reasoning is more appreciated (Katakura 1991; Kato 2017a).
The essence of Islamic society is theological genuineness or what we can 
simply call ‘religion’, while the substance of Muslim society is anything char-
acterised as religious or ‘religiosity’. This classification is useful to understand 
the substance of Pancasila, or the five ideological principles of the Republic 
of Indonesia as stated in the constitution, which all citizens should follow. 
Pancasila is stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as fol-
lows: Belief in One and Only God; just and civilised humanity; the unity of 
Indonesia; democratic life led by wisdom of thoughts in deliberation amongst 
representatives of the people; and achieving social justice for all the people 
of Indonesia.
In the time of the establishment of the Republic, the national leaders set 
Yang Maha Esa, or the One and Only God, as the first principle without allud-
ing to Allāh explicitly on the grounds that Indonesia is a multi-religious nation. 
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution in 1945, the national leaders 
decided to take a secular nationalist political formation on religiosity through 
the principle of Yang Maha Esa. Obviously, this rather politically compro-
mised state ideology clashes with the basic principle of Islamic teachings that 
enforces syariah and upholds tauhid (Arab. tawḥīd), the singularity of Allāh. It 
was therefore understandable that those who struggle for realising an ‘Islamic 
society’ reject Pancasila.
Presumably, Islam qua religion itself consists of Islamic society or reli-
gion and Muslim society or religiosity. As the latter presents new-fashioned 
religious practices, influenced by social, historical, geographical, economic, 
political, and cultural locality, religion itself would alter its shape as an organ-
ism (Kato 2012). However, this does not necessarily mean that the residents of 
Islamic society and Muslim society unequivocally cling to their own domains; 
rather, they occasionally cross the boundary of each sphere and show complex 
religious attitudes. The residents of Muslim society, for example, believe that 
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they are religiously authentic enough to be called devout Muslims and never 
dream that they are being unorthodox Muslims. Jeremy Menchik (2016: 72) 
points out this complexity in Muslims:
Godly nationalists feel that belief in God is a civic virtue that accrues 
both individual and social benefits. For individuals, belief in God brings 
an enlightened understanding of the world that is preferable to premod-
ern beliefs such as animism, heterodox beliefs, or secular worldviews.
This suggests that the components of religion or Islam are rather complex, 
and Muslims, especially the people of Muslim society, are by no means single-
minded. The object of our study in this chapter, the Islam Nusantara move-
ment, can be categorised as one of the examples of the religiosity of Islam in 
that the residents of Muslim society adopt local traditions in order to affirm 
their ‘piousness’ and commitment to their own faith. At the same time, the 
Islam Nusantara movement will be rejected by those who value the realisation 
of a religiously conservative and ‘purely’ Islamic society.
The substance of religion will be also explored. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown sug-
gested that an efficient means to understand religion is to examine the “social 
function of religions” (Radcliffe-Brown 1965: 154). With this idea in mind, the 
substance of the Islam Nusantara movement and the complex mind of the fol-
lowers of Islam Nusantara will be explored in the following part of the chapter.
3 Overview of Islam Nusantara
‘Nusantara’ is the combination of two ancient Javanese words, nusa and antara, 
which mean ‘islands’ and ‘opposite’ or ‘across from’ respectively (Baso 2017: 
2). Nusantara in fact includes Sumatra, Java, the Sunda Islands, Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, the Maluku, and West Papua (Irian Jaya) of current Indonesian 
territory, as well as other parts of Southeast Asian regions, such as Malaysia, 
Singapore, and the southern Philippines (Baso 2017: 2–3). The defining charac-
teristic of Islam Nusantara is its appreciation of the diversity of local cultures 
with regional languages and varying customs in these areas.
However, the initiator of Islam Nusantara, NU, obviously emphasises the 
linkage between Islam and Indonesian native cultures. Azis Anwar Fachrudin 
explains that NU’s traditions are deeply connected with religious rituals, such 
as joint prayer (tahlilan) and communal meals (selametan) (Fachrudin 2015). In 
addition to the preservation of the local religious rituals, the unity of Indonesia 
is another key ideological pillar in the movement. The leader of NU, Aqil Siradj, 
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explicitly stated that “we start from Islam Nusantara and maintain the unity 
of Republic of Indonesia, the local culture, and the richness of nature” (Islam 
Nusantara n.d.).
This also does not mean that Islam Nusantara is a newly-born Indonesian 
version of Islamic teachings (Hasyim 2018: 8). The authenticity of Islam is never 
abandoned by the advocates of the Islam Nusantara movement. Some believe 
that Indonesian tradition never excluded the orthodoxy of Islam. Azyumardi 
Azra, for example, lists three major influences in Islam Nusantara: the ortho-
dox Sunnī theology of al-Ashʿarī or Asy’ariyah; the judicature of al-Shāfiʿī, and 
other judicial schools of the Sunnī tradition; and the Ṣūfism of the Persian 
mystic al-Ghazālī (Azra 2015: 170).
Some also argue that the Islam that spread over the archipelago of 
Indonesia has a profound relation with the Prophet Muḥammad. Ahmad Baso 
states that the descendants of the Prophet, called sayyids or asyrafs, directly 
contributed to the spread of Islam over the Southeast Asian region, includ-
ing the Indonesian islands (Baso 2017: 10). It is a common understanding that 
the nine saints known as wali songo (sanga) played an important role for the 
Islamisation of Java (Laffan 2011: 8). According to Baso, these wali songo, who 
were the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, constructed the founda-
tion of Islam Nusantara (Baso 2017: 27–30). He cited the words of one of the 
wali songo to explain the dialectical development of Islam as “borrowing ele-
ments from the old culture to empower and enrich the new; let the old cus-
toms become the container and the elements of faith the contents” (Baso 
2017: 30). Such statements clearly work to validate Islam Nusantara. This reso-
nates with the view presented by Abudurrahman Wahid, a former leader of 
NU, who has said that Islam in Indonesia is experiencing an “encounter” with 
history and “manifests” Islam uniquely, but never forsaking its core teachings 
(Wahid 2015: 35).
NU hosted an international conference called the International Summit of 
the Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISOMIL) to promote Islam Nusantara in May 
2016. As the outcome of ISOMIL, NU issued a declaration on Islam Nusantara. 
In addition to the advocacy of patriotism that was expressed by its leader Aquil 
Siradj in February 2016, there are several points that should be heeded from the 
declaration: the affinity with the core teachings of Islam; peaceful coexistence 
with other religions without overpowering them; the rejection of extrem-
ism; and the affirmation of being Sunnī Muslim (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah) 
(International Summit of the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.: 51–52).
With regard to the first, the declaration clearly states that the inher-
ited nature of Islam Nusantara never conflicts with Islamic teachings, such 
as “tawassuth [Arab. tawassul, following the middle path, i.e., the path of 
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moderation], tawaazun [tawāzun, balance; harmony], tasaamuh [tasāmuḥ, 
gentle and loving rather than harsh and violent behaviour, i.e., tolerance rather 
than compulsion], and itidaal [iʿtidāl, justice]” (International Summit of the 
Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.: 51), which also corresponds with Indonesian, 
especially Javanese, cultural tradition. The declaration also vehemently warns 
against the emergence of extremism, which would potentially bring about ter-
rorist acts. Some even believe that Islam Nusantara is a reaction to the rise of 
radicalism in Indonesia.7
4 Political Support
Not only does the Islam Nusantara movement have religious meaning, but it 
also has political significance. President Joko Widodo, who was seeking re-
election for another term in 2019, ardently joined the campaign of the Islam 
Nusantara movement in the hope that he would obtain support from the mod-
erate Muslim constituency, especially from a vast number of NU followers.8 He 
has received criticism from more hard-line Muslims, alleging that he and his 
family are affiliated with communism.9 It seems that Joko Widodo was eager 
to maintain his image as a devout and moderate Muslim by supporting NU’s 
Islam Nusantara.
President Joko Widodo attended the religious gathering held in the Istiqlal 
Mosque in Jakarta, which is the largest of its kind in Southeast Asia, at the time 
of Islamic fasting month of Ramadan in June 2015. He reiterated the validity 
of Islam Nusantara in his speech in front of approximately 10,000 attendants, 
saying that “Thank God, we are Islam Nusantara that is filled with santun (well-
mannered people), tata karma (ordered people), and full toleransi (tolerance)” 
(NU Online 2015). On another occasion, President Joko Widodo praised NU’s 
effort to promote a peaceful and tolerant Islam in culturally and ethnically 
diverse Indonesia at the 92nd commemoration ceremony of NU’s establish-
ment in February 2018.
President Joko Widodo also showed his commitment to safeguarding reli-
gious tolerance characterised by Islam Nusantara by building a monument 
in the Sumatran town of Barus, where bearers of Islam from the Middle East 
arrived at the dawn of Islamic history in Indonesia. In addition, he issued a 
7 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 22 March 2018.
8 NU itself declares that their membership is 91,200,000, that is, 36.5% of the total population 
in Indonesia, citing the survey conducted by LSI in 2013.
9 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 9 March 2018.
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presidential decree that instituted the day of Hari Santri Nasional or the 
National Day of Devout Muslims.10 The Islam Nusantara Movement has gained 
momentum by the political stratagems of President Joko Widodo, who intends 
to emphasise his devout but moderate leadership to eliminate the Islamic reli-
gious fanaticism that potentially threatens the stability of the country.
5 Rejection of Islam Nusantara
While Islam Nusantara has been endorsed by the government of the Republic 
of Indonesia, some criticism has been directed towards this NU-led Islamic 
movement. H.A. Fallah, who is active in campaigning for the implementation 
of syariah and was once imprisoned in relation to his involvement in a ter-
rorist scheme, has questioned the legitimacy of Islam Nusantara, saying that 
Islam Nusantara promotes radicalism as it creates a sectarian sentiment.11 He 
points out that the substance of the Islam Nusantara movement is merely 
anti-Wahhābist, and this binary religious setting would widen the division that 
has already existed in the umat in Indonesia.12
He in fact has no hesitation to adopt cultural elements in Islamic life, such as 
wearing Indonesian traditional clothes called batik; however, he never accepts 
any metamorphosis relating to akidah [ʿaqīdah], or Islamic faith. For example, 
he believes the rituals in the time of ḥajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) should remain 
as they have been, referring to some Indonesians who (illegitimately, he thinks) 
chanted Pancasila (the five principles of the Republic of Indonesia) at the time 
of ḥajj.13 By the same token, Fallah believes that selametan, which has the aura 
of the existence of a deity other than Allāh, should never be allowed.
Another high-profile Muslim leader, Abdul Rohim, who serves as one of the 
executives of the hard-line Islamic organisation Jammah Ansharusy Shariah 
(JAS), also accuses ‘moderate Muslims’ who advocate Islam Nusantara as 
forcing fellow Muslims to deviate from the correct path of Islam.14 Rohim 
emphasises that the one of the essentials of the Islamic faith is to respect all 
10  22 October is set as Hari Santri, as NU once declared jihād on 22 October 1945 against 
the Dutch who intended to recolonise Indonesia after World War II. Presidential Decree 
no. 22/2015 enacted Hari Santri, at https://ketemulagi.com/sejarah-hari-santri-nasional 
-22-oktober/, accessed 27/05/2018.
11  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 6 March 2018.
12  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 6 March 2018.
13  See their deeds on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpWH_AfKWhc. Accessed 27/03/ 
2018.
14  Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
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creatures including non-Muslims, citing the verse 21 of al-Anbya in the Qurʾān, 
which reads “We have sent you forth but as a blessing to mankind.” However, 
the concept of being tolerant to other faiths, for Rohim, is different from that 
of moderate Muslims who advocate Islam Nusantara. He believes Muslims 
should never lose the essentials of Islamic faith, such as tauhid (the oneness 
of Allāh), while he firmly maintains they should respect the followers of other 
faiths. Therefore, he never forces the Islamic faith on non-believers but refuses 
to utter, for example, ‘Merry Christmas’ to Christians.15
Rohim explains that the position of Islam is invariably higher than culture, 
although cultural expressions in the attitude of Muslims are permissible.16 
Muslim women in Indonesia are still allowed to wear Indonesian jilbab rather 
than Middle Eastern niqāb.17 Nonetheless, any practice relating to rituals and 
belief, for Rohim, should be based on the orthodoxy of Islam. Thus, tahlīl, for 
example, cannot be accepted by Rohim, as it was ‘created’ by NU followers 
in Indonesia.18
Ismail Yusanto, who is a leader of the banned Islamic organisation Hizb 
ut-Tahrir Indonesia, also shares similar views with both Fallah and Rohim on 
Islam Nusantara. According to Yusanto, there should be no “Islam Nusantara” 
but “Islam in Nusantara,” as Islam should be only one.19 Yusanto also believes 
that no reconciliation between so-called moderate Muslims and fundamen-
talist Muslims under the leadership of Joko Widodo is possible, as the social 
division in the country has been widened by him after the controversial Jakarta 
gubernatorial election in 2017 (Kato 2017b).
The official approval of Islam Nusantara by President Joko Widodo might 
have created the notion that there exists different Islams: the ‘right’ Islam, 
that is, Islam Nusantara, and the ‘wrong’ Islam, whatever Islam exists outside 
of Islam Nusantara. Needless to say, no terrorist acts encouraged by fanatical 
ideology should be justified; however, this does not necessarily mean that all 
Muslims who reject Islam Nusantara are the perpetrators or advocates of terror-
ism. While the Islam Nusantara movement has the potential to be an efficient 
political tool for Joko Widodo, there is the possibility that it will contribute to 
the creation of more serious ideological conflicts in umat in Indonesia in the 
times to come.
15  Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
16  Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
17  Both jilbab and niqāb are headscarfs for Muslim women. Jilbab merely covers the head, 
and niqāb covers the head and face.
18  Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
19  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 9 March 2018.
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6 NU and Modernity
As has been mentioned, NU is an Islamic organisation that is concilia-
tory to indigenous culture, and it was established “to defend the interests of 
Traditionalism” (Ricklefs 1993: 19). On the other hand, there was an Islamic 
reform movement in the early twentieth century in Indonesia, which resulted 
in the establishment of the modernist organisation Muhammadiyah in 1912 
(Ricklefs 1993: 19). The aim of this modernist Muhammadiyah is to bring back 
the authenticity of Islam, which corresponds with the Qurʾān and ḥadīth along 
with the encouragement of utilising ijtihād, or human reasoning (Ricklefs 1993: 
19). Both NU and Muhammadiyah have played an important role not only in 
Islamic life but also in political and social life in Indonesia throughout its mod-
ern history. In the time of the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the leaders 
of both organisations, that is, Abdurrahman Wahid of NU and Amien Rais of 
Muhammadiyah, exercised a tremendous amount of influence over the one 
of the greatest social changes in Indonesia that took place after the end of 
Suharto’s era, called reformasi or reformation (Aspinall 2005).
These two organisations in some respect have had a rivalry, if not mutual 
hatred, since their establishment. When NU started to campaign for Islam 
Nusantara publicly in 2015, Muhammadiyah also launched a similar Islamic 
movement called ‘Islam Berkumajuan’, which means ‘Progressive Islam’. The 
substance of Islam Berkemajuan is explained by its leader as “Islam that is 
adaptive and accommodative to reconcile with [the] dynamic era” (Sahal and 
Aziz 2015: 26). Some note that the difference between Islam Nusantara and 
Islam Berkemajuan is that the former emphasises locality with Islam, as if 
the outfit is Indonesia but the body is Islam, while the latter focuses more on 
globalisation.20
However, A. Abdullah, a respected Muslim scholar, finds few differences in 
the motivation of these movements, as he believes that they merely ‘re-brand’ 
each organisation.21 In Abudullah’s reckoning, as social change proceeds, NU is 
required to be more responsive to modernity, and Muhammadiyah becomes 
more attentive to local culture. In this regard, the origin of NU’s Islam Nusantara 
movement could be traced in its vying with Muhammadiyah.
We in fact find NU’s effort to bring more modern approaches into their 
activities, including the campaign of Islam Nusantara. NU introduced an 
online information technology (IT) called NU-Online for the first time in 2004. 
20  This comment was made by Muhammadiyah’s young intellectual Najib Burhani (cited in 
Sahal and Aziz 2015: 26).
21  Interview with the author, Yogyakarta, 16 March 2018.
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IT-related jargon was so unknown to NU members in rural areas in the early 
2000s; even the word ‘Internet’ was mistaken as internit, which means ‘plaster-
board’ in Indonesian.22 However, NU has rapidly developed its cyber system for 
the last twenty years with the creation of NU-Online, an official website for the 
propagation division of NU, and Islam Nusantara.com in order to accomplish 
their religious mission.
Syaifullah Amin, the head of NU’s propagation division, explains that NU 
needs to reach out to members of every social stratum nationwide. Although 
the major component of NU’s constituency reside in rural areas, NU also 
intends to extend its religious message to urban young people, who, unlike the 
lower-educated people in rural areas, do not hesitate or face obstacles when 
employing modern IT for communication.23 This strategy has become more 
urgent since 2010 when ultra-religious conservatism has become more appar-
ent in Indonesian society.24 In fact, ideas of extremism that can potentially 
bring about acts of terrorism have been circulated through the internet glob-
ally. In response to this, NU, for example, has created an application for smart 
phones called NUTIZEN, which the users can access not only for watching 
commercial television or shopping but also for the lectures on Islam Nusantara 
and moderate Islam delivered by members of the NU ʿulamāʾ.
7 Conventional Approach
While NU has adopted modern digital technology for their propagation strat-
egy, a more conventional approach has never been dismissed. NU is consis-
tently active in their missionary work with the conventional verbal method. 
For example, a local branch of NU in Yogyakarta offers community based 
religious classes to rural workers every fortnight. On 15 March 2018, Fatya, a 
women’s organisation of NU in Yogyakarta, organised a class for female agricul-
tural workers in the evening. The venue was one of the participants’ primitive 
house, and twenty middle-aged women attended the class.
Khotimatul Husna, a leader of Fatya in Yogyakarta, presided over the class 
which was about the Islamic faith, emphasising the need of reverence to Allāh 
and obedience to the Qurʾān and ḥadīth. After the class, they conducted tahlīl 
and had a meal together. According to the participants, the major objective in 
attending the class was to obtain ‘knowledge’. They also explained that there 
22  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.
23  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.
24  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.
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was one non-Muslim family in the village, and that their communication and 
socialisation with non-Muslim families remain firmly amicable. They state 
that the non-Muslim family commonly joins the funerals of fellow villagers, 
and mutual help takes place without exception in times of natural disaster.25 
Khotimatul believes that this type of conventional and direct method is vital in 
order for the villagers to learn the essentials of Islam, as they hesitate to access 
modern cyber technology.
NU’s conventional approach to their followers is employed not only in rural 
areas but also in urban areas. The propagation division of NU offers a special 
course to potential community leaders who convey the religious ideas upheld 
by NU, including Islam Nusantara to the members of their community. The 
course is called Pelatian Kadar Dakwa’h (PKD) or Practice for the Followers of 
the Faith, and it runs twice a week for six months at the headquarters in Jakarta. 
On 20 March 2018, a PKD session was held and was attended by twenty-two 
male and eight female members of NU. Their occupation and their stage of life 
varied: there were university and high school students, teachers, food sellers, 
community leaders, and mosque staff. The class was led by a religious expert, 
and he provided the participants with rather practical advice for efficient pub-
lic speaking and choice of topics. The participants were required to prepare 
for their speech and conduct their session in front of all the participants and 
the teacher.
Four participants had a chance to present their own speech during the one-
and-a-half-hour session. The theme of their speeches included the issue of 
self-achievement through religion, the importance of tolerance, polygamy, and 
general ideas on Islam in life. The atmosphere of the class was amicable, and 
the participants seemed to be enthusiastic about their activities. The young-
est participant was a seventeen-year-old high school male student, and he 
expressed his impressions on the course as follows.
I was encouraged by my parents who had joined the class before to attend 
the course. I have no non-Muslim friends and am not sure if I am willing 
to say ‘Merry Christmas’ to non-Muslims.26
Another participant, a forty-seven-year old community leader also explained 
his motivation to join the course.
25  Discussion with the participants in Bantul, 15 March 2018.
26  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2018.
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I wanted to get the knowledge. Now I know that mutual respect (between 
Muslim and non-Muslim) is important. We (Muslims) should let non-
Muslims be alone. I myself am not really close to non-Muslims. We should 
not disturb one another. I do not utter ‘Merry Christmas’ to non-Muslims. 
I like to say, ‘Selamat’ (Happy).27
These comments from the participants of PKD suggest that the essential idea 
of a harmonious relationship with non-Muslims, for them at least, does not 
necessarily mean to mingle with non-Muslims; rather, it is to maintain their 
own community, independent and undisturbed. This attitude echoes with the 
ideas of Rohim who is regarded as a hard-line, Muslim who vehemently rejects 
the Islam Nusantara movement. For Rohim, Islam offers no ideology to reject 
kuffār (unbelievers), as long as they do not disturb Muslims, while maintaining 
the absolute superiority of Islam to other faiths.28
8 Ambivalence in Islam Nusantara
Generally speaking, the word ‘tolerance’ pertains to manifold concepts. 
However, as far as Islam Nusantara is concerned, there seems to be two major 
domains of the concept of tolerance: tolerance towards local culture in terms of 
religious rituals; and tolerance towards minority groups. In relation to the for-
mer tolerance, we find clear statements from the advocates of Islam Nusantara. 
Muhammadun, one of the executives of the NU branch in Yogyakarta, decid-
edly asserts that the religious rituals in Java should be accepted as Islam in 
order to complete Islam in Indonesia, which they call Islam Nusantara.29 He 
mentioned several rituals as examples, including kenduren or tahlil (joint 
prayer), sekaten (the procession of the day of Muḥammad’s birthday), sedekah 
bumi (offering food to the deity in land and sea), and the tradition in Kudus in 
Java, where they use buffalo as a sacrifice to Allāh rather than a goat.30
Ahmad Ishomuddin, a high-profile NU leader, also explains that there should 
be tolerance in relation to adat, or custom. For example, he finds no obstacle 
for shaking hands with women where that specific custom is accepted, and it 
is also permissible for a Muslim to conduct ziarah, or visit a grave, and make 
27  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2018.
28  Interviews with the author, Solo, 30 December 2017 and 18 March 2018.
29  Interview with the author, Bantul, 15 March 2018.
30  Interview with the author, Bantul, 15 March 2018.
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prayers to Allāh through a mediator. He presents more concrete examples of 
the relationship between Islam and local adat in the following:
Islam should accommodate with local culture and custom [adat] as we 
have the concept that Islam should be in accordance with the place and 
the time [shalihun li kulli zamanin wa makanin]. For example, the share 
of women’s inheritance can be greater in a matrilineal society, though 
Islamic syariah acknowledges the greater share for men. It is also fine that 
Muslims and non-Muslims are buried in the same complex.31
Ishomuddin insists that the essential concepts of Islam Nusantara and the 
authentic teachings of Islam mutually correspond, and he mentions typical 
characteristics of the common values of both as follows: tasaamuh (tolerance); 
itidaal (justice), tawaazun (balance), tawassuth (moderateness); and tasyawur 
(valuing discussion).32 Ishomuddin emphasises the core idea of Islam, that 
is, Islam rahmatan lil alamin or ‘Islam as a blessing for all’. Yet, one of the NU 
executives in fact objected to a view of Ishomuddin’s at a meeting with the 
author, saying that the burial site of Muslims should be separated from that of 
non-Muslims, which suggests that Islam Nusantara has not yet offered a unani-
mous view on ‘tolerance’.
Nonetheless, it is true that the concept of tolerance is recurrently empha-
sised in the movement of Islam Nusantara, while hard-line Muslims, includ-
ing Rohim, clearly elaborate the Islamic tenet on the concept of tolerance. 
However, the advocates of the Islam Nusantara movement themselves seem to 
have exhibited a rather abstract attitude towards tolerance compared to fun-
damentalists, especially on the issues relating to minorities, including the his-
torically persecuted Aḥmadiyya (or Ahmadiyah)33 movement, and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. With regard to the religious minor-
ity of Shīʿa, NU is invariably clear that Sunnī Islam is their tenet, and Islam 
Nusantara is for the Sunnī community (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah) worldwide; 
however, Islam Nusantara proponents almost unanimously agreed that Sunnī 
and Shīʿa Muslims should coexist in a harmonious manner. Nonetheless, the 
31  Interview with the author, Jakarta,7 March 2018.
32  Interview with the author, Jakarta,7 March 2018. This is also mentioned in International 
Summit of the Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISOMIL) & Deklarasi Nahdlatul Ulama, 51.
33  Ahmadiyah was established by Punjabi Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad in northern India at the 
end of nineteenth century. There are two major schools: Lahore, which regards Aḥmad 
as a “renewer” of Islam; and Qadian, which takes Aḥmad as the last Prophet (Ricklefs 
2012: 48).
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degree and extent of tolerance in Islam Nusantara varies depending on indi-
vidual understandings rather than an institutional definition.
For example, some young NU activists who actively campaign on behalf of 
Islam Nusantara do believe that the existence of Aḥmadiyya can be accepted, 
and the followers of Aḥmadiyya can be regarded as Muslims, although their 
concept of Muḥammad is deemed wrong.34 On the other hand, some NU 
executives state that Aḥmadiyya is theologically wrong, and their false beliefs 
about Aḥmad should be corrected, adding that Aḥmadiyya or its members 
should not be the target of attack.35 We find that the difference of attitudes 
between the two towards Aḥmadiyya is that the former has no intention to 
alter Aḥmadiyya, while the latter intends to bring them back to the ‘right path’ 
of Islam. Nonetheless, one of the advisory board members of NU, Ma’ruf Amin, 
clearly stated that Aḥmadiyya was unacceptable on the official website of NU 
in 2005 (NU Online 2005).
The Islam Nusantara movement has also failed to set a clear position on 
another minority group, LGBT Indonesians. While there is no mention in the 
official declaration of Islam Nusantara, different opinions on sexual minorities 
exist among advocates of Islam Nusantara. Khotimatul, a leader of the wom-
en’s association of NU in Yogyakarta, shows her humane attitude towards the 
LGBT community by supporting the identities of transgender people, without 
judging whether they are right or wrong.36 On the other hand, S. Amin, one of 
the executives of NU, believes that LGBT people are wrong, and they should 
be taken back to the right path of Islam, though there is no need to abuse or 
persecute them.37
This discrepancy also suggests that Islam Nusantara has failed to present 
a solution for the discrimination against the minorities. Islam Nusantara in 
fact remains ambivalent on certain social issues, such as Aḥmadiyya and LGBT 
people, while it has taken a clear position on the adaptation of local culture in 
Islamic practice. Azis Fachrudin, a young Muslim intellectual, is right to point 
out that the urgent need for Islam Nusantara to present its stance on minority 
groups, lest it be “a new name for old content” (Fachrudin 2015).
34  Anonymous interview with the author.
35  Anonymous interview with the author.
36  Interview with the author, Bantul, 15 March 2018.
37  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.
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9 Conclusion
The ambivalence found in the Islam Nusantara movement seems to have con-
tributed to the avoidance of intricate religious discussions. Almost all advo-
cates of Islam Nusantara vaguely admit the supremacy of Islam over other 
religions; however, they never explicitly emphasise the ascendancy of Islam. 
Zastrouw, a lecturer at NU University in Jakarta, states using a clever metaphor 
that “I would say that my wife is best, when I am asked about the supremacy of 
Islam over other faiths.”38
This ‘pacifist’ attitude shows clear contrast with that of more ‘liberal’-
minded Muslims who state that all religions are equal. The liberal Islam move-
ment, such as Jaringan Islam Liberal ( JIL), was branded as too extreme with 
overwhelming secularism and was criticised severely in the early 2000s. The 
Islam Nusantara movement tactfully avoids theological controversies, and 
this leads us to understand that the movement contains ambivalence on sensi-
tive issues.
The Islam Nusantara movement obviously accepts several metamorphoses 
in religious practices and rituals. However, the need to retain the authenticity 
of Islam at the same time seems to have never been abandoned in the move-
ment. For instance, they emphasise the linkage between Nusantara and the 
Prophet Muḥammad. The residents of ‘Muslim society’ seem to be unwill-
ing to be branded as impious; thus, they emphasise the rightfulness of Islam 
Nusantara. In this sense, the attitudes of the advocates of Islam Nusantara and 
fundamentalists occasionally overlap. This is a time when we have difficulties 
in drawing a clear line between ‘Islamic society’ and ‘Muslim society’.
In other words, the Islam Nusantara movement, which has emerged from 
Muslim society, necessitates ‘authentic’ Islam as a basic tenet of an Islamic 
society. These two major components of Islam mutually complement each 
other: so-called fundamentalists accept cultural elements in their social behav-
iour including wearing traditional clothes, while Islam Nusantara advocates 
emphasise their linkage with the Prophet. This suggests that there exist some 
similarities between these two distinctive elements in Islam. Yet, it is the Islam 
Nusantara movement’s ambivalence that differentiates it from Salafist-type 
Islam and the residents of Islamic society.
Importantly, the Islam Nusantara movement is evidently reactive to the 
emergence of extremism as the official declaration acknowledges. It could 
be effective in promoting the peaceable aspects of Islam. However, it should 
be noted that Islam Nusantara contains potential for promoting the idea that 
38  Interview with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2018.
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any version of Islam other than Islam Nusantara is belligerent and thus wrong, 
which could create psychological antagonism among umat in Indonesia.
The Islam Nusantara Movement seemingly contributes to a more moderate 
type of Islam and a less tense relationship with other religions in Indonesia; 
however, it is yet to truly confront the stricter form of Islam. This relationship 
will bring about either an organic development of Islam with serious yet pro-
ductive discussions or a deeper mutual distrust and conflicts. We should also 
remember that Islam Nusantara has been a useful political tool for President 
Joko Widodo. In this respect, Islam Nusantara has the potential to bring 
about changes in a society, including stability, peaceful coexistence with the 
members of society, or threats to these. As its political potential is ongoing, 
scholars must consistently engage with the movement to witness how Islam 
Nusantara, Indonesian society, and the religion of Islam more broadly, influ-
ence one another.
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Chapter 6




Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU, the Central Board of Nahdlatul 
Ulama) claims to have 60 million members in Indonesia (Arifianto 2017: 257), 
and approximately 30 million more throughout the world. This makes NU the 
largest independent Islamic organisation across the globe. Its large number of 
members require extra attention from PBNU to adequately cater to their needs. 
In order to support services for the community, a broad range of institutions 
and infrastructures are necessary. To this end, NU boards have extended their 
exposure through Pengurus Besar (the central board) in Jakarta, Pengurus 
Wilayah (regional boards in provinces), Pengurus Cabang (branch boards in 
towns or districts), Majelis Wakil Cabang (councils of branch representatives 
in kecamatan or sub-districts), and Pengurus Ranting (twig boards in kelura-
han or villages) across Indonesia. For overseas members, NU has launched 
Pengurus Cabang Istimewa (special branch boards) in many countries. In 
addition, NU has semi-autonomous organisations for women, university stu-
dents, school or madrasa students, scholars, business people, and others, that 
extend from the central board to the twig boards.
The services to the members and communities also require significant atten-
tion as they include formation, supervision, leadership on all levels, direction, 
visits, and other organisational necessities. The services also include organisa-
tional workshops and training in order to provide information regarding NU’s 
history, theology, activities, products, networks, political policies and strate-
gies, and future projections. Equally important, NU also provides amenities 
such as hospital and health services, educational institutions from schools to 
universities, agricultural groups, and many more. NU provides services for non-
members too, since leaders Ahmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid formally 
accepted “the official state ideology of Pancasila as its ‘sole basis’ ” (Fealy and 
Bush 2014: 546) at the movement’s National Congress in 1984. For a traditional 
socio-religious organisation like NU, it is a substantial commitment to provide 
such services across Indonesia and overseas. Moreover, all caretakers from the 
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central board to the smallest branch are volunteers, providing their dedication 
and services, free of charge.
The sizeable membership and political influence of NU have triggered 
studies on this largest socio-religious organisation in the world. International 
scholars from reputable universities have published on a variety of topics such 
as the discourse of traditionalism (van Bruinessen 1996), politics (Feillard 2013; 
Feillard 2002; Fealy 2007; Bush 2009; McGregor 2009; Fealy and McGregor 
2010; Turmudi 2003), Islamic law (Hosen 2004); civil society (Bush 2002; van 
Bruinessen and Wajidi 2006), leadership and organisation (Nakamura 1981; 
van Bruinessen 1991; 2002; Barton 2002; Mietzner 2001), women (Arnez 2010; 
Feillard 2008), and many other subjects. In addition, Indonesian scholars have 
also conducted research on this traditional Islamic organisation. Yet much con-
temporary progress and development has not been covered in prior research. 
This chapter presents Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in terms of historical accounts, 
theology, members and supporters, the ʿulamāʾ, organisational structure, poli-
tics, the bahtsul masail forum, and its recent product ‘Islam Indonesia’. In order 
to discover its socio-cultural strategies, this chapter also observes NU’s policies 
related to religious and political issues. It is concluded that ‘moderate Islam’ is 
a contested term in contemporary Indonesia, and that while NU’s organization 
has permitted it to represent the interests of a broad swathe of Indonesian 
Muslims, its lack of authoritative and disciplinary structures has resulted in 
illiberal attitudes and practices among individual members and participant 
organisations.
2 Historical Accounts
Formally established in 31 January 1926, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, lit. ‘The Revival 
of ʿUlamāʾ) did not suddenly appear in the history of the Indonesian archi-
pelago or Southeast Asia. Historians pinpoint the initial form of this grassroots 
movement as appearing in early 1926; however, it can be traced back prior 
to the twentieth century (Ismail 2011). Its epistemological and ideological 
traces can even be found as early as the history of Islam in the archipelago. 
The roles played by KH Hasyim Asy’ari (hereafter, Mbah Hasyim) and KH 
Wahab Chasbullah (hereafter, Mbah Wahab) in the foundation of NU are wor-
thy of discussion. These men are related as guru and student. Mbah Hasyim 
(1871–1947) suggested to Mbah Wahab (1888–1971) that he continue studying 
in Mecca after finishing his studies in Tebuireng, Jombang in 1908. In Mecca, 
Mbah Wahab and his contemporaries including Abdul Halim, Ahmad Sanusi, 
and Mas Mansur co-founded a Meccan branch of Syarikat Islam (Effendi 2010: 
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98). Mbah Wahab was an organiser. In this regard, Mbah Wahab was one of the 
originators of this traditional organisation, in addition to Mbah Hasyim.
When he returned to Surabaya in 1914, Mbah Wahab established Nahdhatul 
Wathan (lit. ‘The Revival of Homeland’) that has been proclaimed as the first 
religious institution with a nationalistic and moderate character in the archi-
pelago (van Bruinessen 1994: 35). Nahdhatul Wathan grew rapidly and within 
two years, it already had a madrasa (religious school) with a large two-floor 
building in Surabaya. Branches spread across East and Central Java includ-
ing Malang, Gresik, Jombang, Semarang, and other places. Nahdlatul Wathan 
promoted educational and intellectual development and in 1917, it established 
Tashwirul Afkar as a medium for Qurʾānic learning and religious education. 
Mbah Wahab also founded Syubbanul Wathan (lit. ‘Youth of Homeland’) and 
Nahdlatul Tujjar (lit. ‘The Revival of Tradesmen’) of which members were 
mostly kyais (Javanese clerics). Mbah Wahab is also said to have established 
Nahdlatul Fikr (lit. ‘The Revival of Thought’).
The archipelago had previously witnessed the birth of Muhammadiyah, 
the movement founded by KH Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923), in Yogyakarta on 
18 November 1912. Muhammadiyah was founded as a puritan, reformist, and 
modernist socio-religious movement. It aims to purify Islam from local syn-
cretic practices commonly known as “TBC” which stands for takhayul (myth, 
Arab. taḵayyul), bidʿa (religious innovation), and churafat (superstition). It is 
reformist because KH. Ahmad Dahlan was strongly influenced by the Egyptian 
reformist Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905), and considered the reformation 
of Islam as a foundational principle. Hence, he advocated ijtihād (individual 
interpretation of Islam by going back to the Qurʾān and ḥadīths [hadis in 
Bahasa]) in contrast to taqlīd (following the opinion of the ʿulamāʾ) as being 
more important (Ricklefs 1991). Muhammadiyah is the second-largest Islamic 
movement in Indonesia after NU, and the two organisations have been rivals 
much of their collective history.
The global politics of Islam also underpinned the birth of NU. There was a 
heated debate among Muslim organisations in the Archipelago in early 1926 
after Ibn Saud took power in Hijaz, establishing the state of Saudi Arabia. Some 
organisations suggested sending envoys to Mecca to meet King Ibn Saud to 
advocate for the traditional practices of Muslims. Reformist and modern organ-
isations, however, rejected the idea. As a result, traditionalist Muslims decided 
to send their own envoy to meet the King and voice their concerns. The envoy 
(called the ‘Hijaz Committee’) presented three demands to the King: request-
ing that he grant freedom of adherence to madhhab (schools of Islamic law) 
to Muslims in Hijaz; asking that he open access to historical sites connected 
to the Prophet including the tombs of his daughters; and suggesting that he 
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publicise the cost of ḥajj (pilgrimage). The idea of dispatching the envoy was 
discussed prior to the birth of NU, but it eventually reached Mecca on 7 May 
1928 after NU was founded (Ismail 2011: 257–258).
Observing socio-cultural developments in the homeland of the Indonesian 
archipelago, where the modernist Muhammadiyah was gaining ground, and a 
political shift in Mecca where Ibn Saud with his puritanical Wahhābist form of 
Islam had gained power, Mbah Wahab strongly suggested that Mbah Hasyim 
initiate the foundation of an ʿulamāʾ organisation that would accommodate 
the interests of religious educational institutions in Java. In addition, several 
religious practices were challenged by modernist organisations in the archipel-
ago such as al-Irsyad and Muhammadiyah. After heated debates among kyais 
in Java, Mbah Hasyim initiated the foundation of NU in Surabaya on 31 January 
1926 in accordance to 16 Rajab 1438 of the Islamic calendar.
3 Theology
NU is a Sunnī Muslim organisation. In the Indonesian context, ‘Sunnī’ is 
equivalent to Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah (‘the party of the Sunna’, a traditional 
Arabic expression rendered into Bahasa Indonesia), commonly abbreviated as 
‘Aswaja’. NU is theologically a middle path (wasatiya, ‘moderation’) between 
extreme rationalism and hard-line scripturalism. Following this, the source of 
Islamic law for NU was not only the Qurʾān and hadis, but also the power of 
human reason to understand empirical realities. The idea of the middle path 
was then conceptualised by NU, following Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (874–936) 
and Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (853–944) in kalām and the theological context; 
following one of the four major madhhabs (Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, Ḥanafī, or Ḥanbalī) 
with the majority being Shāfiʿī in fīqh (Islamic law); and following the method 
of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) and Junayd al-Baghdādī (830–910) in 
taṣawwuf (Islamic mysticism). This is clearly evidenced in the Muqaddima 
(Introduction) of the Qanun Asasi Nahdhatul Ulama, a principal constitution 
of NU. NU’s choices in kalām, fīqh, and taṣawwuf is the theological and local 
interpretation of īmān (faith), islām (submission, rituals), and iḥsān (being 
good) as the common trilogy of being Muslim, in the Indonesian context. 
The kalām versions of al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī teach that NU Muslims must 
strongly hold their īmān. Following one of the four major madhhabs (especially 
Shāfiʿiyya) is the principal component of islām for NU. Similarly, orienting their 
spirituality on the teachings of al-Ghazālī and al-Baghdādī is the embodiment 
of iḥsān for NU Muslims. This acknowledgement of Ṣūfi elements marks NU 
as traditionalist, as opposed to the modernist Muhammadiyah which sought 
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to rid Indonesia Islam of Ṣūfi beliefs and practices, among other local and 
regional variations (Ismail 2011: 253).
After the 1998 reformation and the resulting democratic atmosphere, 
Indonesia witnessed a stronger presence of transnational Islamic move-
ments such as Wahhābism, Salafism, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and other smaller splinter 
groups. These movement are all Sunnī or Aswaja, with modernist and puri-
tanical religious orientations. They publicly promote being Sunnī and Aswaja 
whenever the opportunity arises. This inclination has led to the contestation 
of the designation ‘Aswaja’ in Indonesia, as NU is significantly different to these 
transnational Islamic organisations. Therefore, NU introduces itself as Ahlus 
Sunnah wal Jamaʿah al-Nahdhiyyah in order to create a distinction from these 
non-local Islamic organisations. Based on this theological orientation, NU has 
been expected to develop Islam on the credentials of those four madhhabs in 
order to achieve certain short-term and long-term objectives. These include a 
strong commitment to strengthening associations and unity of practitioners 
of the four major madhhabs within the community. To support this idea, NU 
is expected to disseminate Islamic teachings based on the four madhhabs and 
to select which accredited canons will be used to teach within Ahlus Sunnah 
wal Jamaʿah al-Nahdhiyyah. The above objectives can also be implemented 
by supporting the construction of new mosques, madrasas (Islamic schools), 
pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), as well as enhancing its members’ well-
being and improving the quality of life for orphans (Ismail 2011).
The emblem of NU contains symbolism which represents its theology, charac-
ters and ideals. Various elements of the emblem reference verses of the Qurʾān. 
The globe indicates the place where human beings live and come from on the 
basis of Q. 20: 55.1 This means that NU aims to maintain the conservation of the 
Earth for the prosperity of current and future generations. This universal ideal 
of NU indicates that NU works not only for its members and communities, but 
also for humankind in general. The Indonesian map on the globe emphasises 
that NU was born and established in this country. The ropes surrounding the 
globe means that NU has ideals which tie the population of the Earth in terms 
of humanity on the basis of Q. 3: 103.2 The number of lines on the rope repre-
sents the 99 beautiful names of Allāh. In regards to the globe, the Indonesian 
1 Q.S. Taha [20]: 55 says “From the earth We created you, and into it We will return you, and 
from it We will extract you another time.”
2 Q.S. Al ‘Imran [3]: 103 says: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allāh all together and do not 
become divided. And remember the favor of Allāh upon you—when you were enemies and 
He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on 
the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus does Allāh make clear to you His 
verses that you may be guided.
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map, and the rope, NU has innovated three kinds of ties that can unite human-
kind: ukhuwwa bashariya (human brotherhood), ukhuwwa wataniya (national 
brotherhood), and ukhuwwa Islamiyya (Islamic brotherhood).
There are nine stars on the emblem signifying great personalities from the 
history of Islam. The largest star at the top represents the Prophet Muḥammad. 
The four stars on the top right and the left epitomise the four Khulafāʾ 
Rāshidūn, the first four (‘rightfully guided’) caliphs Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, 
and ʿAlī. The four stars at the lower right and left denote the four great Imāms 
of madhhabs (schools of Islamic law) Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, Ḥanafī, and Ḥanbalī. The 
nine stars, hence, strongly claim that NU follows these great personalities, or in 
other words, that NU is faithful to Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah. In the local con-
text, the nine stars also exemplify the nine saints of the archipelago from the 
fourteenth century, who share the same traditionalist Islamic ideology as NU.
The emblem has two colours: green and white. The green symbolises the fer-
tile and luxuriant land of the archipelago where NU was born and established. 
The white is a symbol of chastity and the saintliness of NU’s characters. The 
Arabic writing reads ‘Nahdhatul Ulama’, while the roman text ‘NU’ is the acro-
nym. The emblem was designed by Kyai Ridwan Abdullah, a contemporary of 
Mbah Hasyim and Wahab Chasbullah. Ridwan was only given fifteen days to 
complete the design, but he finished the design in less than the given time. As 
described above, the emblem embodies the stories, Islamic ideology, theology, 
ideals, and objectives of NU.
Figure 6.1 Emblem of Nahdhatul Ulama
Public domain
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4 The Traditionalist Background and Supporters
Founded by kyais in Java, NU traditionally has members consisting of rural 
populations and santri of pesantren across Indonesia. With ties strongly rooted 
with kyais in villages across the Archipelago, the rural population are tradi-
tionally and culturally followers of NU. They conserve and continue to per-
form Islamic practices as suggested by local kyais. Practices would include 
ziyāra (visiting saints’ tombs), wasīla (intercession), celebrating the mawlid 
(Prophet’s birthday), chanting ṣalawāt (praises to the Prophet), performing 
twenty tarāwīḥ (night prayers during Ramadan), reciting tahlīl (a compila-
tion of specific Qurʾānic verses, remembrances, and supplications) and recit-
ing narratives of the life of the Prophet by Jaʿfar al-Barzanjī, sulūk or ṭarīqa 
practices, and many more. These practices are very common and have become 
life rituals of the people in rural Indonesia. The key role played by kyais also 
means that a vast number of members come from traditional, conservative 
Islamic orientations. They are conservative in terms of conserving Islamic tra-
ditions and practices based on strong attachment to al-turāth or tradition as 
recorded in hundreds of Arabic manuals commonly learned in pesantren. They 
are conservative as they keep practicing what the Javanese saints had designed 
centuries ago as the best form of the amalgamation of Islam and local culture 
(Barton 1997: 324).
The current number of pesantren and similar schools across Indonesia is 
approximately 30,000, with santri (pesantren students) and alumni constitut-
ing the cultural followers of this traditionalist Muslim organisation (Azzahra 
2020). Not only do they perform the practices, they also know and understand 
and are able to elaborate the theological reasoning behind the practices. As 
santri of pesantren, they are equipped with strongly rooted “tool knowledge” 
such as the knowledge of Arabic including naḥw (grammar), ṣarf (morphol-
ogy), balāgha (rhetoric), and adab (literature). For these tasks, it is an important 
within traditional learning that they memorise manuals of Arabic grammar, 
from brief texts such as Matn al-Ajrummiyah or al-Imriti, to the extensive 
texts like Alfiya Ibn Malik, which consists of more than a thousand Arabic 
pieces of poetry. This is in addition to their obligation to memorise the Qurʾān 
and hadis.
Furthermore, santri are traditionally defined as those who reside in the 
pesantren, and who follow and obey the kyai (Fealy and Bush 2014: 541). Both 
kyai and santri enjoy a special relationship of guru and pupil, of supervisor and 
supervisee, or that of parent and children. The high reverence of santri toward 
their kyai is indicated with hand kissing during the greeting handshake, listen-
ing and following advice, physical loyalty, and the taking of sanad (chain of 
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knowledge transmission). The reverence is not limited to the students’ time in 
the pesantren, but throughout the person’s lifetime. Pesantren have been her-
mitages and retreats for pupils where they train as Indonesian Muslims for six 
to nine years. Afterward, they often return to their villages and establish new 
pesantren which follow the educational system and practices of the pesantren 
from which they graduated (Hefner 2009; Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007). 
This practice disseminates the traditionalist Muslim education and values 
in Indonesia.
NU followers have also been identified as the ‘sarungan’ people character-
ised by the cloth or sarongs they always commonly wear. Sarongs are worn 
in pesantren, as well as for other socio-religious occasions outside pesantren. 
Sarongs, batik shirts or koko with black peci (hats) on the head are a common 
fashion style for Indonesian men on important occasions. When Abdurrahman 
Wahid (‘Gus Dur’) was the President of Indonesia, he was very often visited by 
kyais from pesantren, who arrived at the presidential palace in Jakarta wearing 
this attire, a sight that was rarely seen in the capital, Jakarta.
5 NU’s ʿUlamāʾ
As described above, sanad as a chain of knowledge transmission, is one of the 
foremost qualities of NU. Possessing a sanad is considered an object of pride 
for NU Muslims as they participate in a direct line of authoritative knowledge 
and ʿulamāʾ. Some of them simply memorise the full chain. Some write down 
the sanad in their personal customised diaries or books. Some even draw the 
sanad beautifully in a chart and display it on the wall of their house. As there 
are a vast number of sanad among ʿulamāʾ within NU, the current chairper-
son of NU, KH. Said Agil Siradj will be used as an example to demonstrate the 
continuous sanad or chain of transmission of religious knowledge back to the 
Prophet Muḥammad, in the chart below. The chart shows at least twenty-eight 
chain links of transmission of religious knowledge. They are all important 
names, but the most significant names and related to the discussion of NU 
are given in yellow. The chart shows that the current chairperson of NU, Said 
Agil Siradj (28) has sanad to Mbah Hasyim/Hasyim Asy’ari (25), the founder of 
NU, to Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (14), an NU reference in taṣawwuf, then to Abū 
al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (10, an NU reference in kalām, to the Prophet Muḥammad 
(1). Some scholars even expand on this by suggesting that the Prophet 
Muḥammad received the knowledge from Jibrīl, the Angel of Revelation, who 
received knowledge from Allāh.
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The above example is simply written as a linear form of sanad, where there is 
only one ʿ alim or Muslim scholar in each chain. Realistically, however, there are 
a number of other names in each chain which continue the same chain eye in 
different levels or generations. For instance, Mbah Hasyim/Hasyim Asy’ari (25) 
learned and received sanad of knowledge from Mahfudz Termas (24), and at 
this same level, also from Arsyad al-Banjari, Kholil Bangkalan, ‘Abdul Shomad 
Palembang, and many more. These four ʿulamāʾ learned and took sanad from 
Nawawi Banten (23). Similarly, a number of ʿulamāʾ might be present in each 
level of the example of sanad above.
There is indeed a list of sanad of NU’s ʿ ulamāʾ that involve al-Māturīdī, an NU 
reference in kalām, or Imām al-Shāfiʿī, an NU reference in fīqh, or al-Baghdādī, 
an NU reference in taṣawwuf. Moreover, there are other special sanads based 
on particular kitab kuning (lit. ‘yellow books’, referring to Arabic books), can-
ons, or manuals that are learned from generation to generation of ʿulamāʾ and 
santri in pesantren all over Indonesia. For example, it is easy to find sanad of 
NU’s ʿulamāʾ for, for example, the ṣaḥīḥ of Imām al-Bukhārī, the number one 
canon of hadis. This means that the sanad from Imām al-Bukhārī, to his stu-
dents which continued to other students, and was passed along to the current 
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NU’s ʿulamāʾ and santri, is definitely present. Similarly, this is also the case for 
millions of sanads for other kitab kuning and Arabic manuals traditionally read 
and learned in the pesantren of NU across Indonesia.
6 Organisational Structure
Pengurus Besar Nahdhatul Ulama (PBNU) is the leadership system and 
organisational structure covering the Mustasyar (Advisory Board), Syuriyah 
(Supreme Council), Aʿwan (Expert Board), and the Tanfidziyah (Executive 
Board). The highest body within this organisation is the Syuriyah or Supreme 
Council of which the leader is named Ra  ʾ is ʿAm, the vice is Naib Rais, and 
the secretary is Katib Syuriyah. The Tanfidziyah or Executive Board is led 
by Ketua Umum (general chairperson) and the Secretary General. The Rais 
ʿAm of the Syuriyah Council and the Ketua Umum of Tanfidziyah Council 
are elected every five years through Muktamar. Another body, which pro-
vides advice to both councils, is the Mustasyar consisting of senior ʿulamāʾ 
and members.
Several lembaga or institutions within PBNU are formed in order to opti-
mise the running of the organisation. The lembaga work as departmental 
institutions and serve as policy implementers in dealing with certain com-
munity groups or any groups that require special treatment. PBNU also 
supervises several lajnah or institutions dealing with key programmes 
within NU. In addition, PBNU also have several semi-autonomous organisa-
tions serving particular community religious interests. The lembaga include 
Lembaga Dakwah Nahdhatul Ulama (LDNU, for Islamic propagation), Lembaga 
Pendidikan Ma  ʾarif Nahdhatul Ulama (LP Ma’arif NU, for education), Lembaga 
Pelayanan Kesehatan Nahdlatul Ulama (LPK-NU, for health services), 
Lembaga Perekonomian Nahdlatul Ulama (LP-NU, for economics), Lembaga 
Pengembangan Pertanian Nahdlatul Ulama (LPP-NU, for agriculture), Rabithah 
Ma‘ahid Islamiyah Nahdlatul Ulama (RMI-NU, for pesantren or Islamic boarding 
schools). Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga Nahdlatul Ulama (LKK-NU for fam-
ily), Lembaga Takmir Masjid Nahdlatul Ulama (LTM-NU, for mosque welfare), 
Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia Nahdlatul Ulama 
(LAKPESDAM-NU, for human resources), Lembaga Penyuluhan dan Bantuan 
Hukum Nahdlatul Ulama (LPBH-NU, for legal issues), Lembaga Kesehatan 
Nahdlatul Ulama (LK-NU, for health), Lembaga Badan Halal Nahdlatul Ulama 
(LBHNU, for halal), and Sarikat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia (SARBUMUSI, 
for workers).
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PBNU also consists of several lajnah or boards, including Lajnah Bahtsul 
Masail Nahdlatul Ulama (LBM-NU, for religious Islamic matters), Lajnah 
Falakiyah Nahdlatul Ulama (LF-NU, for celestial spheres), Lajnah Ta’lif wan Nasyr 
Nahdlatul Ulama (LTN-NU, for publications), Lajnah Auqaf Nahdlatul Ulama 
(LA-NU, for endowments), Lajnah Zakat, Infaq, dan Shadaqah Nahdlatul Ulama 
(LAZIS-NU, for charity). Additionally, PBNU maintains autonomous boards 
including Jamʾiyyah Ahli Thariqah Al-Muʾtabarah An-Nahdliyah (JATMAN, for 
Ṣūfi groups), Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslimat NU, for women), Gerakan 
Pemuda Ansor Nahdlatul Ulama (GP Ansor NU, for youth), Fatayat Nahdlatul 
Ulama (Fatayat NU, for female youth), Keluarga Mahasiswa Nahdlatul Ulama 
(KMNU, for university students), Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama (IPNU, for 
male disciples), Ikatan Pelajar Putri Nahdlatul Ulama (IPPNU, for female disci-
ples), Ikatan Sarjana Nahdlatul Ulama (ISNU, for graduates), Ikatan Pencak Silat 
Nahdlatul Ulama Pagar Nusa (IPSNU Pagar Nusa, for martial arts), Jami’iyyatul 
Qurro wal Huffadz Nahdlatul Ulama (JQH NU, for Qurʾānic reciters and memo-
risers), and Persatuan Guru Nahdlatul Ulama (PERGUNU, for teachers).
NU boards extend from PBNU as the central board to the smallest regional 
boards. The board levels in sequences include PBNU, Pengurus Wilayah 
Nahdhatul Ulama (PWNU, for the provincial level), Pengurus Cabang Nahdhatul 
Ulama (PCNU, for kabupaten/kota or the district level), Majelis Wakil Cabang 
Nahdhatul Ulama (MWCNU, for kecamatan or the sub-district level), Pengurus 
Ranting Nahdhatul Ulama (PRNU, for kelurahan/desa or sub-sub-district 
level), and Pengurus Anak Ranting Nahdhatul Ulama (PARNU, as the smallest 
regional board). NU also has special branches overseas called Pengurus Cabang 
Istimewa Nahdhatul Ulama (PCI-NU). NU is a loosely-organised movement, in 
that the kyais and pesantren are the core personnel and institutions, and the 
“central and regional boards had limited authority over, or desire to dictate to, 
locally influenced kyai” (Fealy and Bush 2014: 542).
7 Political Atmosphere
Since it was founded in 1926, NU has been primarily a socio-religious organisa-
tion. The Qanun Asasi of NU has no single point which explicitly intersects 
with politics. However, the strong fīqh orientation of NU in its Islamic creeds 
and rituals has forced NU to discuss politics. This is normal as canons of fīqh 
always contained politics-related discourses such as imāma (Islamic leader-
ship), qaḍāʾ (judge-related topics), bughāt (rebellion), ḥudūd wa taʿzīrat (pun-
ishment and retribution), qisas (requitals), and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (loyalty 
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and disavowal). All of these fīqh discourses initially envisage the presence of 
Islamic power in politics. With very large numbers of traditional followers, 
especially in Java, this enables NU to be present as a political power in the 
archipelago (Ismail 2011).
NU initially intersected with politics when it issued a decree on land defence 
in 1935. It stated that the Archipelago is a land of Muslims. On another occa-
sion, NU also stated that supporting Japan in the Pacific War was not wājib nor 
an obligation for Muslims, or for people generally living in the archipelago. 
In the 1938 Muktamar in Menes, there was a proposal that NU should place 
its representatives in the Volksraad (the People’s Council) that was initially 
formed in 1916 by the Dutch Administration in the East Indies (Indonesia). The 
majority of the Muktamar participants rejected the idea and wanted to keep 
NU as a socio-religious organisation.
Despite classical competing rivalry between NU and Muhammadiyah, both 
Islamic organisations established the Majelis Islam A’laa Indonesia (MIAI, 
the Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia) in 1937 in order to inaugurate 
an umbrella or federal organisation for all Islamic groups in the archipel-
ago (Ismail 2011: 271). It united and coordinated the voice of Muslims in the 
Archipelago to argue against Dutch policies, such as the marriage ordinance 
and military service for Muslims. The Japanese occupation changed the politi-
cal atmosphere and sponsored the foundation of Masyumi or Majelis Syura 
Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in 1945 
when Mbah Hasyim became the national chairperson.
The core role of NU in Masyumi caused NU to start becoming a political 
movement. After experiencing severe disadvantage while within Masyumi, 
NU left the council, as decided in the PBNU decree dated 5/6 April 1952 (Fealy 
and Bush 2014: 542). The decision was then brought to the nineteenth cen-
tury Muktamar from 28 April–1 May 1952 in Palembang. The Muktamar sup-
ported the move and recommended that NU become a political party. NU then 
founded Liga Muslimin Indonesia (LMI, the Indonesian Muslims League) 
on 30 August 1952, with Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia (Perti, Indonesian 
Tarbiyah United), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII, Islamic Association 
Party of Indonesia), South Sulawesi-based Darud Da’wa wal Irsyad (DDI) and 
Persyarikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Tionghoa Muslim 
Association). In parliament, seven NU members left the Masyumi faction and 
formed an independent bloc (Feith 2007: 233–235).
During the process of withdrawing from Masyumi and becoming a politi-
cal party, the NU Party only had a short time to prepare for the 1955 elec-
tion. The NU Party eventually took part in the 1955 election and won 45 seats 
(18.4% votes) in the DPR, ranking third behind the PNI (Indonesian National 
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Party) and Masyumi, each of which held 57 seats. In the following election for 
Konstituante (Constitutional Assembly), the NU Party won 91 seats (Friend 
2003: 51). Under the New Order policy in 1973, the NU Party was then forc-
ibly fused with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development 
Party), which won the second-largest number of seats in the 1977 and 1982 elec-
tions. Due to dissatisfaction and lack of influence, Abdurrahman Wahid, the 
Chairman of NU, withdrew from PPP, causing a decline of votes for PPP, from 
28% in 1982 to 16% in the 1987 election (Ricklefs 1991: 276). Since then, NU has 
been a socio-religious organisation.
8 Bahtsul Masail
As described above, NU has a lembaga or board, which is in charge of answer-
ing religious Islamic matters arising within Muslim societies in Indonesia. In 
the past, the discussion of contemporary issues was conducted in a forum 
called Lailatul Ijtima ʿNahdatul Oelama or LINO (lit. ‘evening of gathering of 
NU’). This was an intellectual arena for kyais in order to grant legal standings 
of religious matters. Currently, after the institutionalisation of Bahtsul Masail, 
the LINO uses another format. In many regional meetings, the LINO has been 
set up as a regular meeting for learning, where a kyai presents and discusses 
an Arabic work in front of the board and members of PWNU (regional board).
Lembaga Bahtsul Masail—Nahdhatul Ulama (LBM-NU, henceforth LBM) is 
a creative and important scheme of ijtihād or fatwā production (Laffan 2005). 
It is significant and inventive for at least two reasons. First, Muslims outside 
Arab countries used to seek advice and fatwā from ʿulamāʾ in the Middle East 
on religious issues in their home countries. A famous work entitled Muhimmat 
al-Nafa  ʾ is fi Bayan Asʾilat al-Ḥadīth, a nineteenth century compilation of ques-
tions and fatwā, records questions from Muslims in the archipelago, and 
fatwā from Middle Eastern countries and regions, especially Mecca and Cairo 
(Kaptein 1997; Hosen 2004). LBM has successfully ended this practice by offer-
ing answers to religious Islamic matters. Second, before the presence of LBM, 
Islamic authorities including individual ʿalim delivered their independent and 
individual legal opinions, or ijtihād, or fatwā pertaining to various religious 
issues facing Muslim communities. LBM has taken a step forward by introduc-
ing collective ijtihād or ijtihād jamāʿī (Hosen 2004).
LBM consists of senior and junior ʿulamāʾ or senior santri who are con-
sidered knowledgeable and authoritative in Islamic matters. Their authority 
includes a mastering of Arabic grammar, tafsīr and hadis knowledge, Islamic 
law, Islamic history and other supporting knowledge. More particularly, they 
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must ideally be faqih al-nafs (talented in Islamic legal matters), experienced 
in fīqh and its application, and able to present the fīqh and its details. If this is 
impossible to be observed individually, a collective feature of these authorities 
would be an option. These are the main features of an LBM.
LBMs are present in NU boards either in central (PBNU) or regional (PWNU) 
areas. The issues or questions must be individually identified as local, regional, 
or national jurisdictions. LBM in the regional boards, for example, discuss 
all questions and issues from that particular region. When it is considered 
national, it must be referred to the LBM central board. Similarly, when it is a 
local issue, the regional board will discuss and issue the decision. All discus-
sions must be conducted in a forum called Bahtsul Masail. The main task of 
LBM is to analyse actual cases that have not been found in kitab kuning and 
fīqh manuals. Hence, their task is ilhaq al-masail bi nazhairi-ha: using what is 
relevant or analogous in kitab kuning and fīqh manuals to assess contemporary 
matters. If the case has been discussed and found in fīqh manuals, LBM simply 
demonstrates what options are available. However, if there is a new case, their 
task extends to ilhaq al-masail bi nazhairi-ha. For these reasons, LBM is gener-
ally divided into three issue categories: wāqiʿiyya (actual cases), mawduʾiyya 
(thematic cases), and qānūniyya (legal category).
From here, it is clear that the task of LBM is not to extract the law or istinbat 
al-ahkam directly from the Qurʾān and hadis as two primary sources of Islamic 
law, due to their particular limits (Mahfudz 2003: 24). LBM instead applies 
ilhaq al-masail bi nazhairi-ha, namely linking new issues dynamically to the 
similar ones available in any kitab kuning or fīqh manuals. This demands high 
levels of skill for the participants of Bahtsul Masail in the field of fīqh. Due to 
its important status, Syuriyah is the NU board, which is responsible for organis-
ing the Bahtsul Masail (Hosen 2004). The Syuriyah Board organises the Bahtsul 
Masail at least twice every five years; once in the five yearly NU Muktamar, 
and once in the Musyawarah Nasional alim Ulama NU (Zahro 2004: 26). The 
issues discussed in Bahtsul Masail are actual matters arising within Muslim 
communities in Indonesia. Issues can also be raised by the PBNU which might 
consider particular matters important. PBNU then distributes the materials, 
including questions and issues to participants of the Bahtsul Masail, including 
ʿulamāʾ, intellectuals, and any LBM members who are trusted. Before coming 
into the Bahtsul Masail, they would read them and prepare their answers. The 
PBNU then discusses issues in detail and makes decisions.
When providing decisions to issues being discussed, the Bahtsul Masail usu-
ally applies a number of methods including qawli (literal), ilhaqi (comparative 
method), and manhaji (by methodology). The qawli method enables partici-
pants to have direct quotations from acknowledged fīqh manuals and books, 
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especially from the four madhhabs. The ilhaqi method envisages the making of 
law by developing analogies between unlisted issues and similar ones available 
in the fīqh books and manuals. Meanwhile, the manhaji method requires deep 
research and follows the method of istinbat al-ahkam of the four madhhabs, 
for problems that are unresolved by the qawli and ilhaqi methods. This expla-
nation could be broken down into at least three steps or processes. First, when 
new matters are found in the authoritative fīqh manuals or books this could 
be considered a decision. Second, following the first step: if there are differ-
ing opinions from ʿulamāʾ, they apply taqrīr jamāʿī (to make a decision of one 
strong opinion). Third, when these matters are not listed in the fīqh manuals, 
they apply ilhaq al-masail bi nazhariha.
9 Indonesian Islam
One of the most important products of NU is so-called ‘Indonesian Islam’. 
The intention is not to create a negative distinction of Indonesian Islam from 
the rest of the Muslim world. Rather it is to demonstrate khasa ʾis or the spe-
cial qualities of Indonesian Islam, and to accentuate the cultural tastes and 
experiences of Indonesian Islam. The theology remains the same as that in 
other Muslim territories, especially the Sunnī world. There is no space within 
Indonesian Islam to change the principles of Islam such as arkān al-islam (the 
Five Pillars of Islam) and arkān al-īmān (the Six Pillars of Faith). This is to high-
light that the fact that Indonesian Islam shares its theology with the rest of the 
Muslim world (Ismail 2011: 249). Behind the concept of Indonesian Islam is an 
appreciation of localities, including the ways of life, cultures, traditions, and 
practices that are not in contrast to Islamic principles. This is based on one 
concept of fīqh and uṣūl al-fīqh, al-ʿada or al-ʿurf muhakkama, that localities 
can be considered a source of law under the Qurʾān and hadis. In this regard, 
NU accommodates local cultures and practices as long as they do not harm 
the fundamental principles of Islam. One of the most visible demonstrations 
of this idea are the local customs of wearing sarongs, peci (Indonesian black 
hats), batik (traditionally decorated Indonesian shirts) or koko (Shanghai-style 
shirts) during prayers.
Islam in Indonesia has often almost escaped attention even though it con-
stitutes the largest majority Muslim population; the geographical position of 
Indonesia is at the eastern end of the Muslim world, and it was historically 
considered to have a low profile in the Muslim world’s intellectual, economic, 
social, and global political arenas. These factors triggered the neglect of 
Indonesian Islam by various international analysts. In addition, the absence of 
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Indonesia as a participant in any of the Muslim world contestations is another 
reason why Indonesia has been neglected. The uniqueness of Indonesia that 
has been most visible, compared to other parts of the Muslim world, and 
which Samuel Huntington insisted that the clash of civilisations neglected, 
is the inclination to accept modernity and democracy, to voice pluralism and 
religious tolerance, and to accentuate the gracious and the merciful sides of 
God (Inoguchi 2012). The cultural movements which have been dominating 
the discourses of Indonesian Islam since the course of the twentieth century, 
have become the main indicators. In addition, significant actions and move-
ments of neo-modernist Islam in Indonesia, have become another trigger for 
the promotion of Indonesian Islam. These cultural and religious movements 
are the consequences of a unique approach to understanding Islamic texts 
and local cultures, traditions, and practices. The approach has a dual role; to 
heighten social ethics and individual piety, while at the same time, to refrain 
from highlighting unnecessary differences in the Muslim world.
In this regard, Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009), three-term chairperson 
of NU (1984–1999) and the fourth President of Indonesia, has been regarded 
as the foremost pioneer of neo-modernism of Islam in Indonesia (Barton 
1997). In the wake of the Iranian revolution and its influence on Indonesian 
youth, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) rejected Western analysts who believe 
that Middle Eastern fundamentalism had a strong and deep influence on 
Indonesian students studying in the Middle Eastern universities. Abdurrahman 
argued that Islam and Arab culture are two different things. In addition, 
Abdurrahman successfully highlighted the traditions of Islamic pluralism 
in Indonesia through his writings which emphasise theological, philological 
and historical approaches in explaining Indonesian Islam. According to him, 
the development of Islamic cultures is the product of acculturation between 
Islamic core values and cultural qualities of archipelagic Indonesia. This is the 
context when he argues that the harmonious life of religions in Indonesia pro-
vides strong traditional roots for modern pluralism (Barton 1997: 342).
Following this idea, there is a strong argument that Islam should be consid-
ered on two levels, namely on the theological and cultural levels. In terms of 
theology, Islam is a universal religion which works harmoniously in any given 
time and place. Despite different opinions and understanding of ʿulamāʾ, 
Islam is one and is dedicated and oriented toward one identical aim, which 
is to worship and affirm the oneness of Allāh. At this level, NU is the same 
as other Sunnī groups and movements (Ismail 2011: 249). NU, however, would 
be more conservative in religious rituals and worship than some other groups 
and streams, as NU holds strongly to kitab kuning as textual interpretations of 
the Qurʾān and hadis. On another similar level, Islam is a manifestation and 
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expression of religiosity that can be married to local cultures and practices. NU 
generally believes that anything that is not regulated by Islam is halal or per-
missible until one or more texts in the Qurʾān and hadis have been identified 
which restrict it. This completely differs from the Salafi groups, for example, 
who consider that everything is forbidden until there are one or more texts of 
the Qurʾān and hadis allowing it. On the basis of that principle, and with the 
support of another principle that habit or culture is a potential source of law, 
NU has been in the avant garde by advocating for local practices that are not in 
contradiction to the principles of Islam.
NU could be even more “radical” in promoting localities. Gus Dur is famous 
for his slogan Pribumisasi Islam or “indigenisation of Islam.” Abdurrahman 
Wahid’s generation and those following within NU have been strong support-
ers of this idea. There has been a common understanding that Islam must be 
friendly to local practices. For NU, the indigenisation of Islam is necessary, to 
avoid the polarisation of religion (Islam) and culture. In this regard, indigeni-
sation is not syncretism as it simply considers localities within the process of 
the application of Islamic teachings. Neither does it neglect Islamic norms 
for cultural ones. The idea is that Islam accommodates localities by making 
use of the interstices and opportunities provided by Islam. In this regard, NU 
plays hard with the significant roles of the principles of fīqh and uṣūl al-fīqh in 
accommodating localities. In addition, NU believes that indigenisation in any 
part of the Muslim world is an integral part of the history of Islam.
The important roles of NU-based Ministers of Religious Affairs, as well as 
other non-NU Ministers, are also effective in the harmonious life of religions in 
Indonesia. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) has become a main actor 
of these cultural movements by attaching them to state policies. In this regard, 
the position of the Ministers of Religious Affairs is becoming more significant 
in playing their inter-related roles. They are expected to become the primary 
speaker for the government, and, at the same time, the defender of Muslim 
interests in promoting harmonious life in Indonesia. They are in charge of 
and responsible for the harmonious life and cooperation between various reli-
gious communities in Indonesia. Similarly, other non-NU-based Ministers of 
Religious Affairs have played the same significant role. Nevertheless, the close 
attachment of religions to the state might result in a more dominant position 
of the state vis-à-vis the people (Muslims).
The MoRA has also been supporting Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to 
develop their Islamic thoughts by providing scholarships and funding to 
closely interact with the contemporary academic communities globally. It has 
sent many lecturers and students to both Middle Eastern and Western uni-
versities. In this regard, Muslim intellectuals have enriched their knowledge 
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and horizons in social sciences and humanities, and in turn supported their 
traditional Islamic studies to develop progressive thoughts. They are skilful 
in interplaying the truth claims within social sciences and humanities and 
within Islam. As a result, traditionally NU-based intellectuals have produced 
progressive thoughts and movements. They are authoritative in speaking and 
writing on Islam on the basis of kitab kuning, yet at they are fluent in quoting 
and making use any use of sociological, historical, anthropological approaches 
and theories. The interdisciplinary expertise developed by NU scholarships, 
as well as non-NU ones, have been contributively catalyst to the development 
of friendly and tolerant Islam in Indonesia. Woodward (1996) considers this 
development as a “new paradigm” in the contemporary history of Islam. He 
believes that Indonesian Islam is unique and different from historical Islam in 
other Muslim regions.
Through the idea of indigenisation of Islam, NU rejects Arabisation in many 
aspects of cultural Muslims’ life. The text of the Qurʾān, as well as those recited 
in prayers, will always remain in Arabic, but the contextualisation of Islamic 
teachings from the Qurʾān and hadis can be actualised according to the local-
ity. NU Muslims could possibly be more fluent in Arabic that any other groups 
in Indonesia, as Arabic is one of the core subjects in NU pesantrens across 
Indonesia. The ultimate point of this accommodation is to emphasise that 
Muslims living anywhere. and at any time, could potentially become authen-
tic Muslims while still belonging simultaneously to their own culture. When 
it is extended to the nation-state context, it can be said that Muslims living 
in Indonesia could potentially become authentic Muslims while also being 
genuine Indonesians. This should not affect their loyalty as Muslims and as 
Indonesian citizens at the same time. Likewise, by applying this approach, 
Muslims living in Europe, America. Australia, and other Muslim minority 
countries, could realistically belong to their countries of citizenship, while 
simultaneously living as authentic Muslims. They share the same opportuni-
ties to be authentic Muslims as Muslims living in Saudi Arabia.
10 Conclusion
As described above, NU began from robust Arabic and Islamic materials 
learned and scrutinised in pesantrens in Indonesia over time. NU possesses a 
vigorous tradition which interplays with Islamic texts. This means that NU is 
fundamentally traditional in its approach to both texts and practices (Aspinall 
2010: 121). Based on this fact, some people misunderstand NU to be backward 
in thought, opportunistic in politics, and syncretic in religiosity (Aspinall 2010: 
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133). In contrast, religious traditionalism has enabled NU to be a progressive 
religious organisation. The self-consciousness traditionalism has even allowed 
NU to become the most prepared Islamic group to face modernity and changes. 
Criticising an established Western view that religious traditionalism precludes 
progressivity, Nakamura (1981) argues that NU’s traditionalism is not in con-
trast vis-à-vis progressivism in politics.
Nevertheless, the history of Islam in Indonesia has not been linear. There 
have been a number of violent actions conducted in the name of Islam. The 
development of the Right and hardliners seems to have found support on the 
ground. This could influence the common claim and perception of a friendly 
and tolerant Islam in Indonesia. For example, the loose organisational struc-
ture of NU has in practice meant that it is unable to discipline grassroots clerics 
who express illiberal sentiments, for example, declaring the Shīʿa and Aḥmadī 
minorities to be heretics, and violently persecuting them (Arifianto 2017: 241). 
Therefore, there is a continuous need to promote what NU has actually consti-
tuted so far.
New generations of NU are currently building on Gus Dur’s idea of indigeni-
sation of Islam (Effendi 2008). Since 2000, this has created a stream within NU 
called Post-traditional Islam. The new stream envisages a critical evaluation 
of tradition (al-aṣāla) with the traditional values and norms (al-turāth) them-
selves. Post-traditional Islam has made tradition its fundamental epistemology 
to transform into a new tradition strongly rooted in the old tradition with a 
progressive ethos. Through objectification and rationalisation, it deconstructs 
the tradition so the new one will be more compatible with present-ness (Baso 
2000; Rumadi 2015). This differs from modernism, which neglects or even 
rejects tradition in order to arrive in modernity.
This traditionalism-based socio-religious movement with progressive char-
acter has also inspired and stimulated women’s movement within this frame-
work. Interestingly, with modern gender awareness that they had absorbed, 
NU women has experienced progressive development based on traditional-
ism. They have revitalised the horizons of Islamic traditionalism by promoting 
open discussion of interpretive tradition from tafsīr (the interpretation of the 
Qurʾān) and hadis. In addition, the heavy-duty combinations of authoritative 
ʿulamāʾ, pesantren education, and kitab kuning that have been learned by sant-
riwati (female santri) have planted, grown, and harvested the construction of 
female Islamic authority (Saenong 2016; 2019). Rahima, Fahmina, and ʿAlimat 
are at least some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSO) with national and global level movement and reputation 
that have been inspired and born from the womb of NU. They have been work-
ing hand-in-hand to establish the Islamic authority of ʿalimat (female ʿulamāʾ). 
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The three CSO have even conducted the first international congress of women’s 
ʿulamāʾ in 2017 that has been a cutting-edge progress of women movement, 
as well as women’s Islamic authority in classical and modern Islamic studies 
(Saenong 2019). It is concluded that while ‘moderate Islam’ is a contested term 
in twenty-first century Indonesia, NU has been able to represent the interests 
of a large number of different social groupings of Indonesian Muslims, though 
over time it has lost specifically political power and influence since the presi-
dency of Abdurrahman Wahid ended in 2001 (Fealy and Bush 2014).
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Chapter 7
Women and Islamic Movements
Eva F. Nisa
1 Introduction
Muslim women have long been the backbone of the development of Islam, 
including Islamic thoughts, practices, and movements. This chapter focuses 
on the complex trajectory of women’s movement and women’s activism 
in various Islamic movements, including their struggle for women’s rights. 
Despite their extensive contributions, Muslim women’s roles in the develop-
ment of Islamic thoughts, practices, and movements are often overlooked. 
Establishing female religious authority, for example, has been an issue in many 
Muslim countries since the advent of Islam and throughout its development. 
Meanwhile those who have spoken on behalf of Islam, from its earliest days, 
were not only men but also women (see Krämer and Schmidtke 2006; Künkler 
and Nisa 2018). Both men and women have shared their thoughts and exper-
tise to their Muslim fellows, becoming the sources of guidance for Muslims 
throughout Islamic history. In addition, Muslim women have been active in 
forming their own Muslim organisations and have become important agents 
in diverse Islamic movements ranging from ultra conservative to moderate 
and progressive movements. However, studies on religious authorities often 
mention Muslim women and their movements only as an appendix of men’s 
religious authorities, though theoretically women and men hold the same 
responsibility to understand and transmit religious knowledge.1
This chapter analyses Muslim women and their religious activism, both as 
individuals or part of diverse Islamic and Islamist movements. It cannot not be 
all-inclusive because of the complexity and immensely diverse affiliations and 
movements that Muslim women have been a part of to date. It also touches 
on but does not intend to problematise historical debates of women’s pres-
ence and their roles in the early community. Rather, this chapter will briefly 
1 Many Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīth (reports or the words and deeds ascribed to the Prophet 
Muḥammad) emphasise this duty of seeking and transmitting knowledge an act of worship, 
for example, Qurʾān 58:11 “God will exalt, by [many] degrees those of you who have attained 
to faith and, [above all], such as have been vouchsafed [true] knowledge: for God is fully 
aware of all that you do.”
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sketch some common traditional narratives of early Muslim women to serve as 
a bridge to the main discussion of women and Islamic movements. In this sec-
tion both moderate and conservative movements will be looked at to examine 
the roles of women within, and the impact of Islamic feminist consciousness. 
Part of this discussion is the assessment of scholarship by women academics 
on this topic which forms a central aspect of the methodology and analysis of 
Muslim women in the modern practice of Islam.
2 Women of the Prophet Muḥammad’s Circle
Muslim women, from the most conservative to the most liberal, place 
the women of the Prophet Muḥammad’s household, especially ummahāt 
al-Muʾminīn (mothers of the believers), as role models and main references 
for the faith (see Stowasser 1997: 115). In analysing Muslim women and Islamic 
movements, therefore, this chapter necessarily commences with a brief over-
view of the women within the Prophet Muḥammad’s circle and other pious 
female companions. Among the wives of the Prophet Muḥammad—some say 
eleven and others thirteen—three wives in particular are often mentioned as 
leading role models for Muslim women: Khadīja bint Khuwaylid (556–620), 
ʿĀʾisha bint Abī Bakr (604–678), and Umm Salama (594–680). In addition to 
the ummahāt al-Muʾminīn, one daughter of the Prophet Muḥammad Fāṭima 
al‐Zahrāʾ is an important figure for many Muslims. The Qurʾān also mentions 
other women, such as the Virgin Mary (or Maryam), the mother of Jesus (or 
ʿĪsā) and Āsiyā bint Muzāḥim, the wife of the Pharaoh and adoptive mother of 
Moses (Abboud 2014).
It is especially important to look to the life of ʿĀʾisha, the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s favourite wife, who was the daughter of his close companion 
and first caliph (al-Khulafāʾ al-Rāshidūn), Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (573–634) (see 
also Abbott 1942). There is some contestation about ʿĀʾisha’s age at the time of 
her marriage to the Prophet Muḥammad. Some narrations say that she was six 
years old when the marriage contract was concluded, but the consummation 
took place when she reached puberty. Others mention the marriage was con-
summated when she was nine. For example, one of the collections of ḥadīth, 
(pl. aḥādīth) Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, in the Book of Marriage, recorded “that the 
Prophet married her when she was six years old and he consummated his mar-
riage when she was nine years old” (al-Bukhārī n.d.). Some scholars contend 
that the age signifies that she had reached physical maturity according to that 
time in history (Brown 2014: 142–3; Barlas 2002: 125–126).
153Women and Islamic Movements
Those who are interested in understanding ʿĀʾisha often problematise her 
age at marriage, the conflict with ʿAlī, and the infamous ḥadīth al-ifk (the inci-
dent of the lie) or accusation of adultery. Ḥadīth al-ifk refers to rumours that 
ʿĀʾisha was unfaithful and had committed adultery with Ṣafwān ibn Muʿaṭṭal. 
One of the most infamous examples is a controversial fictional novel by 
Sherry Jones, The Jewel of Medina (2008). This fictional book was inspired by 
Islamic history but has twists to suit the author’s interests (see Larsson 2015: 
104), depicting ʿĀʾisha negatively including emphasising her special relation-
ship with Ṣafwān (Jones 2008: 178–179). Sunnī Muslims, however, believe that 
ʿĀʾisha was innocent and falsely accused.
The Prophet’s marriage to ʿĀʾisha is important for Sunnī Muslims as it has 
often been mentioned as one of the signs that Muḥammad desired Abū Bakr as 
his successor, rather than his cousin ʿAlī ibn ʾAbī Ṭālib, as Shīʿī Muslims believe 
(see Thurlkill 2010: 91). Her status as the wife of Muḥammad in addition to 
her intelligence have positioned ʿĀʾisha as one of the main references for the 
Muslim community, especially Sunnī Muslims. ʿĀʾisha’s authority originated 
from the fact that she was present during the lifetime of the Prophet and wit-
nessed the life of the Prophet, the living role model of ideal persona for all 
Muslims. During her lifetime, ʿĀʾisha was one of the principal transmitters of 
ḥadīth (see Stowasser 1997).
ʿĀʾisha took an active role in political affairs. She was involved in the first 
civil war among Muslims after Muḥammad’s death. The opponents of ʿĀʾisha’s 
political activities have criticised her involvement in the Battle of the Camel in 
656, a battle named after the camel that ʿĀʾisha rode during the battle between 
her and ʿAlī. Progressive Muslim scholars, activist women, and Islamic femi-
nists, on the other hand, emphasise ʿĀʾisha’s venture into the political arena as 
evidence of women’s full participation in early Muslim society. As Leila Ahmed 
contends, “her venture is itself a sign of the community’s acceptance of women 
as capable of leadership and is important in that it even occurred” (1992: 74).
Shīʿī Muslims have perceived the battle between ʿĀʾisha and ʿAlī differently 
to Sunnī Muslims. Many Shīʿīs consider her as an opponent of Shīʿī’s first 
imām (a leader of Muslim community) and the fourth caliph, Imām ʿAlī. They 
often contrast ʿĀʾisha’s position to other important figures from the Prophet’s 
household, especially his daughter Fāṭima. Mary Thurlkill notes that Shīʿites 
have argued that Fāṭima’s importance transcends that of her mother, Khadīja, 
Mary, the mother of Jesus, and ʿĀʾisha (2010: 19). Within Shīʿī hagiographi-
cal tradition, Fāṭima is depicted as a woman with theological authority, pro-
phetic insight and the mother of Shīʿī imāmate (umm al-āʾimma) (Thurlkill 
2010; Ruffle 2020). She has continuously become the source of emulation for 
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contemporary Shīʿī women, including Shīʿī Islamic feminists (Fazaeli 2017: 
61). Besides Fāṭima, Shīʿīs also often juxtapose ʿĀʾisha with another wife of the 
Prophet Muḥammad, Umm Salama (Spellberg 1991: 51). However, the records 
suggest Umm Salama did not enjoy as much influence on Islam as did ʿĀʾisha: 
“compilers have enumerated between 1,500 and 2,400 hadith for which ʿAisha 
is the first authority. Umm Salama, though a distant second, contributed 
between 175 and 375 reports” (Sayeed 2015: 25).
The position of ʿĀʾisha against other women within the Prophet Muḥammad’s 
circle signifies that the early contestation between Sunnī and Shīʿa did not only 
involve male successors of the Prophet Muḥammad, but also debates regarding 
the leading female religious authority for the Muslim community. Among Shīʿī, 
including contemporary Shīʿī activist women, Fāṭima’s daughter Zaynab bint 
ʿAlī has also become a role model of ideal womanhood. Lara Deeb records in 
the context of ʿĀshūrāʿ, the annual commemoration marking the martyrdom 
of Imām Ḥusayn, that “lay women focus on Zaynab as the dominant female 
figure of Ashura, emphasizing her presence at the battle and her role as the 
community’s leader following Husayn’s martyrdom” (2006: 32).
2.1 Aftermath of the Death of the Prophet
In the aftermath of the death of the Prophet Muḥammad and women within 
his circles, the central orthodoxy of Islam became increasingly patriarchal. 
This pattern can be seen in various Islamic traditions. Within Ṣūfī tradition, 
for example, Ṣūfī biographies and hagiographical literature often mention 
Ṣūfī women as spiritual guides, saints, and muḥibbāt (lovers), especially in the 
ninth to eleventh centuries, before the institutionalisation and development 
of ṭuruq (Ṣūfī orders) in the twelfth century (Krokus and Catharina 2020). The 
most notable of them was Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya (d. 801). Later, patriarchal tradi-
tions linked to social propriety became the main opposition to the leadership 
of Ṣūfī women and their ability to become pīrs (spiritual leaders).
One major concern within the Muslim community has been the way clas-
sical literature within Islamic literary genres, including within the develop-
ment of the Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr), emphasises gender differences between 
women and men. The premodern era gave birth to Muslim theologians and 
jurists who interpreted the Qurʾān through patriarchal perspectives. Indeed, 
during that period Qurʾānic exegesis can be regarded as having a significantly 
male prerogative. The socio-political contexts of the later era within the Islamic 
world, embedded in patriarchal societies, have influenced the products of 
Qurʾānic exegesis and the emergence of misogynistic ḥadīth. Fatima Mernissi 
(1998), a Moroccan feminist sociologist, in her criticism of some companions 
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of the Prophet and male Muslim scholars, like Abū Hurayra (d. 678), al-Bukhārī 
(810–870), and their misogynistic ḥadīth narrations and collections, empha-
sises how these early Muslim scholars misinterpreted, and sometimes incom-
pletely presented, Islamic sources on the position of women. A ḥadīth from 
al-Bukhārī’s collection mentions “Three things bring bad luck: house, women, 
and horse,” as Imām al-Zarkashī (745–794) records:
They told ʿAʾisha that Abu Hurayra was asserting that the Messenger of 
God said: ‘Three things bring bad luck: house, woman, and horse.’ ʿAʾisha 
responded: ‘Abu Hurayra learned his lessons very badly. He came into our 
house when the Prophet was in the middle of a sentence. He only heard 
the end of it. What the Prophet said was: “May God refute the Jews; they 
say three things bring bad luck: house, woman, and horse”’.
quoted in Mernissi 1998: 123
Aisha Geissinger (2015) in her work mentions how after the era of the Prophet’s 
wives, Muslims witnessed a decrease of women in the domain of exegetical 
roles. Karen Bauer (2015) also argues that premodern exegetical works per-
taining to certain issues on gender and hierarchy have influenced modern 
interpretations of the Qurʾān and the later exegetes. Therefore, modern con-
servative readings of the Qurʾān maintain the views of medieval exegetes by 
emphasising that women are equal but different, due to their ‘natural’ quali-
ties. The most common pattern within early exegetical work was that male 
exegetes influenced by patriarchal forces dominated the discussion of women.
The Qurʾānic exegeses by women can be found in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. One of the most important figures in this context 
is ʿĀʾisha ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1913–1998), the wife of renowned Egyptian scholar 
Amīn al-Khūlī (1895–1966), known by her pseudonym Bint al-Shāṭiʾ (Daughter 
of the Shore). Bint al-Shāṭiʾ was an exceptional scholar in the Arab world who 
published more than sixty books, including those on Qurʾānic exegesis (see 
Boulatta 1974). As one of the first Muslim women to focus her work on Qurʾānic 
exegesis, she has become an inspiration for many Muslims, including Islamic 
feminists (Roded 2006: 51). During her lifetime she never declared herself a 
feminist; indeed, her depictions of the wives within the prophet’s household 
are considered as problematic (see al-Shati 1961). Ruth Roded argues that 
when Bint al-Shāṭiʾ portrayed the Prophet’s wives, “there are stereotypical 
depictions of women’s petty jealousy that would hardly be considered femi-
nist, the author raises a common feminist claim—that the perception of wom-
en’s lives by male authors will always be lacking because they are ‘ignorant of 
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female instinct’” (2006: 52). However, Roded contends that her lecture titled 
al-Mafhūm al-Islāmy li Taḥrīr al-Marʾah published in 1967 was often considered 
proof that Bint al-Shāṭiʾ was, in fact, a forerunner of Islamic feminism (2006).
3 Muslim Women during Premodern and Colonial Eras
The discussion of women and Islamic movements need not to neglect the non-
Arab premodern era. The main inspirations for later Muslim women activists 
and their Muslim women’s organisations, were not only women of the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s household but also non-Arab premodern era female figures, 
including female rulers in the premodern era (see Reid 1988: 640; Andaya 
2006). In South Asia, Sultana Raziya of the Delhi Sultanate (c. 1236–1240), as 
the only female ruler of the premodern age in the Indian subcontinent, has 
often been mentioned as a role model (Brijbhushan 1990). Following this, 
the role of women in the early Mughal Empire was an important inspira-
tion for later women activists (Lal 2005). Southeast Asia witnessed the pres-
ence of the first Muslim queen or sultana, Sultana Taj al-Alam Safiyat al-Din 
Syah, who reigned between 1641 and 1675. Taj al-Alam has been described as 
“a devout patron of Islam who only spoke to European men from behind a 
curtain” (Andaya 2006: 167). Later in the nineteenth century, Tjoet Nja Dien 
(c. 1848–1908) and Tjoet Nja Meuthia (1870–1910) were also known as Muslim 
female warriors and national heroines in the archipelago who fought against 
the Dutch and became role models for later generations (see Clavé 2020: 109).
Mernissi (1993) has listed fifteen queens across the Islamic empires and how 
their roles broke the chains of patriarchal norms which suggest that women’s 
access to power can lead to chaos. Mernissi recorded that women were often 
excluded from being appointed for religious authority, however in the domain 
of political authority history demonstrates that they were present, such as sul-
tana within the Mamluks in Egypt, and malika (queen) within Yemeni dynas-
ties. The presence of these female rulers, however, has not had a significant 
effect in reforming the prevalent discourses pertaining to the patriarchal read-
ing of religious texts.
Further across Muslim-majority countries, the position of women in Islam 
was one of the main aspects attacked by colonial powers. Thus, issues pertain-
ing to Muslim women’s rights and their status were also part of an imperial-
ist agenda. In many Muslim majority countries, the anti-colonial period was 
not an easy time for Muslim women who fought for women’s rights because 
they were under pressure to conform to anti-colonialist and nationalist agen-
das. As Ziba Mir-Hosseini notes, “for anti-colonialists and most nationalists, 
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feminism—that is, advocacy of women’s rights—was a colonialist project that 
had to be resisted” (2006: 639). The complicated situation faced by Muslim 
women during that period was depicted in Ahmed’s expression as a dilem-
matic choice “between betrayal and betrayal” (1984) referring to the way early 
feminists were in limbo between being loyal to their Muslim identity so that 
they were not accused of cultural betrayal and betrayal to their new gender 
awareness. As Ahmed puts it, “it is precisely the matter of cultural loyalty that, 
currently skilfully manipulated in militantly Islamic societies, is behind such 
bizarre phenomena as women marching and protesting, in the name of cul-
tural authenticity, in support of the revoking of their own rights” (1984: 121–2).
4 Women’s Rights Consciousness and Islamic Feminism
The patriarchal reading of religious texts during the premodern era has had a 
significant influence on Muslim communities in the modern period, particu-
larly relating to the status of women in Islam. This includes domestic seclusion, 
gender segregation, and educational access. Muslim women have recognised 
the problems pertaining to embedded patriarchal readings of religious texts, 
but it is also noteworthy that men have been important figures in struggle for 
female emancipation. Mernissi praises Imām al-Zarkashī, for example, who 
acknowledged ʿĀʾisha’s contribution to the development of ḥadīth (1998: 124).
The discussion of Muslim women and their movement for rights cannot 
be separated from the role of modernist movements in different parts of the 
Islamic world, from the Ottoman Tanzimat’s (1839–1876) efforts to address gen-
der inequalities, which can be se seen in the first establishment of secondary 
school for girls in 1858, to the presence of modernists in the Arab world in 
the late nineteenth century, such as Rifā῾ah Rāfiʿ al‐Ṭahṭāwī (1801–1873) and 
his disciple, Muḥammad ῾Abduh (1849–1905). ῾Abduh focused on defending 
women’s rights and their status, especially in the domain of providing them 
access to education and preventing arbitrary polygamy. ῾Abduh was very strict 
about the practice of polygamy and called for polygamy abolition (see ῾Abduh 
n.d.: 117–118). ῾Abduh’s disciple, Qāsim Amīn (1863–1908) was also one of the 
most important writers calling for women’s issues in Egypt. The later genera-
tion of male progressive thinkers have also contributed to the discussion of 
gender equality, such as Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), Mohammad Arkoun 
(1928–2010), Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943–2010), Muhammad Shahrour (1938–
2019), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (b. 1936), Abdulkarim Soroush (b. 
1945), Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim (b. 1946), and Khaled Abou el-Fadl (b. 1963) 
(see Mir-Hosseini 2016: 70).
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Along with this, the rise of women’s rights consciousness or “feminist con-
sciousness,” to borrow Margot Badran’s phrase, can be seen in many Muslim 
societies from the late nineteenth century. Egypt is especially important in the 
discussion of women’s activists, feminists and their movements. Many schol-
ars, including Badran, have argued, that “the feminist movement in Egypt, in 
many ways, was prototypical of secular feminist activism elsewhere in the 
Muslim world in the first half of the twentieth century” (2019). To begin with, 
Malak Ḥifnī Nāṣif (1886–1918), the first woman in Egypt to become a teacher, 
is known as one of the early feminist writers in the country (Yousef 2011: 70). 
Nāṣif experienced gender discrimination firsthand. Receiving a diploma in 
1900, she was banned from teaching after her marriage. This condition, how-
ever, did not stop her activities. She was active in contributing articles in 
al-Jarīdah—a liberal/nationalist paper initiated by Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, the 
founder of the Ḥizb al-Umma (Umma Party) (Yousef 2011: 73), writing under 
her pen name Bāḥithah al-Bādiyah (The Searcher of the Desert). In 1911, Nāṣif 
listed feminist demands to the Muslim nationalist congress in Heliopolis which 
was conveyed without her presence, because at the time women in Egypt were 
not permitted to appear in public in front of men. Some of the points men-
tioned in the demands related to women’s freedom to participate in congre-
gational prayer in mosques, females’ access to education and work, reforms 
of the Muslim Personal status code, as well as broader socio-religious reforms 
(Yousef 2011: 71). In 1914, Nāṣif and other women, including another feminist 
leader Hudā Shaʿrāwī, founded the Women’s Refinement Union (al-Ittiḥād 
al-Nisāʿī al-Tahdhībī) and the Ladies Literary Improvement (Jamʿīyat al-Raqy 
al-Adabīyah li-al-Sayyidāt al-Miṣrīyat). Nāṣif died of Spanish influenza when 
she was thirty-two years old. Her work was then continued by Hudā Shaʿrāwī.
Hudā Shaʿrāwī (1879–1947) was known as one of Egypt’s feminist leaders. 
Continuing Nāṣif ’s struggle, Hudā formed the first explicitly feminist organisa-
tion in Egypt, the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1923 (Badran 1995: 37). Active 
in the Egyptian public sphere during the time leading to the nationalist 
Revolution, Shaʿrāwī was also involved in the movement for Egypt’s national-
ist Revolution from 1919 to 1922 (see Kahf 1998: 53). Before her death in 1947, 
Shaʿrāwī was appointed as the president of the Arab Feminist Union founded 
in 1945. Following Shaʿrāwī, many Muslim women in Egypt and elsewhere also 
established women’s movements. In 1948, for example, Durīyya Shafīq or Doria 
Shafik (1908–1975) founded Bint al-Nīl (Daughter of the Nile), focusing on 
women’s political participation in Egypt and abolishing illiteracy (Blaydes and 
El Tarouty 2009: 366). Her staunch struggle for political equality and womens’ 
right to vote resulted in the issuance of a new Constitution in 1956 that granted 
women this right (Blaydes and El Tarouty 2009: 366).
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Continuing the struggles of early Muslim feminists, in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, feminists began focusing their agenda on women’s 
bodies and sexuality. One of the most famous feminists and women activists 
working on women’s bodies and sexuality is Nawāl al-Saʿdāwī or El Saadawi 
who in 1982 founded the Arab Womens’ Solidarity Association (Saadawi 1997: 
24). al-Saʿdāwī contends:
We Arab and Muslim Women know that our authentic identity is based 
on unveiling our minds and not on veiling our faces. We are human 
beings and not just bodies to be covered (under religious slogans) or to be 
naked (for consumerism and Western commercial goods). We know that 
veiling of women is the other side of the coin of nakedness or displaying 
the body. Both consider women as sex objects (1997: 97).
Mernissi, in her book Beyond the Veil, also discusses women’s bodies and sexu-
ality, and their relationship with the concept of fitna (disorder or chaos). She 
explores the influence of this concept on women who have been seen as dan-
gerous creatures who produce fitna through sexual disorders, thus, need to be 
controlled through practices such as veiling and seclusion (1987: 31).
4.1 Islamic Feminism
Islamic feminism emerged as a discourse rather than a social movement in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, particularly from the 1980s and 1990s 
when it became especially noticeable (Badran 2002). Triggers that have given 
impetus to the presence of Islamic feminism include the spread of conserva-
tive movements, especially Islamist movements, and disappointment with 
secular authoritarianism (Badran 2005: 9; Schröter 2017: 116). Badran argues:
The basic argument of Islamic feminism is that the Qurʾān affirms the 
principle of quality of all human beings but that the practice of equality 
of women and men (and other categories of people) has been impeded 
or subverted by patriarchal ideas (ideology) and practices. Islamic juris-
prudence, fiqh, consolidated in its classical form in the 9th century, was 
itself heavily saturated with the patriarchal thinking and behaviours of 
the day (2002).
Thus, Islamic feminism can be regarded as a new approach to the gender-
egalitarian interpretation of Islamic religious texts, usually known as a dis-
course focusing on women-sensitive rereading of religious sources, especially 
the Qurʾān.
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The product of patriarchal readings of religious texts, as Badran mentioned, 
has strengthened those who argue that Islam is the signature cause of wom-
en’s troubles. Bronwyn Winter, for example, who rejects progressive readings 
of Islam, contends “all monotheistic religious texts as oppressive to women” 
(Winter 2001: 12). She calls those who embrace progressive rereading of the 
texts—which can be seen as a latter product of progressive Muslim think-
ers as—“apologists.” She argues, “Scholars following the apologist framework 
claim that Islam made things better for women, but the fundamentalists mis-
interpret it—which corresponds roughly to the ‘multiculturalist’ discourse—
or that the Quran is open to interpretation, and feminist interpretations can 
be made—which corresponds roughly to the ‘pluralist discourse’” (2001: 13).
The spirit of Islamic feminism in the 1980s can be seen in the development 
of Muslim feminist solidarity networks and organisations. One of the earliest 
is Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) which was founded in 1984 by 
women from Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Iran, Mauritius, Tanzania, Bangladesh, 
and Pakistan. In the context of Islamic feminism, women’s activists, includ-
ing a few men, in Iran had been considered as important agents of this new 
wave. These activists and thinkers published their thoughts on gender jus-
tice in Islam in Zanan, a journal founded in 1992 by Shahla Sherkat. Indeed, 
Zanan was an important publication which had initiated the use of Islamic 
feminism. It is noteworthy that the main writers of Zanan offering gender jus-
tice perspective between 1992 and 2008 were men (Fazaeli 2017: 59). Sherkat 
and her colleagues used Zanan as their platform for Islamic readings of gender 
equality and justice. This phenomenon can be seen in other countries, such as 
Sisters in Islam, a Malaysian based nongovernmental organisation mainly of 
Malay Muslim professional women, founded in Malaysia in the late 1980s and 
formally registered in 1993 (Basarudin 2016: 4, 12), and Musawah (Equality), a 
“Global Movement for Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family” founded in 
2007 and was officially launched in Kuala Lumpur in 2009.
Some most often mentioned figures in this context who have focused their 
attention on rereading the Qurʾān are Amina Wadud, Rifaat Hasan, Fatima 
Naseer, Aziza al-Hibri and Shaheen Sardar Ali. Wadud, an African-American 
theologian, has been known as a main figure in the rereading of the Qurʾān 
(see Badran 2001: 50; see Wadud 2006). Two seminal treatises considered to 
be foundational texts of Islamic feminism are Wadud’s Qurʿān and Woman: 
Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective and Pakistani-American 
scholar Barlas’ ‘Believing Women’: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of 
the Qurʿān.
Although this movement has inspired many other Muslim women’s move-
ments across the globe, it is noteworthy that the term “Islamic feminism” has 
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been highly contested and even explicitly rejected by some Muslim women 
activists and scholars. Asma Barlas, for example, has been critical about being 
labelled as feminist due to its ethnocentric undertones. Barlas responded to 
Badran’s “Islamic feminism” in her “Four Stages of Denial or my On-again, 
Off-again, Affair with Feminism” (2008: 16). Barlas contends, “So, when we call 
something Islamic feminism we close off the possibility of seeing it as anything 
else and it is this closure that I find problematic. When we ignore how people 
choose to name themselves, their work, and their struggles, we necessarily do 
some epistemic violence to them” (2008: 21–22).
Haideh Moghissi is another one of the scholars who has been critical of the 
Islamic feminist project (see also Schröter 2017: 128). In her work she asks a 
question, “‘Islamic feminism’ is connected with the question of the compat-
ibility of feminism with Islamic teaching and scripture, and the social and 
legal frameworks which have evolved in Islamic societies. How could a religion 
which is based on gender hierarchy be adopted as the framework for struggle 
for gender democracy and women’s equality with men?” (1999: 126). Further, 
she argues:
Feminism’s core idea is that women and men are biologically different, 
but this difference should not be translated into an unequal valuation of 
women’s and men’s experience; biology should not lead to differences in 
legal status, the privileging of one over the other. This idea is diametri-
cally opposed to the basic principles of Islam … the Qurʾān makes men 
‘the managers (Qawwamoun) of the affairs of women’, because ‘God has 
made the one to excel over the other’, assigning men the task of admon-
ishing women when they fear they may be rebellious (1999: 140).
Therefore, she believes that, gender equality is alien to Islam ‘essence’ and the 
basic principles of Islam as mentioned in the texts. The exponents of Islamic 
feminism undoubtedly criticise Moghissi’s position. Ahmad, for example, 
argues, “Islam has no essence; hence a non-patriarchal reading of Islam is plau-
sible. It is my contention that it is not the Qurʾān per se, which legitimates gen-
der hierarchy, but the person making interpretation thereof and the context in 
which it is done” (2008: 551).
It is important to note despite the presence of scholars criticising Islamic 
feminism, the discourse, movement, and its spirit of gender-just rereading of 
Islamic texts have spread across the world. Many Muslim women who lack 
understanding and knowledge of gender just interpretations of the Qurʾān and 
other religious texts, however, are still unfamiliar with their agenda (Nisa 2019: 
441). In addition, within the Muslim-majority countries, the widely spread 
162 Nisa
assumption is that women’s activism, in particular feminists including Islamic 
feminists, are promoting foreign Western ideas which are at odds with Islamic 
values. Therefore, although it is regarded as a transnational movement, this 
progressive movement has not gained significant appeal for Muslim women. 
The following section will focus on Islamic movements and their women’s 
wings to cater to their female constituents.
5 Muslim Women and Moderate Movements
Women belonging to diverse Islamic movements have contributed greatly 
in the development of democracy and better gender relations (see Robinson 
2008 regarding Indonesia). Robinson provides a crucial study on the impor-
tant position of women activists as agents of reform and leading players in 
the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998, a regime of hege-
monic masculinity. Unfortunately, the end of the New Order was not the end 
of women’s domination and inferiority. Robinson argues, “Politicized Islam has 
emerged as an important force in the democratic atmosphere of the Reform 
period. Islamic voices that had been subdued under the New Order have found 
a public stage” (2008: 165).
Issues dealt by women’s activists of Islamic movements mirror those 
belonging to Islamic feminism or secular feminism, such as access to and 
development of women’s education, polygamy, forced marriages and child 
brides. Different contexts, however, have different foci due to the specific and 
localised nature of their problems. Therefore, some of the issues confronted by 
women of the Middle East and North Africa, like the removal of the face-veil, 
are not issues faced by Muslim women in Asia where face-covering is not the 
norm. Another example can be seen from the system of purdah or female seclu-
sion which is observed especially within the Indian subcontinent (Minaut and 
Papanek 1982). In addition, the characteristics of diverse expressions of Islam 
in different contexts have also coloured women’s activism. For example, the 
development of Ṣūfism in South Asia has led to the high presence of women’s 
participation in devotional activities at Ṣūfi shrines, which are central within 
Ṣūfi tradition (Abbas 2002). Indeed, the presence of women holding authority 
as pīrs has increased in the subcontinent (Pemberton 2006).
Women within moderate circles in Muslim majority countries have success-
fully established their women’s wings and, in certain contexts, demonstrated 
their independence in responding to issues pertaining to women. They do 
not always echo the views of men within the organisations. The presence of 
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women’s wings within moderate mainstream Muslim organisations, can be 
seen in the world’s largest Muslim majority country, Indonesia. Indonesia 
has two of the largest Muslim mass organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
founded in 1926, and Muhammadiyah established in 1912. Both organisations 
have female wings ranging from female student associations to adult women 
associations.
Within the organisational structure of NU, women’s organisations are part 
of its autonomous bodies. Muslimat NU is known as a NU women’s organisa-
tion, Fatayat as a NU young women’s organisation, and IPPNU (Ikatan Pelajar 
Putri Nahdlatul Ulama or NU School Girls Organisation) as a NU female stu-
dents’ association (Bush 2009: 15). Each of these female organisations has its 
own specialities and agenda which might overlap or differ from one another. 
Despite being widely known as a moderate Islamic organisation, NU is still 
rooted in patriarchal norms, which is evident in the position of women within 
the highest organisational structure of NU, PBNU (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Executive Board of NU). Muslim women within NU have continuously 
voiced their concerns pertaining to the position of women in the highest level 
of NU’s leadership structure, PBNU. They have demanded revision to NU’s con-
stitution to allow women representatives at the PBNU level (Bush 2009: 159). 
Women activists within NU organisations, especially Fatayat NU, have long 
been regarded as progressive women (Arnez 2010: 81). Belonging to an Islamic 
movement, Fatayat has been inspired by and actively collaborated with other 
progressive scholars, including Islamic feminists, such as Amina Wadud, Ziba 
Mir-Hosseini, Asma Barlas, Margot Badran, Amina Rasul, and Vivien Wie, 
(Nadjib 2019). Fatayat, according to Schröter, “have taken on leading roles in 
the further development and localization of ideas taken from Islamic femi-
nism” (2017: 126).
Muhammadiyah, usually known as a reformist and modernist Islamic 
organisation in Indonesia, also has affiliated women’s organisations. The 
women’s section of Muhammadiyah is called Aisyiyah and was initially 
led by the wife of founder, Nyai Ahmad Dahlan. Aisyiyah can be regarded 
as Muhammadiyah’s version of Muslimat NU. The equivalent to Fatayat is 
Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. The term ‘Aisyiyah’ was intentionally adopted from ʿĀʾisha, 
the Prophet Muḥammad’s wife. As mentioned above, the roles of the wives 
and women within the family of the Prophet Muḥammad have continuously 
been the main inspiration for later women’s activism and their movements. 
Similar to Fatayat, the agenda of Nasyiatul Aisyiyah is also more progres-
sive than Aisyiyah. Nasyiatul Aisyiyah has experienced moments when it 
has opposed Aisyiyah, which has been more conservative when engaging 
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with gender issues. Syamsiyatun records, “Some Aisyiyah women even tried to 
block the spread of the gender ‘virus’ among Aisyiyah by not allowing Nasyiah 
women to talk about gender issues within Aisyiyah’s pengajian [Islamic study 
group]” (2007: 87).
The dynamics within these women’s wings of Islamic movements come 
from the brand of moderate (wasatiyya) Islam in their given country, demon-
strating that different positions pertaining to various women’s issues can be 
seen even within one organisation (see also Van Doorn-Harder 2006). The fol-
lowing section will focus on women and their organisations within the circle 
of more conservative movements, especially Islamist movements.
6 Muslim Women and Conservative Movements
Earlier in the section on Islamic feminism, this chapter mentions that the dis-
course of Islamic feminism initially emerged as part of the response of activ-
ists and thinkers to the rise of conservative movements, including Salafism 
and diverse Islamist movements. Notably, some began attaching themselves to 
diverse Islamist movements at the same time as when other Muslim women 
were attracted to feminist activism. Mounira Charrad, in her study on gen-
der in the Middle East, argues that due to better access to education and the 
end of colonialism in many Muslim countries in the 1980s, Muslim women’s 
movements could be seen flourishing (2011: 425) including those of Islamist 
movements. Echoing other scholarly positions, such as the position of Ahmed 
mentioned above, Charrad argues, “Although some may come close to it, most 
groups differentiate themselves from Western feminism, which has been per-
ceived in the region as a legacy of colonialism and Western hegemony, having 
little relevance to the Middle East” (2011: 425). This section focuses on the most 
current scholarly concerns on the growing presence of women becoming part 
of diverse conservative and Islamist movements and their parties.
6.1 Salafism
Salafism is the oldest root of many conservative and revivalist movements, 
including diverse Islamist movements that have also been inspired by some 
Salafi ideologies in their understandings of Islam. It is noteworthy that through-
out its development, there have been many groups identifying as belonging to 
Salafism, especially traditionalist Salafism. Scholars (Wiktorowicz 2006; Meijer 
2009) often mention the three major factions: purist, political, and jihadi. The 
position of women within diverse Salafi movements and groups can be seen 
not only within Muslim majority countries (Nisa 2012, 2013, 2014; Inge 2016; 
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Tønnessen 2016; Kolman 2017). My work focuses on Salafi women within purist 
and political Salafism—to borrow Wiktorowicz’s classification—in Indonesia. 
I analyse the agency of young Salafi women in Indonesia living under specific 
strict Salafi understandings of Islam, including the injunction that women 
should ideally wear face-veils (Ind. cadar) to guard their morality (2012: 367).
The struggle of these Salafi women to defend their conservative under-
standings of Islam can be seen in Muslim majority and Western countries. Liv 
Tønnessen (2016), for example, concentrates on the political agency of Salafi 
women in Sudan in their fight against the state’s understanding of gender mix-
ing (in Tunisia see Kolman 2017). Anabel Inge (2016) analyses the life of young, 
British Salafi women and their process of conversion, as well as the constraints 
they face when negotiating between their Salafi identity and Western lifestyle 
(on Moroccan-Dutch Salafi women, see de Koning 2009). These scholarly 
works emphasise the important role played by Salafi women within diverse 
Salafi groups not only by supporting the strict conservative Salafi understand-
ings of women’s positions in Islam, but also in strengthening their movements 
by inviting others to uphold the same strict understandings of Islam.
6.2 Muslim Brotherhood
The most famous Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān 
al-Muslimūn), founded by Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906–1949) in 1928, also has a 
female wing that supports the agenda of the movement, including veiling and 
the main role of women being in the home. The Muslim Brotherhood is known 
as “the parent body and main inspiration for many Islamist organizations in 
Egypt and several other Arab countries” (Ayubi et al 2019). Women’s mobility 
in the public arena was part of al-Bannā’s concern, which can be found in his 
article published in 1940 entitled “Risālah al Marʾa al Muslima” (Tadros 2011: 
90). He warns of the danger of women’s mobility: “This fascistic mingling of 
sexes among us in schools, institutes … all of this is foreign goods which have 
absolutely no relation to Islam and has had the worst effects in our social life” 
(quoted in Tadros 2011: 91). Al-Bannā argues, “the difference between man and 
woman in rights is attributable to their different natures and in accordance 
with the different roles assigned to each” (quoted in Tadros 2011: 91). Indeed, 
al-Bannā’s view on different gender roles have been echoed by many Islamists. 
Mir-Hosseini, for example, uses the term ‘neotraditionalist’ or ‘neofiqh’ to refer 
to a new gender discourse written mostly by men to oppose Western concepts 
of gender equality (2016: 68). They use the concepts of ‘equity’ and ‘comple-
mentarity’ to emphasise the human nature of men and women (2016: 69).
One of the most prominent women within the Muslim Brotherhood’s circle 
was Zaynab al-Ghazālī (1917–2005). Al-Ghazālī initially joined Hudā Shaʿrāwī’s 
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Egyptian Feminist Union until she became “disaffected” and decided to con-
struct her own association for pious Muslim women (Cooke 1994: 2). Later, 
al-Ghazālī was known as a fierce opponent of feminist movements and a 
promoter of conservative understandings of Islam. At the age of eighteen, 
al-Ghazālī founded the Jamāʿat al-Sayyidāt al-Muslimāt (Muslim Women’s 
Association) (Hoffman 2019). Supporting the agenda of the Islamist move-
ment, she “maintained that women should have important public roles as 
long as it was in the defense of Islam and traditional Islamic values” (Ayubi 
et al 2019). As the most powerful female figure within the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, al-Ghazālī also experienced imprisonment. She shared her expe-
riences in her memoir written in 1977 (Al-Ghazali 1994).
The Muslim Brotherhood spread through the Arab world, opposing the 
female vote and coeducation in the 1940s and 1950s (Tadros 2011: 92). Later, 
however, they proposed a reform of the status of women, maintaining their 
emphasis that women’s domestic responsibilities should be centre stage. Their 
position that women’s domestic responsibilities are their ‘noble tasks’ and 
‘noble missions’ has been maintained. The Muslim Brotherhood’s election 
platform of 2006, states that, “We must not forget that the woman has a noble 
and significant task entrusted to her by Allah Almighty, child bearing and 
motherhood … these duties must be given precedence over other responsibili-
ties … However, the husband has a right to permit his wife to work” (quoted in 
Tadros 2011: 92). Permission from one’s husband has become the main gate for 
a woman to become active in public, outside of the home.
6.3 Beyond the Muslim Brotherhood
Following women within the Muslim Brotherhood’s circle, this kind of Islamist 
movement has attracted a large number of young women, especially since the 
1970s. One of their main role models has been al-Ghazālī. Valerie Hoffman con-
tends, “Zaynab al-Ghazali stands out thus far as the only woman to distinguish 
herself as one of its major leaders” (Hoffman 2019). During the last quarter of 
the twentieth century, many Muslim-majority countries started to witness the 
rise of Islamist movements along with a broader resurgence of piety. This phe-
nomenon also attracted many women to Islamist movements, such as those in 
Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Palestine, Pakistan, Jordan, and Yemen.
Many Islamist movements have been inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
including Jamā’at-I Islāmī (The Islamic Party) which shares the Brotherhood’s 
ideology (Ayubi et al 2019). Jamā’at-I Islāmī, one of the oldest transnational 
Islamist movements, was founded in Lahore in 1941 by Islamist thinker and 
activist, Mawlānā Sayyid Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī. Its wide appeal can be seen 
among Muslim men and women not only in South Asia, but also in East Asia 
167Women and Islamic Movements
and the Middle East, North America, the UK, and other parts of Europe (Jamal 
2009: 10). Sharing the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology in many aspects per-
taining to women, Mawdūdī, like al-Bannā, also ruled that women have to 
veil themselves because women’s body is a source of fitna, entry to the pub-
lic domain can cause immorality, and he was against women’s political roles 
(Ahmad 2008: 549). He was also against women becoming rulers, and quoted 
a ḥadīth, “A nation which handed over its affairs [of state] to a woman would 
never prosper” (Ahmad 2008: 557). Similarly to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Jamā’at-I Islāmī has also experienced some reforms pertaining to the status 
of women, especially from the 1970s onwards (Ahmad 2008: 549). Differing 
to the founder, the later generation believed that women should be allowed 
to leave their homes. In the early twentieth century, Muslim women began to 
be seen in modern politics and Jamā’at-I Islāmī started allowing female mem-
bership (Ahmad 2008: 558). The women’s wing of Jamā’at-I Islāmī was devel-
oped in the 1950s. Similar to other Islamist women, they emphasise a return 
to Islam as the answer to moral decadence due to the infiltration of Western 
culture (Jamal 2009: 11). It is noteworthy that they are not anti-modernity 
(Jamal 2009: 12).
Another transnational Islamist movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of 
Liberation), was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1909–
1977). With a main agenda to establish a global caliphate with non-violent 
methods. Women within Hizb ut-Tahrir are active in voicing their concerns 
pertaining to women and family issues. They are also active in using diverse 
media, including social media, to voice their concerns. Orofino, in her work on 
Muslimah Hizb ut-Tahrir in Australia, argues that the women are very active 
in this movement which has successfully appealed to young girls and has con-
tinuously contributed to the movement’s agenda (2018: 277). Muslimah Hizb 
ut-Tahrir Indonesia, the women’s division of the Indonesian chapter of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, which was banned in 2017, also emphasises the vital role of women 
in preparing a pious young Muslim generation so that the khairu umma (the 
best Muslim community) can be realised (Nisa 2014a: 145).
Lately, many scholars have focused their attention on elucidating why 
women’s participation in Islamist movements and their parties have increased 
through time. Indeed, the transformation of diverse Islamist movements 
in adopting a more pragmatic approach, which might be seen as sacrificing 
their core ideological commitments for political gain, has created supportive 
environments for encouraging the presence of women. The literature on the 
inclusion-moderation hypothesis in analysing the strategies of some Islamist 
parties and their political actors signifies a tendency to be more inclusive and 
suggests their democratic commitment as a response to political opportunities 
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(see Bayat 2013; Tezcur 2010; Hasan 2013), including issues pertaining to the 
position of women in politics.
Today, women within Islamist parties have more influence. They are pres-
ent within the ranks of political parties which adopt Islamist ideology (see 
Clark and Schwedler 2003; Arat 2005 on women within an Islamist Refah 
party in Turkey; Rinaldo 2013 on women within an Indonesian Islamist party, 
the Prosperous Justice Party). Clark and Schwedler, for example, focusing 
their work on women’s activists in Islamist groups in Jordan, Jabhat al-ʿAmal 
al-Islāmī (Islamic Action Front, or IAF) and Yemen, Tajammuʿ al-Yamanī li 
al-Iṣlāḥ (Yemeni Reform Group), argue that in 1989 and 1990 these two larg-
est Islamist groups expressed a strong opposition to the full and equal politi-
cal participation of women, however, a decade later they demonstrated that 
the parties have women in their highest decision making bodies (Clark and 
Schwedler 2003: 308–9).
6.4 Tablīghī Jamāʿat
Besides the involvement of women and political Islam, women have also been 
the backbone of other Islamic resurgence movements, which are often consid-
ered apolitical or movements which strive to stay away from political contro-
versies (see also Sikand 2006). Tablīghī Jamāʿat is an example of this current. 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat was founded in 1926 in Mewat by Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās 
(1885–1944).
Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s views of women is similar to those of other conserva-
tive movements, especially Salafism. Although women are active in diverse 
Tablīghī activities, they have to observe a specific standard of morality, such 
covering their bodies properly during Tablīghī activities by donning a face-veil. 
This includes the main core activity of Tablīghī Jamāʿat, khurūj (going out of 
one’s own neighbourhood to proselytise) (Nisa 2014b: 470; see also Metcalf 
1998, 2009). Mirroring views of ʿulamāʾ (Muslim clerics) within Islamist move-
ments, Tablīghī ʿulamāʾ initially did not approve women’s khurūj “arguing 
that this was ‘an age of great disorder’ with women going out of their homes 
without covering themselves ‘properly’, and that tabligh tours might actually 
be used by women as an ‘excuse’ for ‘turning towards freedom’” (Sikand 1999: 
43). However, Ilyās’ continuous effort to seek approval from Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s 
elites to allow women to participate in Tablīghī work finally received a posi-
tive response, and nowadays, Tablīghī women are as active as their male coun-
terparts. They participate in khurūj as long as they are accompanied by their 
maḥram, especially their husband or other close male kin from their immedi-
ate family (Nisa 2014b: 482).
My work on Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Indonesia, which can be regarded as one 
of the biggest branches of this movement, demonstrates the appeal of this 
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movement not only to Muslims from underserved communities, but also 
urban middle and high-class wealthy women (Nisa 2011: 135) and school aged 
girls who are willing to learn the basic teachings of Tablīghī Jamāʿat through 
the growing presence of Tablīghī Islamic boarding schools (Nisa 2014b: 468). 
The involvement of women of privileged backgrounds questions the common 
stereotype of Tablīghī Jamāʿat women, who are commonly seen as women 
strictly wearing face-veils, hence they are often portrayed as oppressed women. 
Indeed, the involvement of these women from privileged social backgrounds 
signifies that “their passion to return to the true path of Islam and the commit-
ments it embodies have made them aware of their capacity to exercise agency 
within the movement’s structuring conditions” (Amrullah 2011: 135). They have 
been active in recruiting and sustaining the movement, especially women’s 
Tablīghī networks.
7 Conclusion
This chapter does not aim to be exhaustive and cover all issues pertaining to 
women and Islamic movements. The chapter begins with a historical over-
view of the position of important female figures in Islam, especially those of 
the Prophet Muḥammad’s circle, who later became the main inspiration for 
women in diverse movements ranging from Islamic to Islamist movements. 
One important point in the discussion of women and their activism, includ-
ing their attachment to diverse Islamic and Islamist movements, is how they 
frame their attachment in the name of religious language. Both Islamic femi-
nists and conservative women, for example, return to the Qurʾān and position 
women within the Prophet Muḥammad’s circle as their sources of inspiration 
to justify their activism. In this context, Abu Zayd’s remark resonates with the 
phenomenon in which he said, “the Quran is at the mercy of the ideology of its 
interpreter. For a communist, the Quran would thus reveal communism, for a 
fundamentalist it would be a highly fundamentalist text, for a feminist it would 
be a feminist text, and so on” (2006: 91). The wide spectrum of the position of 
women and their activism reminds us not only of their diverse opinions, but 
also that different contexts can lead to different expressions of Muslim activ-
ism. Therefore, in studying Muslim women, there is no such thing as a global 
context. This chapter demonstrates how some Islamist women support gender 
hierarchy, while at the same time, Islamic feminists and progressive Muslim 
thinkers strive to fight against gender hierarchy.
Any discussions pertaining to women cannot neglect the position of 
men. Deeply rooted patriarchal understandings of religious texts have been 
prevalent in diverse religious traditions, including Islam. On the other hand, 
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throughout the history of Muslim women’s activism, we can see that women 
have worked in collaboration with modernist male Muslims toward emancipa-
tion and gender justice. Similar to women within the circles of Islamic femi-
nism and those who belong to diverse Islamic movements that support gender 
just interpretations of the Qurʾān and other religious texts, women who have 
become active in women’s wings within Salafist and diverse Islamist move-
ments, also produce or echo their male counterparts’ readings and rereadings 
of the Qurʾān and other religious texts. While women within diverse Islamic 
movements, including those of Islamic feminist movements, emphasise gen-
der equality and egalitarian gender roles, Islamist and other conservative 
women strengthen the concepts of equity and complementarity. The growing 
presence of women within diverse Islamist movements and their Islamist par-
ties, from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, demonstrate the vital position of 
women. The moderation of Islamist parties due to their intention to achieve 
political gain has led to the presence of a positive political atmosphere for 
Islamist women. Women in diverse Islamist parties have become important 
strategic and potential agents to gain political gain and enjoy diverse political 
incentives.
This chapter suggests that anyone who wants to understand Muslim women 
and their activism within diverse Islamic and Islamist movements must avoid 
the inclination to make broad and unqualified generalisations. The wide geo-
graphical scope covered in this chapter also reminds us of the diversity within 
Muslim-majority countries. A continuous ideological tension can be seen from 
one movement or organisation. In addition, women’s backgrounds need to be 
considered when reading their activities, because women from underserved 
communities might be different from those of more privileged backgrounds. 
Therefore, it is important to underline the specific socio-cultural economic, 
and political contexts and orientations of women’s activism. Any activism 
should be understood within contextualised and localised settings with their 
own dynamics and specifics.
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Introduction to Part 2
Shīʿa Islam is the second largest group of Muslims after the Sunnīs. An esti-
mated 10–15% of the world’s Muslims are Shīʿas. While Sunnīs are a majority 
in most Muslim-majority countries, a majority of population in Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq adheres to the Shīʿa faith. Shīʿa Muslims believe that 
Prophet Muḥammad’s family (Ahl al-Bayt) and his descendants are the source 
of religious guidance and leadership (Hazleton 2010). According to Shīʿa tradi-
tions, after Muḥammad’s death, his cousin ʿAlī became the first imām. ʿAlī was 
married to Muḥammad’s daughter Fāṭima. Their sons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn suc-
ceeded ʿAlī as the second and the third imāms. Ḥusayn’s death at the hands of 
the army sent by the ruler of the time, Yazid, at Karbalāʾ marks one of the most 
significant events on the Shīʿa calendar.
The concept of imāma, a divinely guided leader of Muslims, is fundamental 
to the Shīʿa faith (Blankinship et al. 2001). Shīʿa imāms are infallible. While all 
Shīʿas agree on the first three imāms, different branches of Shīʿism are divided 
on their successors (Angeles 2011). An overwhelming majority of Shīʿas in the 
world today belong to the Twelver sect who believe in twelve divinely guided 
imāms. Each of the imāms who followed Ḥusayn was the son of the previ-
ous imām. The twelfth imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdi, went into occultation in 
874 CE and will return to establish peace and justice. Ismāʿīlīs believe that it 
was the seventh imām, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, who went into occultation. 
Bohras believe that the last Fāṭimid Caliph, Abū al-Qāsim, is in hiding await-
ing his return. Not all Shīʿa believe in occultation. Some, such as Zaydī and 
Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, do not believe in occultation. Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs believe that the 
Imāmate has continued in the form of their leaders, Aga Khan (Gova 2005).
Each of the six chapters in this section explores an aspect of the Shīʿa tradi-
tion and demonstrates the diversity and geographic spread. We open with the 
Twelvers or Imāmiyya Shīʿa, who comprise a considerable portion of the Shīʿa 
Muslim population today. The history, doctrine, and contemporary challenges 
of the Zaydīs, Ismāʿīlīs, Dāʾūdī Bohras (Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlī Shīʿa), and the Alevīs of 
Turkey with the ʿ Alawīs of Syria. This section closes with an ethnography of the 
heyʾatī movement in modern Iran.
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Chapter 8
Imāmiyya Shīʿa (The Twelvers)
Mohammad Fazlhashemi
1 Introduction
Shīʿa is one of the earliest branches within Islam. Shīʿa Muslims today make up 
a sizable minority among the Muslims around the world (about 15–20% of all 
Muslims). They are spread throughout the Muslim world, but in most coun-
tries, they have a minority position. The exception is countries such as Iran, 
Iraq and Lebanon, where Shīʿa Muslims make up a majority of the population. 
Shīʿa theological traditions and institutions have developed in parallel with the 
Sunnī-dominated theological tradition.
The shaping of Shīʿa within Islam goes back to a conflict over the succession 
after the death of the prophet Muḥammad. Just after he died in 633, a struggle 
began between his closest followers that would prove to be of great signifi-
cance for Islam, for the future development of the Muslim realm, and for cre-
ation the tradition of Shīʿa political ideas. The power struggle concerned who 
was to succeed Muḥammad as leader of the Muslim community. No one could 
succeed him in his capacity as divine messenger since Muḥammad, according 
to Islamic doctrine, was the last messenger: “Muḥammad is not the father of 
any man among you, but a messenger of God, and the seal of the prophets; and 
God is knower of all things” (Qurʾān 33:40).
One of the parties in the conflict over Muḥammad’s successor thought 
that the role should be filled by one of his oldest followers, in this case, Abū 
Bakr, who belonged the small band of Muḥammad’s closest men. Opposition 
came from a group who claimed that the leadership should remain within 
Muḥammad’s family. Muḥammad had no sons, so leadership would pass to his 
cousin ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭalib (600–661), who was married to Muḥammad’s daugh-
ter Fāṭima (Lambton 1981: 219). According to Shīʿa historical sources, when 
Muḥammad returned after his last pilgrimage to Mecca, he proclaimed to a 
large group of assembled Muslims that he had appointed ʿAlī as his successor. 
This claim is challenged by the Sunnī.
Those who supported ʿAlī’s candidacy were called ʿAlī’s Party, Shīʿat ʿ Alī, from 
which we get the name Shīʿa. The Shīʿa movement was thus motivated by rever-
ence for the prophet Muḥammad’s household, ahl al-bayt, in particular for his 
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cousin ʿAlī, his wife, and their children. Shīʿa Muslims viewed Qurʾānic verses 
as a support for their reverence for the Prophet’s household, for example:
do not display yourselves after the manner of the days of ignorance; and 
establish prayer, give the poor-rate, obey God and His messenger. Verily, 
verily God intends to keep off from you (every kind of) uncleanness O, 
you the people of the House, and purify you (with) a through purification.
Qurʾān 33:33
Hence, the household of the Prophet were those who were closest to him and 
the most pure, providing an example for Muslims to follow and obey. The Shīʿa 
imāms, leaders of the community, were considered to possess special charac-
teristics such as purity and moral and ethical infallibility, or ʿiṣma.
Shīʿa have not been a homogeneous group. During a short period in the early 
history of Shīʿa, between 660 and 870, a dozen conflicting factions formed, all 
of which laid claim to the correct interpretation within Shīʿa. The differences 
concerned, for example, the order of succession among Muḥammad’s descen-
dants and the question of which of the descendants should be regarded as the 
rightful Shīʿa imāms (Aqajari 2002: 20).
One example is the Zaydīs, who believed that any descendant of the first 
imām ʿAlī could become imām. They claimed that Zayd ibn ʿAlī (695–740), 
who was son of the fourth Shīʿa imām ʿAlī Zayn al-ʿAbedin (658–712) should be 
regarded as the fifth Shīʿa imām. This was in contrast to the majority of Shīʿa 
Muslims who believed that Muḥammad al-Bāqir (676–736), an elder son of 
ʿAlī Zayn al-ʿAbedin, was the fifth imām. The Zaydīs were against the Umayyad 
and ʿAbbāsid caliphates and founded the first Shīʿa dynasty in northern Persia. 
The Būyid dynasty who controlled a major part of ʿAbbāsid territory were also 
Zaydīs. The contemporary Ḥuthi Shīʿa minority in northern Yemen are also 
Zaydīs, and their ancestors founded a dynasty in Yemen in the ninth century 
that lasted until the 1960s (Esposito 2011: 48–49).
Another example is the Ismāʿīlīs, who in the eighth century decided to 
contest who was to succeed the Shīʿa imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq. According to the 
Ismāʿīlīs, his son Ismāʿīl was to succeed him. He is also the one who, accord-
ing to Ismāʿīlite belief, will return to save the world. The Twelvers, on the 
other hand, believed that the imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq should be succeeded by 
another one of his sons, the one the Twelvers regard as their seventh imām, 
Mūsā al-Kāẓim (745–799) (Fazlhashemi 2011: 29), The Ismāʿīlīs started their 
activities as a revolutionary and missionary movement who wanted to spread 
their esoteric knowledge of Qurʾān to other Muslims. They were prepared to 
use violence in this regard. Security forces from both the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate 
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and Seljuq Sultanate hunted them, forcing them to operate in secret. Ismāʿīlīs 
took power in several parts in the Muslim world, but the two most famous of 
them were the Faṭimid Caliphate in Egypt (969–1171) and a group who broke 
away from the Faṭimids in 1094 and had its headquarters at Mount Alamūt in 
northern Persia. The most famous name from this group was Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ 
(1050–1124) who ordered assassinations against ʿAbbāsid and Seljuq officials 
(Esposito 2011: 49–51).
This chapter focuses on the largest group within Shīʿa: The Imāmiyya, or the 
Twelvers. According to Imāmiyya Shīʿa the leadership of the Muslim commu-
nity after Muḥammad should start with his relative ʿAlī and the last Shīʿa imām 
was Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan (b. 868), known as al-Mahdī, the ‘Hidden Imām’ 
(Esposito 2011: 48). They recognise twelve imāms in total who are believed to 
have distinguished themselves from other people by possessing a divine light 
that gave them knowledge about sacred mysteries. This light gave the Twelve 
Imāms immunity from sin, and for that reason, they should be the obvious 
leaders of the Muslim community. Their leadership, it is believed, would give 
them the opportunity to transfer divine knowledge to the people (Lambton 
1981: 220).
Perhaps the most controversial theological feature of Imāmiyya Shīʿa is the 
belief in the ‘Hidden Imām’ al-Mahdī who is considered to have been in occul-
tation since the 900s. According to Imāmiyya Shīʿa, he will emerge from hiding 
to defeat evil and save the world. In this mission, he is accompanied by other 
prophets such as Jesus. An even more controversial view within Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa’s eschatological beliefs is the notion of rajʿa, the resurrection of a num-
ber of central historical figures. The resurrection, includes both good and evil 
people who will take part in a final battle, in which forces of evil will be van-
quished once for all before the final apocalypse, predicted in the Qurʾān. From 
the Sunnī side, and for some Imāmiyya Shīʿa clergies, these beliefs have been 
heavily criticised for lack of support from the Qurʾān and the prophetic tradi-
tion. Critics regard these beliefs as heretical and superstitious and blame the 
infiltration of Jewish sources from converts for the appearance of such “un-
Islamic” beliefs (see for example the Imāmiyya Shīʿa clergy Shari‘at Sangelaji’s 
[1891–1944] book Eslam va rij‘at, published by his disciple Farid Tonkaboni).
The Shīʿas in general, and Imāmiyya Shīʿas in particular, have historically 
found themselves in the minority and on the losing end of broader power 
struggles in the early centuries of Islam. These struggles were the foundation 
for the schism that arose between the two main branches of Islam, the Sunnī 
and Shīʿas. The most important controversy concerned the foundation for the 
legitimacy of secular power and leadership in the community (Kadivar 2000: 
12). During the fourteen hundred years that have elapsed since then, the chasm 
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between them has widened to include theological, legal, philosophical, cul-
tural, social, and not least political controversies (Fazlhashemi 2011: 22).
This chapter has a chronological structure and takes a largely historical 
approach to present the development of Imāmiyya Shīʿa. Relevant primary 
sources and scholarly works help to trace the process of the development and 
formation of Shīʿa political ideas in the course of history, with a particular 
focus on Persia/Iran under the Ṣafavid Dynasty (1501–1736) and in the modern 
era, where Shīʿa has seen its most fervent periods of support and evolution.
2 Succession and Leadership: The Emergence of Imāmiyya Shīʿa
Shīʿa Islam emerges from the first major schism within the religion founded 
by the prophet Muḥammad. As Muḥammad appointed no heir before his 
death, the question of succession caused quickly became one of great politi-
cal import, causing the division of the Sunnī and Shīʿa factions. It remains the 
topic of debate today. Iraqi Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholar Moḥammad Baqer 
al-Ṣadr (1935–1980) writes that the prophet Muḥammad had to choose among 
three possibilities regarding succession before his death. One was not to bother 
appointing a successor, another was to persuade his closest followers to elect 
a successor after deliberation, and the third option was that he himself should 
nominate his successor. Al-Ṣadr rejects the first two alternatives: that the 
prophet would not appoint his own successor could be interpreted to mean 
that he did not care about what would happen to the young Muslim commu-
nity after his death. This is not consistent with the great concern he displayed 
for the welfare of the community. Nor was the second alternative particularly 
appealing to the prophet, in al-Ṣadr’s view, since the tradition of deliberative 
councils was far too risky in view of the heterogeneous character of the Muslim 
community. It was the prophet himself who functioned as a unifying factor for 
the early Muslim community, within which there were significant differences. 
This circumstance would increase the risk of division and would not benefit 
his community.
Al-Ṣadr believes that the prophet, from a logical point of view, ought to have 
chosen the last alternative to ensure that the leadership of his community 
would be in safe hands after him. Al-Ṣadr thinks that the choice of ʿAlī was not 
primarily due to the close family relationship of the two men. He does not dis-
regard the fact that this would let the leadership stay within Muḥammad’s own 
family, but he asserts that ʿAlī was by far the best choice. ʿAlī had very good and 
close relations with Muḥammad. He had followed Muḥammad since his child-
hood and was among the first to convert to Islam. Muḥammad had followed 
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ʿAlī’s development closely from his early years and had been a part of it. ʿAlī 
had thus been brought up in Muḥammad’s “school” since he was a child, but 
he was also, according to the Shīʿa view, the one who was most familiar, after 
the Prophet himself, with religious knowledge. Here his close relationship to 
the Prophet played a crucial part. ʿAlī’s young age also meant that, unlike many 
of the older followers, he was not involved in conflicts arising from older loyal-
ties to tribes and clans or from the social, economic, and political positions, 
they had before they converted to Islam. According to al-Ṣadr, then, the choice 
of ʿAlī was something that guaranteed the continuity of secular and religious 
leadership in the Muslim community (al-Sadr 2002: 28–88).
In the Shīʿa view, there was no doubt that following the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad leadership should go to his descendants, a concept that they argue 
found support in the Qurʾān and the principle of wilāya or leadership. Their 
stance was that if wilāya ended up outside Muḥammad’s lineage, the leader-
ship of Muslims would be in the hands of people who lacked divine protection, 
ʿiṣma. This protection, in the Shīʿa view, was reserved solely for Muḥammad’s 
lineage. Without this protection, there was a risk of innovations and deviations 
that conflicted with the fundamental principles of Islam.
It took over two decades before ʿAlī became the fourth caliph after 
Muḥammad, although not in his capacity as a Shīʿa imām but as the person 
chosen by the Muslim people to lead the community. His time in power was 
very short, however, just over four years. He was murdered in a political attack 
by a group of religious extremists who accused him of having broken the laws 
of Islam, and in certain respects not having lived up to its ideals. Shortly after 
this event, the first caliphate dynasty was founded, the Umayyads (661–750), 
who were then succeeded by the new caliphate dynasty of the ʿAbbāsids (750–
1258). Both dynasties belonged to the Sunnī branch of Islam (Fazlhashemi 
2011: 21).
ʿAlī’s descendants never succeeded in regaining power. They were out-
maneuvered and suffered severe losses. During the time of the Twelve Shīʿa 
Imāms (633–874) the repression of the Shīʿa became harsher. A couple of these 
imāms took part in armed actions against Sunnī rulers and were killed on 
the battlefield or poisoned on the orders of Umayyad leaders. The Battle of 
Karbalāʾ in 680, when the third Shīʿa imām, Ḥusayn, Muḥammad’s grandson, 
and his nearest circle were massacred by a superior Sunnī army, was the last 
armed resistance put up by the Shīʿa imāms. After the Battle of Karbalāʾ, which 
has left deep traces in Shīʿa folk memory, the Shīʿa Imāms continued their 
resistance against the Umayyad and later the ʿAbbāsid caliphs without armed 
actions (Fazlhashemi 2011: 21–22). The reason for the Shīʿa imāms’ refusal to 
recognise the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid rulers was that they wanted to maintain 
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the principle of wilāya, or leadership, under their system of imāms who could 
be traced back to the Prophet.
The repression of the Shīʿa Imāms was so severe during the period from the 
680s to the 880s that they concentrated on developing Shīʿa theology in order 
to preserve Shīʿa Islam as a religious tradition. The best known of these imāms 
who helped to shape Shīʿa theology was the sixth imām, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (705–
765). The theology of the Twelve Imāms consequently bears his name and is 
also called Jaʿfarite theology. Despite this, the Shīʿa Imāms did not escape per-
secution by the Sunnī rulers. Several of them died in prison or were poisoned 
in their homes. The last of these imāms, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan (born 868), 
known under the name al-Mahdī, went underground as a young man to evade 
the patrols of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, and communicated with his followers by 
proxy (Fazlhashemi 2011: 22).
After 940 and the Imāmiyya Shīʿas’ idea of the twelfth imām living in hid-
ing, the question arose of who would carry on this heritage. It was obvious 
that no one could replace either the Prophet or the Twelve Imāms, but now 
the idea was formed that legal scholars should fill the vacuum that had arisen 
during the long absence. There was no disagreement about the need for these 
jurists, but soon differences of opinion were heard about their authority. This 
concerned, above all, the issue of whether they should solely function as stew-
ards of the tradition or could act independently in the interpretation of the 
religion’s founding documents, but also how far they could go and whether it 
was permissible to use reason when interpreting religious texts and statements 
by the Prophet and the Twelve Imāms (Lambton 1981: 243–63).
The division among the Shīʿa, however, was not limited to disputes about the 
order of succession among Muḥammad’s descendants. Within the Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa, there was soon a schism that would be of great significance for the out-
look on secular power. Once again, this division concerned the relationship 
between faith/revelation and reason. The group that wanted to give priority 
to faith thought that the most important task was to seek guidance in revela-
tion and in the statements of Shīʿa imāms. According to this view, the revela-
tion communicated through the Prophet and his statements and through the 
Shīʿa imāms’ statements are the only sources that Shīʿa Muslims need when 
they seek answers to their questions. All they have to do is to navigate cor-
rectly among the countless existing statements and guidelines. This group 
came to be called the Akhbarids. Against this stance were those who thought 
that although the revelation and the imāms’ statements should be used, they 
should simultaneously be interpreted by legal scholars on the basis of the tra-
dition of ijtihād. This group was called Uṣulids. The conflict between these two 
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tendencies would develop into a struggle between faith and reason (Fazlhashemi 
2011: 30).
The Twelve Imāms, their lives, theological beliefs, and political stances, have 
shaped Imāmiyya Shīʿa orthodoxy and orthopraxy, its theology, and its outlook 
on secular power. Along with themes of persecution and oppression, and the 
important of history and remembrance, the imāmate is one of the key features 
of ‘Twelver’ Shīʿa Islam.
3 Key Themes in Imāmiyya Shīʿa
3.1 The Twelve Imāms
The concept of heritage is clearly central to the development of Shīʿa, its own 
schisms, and to the beliefs of Imāmiyya Shīʿa. The centrality of the role of the 
twelve Shīʿa imāms in Imāmiyya Shīʿa was due to their links with the Prophet, 
and their ability to authentically carry on his tradition. From the time of the 
Twelve Shīʿa Imāms (633–874 CE) those who are thought to have been of the 
greatest significance for empowering the movement are the first imām ʿAlī 
ibn Abī Ṭālib (600–661 CE), his sons Ḥasan (624–669 CE) and Ḥusayn (626–
680 CE), and the last imām, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan, al-Mahdī (Fazlhashemi 
2011: 22).
A consideration of the actions of the Twelve Imāms during the period 657–
940 shows an important dividing line between the first three imāms and the 
others. The first three imāms—ʿAlī, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn—acted as both secu-
lar and religious leaders. They did not hesitate to take part in armed conflicts 
even if it meant certain death for themselves and the people closest to them. 
The murder of the third imām, Ḥusayn, in 680 is an example of this. Other 
imāms, however, seem to have had different priorities. They made no great 
effort to assume secular power. They preferred to act as the foremost religious 
authorities of their time. It was also during their time that Shīʿa theology took 
shape. Starting with the fifth and sixth imāms—Muḥammad al-Bāqir (676–736 
CE) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (705–765 CE)—this shift became even more obvious. 
The Shīʿa imāms acted more in their capacity as prominent religious than 
secular leaders. What distinguished them from other religious authorities was 
their close family ties to the Prophet, since they were his direct descendants 
(Modarresi Ṭabaṭaba’i 2007: 38–39). Secular and political responsibility was 
transferred to a messianic figure who would restore order and give power back 
to the Shīʿa imāms. This saviour, the Qāʾim, would come forth from the group 
of Shīʿa imāms, but simultaneously several of these imāms declared that they 
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were not the expected saviours. Among other things, the fifth and sixth imāms 
emphasised this.
The situation changed somewhat under the seventh imām, Mūsā al-Kāẓim 
(745–799), who breathed new life into the belief in the coming saviour. What 
was new for the seventh imām was that he introduced an extensive system 
of representatives all over the Islamic realm. These were in close contact 
with the imām and collected religious taxes. The newly organised network of 
representatives and the economic opportunities that were opened with the 
centrally collected religious taxes aroused new hope of the expected saviour 
among Imāmiyya Shīʿas. Another relevant factor is that the seventh imām had 
adopted a position that differed partly from that of his immediate predeces-
sor. He levelled open criticism at the caliphate in Baghdad, and his opposition 
inspired some Shīʿa groups to revolt against the caliphate. The development 
also provoked fears in the ʿAbbāsid caliphate and the then-caliph Hārūn 
al-Rashīd (763–809), who feared new uprising among Imāmiyya Shīʿa follow-
ers. He imprisoned Mūsā and then had him murdered in captivity (Modarresi 
Ṭabaṭaba’i 2007: 40–41).
The murder of the seventh imām once again crushed new hopes of the sav-
iour who would liberate the Shīʿa from ʿAbbāsid repression. These hopes were 
revived when the new ʿAbbāsid caliph Ma’mun appointed the eighth Shīʿa 
imām, ʿAlī al-Riḍā (763–818), as his crown prince. The move by the ʿAbbāsid 
caliph proved to be a political manoeuvre to gain control over the troubled 
situation. When things calmed down he had al-Riḍā poisoned. The belief in 
the saviour lay dormant until the 870s when the twelfth and last imām began 
his life in hiding. The ninth and tenth imāms were both minors when they suc-
ceeded to the office, and the eleventh imām spent most of his life under virtual 
house arrest where his freedom of action was limited by the ʿAbbāsid caliph. 
A debate that flared among the Imāmiyya Shīʿa in connection with the ninth 
and tenth imāms concerned whether minors—both became imāms at the age 
of seven or eight because their fathers had been murdered—had sufficient 
religious knowledge to take office as imām or the secular leadership qualities 
required to save the Shīʿa community. These circumstances meant that the 
secular role of the imāms had to take a back seat to other issues (Modarresi 
Ṭabaṭaba’i 2007: 42–43).
Already in the time of the Shīʿa imāms, we can see that their actions with 
regard to secular power and the relationship between religious and secular 
leadership was linked to prevailing social and political circumstances. While 
some people could even take up arms to defend their right to secular power, 
others chose solely to assert this right, without otherwise making any great 
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efforts to achieve it. They gave priority to other questions, which included reli-
gious concerns and areas to do with social care.
A shared view among Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars has been that during the 
absence of the twelfth imām, the secular power belongs, de jure, to the Hidden 
Imām, according to Shīʿa law, but de facto, in reality, it is in the hands of others. 
The Hidden Imām was in occultation, and even if power did fall to him, he was 
not available to assume this rule. From this point of view, the secular rulers 
were illegitimate, but there was no real substitute for them. Shīʿa legal scholars 
were obliged to relate to the secular rulers who had the real power. They chose 
completely different approaches, however. Some stayed at a safe distance from 
secular power, maintaining a quietist stance. They refrained from any involve-
ment in secular power and indulged in utopian visions of the ideal society that 
the Hidden Imām would create on his return. The most important issue for this 
group was to preserve Shīʿa Islam. The Hidden Imām himself would look after 
the question of secular power when he found the time ripe.
Against this passive attitude, there was an activist stance that saw it as the 
task of legal scholars to try to hasten the return of the Hidden Imām. This 
would be done by combating the illegitimate rulers and trying to overthrow 
their regime. One example was the distinguished Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholar 
Naṣir al-Din Tusi (1201–1274), who cooperated with Mongol rulers when they 
attacked the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. He saw the Mongols as a means of overthrow-
ing the hated Sunnī supremacy (Lambton 1981: 224).
Another example was the Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholar Shaykh Muḥammad al-
Mufid (d. 1022) who believed that those who assigned to the office of illegiti-
mate worldly rulers had in fact received these positions by the Hidden Imām. 
They should use their offices to counteract offences and sinful acts (Bagdadi 
and No’man 1995: 120–121). A further example was the distinguished scholar 
Sayyid Murtada (978–1058), who was the great-grandson of the seventh Shīʿa 
imām Mūsā al-Kāẓim. He made a distinction between evil and fair rulers. He 
meant that the scholars should accept positions and offices offered by fair rul-
ers. Under these circumstances, participation in the political life was a prereq-
uisite for being able to enforce Shīʿa order in the worldly rule (Sayyid Murtada 
1987: 96–98).
In between these opposing attitudes were those who wanted to make the 
best of the situation and adopted a pragmatic and realistic stance by creating 
forms for dealings between the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars and the secular 
rulers. The differing attitudes of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars on this issue 
are based in part on the fact that they lived in different historical, economic, 
social, and political conditions. It also happened that legal scholars living in 
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the same period and in similar social and political structures adopted diamet-
rically opposite positions. One explanation for this was that they proceeded 
from different theological interpretive traditions.
3.2 Persecution and Oppression
Imāmiyya Shīʿa Muslims do not regard themselves as a minority or a sect that 
is in opposition to the majority within Islam in the matter of its religious foun-
dations, the Qurʾān, or the prophet’s tradition, sunna. Nor do they perceive 
themselves as an ethnic or political group seeking to establish a new religious 
tendency to split the Muslim community and thus break up the Muslim unity. 
They also dismiss all allegations that come from some Sunnī, mostly Salafis 
and Wahhābīs, claiming that it was Jews—a Jewish man named Ibn Saba who 
had converted to Islam and lived during the third caliph Othman’s era—or 
Persians, more specifically the Shīʿa dynasties Būyids (934–1065) and Ṣafavids 
(1501–1736), who were political rivals to Sunnī Caliphates and who invented 
Shīʿa to harm Islam from within (Ṭabaṭaba’i 2003: 18–19).
The Imāmiyya Shīʿa Muslims prefer to view themselves as a group within the 
Muslim community whose history started the same day as the Prophet’s death. 
They reacted to the danger that would shut out the descendants of Prophet 
from the leadership of the young Muslim community. The descendants of the 
Prophet had the specific task of protecting Islam’s principles and Islamic laws 
that had their origin in the revelation that God had sent to the Prophet. They 
reacted also, against what they perceived as deviations from the Qurʾān and 
the prophet’s tradition of which representatives of Sunnī Islam were guilty. 
According to this view, then, Imāmiyya Shīʿa arose as a defence of Islam’s fun-
damental principles (Ṭabaṭaba’i 2003: 21–22).
Imāmiyya Shīʿa Muslims tend to highlight the development after 
Muḥammad’s death, when the Muslim rulers, according to the Imāmiyya Shīʿa 
view, made major deviations from Islamic laws. They also accused the Sunnī 
rulers of dictatorial ways, corruption, immorality, and love of luxury. They 
accused the Sunnī rulers of abandoning basic principles of Islam and conven-
tions that were founded by the Prophet during his time. One example was the 
fair distribution of public funds among all Muslims. They began to favour cer-
tain groups of Muslims over others, an act that was in conflict with egalitarian 
principles of Islam and led to major class divisions between Muslims. They 
also accused the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs of having acquired Byzantine 
and Persian court traditions that were not Islamic and deviated from the path 
of the Prophet (Ṭabaṭaba’i 2003: 23–24, 26–27).
During the first century after the Prophet Muḥammad’s death, Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa was an oppositional movement opposed to the secular order. Otherwise 
191Imāmiyya Shīʿa
they did not differ much from other Muslims. It was only from the mid-eighth 
century that Shīʿa theology and sharīʿa law began to take shape, in that this 
was when Shīʿa theologians entered the debate and marked their positions in 
relation to Sunnī law schools. It was under the fifth and sixth Shīʿa imāms that 
Shīʿa theology developed (Modarresi Ṭabaṭaba’i 2007: 30–31).
Sunnīs regarded the Shīʿa Muslims as rāfiḍī (rejectors/rejectionists, or apos-
tates). During certain periods in the history of Islam, this led to cruel persecu-
tion of Shīʿa. They were viewed as outlaws whose lives should not be spared 
and whose property could be confiscated (Ṭabaṭaba’i 2003: 28). The harsh-
est persecutions took place during the first three centuries of Islam’s history. 
Sunnīs accused Shīʿa as a kind of opposition who rejected their attempts to 
hold together the religious institution and the state by reconciling religious 
theory and historical precedent (Lambton 1981: 223). With the formation of the 
Shīʿa (but not Imāmiyaa) Fāṭimid Caliphate (909–1171) in Egypt and the Būyid 
State (934–1055) in Persia, different Shīʿa groups found protection. The great 
breakthrough for Imāmiyya Shīʿa came when the Ṣafavids (1501–1736) seized 
power in Persia and Shīʿa became a state religion, thus enjoying its greatest 
upswing in support.
Another cause of the marginalisation of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa was the dis-
missal of the rationalist exegetic tradition of Islamic theology favoured by 
Shīʿa Islam. In Sunnī Islam, the Muʿtazilites had promoted this tradition but 
this was efficiently subdued by the Ashʿarites who restricted the influence 
of rationalism (Ṭabaṭaba’i 2003: 31–33). The Imāmiyya Shīʿa theologian and 
philosopher Moḥammad Ḥussein Ṭabaṭaba’i (1892–1981) blames the grow-
ing intellectual stagnation in Islamic civilisation on the exclusion of the 
Imāmiyya Shīʿa. According to Ṭabaṭaba’i this eliminated critical thinking and 
left room for orthodoxy, blind faith, dogmatism, and fanaticism (Ṭabaṭaba’i 
2003: 35–37).
The persecutions of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa Muslims by the ʿAbbāsid caliphate 
intensified to such a degree that the twelfth Shīʿa imām chose to go under-
ground to be able to continue to lead the Imāmiyya Shīʿa Muslims. This period, 
which began in 874 and lasted until 940, is called the ‘lesser occultation’, Ghayba 
al-ṣughra. During this period the imām maintained contact with the Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa Muslims through four agents he had personally appointed. This period 
ended in 940, however, when the last agent died, and this marked the start of 
the ‘long occultation’, Ghayba al-kubra, a time when the twelfth Shīʿa imām 
continued to exercise his leadership of the Shīʿa through a life in hiding and 
without any agents. He is still believed to be hiding today and will eventually 
return like a messianic figure to deliver the world from all evil and create a just 
world (Sachedina 1988: 170).
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3.3 History and Rememberance
A recurrent feature of Imāmiyya Shīʿa is the feedback loop within the history of 
Shīʿa, bolstered by the ritual of remembering one’s history. Popular Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa religiosity is based on a large and powerful community of tears. It builds 
on the grief for the murdered imāms, especially the third imām Ḥusayn, on 
the fear of historical persecutions, and on the hope of the redeemer al-Mahdī. 
This community demands a type of engagement that cannot be ques-
tioned and that rests on a natural, original, and unconditional membership 
(Fazlhashemi 2011: 33). Shīʿa history serves to preserve the hardships of the past 
as well as informing the present and the future, and a cyclical effect is created 
through the parallels that arise between historical events and the collective or 
social memory.
It is always interesting to study why historical events have been constructed 
and revived in the way they have. The use of history has had an important func-
tion in the construction of national identities, and religious identities as well. 
The most important function has been existential in character. The existential 
use of history in Shīʿa has been to provide a foundation for remembering, since 
people need to remember, but also to be able to set the history of the Shīʿa 
in a larger context of oppression and righteousness and to feel an affinity to 
other people who profess the same beliefs. Alongside this sense of solidarity, 
there are also moral and ideological aspects which mean that history is used to 
achieve completely new aims (Fazlhashemi 2011: 34).
A central concern in the history of Imāmiyya Shīʿa has been to create his-
torical “places of memory” of both physical and spiritual character. It is a 
question of events, dates, battles, graves, and other things that arouse strong 
emotional associations in Shīʿa Muslims. Some of the most important places 
for the Imāmiyya Shīʿa are the places where the Shīʿa imāms are buried. They 
are located in cities like Najaf, Karbalāʾ, Sāmarrāʾ and Al-Kāẓimayn in Iraq, 
Medina in Saudi Arabia, and Mashhad in Iran. One of the most visited places 
is the shrine of the third Shīʿa imām Ḥusayn who was massacred together with 
seventy of his children, relatives, and followers by a huge Umayyad army in an 
unequal battle in 680 in Karbalāʾ. Shīʿa Muslims who visit these places, graves, 
or shrines participate in mourning ceremonies, specific prayers and rituals. 
These places of memory belong to a context that is recognised by individuals 
or a collective that has been welded together by shared Imāmiyya Shīʿa beliefs. 
These places of memory awaken a sense of “restorative” nostalgia that is used to 
recreate a specific state that either existed in the past or never had a chance to 
be realised (Fazlhashemi 2011: 35). Four Shīʿa imāms who are buried in Medina 
at the graveyard of Baqīʿ al-Gharqad are still not allowed to have shrines due to 
the dominant Wahhābī tradition of that region, a continuing reminder of the 
compromised status of Shīʿa in the wider Islamic world.
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4 Imāmiyya Shīʿa in the Ṣafavid Dynasty
The thoughts of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars about secular government 
underwent a drastic change in the sixteenth century. They started to collabo-
rate with the Ṣafavids who had seized power in Persia (1501–1736). The Ṣafavids 
proclaimed Imāmiyya Shīʿa as the state religion and gave the Imāmiyya Shīʿa 
legal scholars a free hand to spread Imāmiyya Shīʿa in their kingdom. In return 
they demanded that the scholars bless their political status and thereby grant 
them religious legitimacy, which was an important ground for political legiti-
macy in pre-modern times. The collaboration of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal 
scholars with the Ṣafavid kings can be compared to a forced marriage in which 
the two parties are not very fond of each other, but have to be married since 
they are mutually dependent. The Ṣafavid kings relied on the blessing of the 
legal scholars because this could give religious legitimacy to their kingly power. 
The legal scholars were dependent on the royal house, which could help them 
to consolidate their position by strengthening their institutions and extending 
their jurisdiction.
But there were theological obstacles to the collaboration of the legal schol-
ars with the royal house. All power and glory, according to Imāmiyya Shīʿa the-
ology, was supposed to be in the hands of the scholars while the Shīʿa Muslims 
awaited the return of the occulted imām al-Mahdī. The collaboration of the 
scholars with the royal Ṣafavid house meant that they blessed kings who were 
regarded by definition as being illegitimate in strict religious and theological 
terms (Fazlhashemi 2011: 35–48).
For the legal scholars there were weighty reasons for overlooking their own 
theological misgivings. This was the first time a royal power of the dignity of 
the Ṣafavids extended a hand of cooperation to the Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars 
and also declared themselves willing to proclaim Imāmiyya Shīʿa as the state 
religion. It was thus a very tempting offer. The first Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars 
who accepted the invitation viewed it as a golden opportunity for them to 
escape from their hitherto vulnerable position as a persecuted minority. They 
also saw great possibilities to use the support of the Ṣafavid kings to promote 
the mission of Shīʿa Islam in a larger, cohesive kingdom. The willingness of the 
Shīʿa leaders to enter this alliance, however, required new theological thinking 
to open the way for a new political doctrine.
4.1 Rationalist Theology
One of those who helped to develop an exchange of favours with the Ṣafavid 
kings was the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholar Karakī (1464–1534). His most impor-
tant action, apart from granting the Ṣafavids their longed-for religious legiti-
macy, was the compilation of Jami’ al-maqṣaid, a book of legal exegesis. The 
194 Fazlhashemi
work served several purposes. It functioned as a source for interpreting the 
law during the Ṣafavid era, thereby creating clear judicial structures. It set a 
Shīʿa stamp on the judicial tradition and counteracted the arbitrary behaviour 
of the autocratic kings (Fazlhashemi 2016: 134). The Ṣafavid king Ṭahmasp I 
(1514–1576) declared in a letter that he regarded Karakī as the representative of 
the twelfth Shīʿa imām and himself as Karakī’s representative (Khonsari 1981, 
vol. 4: 362–363).
It is interesting to note that Karakī, despite his close collaboration with 
the Ṣafavid kings, considered them illegitimate, even though he blessed their 
power and their right to collect tax from their subjects. One may ask how he 
could reconcile these two oppositional stances (Khonsari 1981, vol. 4: 76). 
Karakī maintained that it was forbidden to assist evil and repressive rulers: if it 
turns out that the collaboration results in an evil ruler consolidating his posi-
tion, then one is guilty of an impermissible act, in his opinion. But if one can 
ensure that the cooperation makes it possible to achieve good things in society, 
there is nothing to prevent cooperation with the king. According to Karakī, 
through such collaboration one could fulfil the Qurʾānic principle of imposing 
the admissible and prohibiting the unlawful—amr bi al-ma‘roof wa nahj ‘an 
al-munkar. The only thing to be wary of was complicity in sin, oppression, and 
murder (Karaki 1998: 44).
From this perspective, collaboration with illegitimate secular rulers was not 
intrinsically evil. The crucial point was the purpose of the collaboration, and 
a secondary consideration was the circumstances that enabled collaboration. 
A legal scholar who enters an alliance with an unrightful king with the aim 
of reforming and rectifying things—of doing ʾiṣlāḥ (reforming)—does so with 
good intent. A legal scholar should be regarded as the representative of the 
occulted Shīʿa imām, al-Mahdī, and not as the king’s man or someone obey-
ing the king’s orders. It is the occulted imām who is the lawful ruler, and it 
is he who appoints the legal scholar as his agent (Karaki 1998: 489–490). The 
elevation of the legal scholars to the position as representatives of the occulted 
imām meant that their powers were not confined to the religious sphere. Like 
the occulted imām’s own jurisdiction, theirs would also comprise all spheres of 
society (Karaki n.d.: 142).
4.2 Religious Legitimacy
The powerful position of the Ṣafavids was due to their own military strength, 
yet religious blessing was still deemed necessary for secular rulers during this 
historical period. Religious legitimacy would raise the Ṣafavids to the same 
level as their Ottoman rivals, a fact of which Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars were 
well aware. Refusing to give the Ṣafavids the coveted religious blessing was an 
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option, but it would mean gambling away their historical opportunity to exert 
influence in the corridors of power. This was the factor that made a group of 
senior Shīʿa scholars choose to collaborate with the Ṣafavid kings.
To begin with, the Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars viewed their task from an ethical 
perspective. Their duty was to urge the king to reform the realm in accordance 
with Islamic ethics. They cited support for their action in concepts such as 
ʾiṣlāḥ, putting things right, in the Qurʾān (11:88, 7:85). Acting in accordance with 
the concept of ʾ iṣlāḥ proved to be something that could vary depending on pre-
vailing circumstances. In times when the king was strong and the manoeuvring 
space of the legal scholars was limited, the latter interpreted ʾiṣlāḥ to mean 
that they should provide the king with an ethical frame of reference. There 
was no consensus among legal scholars about how to legitimise collaboration 
with the Ṣafavid kings. The jurist Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer Majlesi (d. 1699) 
chose to attribute the legitimacy of the Ṣafavid kings to their alleged kinship 
with the Shīʿa imāms and ultimately with the Prophet himself. This basis for 
legitimacy meant, according to Majlesi, that there were important obligations 
for the Ṣafavid kings. They were supposed to follow in the footsteps of the Shīʿa 
imāms and the Prophet, to live an orthodox life, and act righteously. Majlesi 
asserted that God had chosen to give royal power to the Ṣafavid kings so that 
the Shīʿa Muslim subjects could live in security in the kingdom of the Ṣafavids 
(manuscript collection of the Iranian Parliamentary Library, no. 1, collection 
no. 2721).
Majlesi’s legitimisation of Ṣafavid power can be regarded as a pragmatic 
solution attempting to adapt the fundamental Shīʿa tradition of political ideas 
to prevailing conditions. It can simultaneously be seen as a very smart solution 
to the question of establishing a secular power that could win the blessing of 
legal scholars during the absence of the twelfth imām. Majlesi enjoined the 
king to satisfy a series of criteria based on the Shīʿa religious tradition. He did 
not go so far, however, as to raise the Ṣafavid kings to the level of the Hidden 
Imām or to see them as his deputies. The most important reason for this was 
that the Ṣafavid kings, despite all their services to Shīʿa Islam and their alleged 
kinship with the Prophet’s descendants, could not be classed as free of sin, 
or maʿṣum. This was reserved solely for the Twelve Imāms. Majlesi’s support 
for the Ṣafavids was however founded on his genuine religious conviction that 
the era of the Ṣafavids was a preliminary stage in the return of the Hidden 
Imām al-Mahdī (Majlesi 1993: 243). The Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholar Shaykh 
Baha’i (1547–1621) legitimised the power of King ʿAbbās I (1571–1629) for a dif-
ferent and more practical reason: the legitimacy was valid as long as the king, 
in his public actions, followed the principle of justice and continued to defend 
Twelver Shīʿa Islam (Lakzai 2007: 290).
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Since Shaykh Bahai did not elevate the Ṣafavid kings to the level of the Shīʿa 
imāms, obedience to them was not equated with obedience to God and crimes 
against them could not be regarded as crimes against God. The legal scholar 
Sabzevari (1599–1672) listed the properties a king must have if he is to earn reli-
gious legitimacy in a Shīʿa kingdom. These properties include probity, follow-
ing the tradition of the Hidden Imām, protecting Shīʿa Muslims from dangers 
and infidels, protecting Shīʿa, and so on (Sabzevari 2004: 64). By enumerating 
the properties of a Shīʿa king and the demands made of him, the legal schol-
ars were released from the duty of dealing with this task themselves (Lakzai 
1988: 146).
4.3 Institutionalisation and Changing Roles
The Ṣafavid kings knew nothing about Imāmiyya Shīʿa theology. The Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa legal scholars had unrestricted jurisdiction over religious and judicial 
matters. To ensure his power over the religious institutions, it was the king who 
appointed the leaders of the religious institutions. These were selected with 
great care from among those who were most loyal to the crown. This could in 
turn create disruptive disputes between parts of the ordinary religious com-
munity and the royal house (Lambton 1981: 266–267). The Ṣafavids exercised 
rigorous supervision over the Imāmiyya Shīʿa religious institutions. The king 
appointed, for example, the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholar who acted as head of 
all Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars. This man, who was called Molla Bashi in the 
Ṣafavid era, was the highest religious authority and the link between the king 
and the legal scholars. The royal house also appointed another administrative 
leader designated as ṣadr. The duties of the ṣadr included appointing reli-
gious judges, those who were to take charge religious endowments, appoint-
ing prayer leaders, leaders of religious schools and mosques, and various other 
religious offices (Lambton 1981: 268).
By leaving such religious matters to an official religious leader appointed by 
the Ṣafavid court, the king could affect development and supervise the various 
religious activities (Jafarian 2000: vol. I, 196–198). The office of ṣadr filled yet 
another important function that concerned the dissemination of Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa. The Ṣafavids proclaimed Imāmiyya Shīʿa as the state religion in a king-
dom where the majority were Sunnī Muslims and they thus had the duty of 
ensuring that people in the realm of the Ṣafavids would convert to Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa (Lambton 1981: 268). Yet another office of great significance in the Ṣafavid 
era was Shaykh al-Islām, chief among jurists, the representative of the Hidden 
Imām, whom all Shīʿa Muslims were duty-bound to obey and whose tasks 
included crowning the king. At the same time, it was the king who chose the 
man who would bear the title Shaykh al-Islām (Samia 1999: 3).
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When the Ṣafavids fell from power in 1736, the situation of the Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa legal scholars changed dramatically. It did not just mean that a Shīʿa 
dynasty was overthrown and that the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars lost the 
support of the crown, the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars were also subjected to 
severe reprisals for having given their blessing to the Ṣafavid kingdom and for 
their participation in the Ṣafavids’ policy of consolidating Imāmiyya Shīʿa in 
their kingdom. The new rulers regarded the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars as a 
religious and political obstacle that had to be removed. The fall of the Ṣafavids 
was accompanied by political unrest, war, famine, and disease, and a share 
of the Shīʿa people were taken away to be sold into slavery. The population in 
the former kingdom of the Ṣafavids was reduced by about one tenth (Ravandi 
1978: 436).
The Ṣafavids set their stamp on the continued development in what 
remained of their kingdom. The Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars and their insti-
tutions managed to survive the fall of the Ṣafavids and would play an impor-
tant part in social and political development in following years. The most 
obvious impact was their influence on political developments in Persia/Iran. 
This intensified from the second half of the nineteenth century in connection 
with the constitutional revolution in Iran in 1906, and peaking with the revolu-
tion of 1979 when the legal scholars ended the previously mentioned parallel 
form of government and took over secular power.
5 Modern Iran: Political Activism on the Advance
The attitude of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars to political matters changed during 
the nineteenth century, when more and more scriptural scholars were drawn 
into the discussions about the intellectual tradition of constitutionalism and 
the nascent constitutional movement that was sweeping over several Muslim 
countries, especially in the Imāmiyya Shīʿa-dominated Persia. It was thus a con-
sequence of the close contacts of Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars with European ideas 
about constitutional government that scholars were increasingly involved in 
the political debate and new political theories and doctrines were elaborated. 
Among the issues discussed was the adoption of a constitution, the abolition 
of despotism, the introduction of parliamentarism, holding general elections, 
electing or becoming a representative for a constituency/guild/estate, separat-
ing executive, legislative, and judicial powers, passing laws to guarantee basic 
civil rights and freedoms without regard for religious affiliation, birth, or social 
status, and determining the right of citizens to control political power (Kadivar 
1999: 9–12, 19–21).
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The reactions of legal scholars to these issues can be roughly divided into 
two categories. One proceeded from a quietist attitude, advising legal schol-
ars not to intervene in secular matters; this was a sphere that also had to be 
regarded as reserved for the Hidden Imām. The other attitude broke with the 
traditional view and recommended a model according to which legal schol-
ars should take an active part in a transition to a constitutional form of gov-
ernment under the supervision of the highest legal Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars. 
Iranian scholar and jurist Ayatollah Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Nāʾīnī (1860–1936) 
advocated this model, believing that legal scholars could sit in parliament and 
ensure that the laws passed there were not in conflict with Imāmiyya Shīʿa 
(Naini 1955: 52–55).
The new role of the legal scholars has to do with the changes undergone by 
Shīʿa-dominated societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A good 
example of this is the development in Iran. Contacts with European ideas had 
the result that more and more people were influenced by constitutional ideas 
demanding political and social reform. It was in the same period that the art of 
printing reached the country, which meant that more and more people could 
be reached by the new ideas through printed books and newspapers. The 
changed situation meant that there were increasing demands on legal scholars 
to pronounce verdicts on various social and political matters. An illustrative 
example is the tobacco uprising in Iran in 1892. When the highest religious 
leader Mirza Shirazi (1814–1896) uttered his famous words about the use of 
tobacco being an act of war against the Hidden Imām, the statement had such 
a huge impact among the people that the reigning king was forced to annul the 
concession to the British company. The response also made the legal scholars 
aware of their own power.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a growing number of 
Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars were speaking about the rule by foreigners in 
Shīʿa-dominated areas. This coincided with the weakening of central govern-
ment, wars enforced by European colonial powers, and the increasing influ-
ence of Europeans over Muslim countries’ politics, economy, and social and 
cultural life. This was viewed as a serious threat that had to be combated. When 
the secular rulers were unable to resist the external threat, the legal scholars 
saw it as their duty to use their influence to mobilise the public against this 
external threat (al-Ṣadr 1980: 2–3).
Although the Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars had moved their positions for-
ward, it would take a long time before they began to speak about taking over 
secular power themselves. Up to the start of the 1960s, they accepted the divi-
sion of power that had been founded in the era of the Ṣafavids. For a long time, 
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the politically active Imāmiyya Shīʿa leaders worked to preserve the status quo. 
Many of them acted behind the scenes in order not to upset the division of 
power. After several unsuccessful attempts to introduce a constitutional form 
of government, however, and after new secular rulers disturbed the parallel 
power system, voices were heard calling for the introduction of a completely 
new form of government in which power would lie in the hands of the highest 
religious jurists.
The reaction of the legal scholars came after a series of political decisions 
which were interpreted as outright breaches of the parallel power system. 
Legal scholars were purged from the judicial and educational systems in the 
inter-war years. Parallel to this, the rulers in Persia/Iran started campaigns of 
modernisation and secularisation aimed against Islam and the legal scholars. 
A number of prominent Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars declared that the state 
was in breach of the agreement about the parallel power system. The one who 
went furthest was Āyatallāh Rūḥallāh Khumaynī (Ayatollah Khomeini) (1902–
1989), who thought that legal scholars were no longer bound by the agreement. 
At the start of the 1960s he launched a vehement attack on the king, whom he 
accused of not complying with any part of the agreement. He accused the king 
of being hostile to Imāmiyya Shīʿa. He also questioned the king’s sovereignty 
and blamed him for having paved the way for foreign rule by conceding to alien 
powers. Ayatollah Khomeini said he wanted to introduce a new form of gov-
ernment based on Imāmiyya Shīʿa theology and jurisprudence, which in his 
view included a complete plan for society, comprising everything from politi-
cal and economic to social and cultural matters (Mousavi Khomeini 1979: 23).
There was no consensus on this matter, however. Ayatollah Khomeini rep-
resented a minority view among Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars. His political 
doctrine, Velayat-e faqih, the rule of the jurist (legal scholar), lacked support 
among the leading grand ayatollahs in the chief seat of Imāmiyya Shīʿa insti-
tutions in Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran). A number of contemporary grand 
Ayatollahs in Imāmiyya Shīʿas most famous religious institutions in the Hawza 
of Najaf were against this doctrine. Among his leading opponents were Grand 
Ayatollahs al-Ḥakim (1889–1970), al-Khoei (1899–1992), and al-Sistani (1930). 
They considered his doctrine as something that lacked basis in the Qurʾān and 
Imāmiyya Shīʿa sources.
In connection with the revolution in Iran in 1979, the doctrine of rule by 
legal scholars became the state-bearing ideology. The shortcomings of the doc-
trine were exposed even more after this transition. Besides the quietist critics 
of the doctrine, more and more senior Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars who had 
previously supported the doctrine joined in the critique. One of the foremost 
200 Fazlhashemi
defenders of the doctrine, the Grand Ayatollah Montazeri (1922–2009), turned 
his back on it in the mid-1980s. He drew attention to the totalitarian ele-
ments in the new form of government and demanded its replacement by a 
democratic form of government in which political power and religious institu-
tions are separated (see for example his books Eslam din-e feṭrat, Ḥokumat-e 
dini va ḥoquq-e ensan and his memoirs, Khâṭerat, which was published on 
the internet).
6 Conclusion
The origins of Imāmiyya Shīʿa goes back to the theological and political strug-
gle within the young Muslim community that started after the death of Islam’s 
prophet Muḥammad. According to the Imāmiyya Shīʿa, the descendants of 
Muḥammad had the right qualifications to lead Muslims and to defend the 
fundamental principles of Islam. The Imāmiyya Shīʿa were defeated quickly. 
Their theological and legal perceptions were marginalised, and they were 
held outside the corridors of worldly power until the Ṣafavids took over the 
power in Persia in 1501, and proclaimed Imāmiyya Shīʿa as their state religion in 
their empire.
The Imāmiyya Shīʿa legal scholars perceived all worldly rulers by defini-
tion as illegitimate during the absence of the Hidden Imām. However, in 
reality they had to relate to the new conditions when the Ṣafavid kings com-
mitted themselves to defend Shīʿa Islam. This became the start of a paral-
lel power system, according to which the legal scholars had the power over 
the judiciary system, education, social welfare and the mission. All other 
worldly powers were in the hands of the kings. The unique collaboration 
between the worldly rulers and the religious leaders was the most important 
background for the leaning of the Imāmiyya Shīʿa scholars towards politi-
cal pragmatism. This system of distribution of the power lasted until the 
twentieth century.
A new political doctrine that rejected the parallel power system was pre-
sented in the mid-twentieth century, following the socio-political changes that 
occurred. This doctrine put all the power in the hands of the highest Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa legal scholars, but the new doctrine eventually encountered tough criti-
cism. The critics took their frame of reference from the religious context and 
firmly anchored the criticism in the soil of the Islamic/Shīʿa theological and 
judicial tradition. Their reason-oriented, rationalist approached critique 
emphasised that the doctrine lacked theological and judicial basis. They also 
pointed out that the political regime founded on it was dysfunctional. Their 
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criticism opened the door for the will to create harmony between the inter-
preting of Imāmiyya Shīʿa theology and jurisprudence and the frames of refer-
ences provided by modern society. It can also be seen as an attempt to answer 
the challenges of modernity and globalisation.
This brief survey shows that the outlook on secular power in Imāmiyya Shīʿa 
and the religious legitimacy of worldly power is grounded to some extent on 
theological ideas and Imāmiyya Shīʿa jurisprudence, but that it has undergone 
major changes due to social, political, and historical circumstances. Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa’s history of ideas is not limited to various theological, philosophical, polit-
ical ideas and fiqh, jurisprudence. Another tradition of ideas within Imāmiyya 
Shīʿa is ʿirfān, which, like Ṣūfism, seeks other paths to truth beyond the sources 
of knowledge of theology, philosophy and jurisprudence.
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Chapter 10
The Ismāʿīlīs and Their Traditions
Farhad Daftary
1 Introduction
A major Shīʿī Muslim community, the Ismāʿīlīs have had a complex history 
dating back to the formative period of Islam. In the course of their history, 
the Ismāʿīlīs became subdivided into a number of major branches and minor 
groups. However, since the end of the fifth/eleventh century, they have existed 
in terms of two main branches, the Nizārīs and the Mustaʿlians, respectively 
designated as Khojas and Bohras in South Asia. Currently, the Ismāʿīlīs are scat-
tered as religious minorities in more than thirty countries in Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, Europe, and North America. Numbering several millions, they also 
represent a diversity of ethnic groups and literary traditions and speak a vari-
ety of languages.
Both Ismāʿīlī historiography and the perceptions of outsiders of the Ismāʿīlīs 
in pre-modern times, in both Muslim and Christian milieus, have had a fasci-
nating trajectory. In the course of their long history, the Ismāʿīlīs were persis-
tently misrepresented with a variety of myths and legends circulating about 
their teachings and practices. This state of affairs reflected mainly the fact 
that until the twentieth century the Ismāʿīlīs were almost exclusively studied 
and evaluated on the basis of evidence collected, or often fabricated, by their 
detractors. As the most politically active wing of Shīʿī Islam, with a religio-
political agenda that aimed to uproot the ʿAbbāsids and restore the caliphate 
to a line of ʿAlid imāms, from early on the Ismāʿīlīs aroused the hostility of the 
Sunnī establishment that led the Muslim majority.
With the foundation of the Fāṭimid caliphate in 297/909, ruled by the 
Ismāʿīlī imām-caliph, the potential challenge of the Ismāʿīlīs to the established 
Sunnī order was actualised, and thereupon the ʿAbbāsids and the Sunnī ʿ ulamāʾ 
or religious scholars launched what amounted to an official anti-Ismāʿīlī pro-
paganda campaign. The overall aim of this prolonged literary campaign was 
to discredit the Ismāʿīlī movement from its origins, so that the Ismāʿīlīs could 
be readily condemned as mulḥids, heretics or deviators from the true reli-
gious path. In particular, Sunnī polemicists fabricated the necessary evidence 
that would lend support to the refutation of the Ismāʿīlīs on specific doctri-
nal grounds. Muslim heresiographers, theologians, jurists, and historians also 
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participated variously in the campaign. Through their forged accounts and 
misrepresentations of the Ismāʿīlīs, the anti-Ismāʿīlī authors in fact produced a 
‘black legend’ in the course of the fourth/tenth century. Accordingly, Ismāʿīlism 
was portrayed as the arch-heresy of Islam, carefully designed by mischievous 
impostors to destroy Islam from within (Ivanow 1946). By the fifth/eleventh 
century, this ‘black legend’, with its elaborate details and stages of initiation, 
had been accepted as an accurate description of Ismāʿīlī motives, beliefs, and 
practices, leading to further accusations against the community.
The revolt of the Persian Ismāʿīlīs, led initially by Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ (d. 518/ 
1124), against the Seljuq (or Seljuk) Turks, the new Sunnī overlords of the 
ʿAbbāsids, called forth another round of Sunnī reaction against the Ismāʿīlīs in 
general and the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs in particular. The new literary campaign was 
initiated by the all-powerful Seljuq vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), who 
devoted a long chapter in his Siyāsat-nāma (1978: 208–231) to the condemna-
tion of the Ismāʿīlīs. At the same time, Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), the 
most renowned contemporary Sunnī theologian, was commissioned by the 
ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mustaẓhir to write a major treatise against the Ismāʿīlīs, or 
Bāṭinīs (esotericists), another designation coined in reference to the Ismāʿīlīs 
by their enemies.
Around the same time, the Crusader circles and their occidental chroniclers 
began to fabricate and disseminate, in both the Latin Orient and Europe, a 
number of tales, rooted in their ‘imaginative ignorance’, about the secret prac-
tice of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs of Syria, who were thus made famous in medieval 
Europe as ‘the Assassins’. These so-called assassin legends finally culminated 
in a synthesis popularised by Marco Polo (Daftary 1994: 88–127). Henceforth, 
the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs were depicted in medieval European sources as a sinister 
order of drugged killers bent on senseless murder. The orientalists of the nine-
teenth century correctly identified the Ismāʿīlīs as a Shīʿī Muslim community, 
but they were still obliged to study them exclusively on the basis of hostile 
Sunnī sources and the fanciful tales of the Crusaders. Consequently, the orien-
talists, too, unwittingly lent their seal of approval to the medieval myths and 
misrepresentations of the Ismāʿīlīs.
The breakthrough in Ismāʿīlī studies occurred with the recovery and study 
of genuine Ismāʿīlī texts on a relatively large scale; manuscript sources which 
had been preserved secretly in private collections in Yemen, Syria, Persia, 
Central Asia, and South Asia. Modern scholarship in Ismāʿīlī studies was actu-
ally initiated in India, where significant collections of Ismāʿīlī manuscripts 
have been preserved by the Ismāʿīlī Bohra community. The breakthrough 
resulted mainly from the pioneering efforts of Wladimir Ivanow (1886–1970), 
a Russian orientalist, and a few Bohra scholars, who were educated in Europe 
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and based their original studies on their family collections of manuscripts. In 
fact, Ivanow compiled the first detailed catalogue of Ismāʿīlī works, attesting to 
the, hitherto unknown, richness and diversity of Ismāʿīlī literature and intel-
lectual traditions (Ivanow 1933). Subsequently, numerous Ismāʿīlī texts were 
critically edited and studied, laying a solid foundation for further progress in 
the field (see Ivanow 1963; Poonawala 1977; Daftary 2004: 106–173).
2 Origins and Early History
The origins of Islam’s two main divisions, Sunnī and Shīʿī, may be traced to 
the crisis of succession to the Prophet Muḥammad (d. 11/632). A successor was 
needed to assume his functions not as a prophet, but as leader of the nascent 
Islamic community (umma). In practice, this choice was resolved by a group 
of Muslim notables, leading to the historical caliphate. However, it is the fun-
damental belief of the Shīʿī Muslims that the Prophet himself had designated 
his cousin and son-in-law, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661), married to his daughter 
Fāṭima, as his successor, a designation believed to have been instituted under 
divine command. A minority group originally holding to this view gradually 
expanded and became generally designated as the Shīʿat ʿAlī, party of ʿAlī, or 
simply as the Shīʿa.
In time, the Shīʿa themselves split into a number of major communities, 
notably the Ismāʿīlīs, the Ithnā ʿAsharī or Twelvers, and the Zaydīs. However, 
initially Shīʿism represented a unified community. The Shīʿa then recognised 
successively ʿAlī and his sons al-Ḥasan (d. 49/669) and al-Ḥusayn (d. 61/680) 
as their imāms or spiritual leaders. The martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson 
al-Ḥusayn at Karbalāʾ, Iraq, infused a religious fervour in the Shīʿa, also leading 
to radical trends in Shīʿism. The situation of the early unified Shīʿa changed 
soon after the Umayyads established their rule. Henceforth, different Shīʿī 
communities and lesser groups came to coexist, each with its own line of ʿAlid 
imāms, descendants of ʿAlī, and elaborating its own ideas. Under the circum-
stances, the Shīʿism of the later Umayyad period developed mainly in terms 
of two branches, the radical Kaysānīs and the quiescent Imāmis. The Kaysānī 
Shīʿīs were mainly absorbed into the ʿAbbāsid movement and they disinte-
grated after the ʿAbbāsid victory of 132/750 over the Umayyads.
Meanwhile, Imāmi Shīʿism had continued to develop under the leadership 
of a particular line of ʿAlid imāms, descendants of al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. By contrast 
to the Kaysānīs, the Imāmis remained completely removed from any political 
activity. It was with Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. ca. 114/732), their fifth imām, that 
the Imāmis branch of Shīʿism began to acquire prominence among the early 
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Shīʿa. It was, however, during the long and eventful imāmate of al-Bāqir’s son 
and successors, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, that Imāmis Shīʿism expanded significantly and 
became a major religious community with a distinct identity. Above all, Jaʿfar 
al-Ṣādiq and his circle of prominent scholars now elaborated the basic concep-
tion of the doctrine of the imāmate (imāma), which was essentially retained by 
the later Ismāʿīlīs and Twelver Shīʿīs. Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the last imām to be recog-
nised by both the Ismāʿīlīs and the Twelvers, died in 148/765. The dispute over 
his succession led to historic divisions in Imāmis Shīʿism, marking the emer-
gence of the earliest Ismāʿīlīs (al-Nawbakhtī: 34, 53–55; al-Qummī: 76–78).
Imām al-Ṣādiq had originally designated his second son Ismāʿīl, the eponym 
of the Ismāʿīliyya, as his successor to the imāmate. As related in the majority of the 
sources, however, Ismāʿīl apparently predeceased his father. At any rate, Ismāʿīl 
was not present in Medina or Kufa, the centre of Imāmi Shīʿism, on al-Ṣādiq’s 
death, when three of Ismāʿīl’s brothers laid claim openly to the imāmate. Be 
that as it may, al-Ṣādiq’s Imāmi Shīʿī followers now split into six groups, two 
of which may be identified as the earliest Ismāʿīlīs. One of these two splinter 
groups, based in Kufa, denied the death of Ismāʿīl and awaited his return as 
the mahdī. The members of this group are designated as the “Pure Ismāʿīliyya” 
by the earliest Imāmi heresiographers, al-Nawbakhtī (57–61) and al-Qummī 
(80–81, 83), who are our main sources for the opening phase of Ismāʿīlism. A 
second group, designated as the Mubarakiyya, affirmed Ismāʿīl’s death in the 
lifetime of his father and now acknowledged his eldest son Muḥammad ibn 
Ismāʿīl as their imām. It is certain that both these groups, as well as the extrem-
ist Khattabi Shīʿīs, were politically active against the ʿAbbāsids and they repre-
sented the radical fringes of Imāmi Shīʿism in Kufa.
On the death of Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, not long after 179/795, the 
Mubarakiyya themselves split into two groups. A majority, identified by 
Imāmis heresiographers as the immediate predecessors of the dissident 
Qarmaṭīs, refused to accept his death; they recognised Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl 
as their seventh and last imām, and awaited his return as the mahdī or qāʾim 
(riser), terms which were synonymous in their early usage by the Ismāʿīlīs and 
other Shīʿīs. A second, small and obscure group, acknowledged Muḥammad 
ibn Ismāʿīl’s death and now began to trace the imāmate in his progeny. Almost 
nothing is known with certainty regarding the subsequent history of these 
earliest Ismāʿīlī groups until shortly after the middle of the third/ninth cen-
tury, when a unified Ismāʿīlī movement appeared on the historical stage 
(al-Nawbakhtī: 61; al-Qummī: 83; Daftary 2007: 95–96).
It is certain that for almost a century after Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, a group 
of his descendants worked secretly for the creation of a unified, revolution-
ary Shīʿī movement against the ʿAbbāsids. These leaders did not openly claim 
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the Ismāʿīlī imāmate for three generations. They had, in fact, hidden their true 
identity in order to escape ʿAbbāsid persecution. ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar, the first of 
these hidden leaders, had organised his campaign around the central doctrine 
of the majority of the earliest Ismāʿīlīs, namely, the Mahdism of Muḥammad 
ibn Ismāʿīl. At any rate, ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar eventually settled in Salamiyya, 
in central Syria, which served as the secret headquarters of the Ismāʿīlī move-
ment for several decades. The early Ismāʿīlīs now referred to their movement 
as the daʿwa, the mission, or the daʿwa al-hādiya, the rightly guiding mission. 
The religio-political message of the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa was disseminated by a net-
work of dāʿīs, summoners or missionaries (Daftary 2007: 98–116).
The efforts of ʿAbd Allāh al-Akbar, and his next two successors, began to 
bear fruit in the 260s/870s, when numerous dāʿīs appeared in southern Iraq 
and other regions. In 261/874, Ḥamdān Qarmaṭ was converted to Ismāʿīlism. He 
organised the daʿwa in Kūfa and other districts of southern Iraq. The Ismāʿīlīs of 
southern Iraq became generally known as Qarmaṭī, after their first local leader. 
Ḥamdān’s chief assistant was his brother-in-law ʿAbdān, a learned theologian. 
ʿAbdān was responsible for training and appointing numerous dāʿīs, including 
Abū Saʿīd Ḥasan ibn Bahrām al-Jannābī, who later founded the Qarmaṭī state 
of Bahrayn. In the meantime, the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa had appeared in many other 
regions. Centred on the expectation of the imminent return of Muḥammad 
ibn Ismāʿīl as the Mahdī who would establish justice in the world, the revolu-
tionary and messianic Ismāʿīlī movement appealed to underprivileged groups 
of different social strata. It achieved particular success among those Imāmi 
Shīʿīs (later designated as Twelvers) who were disillusioned with the quietist 
policies of their imāms and were left without a manifest imām after the death 
of their eleventh imām in 260/874.
The daʿwa in Yemen was initiated by Ibn Ḥawshab, later known as Manṣūr 
al-Yaman, where he arrived in 268/881, accompanied by his collaborator ʿAlī 
ibn al-Faḍl. By 293/905, the Ismāʿīlī dāʿīs were in control of almost all of Yemen. 
South Arabia also served as a base for the extension of the daʿwa to other 
regions, such as Egypt and Sind. By 280/893, on Ibn Ḥawshab’s instructions, 
the dāʿī Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Shīʿī was already active among the Kutāma Berbers 
of the Lesser Kabylia mountains in North Africa. It was in the same decade 
of 260s/870s that the daʿwa was taken to the region of the Jibāl in Persia. 
Later, the daʿwa spread to Qumm, Kāshān, Iṣfahān, and other towns of that 
region. Somewhat later, the daʿwa was formally established in Khurāsān and 
Transoxania (Stern 1960: 56–90; Daftary 2007: 98–116).
By the early 280s/890s, a unified Ismāʿīlī movement had replaced the earlier 
Ismāʿīlī splinter groups. However, in 286/899, soon after ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī, 
the future Fāṭimid caliph, had succeeded to the central leadership of the daʿwa 
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in Salamiyya, Ismāʿīlism was rent by a major schism (Daftary 1993: 123–139; 
Daftary 2007: 116–126). ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī now claimed the Ismāʿīlī imāmate 
openly for himself and his ancestors, the same leaders who had organised and 
led the early Ismāʿīlī daʿwa. Later, he explained that as a form of taqiyya, or 
precautionary dissimulation, the central leaders of the daʿwa had adopted dif-
ferent pseudonyms, also assuming the rank of ḥujja, proof or full representa-
tive, of the absent mahdī, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl. He further explained that 
the earlier propagation of the Mahdism of Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl was itself 
another dissimulating tactic, and that this was in reality another collective 
code-name for every true imām in the progeny of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (Hamdani and 
de Blois 1983: 173–207).
ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī’s doctrinal reform, which allowed for continuity in the 
Ismāʿīlī imāmate after Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, split the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa and 
community into two rival factions. One faction remained loyal to the central 
leadership and now acknowledged ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī and his ʿAlid ances-
tors as their imāms, which in due course became the official Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlī 
doctrine of the imāmate. This loyalist faction included the bulk of the Ismāʿīlīs 
of Yemen and those communities in Egypt, North Africa and Sind founded by 
the dāʿīs dispatched by Ibn Ḥawshab. On the other hand, a dissident faction, 
originally led by Ḥamdān and ʿAbdān, rejected ʿAbd Allāh’s reform and main-
tained their belief in the Mahdism of Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl. Henceforth, the 
term Qarmaṭī came to be applied more specifically to the dissidents who did 
not acknowledge ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī, as well as his predecessors and suc-
cessors in the Fāṭimid dynasty, as their imāms. The dissident Qarmaṭīs soon 
acquired their most important stronghold in Bahrayn, in eastern Arabia, where 
a Qarmaṭī state was founded in the same eventful year, 286/899, by al-Jannābī. 
The Qarmaṭī state of Bahrayn survived until 470/1077. There were also Qarmaṭī 
communities in Iraq, Yemen, Persia, and Central Asia (Daftary 1993: 129–139).
The early Ismāʿīlīs elaborated the basic framework of a system of religious 
thought, which was further developed or modified in the Fāṭimid period of 
Ismāʿīlī history. Central to this system was a fundamental distinction between 
the exoteric (ẓāhir) and the esoteric (bāṭin) aspects of the sacred scriptures 
and the religious commandments and prohibitions. Accordingly, the Ismāʿīlīs 
held that the Qur’an and other revealed scriptures, and their laws (sharīʿa), 
had their apparent or literal meaning, which had to be distinguished from 
their inner meaning hidden in the bāṭin. They further held that the ẓāhir, or 
the religious laws enunciated by the prophets, underwent periodical changes 
while the bāṭin, containing the spiritual truths (ḥaqāʾiq), remained immutable 
and eternal. The hidden truths, representing the message common to Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, were explained through the methodology of ta   ʾ wīl or 
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esoteric exegesis, which often relied on the mystical significance of letters 
and numbers.
The esoteric truths or ḥaqāʾiq formed a gnostic system of thought for the 
early Ismāʿīlīs, representing a distinct worldview. The two main components 
of this system were a cyclical history of revelations or prophetic eras (dawrs), 
each one inaugurated by a speaker or enunciator (nāṭiq) of a divinely revealed 
message which in its exoteric (ẓāhir) aspect contained a religious law (sharīʿa). 
The nāṭiqs of the first six eras were Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and 
Muḥammad. Each nāṭiq was, in turn, succeeded by a spiritual legatee (waṣī), 
who explained to the elite the esoteric truths (ḥaqāʾiq) contained in the bāṭin 
dimension of that era’s message. Each waṣī was succeeded by seven imāms, 
who guarded the true meaning of the sacred scriptures and laws in their ẓāhir 
and bāṭin aspects. The seventh imām of every era would rise in rank to become 
the nāṭiq of the following era. This pattern would change only in the seventh 
and final era of history; the eschatological era of the qāʾim when the esoteric 
truths of all the preceding revelations would be made apparent before the con-
summation of the physical world (Corbin 1983: 30–58; Daftary 2007: 128–136).
3 The Fāṭimid Period
The Fāṭimid period in Ismāʿīlī history represents the ‘golden age’ of Ismāʿīlism, 
when the Ismāʿīlīs possessed an important state of their own and Ismāʿīlī 
thought and literature attained their summit. It was during this period that the 
learned Ismāʿīlī dāʿīs, who were at the same time the scholars and authors of 
their community, produced what were to become the classical texts of Ismāʿīlī 
literature dealing with a variety of exoteric and esoteric subjects, as well as 
ta   ʾ wīl which became the hallmark of Ismāʿīlī thought.
The early success of the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa culminated in the foundation of an 
Ismāʿīlī state or dawla, the Fāṭimid caliphate, in 297/909. The new dynasty was 
named Fāṭimid after the Prophet Muḥammad’s daughter Fāṭima, to whom the 
Fāṭimid imām-caliphs traced their ʿAlid ancestry. The ground for the establish-
ment of the Fāṭimid caliphate in Ifrīqiya, in North Africa, was meticulously 
prepared by the dāʿī Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Shīʿī (d. 298/911), who had been active 
among the Kutāma Berbers of the region for almost twenty years. Meanwhile, 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī had been obliged to flee from Salamiyya in 289/902. 
After spending some time in Egypt and southern Morocco, he was brought to 
Qayrawān, the former Aghlabid capital in Ifrīqiya, by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Shīʿī 
who had successfully uprooted the Aghlabids shortly before. On 20 Rabīʿ II 
297/4 January 910, ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī (d. 322/934) was acclaimed as caliph, 
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also marking the end of the dawr al-satr, or period of concealment, in early 
Ismāʿīlī history.
The Fāṭimids did not abandon their Ismāʿīlī daʿwa on assuming power, 
as they aimed to extend their rule over the entire Muslim community and 
beyond. However, the early Fāṭimid imām-caliphs, ruling from Ifrīqiya in North 
Africa, encountered numerous difficulties while consolidating their power 
with the help of the Kutama Berbers, who were converts to Ismāʿīlism and now 
provided the backbone of the Fāṭimid armies. In particular, they confronted 
the hostility of the Khariji Berbers and the Sunnī inhabitants of the cities of 
Ifrīqiya, in addition to conflicts with the Umayyads of Spain, the ʿAbbāsids 
and the Byzantines. Fāṭimid rule was firmly established in North Africa only 
under the fourth Fāṭimid imām-caliph, Abū Tamīm Maʿadd al-Muʿizz li-Dīn 
Allāh (341–365/953–975), who succeeded in transforming the Fāṭimid caliph-
ate from a regional state into a great empire. He was also the first member of 
the Fāṭimid dynasty to concern himself significantly with the propagation of 
the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa outside the Fāṭimid dominions, especially after the transfer-
ence of the seat of the Fāṭimid caliphate in 362/973 to Egypt, where he founded 
Cairo as his new capital city.
The imām-caliph al-Muʿizz also permitted the assimilation of the 
Neoplatonic cosmology elaborated by the dāʿīs of the Iranian lands into the 
teachings of the Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlī daʿwa. In the course of the fourth/tenth cen-
tury, Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d. 332/943), Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (322/934), and 
al-Sijistānī (d. after 361/971) had set about harmonising their Ismāʿīlī Shīʿī 
theology, revolving around the central Shīʿī doctrine of the imāmate, with 
Neoplatonic philosophy. This led to the development of a unique intellec-
tual tradition of philosophical theology in Ismāʿīlism. The last major propo-
nent of philosophical Ismāʿīlism was the eminent Persian poet and traveller 
Nāṣir-i Khusraw (d. after 462/1070), who successfully propagated Ismāʿīlism 
throughout the region of Badakhshān, now divided between Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan. These Iranian dāʿīs elaborated complex metaphysical systems of 
thought with a distinct Neoplatonised emanational cosmology (Walker 1993: 
67–142). It was also in al-Muʿizz’s time that Ismāʿīlī law was finally codified and 
its precepts began to be observed by the judiciary throughout the Fāṭimid state. 
The promulgation of an Ismāʿīlī madhhab, or school of jurisprudence, resulted 
mainly from the efforts of al-Qāḍī Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān ibn Muḥammad (d. 
363/974), the foremost jurist of the Fāṭimid period (Poonawala 1996: 117–143).
The Ismāʿīlīs had high esteem for learning and under the Fāṭimids they 
elaborated distinctive traditions of learning. The Fāṭimid daʿwa was particu-
larly concerned with educating the Ismāʿīlī converts in the esoteric doctrine 
known as the ḥikma or ‘wisdom’. As a result, a variety of lectures or ‘teaching 
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sessions’, generally designated as majālis, were organised. The private lectures 
on Ismāʿīlī esoteric doctrine, known as majālis al-ḥikma, or ‘sessions of wis-
dom’, were reserved exclusively for the Ismāʿīlī initiates who had already taken 
the oath of allegiance and secrecy (Halm 1996: 91–115). The lectures delivered 
by the dāʿī al-duʿāt or chief dāʿī, were approved beforehand by the imām. 
Many of these majālis were in due course collected and committed to writing. 
This Fāṭimid tradition of learning culminated in the 800 lectures of the dāʿī 
al-Muʾayyad fī l-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 470/1078), who served as the chief dāʿī for 
twenty years. Another main institution of learning founded by the Fāṭimids 
was the Dār al-ʿIlm, the House of Knowledge, sometimes also called the Dār 
al-Ḥikma. Established in 395/1005 by the imām-caliph al-Ḥākim (386–411/996–
1021), a variety of religious and non-religious subjects were taught at this acad-
emy which was also equipped with a major library. Many Ismāʿīlī dāʿīs received 
at least part of their training at the Dār al-ʿIlm (Halm 1997: 71–77).
The Ismāʿīlī daʿwa organisation developed over time. The dāʿīs were active 
both within the Fāṭimid dominions as well as in other regions referred to as 
the jazāʾir or islands. Organised in a strictly hierarchical fashion, the Fāṭimid 
daʿwa was under the overall supervision of the imām and the dāʿī al-duʿāt, also 
known as the bāb, who acted as its administrative head. All in all, it was in 
non-Fāṭimid regions, the jazāʾir, especially Yemen, Persia, and Central Asia, 
that the Fāṭimid daʿwa achieved lasting success. The daʿwa was particularly 
intensified in Iraq and Persia under al-Ḥākim. Foremost among the dāʿīs of 
this period was Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. after 411/1020), who elaborated 
his own unique tradition within the Iranian school of philosophical Ismāʿīlism 
(Walker 1999: 80–124). Al-Ḥākim’s reign also coincided with the opening phase 
of what was to become known as the Druze religion, founded by a number of 
dāʿīs who proclaimed the end of the era of Islam and advocated the divinity 
of al-Ḥākim.
The Ismāʿīlī daʿwa activities outside the Fāṭimid state reached their peak 
in the long reign of al-Mustanṣir (427–487/1036–1094), continuing even after 
the Sunnī Seljuqs replaced the Shīʿī Būyids as overlords of the ʿAbbāsids in 
447/1055. Meanwhile, the leadership of the daʿwa in Yemen had come into the 
hands of ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣulayḥī, an important chieftain of the Banu 
Hamdān. The dāʿī ʿAlī al-Ṣulayḥī rose in the mountainous region of Ḥarāz in 
439/1047, marking the effective foundation of the Ṣulayḥid dynasty ruling 
over different parts of Yemen as vassals of the Fāṭimids until 532/1138. The 
Ṣulayḥids also played an active part in the renewed efforts of the Fāṭimids 
to spread the daʿwa on the Indian subcontinent. The Ismāʿīlī community 
founded in Gujarāt by dāʿīs sent from Yemen evolved into the modern Ṭayyibī 
Bohra community.
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Meanwhile, the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa had continued to spread in many parts of 
the Iranian world, now incorporated into the Seljuq sultanate. By the early 
460s/1070s, the Persian Ismāʿīlīs were under the leadership of ʿAbd al-Malik 
ibn ʿAṭṭāsh, who had his secret daʿwa headquarters in Iṣfahān, the main Seljuq 
capital. He was also responsible for launching the career of Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, 
who in due course led the Ismāʿīlī cause in Persia. In Badakhshān and other 
eastern parts of the Iranian world, too, the daʿwa had continued to spread 
after the downfall of the Sāmānids in 395/1005. As noted, Nāṣir-i Khusraw 
played a key role in propagating Ismāʿīlism in Central Asia, while maintaining 
his contacts with the chief dāʿī al-Mu’ayyad and the central daʿwa headquar-
ters in Cairo (Hunsberger 2000: 220–254). By the time the Qarmaṭī state of 
Bahrayn was finally uprooted in 470/1077 by some local tribes, other Qarmaṭī 
groups in Persia, Iraq, and elsewhere too, had either disintegrated or switched 
their allegiance to the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa of the Fāṭimids. There was now, once 
again, only one unified Ismāʿīlī daʿwa under the supreme leadership of the 
Fāṭimid imām-caliph.
In the course of al-Mustanṣir’s long reign the Fāṭimid caliphate had already 
embarked on a decline resulting from factional fighting in the Fāṭimid armies 
and various political and economic problems (Thompson 2016: 40–72). Under 
the circumstances, al-Mustanṣir appealed to Badr al-Jamālī, an Armenian 
commander in the service of the Fāṭimids, who succeeded to restore peace 
and stability to the state. Badr soon assumed leadership of civil, judicial, and 
religious administrations in addition to being the ‘commander of the armies’ 
(amir al-jūyūsh), his main source of power. Badr died in 487/1094 after having 
arranged for his son al-Afḍal to succeed him in the vizierate. Henceforth, real 
power in the Fāṭimid state remained in the hands of the viziers who also com-
manded the armies, and were often in charge of the daʿwa organisation and 
activities as well.
Al-Mustanṣir, the eighth Fāṭimid caliph and the eighteenth Ismāʿīlī imām, 
died in Dhu’l-Ḥijja 487/December 1094, a few months after Badr al-Jamālī. 
Thereupon, the unified Ismāʿīlī daʿwa and community split into two rival fac-
tions, as al-Mustanṣir’s son and original heir-designate Nizār was deprived of 
his succession rights by al-Afḍal, who installed Nizār’s younger half-brother on 
the Fāṭimid throne with the title of al-Mustaʿlī bi-llāh (487–495/1094–1101). The 
two factions were later designated as Mustaʿlian and Nizārī, after al-Mustanṣir’s 
sons who had claimed his heritage. Nizār refused to pay homage to al-Mustaʿlī 
and rose in revolt, but was defeated and killed in 488/1095. The imāmate of 
al-Mustaʿlī was recognised by the Ismāʿīlī communities of Egypt, Yemen, and 
western India. These Ismāʿīlīs, who were dependent on the Fāṭimid regime, 
later traced the imāmate in the progeny of al-Mustaʿlī. On the other hand, the 
245The Ismāʿīlīs and Their Traditions
Ismāʿīlīs of Persia, who were already led by Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ, supported the suc-
cession rights of Nizār. The Central Asian Ismāʿīlīs remained uninvolved for 
quite some time in the Nizārī-Mustaʿlī schism.
4 Mustaʿlian Ismāʿīlīs
The Fāṭimid state survived for another seventy-seven years after the 
Nizārī-Mustaʿlī schism of 487/1094. These decades witnessed the rapid decline 
of the Fāṭimid caliphate. Al-Mustaʿlī and his successors on the Fāṭimid throne 
continued to be recognised as imāms by the Mustaʿlian Ismāʿīlīs who themselves 
soon split into Ḥāfiẓī and Ṭayyibī branches. After al-Mustaʿlī, the all-powerful 
vizier al-Afḍal placed his minor son on the Fāṭimid throne with the caliphal 
title of al-Āmir bi-Aḥkām Allāh. On al-Āmir’s assassination in 524/1130, the 
Mustaʿlian Ismāʿīlīs were confronted with a major crisis of succession. A son, 
named al-Ṭayyib, had been born to al-Āmir a few months before his death; and, 
he had been designated as al-Āmir’s heir-apparent. But after al-Āmir, power 
was assumed initially as regent, by his cousin, who later proclaimed himself 
as caliph and imām with the title of al-Ḥāfiẓ li-Dīn Allāh (526–544/1132–1149).
The irregular succession of al-Ḥāfiẓ to the Mustaʿlian Ismāʿīlī imāmate led 
to a major split in the Mustaʿlian community. Similar to the earlier case of the 
Nizārī-Mustaʿlī schism, the Mustaʿlian daʿwa headquarters in Cairo endorsed 
the imāmate of al-Ḥāfiẓ, which was also acknowledged by the Mustaʿlians 
of Egypt and Syria as well as a portion of the Mustaʿlians of Yemen. These 
Mustaʿlian Ismāʿīlīs, who recognised al-Ḥāfiẓ and the later Fāṭimid caliphs 
as their imāms, became known as Ḥāfiẓī. Ḥāfiẓī Ismāʿīlism disappeared com-
pletely soon after the collapse of the Fāṭimid dynasty in 567/1171. On the other 
hand, Sayyida Arwā (d. 532/1138), then the effective ruler of Ṣulayḥid Yemen, 
upheld al-Ṭayyib’s cause and recognised him as al-Āmir’s successor to the 
imāmate. As a result, the Mustaʿlians of Ṣulayḥid Yemen as well as those of 
Gujarāt also acknowledged al-Ṭayyib’s imāmate; they became known as the 
Ṭayyibīs (Stern 1951: 193–255). Mustaʿlian Ismāʿīlism has survived only in its 
Ṭayyibī form.
Ṭayyibī Ismāʿīlism found its permanent stronghold in Yemen, with the ini-
tial support of the Ṣulayḥid queen. It was soon after 526/1132 that she broke 
off relations with Cairo and declared Dhuʾayb ibn Mūsā al-Wādiʿī (d. 546/1151) 
as the dāʿī al-muṭlaq, or dāʿī with supreme authority, to lead the affairs of the 
Ṭayyibī Mustaʿlian daʿwa on behalf of al-Ṭayyib, who was thought to be in hid-
ing. This marked the foundation of the Ṭayyibī daʿwa independently of the 
Fāṭimid regime as well as the Ṣulayḥid state. The Ṭayyibīs are of the opinion 
246 Daftary
that since the time of al-Ṭayyib, their imāmate has continued in his progeny to 
the present time. However, all these Ṭayyibī imāms have remained in conceal-
ment, and in their absence the dāʿī muṭlaqs have led the affairs of the Ṭayyibī 
daʿwa and community. As in the case of imāms, every dāʿī muṭlaq has appointed 
his successor. In the doctrinal field, the Ṭayyibīs maintained the Fāṭimid tradi-
tions, also preserving a good portion of the Ismāʿīlī texts of the Fāṭimid period 
(Daftary 2007: 269–276).
Meanwhile, the Ṭayyibī dāʿīs in Yemen maintained close relations with the 
rapidly growing Ṭayyibī community in western India, where these Ismāʿīlīs 
became designated as Bohras. Towards the end of the tenth/sixteenth century, 
the succession to Dāʾūd ibn ʿAjab Shāh (d. 997/1589), the twenty-sixth dāʿī, was 
disputed, leading to the Dāʾūdī-Sulaymānī schism in the Ṭayyibī daʿwa and 
community. Henceforth, the Dāʾūdī and Sulaymānī Ṭayyibīs followed separate 
lines of dāʿīs. The Dāʾūdī dāʿīs continued to reside in India, where the bulk of 
the Ṭayyibī Dāʾūdī Bohras were located. On the other hand, the Sulaymānīs, 
accounting for a minority of the Ṭayyibīs, remained concentrated in Yemen, 
where their dāʿīs resided until recent times. In time, the Dāʾūdī Bohras were fur-
ther subdivided in India due to periodical challenges to the authority of their 
dāʿī muṭlaq. The total Dāʾūdī population of the world is currently estimated at 
around one million. Since the 1920s, Bombay (Mumbai), with the largest single 
concentration of Dāʾūdī Bohras, has served as the permanent administrative 
seat of the Dāʾūdīs (Daftary 2007: 282–295; Qutbuddin 2011: 331–354).
In Yemen, the leadership of the Sulaymānī Ṭayyibīs has remained heredi-
tary in the same Makrami family. The Sulaymānī dāʿīs established their head-
quarters in Najrān, in northeastern Yemen, and ruled over that region with 
the military support of the local Banū Yām. In the twentieth century, the 
political prominence of the Sulaymānī dāʿīs, checked earlier by the Zaydīs 
and the Ottomans, was further curtailed by the Saudi family, adherents of 
austere Wahhābī Sunnism. Najrān was, in fact, annexed to Saudi Arabia in 
1934. Thereafter, the Sulaymānī dāʿīs and many of their followers have been 
persecuted intermittently by the Saudis, who persecute Shīʿī Muslims gener-
ally as ‘heretics’. The total Sulaymānī Ṭayyibī population is currently estimated 
officially at around 200,000 persons (Daftary 2007: 295–300). Similar to the 
Dāʾūdīs, the Sulaymānīs withhold their religious literature from outsiders.
5 Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs
By the time of the Nizārī-Mustaʿlī succession dispute of 487/1094, Ḥasan-i 
Ṣabbāḥ, who preached the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa on behalf of the Fāṭimids within the 
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Seljuq dominions in Persia, had emerged as the leader of the Persian Ismāʿīlīs. 
He had already been following an independent policy, and his seizure of the 
mountain fortress of Alamūt in 483/1090 signalled the commencement of the 
Persian Ismāʿīlīs’ open revolt against the Seljuq Turks as well as the founda-
tion of what would become the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī state. The Nizārī state, centred 
at Alamūt, with its territories and network of fortresses scattered in different 
parts of Persia and Syria, lasted some 166 years until its destruction by the 
Mongols in 654/1256.
As an Ismāʿīlī, Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ could not tolerate the anti-Shīʿī policies of 
the Seljuqs, who being the new champions of Sunnī Islam aimed to uproot 
the Fāṭimids. Ḥasan’s revolt was also an expression of Persian ‘national’ sen-
timents, as the alien rule of the Seljuq Turks was intensely detested by the 
Persians of different social classes. This may explain why he substituted Persian 
for Arabic as the religious language of the Persian Ismāʿīlīs, also accounting 
for the early popular success of his movement (Daftary 1996: 181–204). It was 
under such circumstances that in al-Mustanṣir’s succession dispute Ḥasan 
supported Nizār’s cause and severed his relations with the Fāṭimid regime and 
the daʿwa headquarters in Cairo which had supported al-Mustaʿlī. By this deci-
sion, Ḥasan had founded the independent Nizārī Ismāʿīlī daʿwa on behalf of 
the Nizārī imāms, who remained in concealment for several generations after 
Nizār. In fact, numismatic evidence shows that Nizār’s own name appeared 
on coins minted at Alamūt for about seventy years after his death in 488/1095, 
while his progeny was blessed anonymously (Miles 1972: 155–162).
The early Nizārīs were thus left without an accessible imām in another dawr 
al-satr, or period of concealment; and, as in the pre-Fāṭimid period of con-
cealment, the absent imām was represented in the community by a ḥujja, his 
chief representative. Ḥasan and his next two successors as heads of the Nizārī 
daʿwa and state were, indeed, recognised as such ḥujjas. It seems that already 
in Ḥasan’s time many Nizārīs believed that a son or grandson of Nizār had been 
secretly brought from Egypt to Persia, and he became the progenitor of the line 
of the Nizārī imāms who later emerged at Alamūt.
The early Nizārīs were also active in the doctrinal field. Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ 
himself is credited with having reformulated the old Shīʿī doctrine of taʿlīm, 
or authoritative teaching by the imām of the time. This doctrine, emphasising 
the autonomous teaching authority of each imām in his own time, became 
the central doctrine of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs. The intellectual challenge posed 
to Sunnī Islam by the doctrine of taʿlīm, which also refuted the legitimacy of 
the ʿAbbāsid caliph as the spiritual spokesman of all Muslims, called forth the 
reaction of the Sunnī establishment. Many Sunnī scholars, led by al-Ghazālī, 
attacked the Ismāʿīlī doctrine of taʿlīm. Soon the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs possessed 
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networks of fortresses in several regions of Persia, including Daylamān and 
Quhistān (Willey 2005: 103–203); and, in the opening decade of the sixth/
tenth century, Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ also extended his activities to Syria by sending 
dāʿīs there from Alamūt. Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ died in 518/1124 and was succeeded 
by the dāʿī Kiyā Buzurg-Umīd (518–532/1124–1138). However, by the final years 
of Ḥasan’s life, the anti-Seljuq revolt of the Persian Nizārīs had already lost its 
momentum, much in the same way that the Seljuqs had failed in their pro-
longed military campaigns to dislodge the Persian Nizārīs from their fortress 
communities. Ismāʿīlī-Seljuq relations had now entered a new phase of ‘stale-
mate’ (Hillenbrand 1996: 205–220; Daftary 2015: 41–57).
Meanwhile, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs had been eagerly expecting the appearance 
of their imām. The fourth lord of Alamūt, Ḥasan II, succeeded to the leader-
ship in 557/1162, and soon after, in 559/1164, declared the qiyāma or resurrec-
tion, initiating a new phase in the religious history of the Nizārī community. 
Ḥasan II relied heavily on Ismāʿīlī ta   ʾ wīl and earlier traditions, interpret-
ing qiyāma symbolically and spiritually for the Nizārīs. Accordingly, qiyāma 
meant nothing more than the manifestation of unveiled truth (ḥaqīqa) in the 
person of the Nizārī imām. It was a spiritual resurrection only for the Nizārīs 
who acknowledged the rightful imām of the time, and were now capable of 
understanding the truth, the esoteric essence of Islam. It was in this sense that 
Paradise was actualised for the Nizārīs in this world. The Nizārīs, like the Sufis, 
were now to rise to a spiritual level of existence, transcending from ẓāhir to 
bāṭin, from sharīʿa to ḥaqīqa, or from the literal interpretation of the law to an 
understanding of its spiritual essence and the eternal truths of religion. On the 
other hand, the ‘outsiders’, the non-Nizārīs who were incapable of recognising 
the truth, were rendered spiritually non-existent (Daftary 2007: 358–367). The 
imām proclaiming the qiyāma would be the qāʾim al-qiyāma, or ‘lord of resur-
rection’, a rank which in Ismāʿīlī religious hierarchy was always higher than 
that of an ordinary imām.
Ḥasan II’s son and successor Nūr al-Dīn Muḥammad devoted his long reign 
(561–607/1166–1210) to a systematic doctrinal elaboration of the qiyāma. The 
exaltation of the autonomous teaching authority of the present Nizārī imām 
now became the central feature of Nizārī thought. Nūr al-Dīn Muḥammad also 
made every Nizārī imām potentially a qāʾim, capable of inaugurating an era of 
qiyāma. Furthermore, he explicitly affirmed the Fāṭimid descent of his father 
and, therefore, of himself. He explained that Ḥasan II was, in fact, an imām and 
the son of a descendant of Nizār ibn al-Mustanṣir, who had earlier found ref-
uge in Alamūt. Henceforth, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs recognised the lords of Alamūt, 
beginning with Ḥasan II, as their imāms (Hodgson 1955: 160–184, 210–217).
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Meanwhile, the Syrian Nizārīs had entered into an important phase of their 
own history under the leadership of Rāshid al-Dīn Sinān, their most famous 
chief dāʿī and the original ‘Old Man of the Mountain’ of the Crusader sources. 
He reorganised and strengthened the Syrian Nizārī daʿwa, also consolidating 
the Nizārī network of castles (Willey 2005: 216–245). Aiming to safeguard his 
community, Sinān entered into intricate and shifting alliances with the major 
neighbouring powers, notably the Crusaders, the Zangids and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 
(Saladin of the Crusader sources). Sinān led the Syrian Nizārīs for almost three 
decades, when they attained the peak of their power and fame, until his death 
in 589/1193 (Hodgson 1955: 185–209; Daftary 2007: 367–374).
Nūr al-Dīn Muḥammad’s son and successor Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan (607–
618/1210–1221), who had become concerned with the isolation of the Nizārīs 
from the larger world of Sunnī Islam, successfully attempted a daring rap-
prochement with the ʿAbbāsid caliph. He ordered his followers to observe the 
sharīʿa in its Sunnī form; this was interpreted by the Nizārīs as a dissimulating 
tactic. Be that as it may, the rights of Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan to Nizārī territories 
were now officially recognised by the Sunnī establishment. The Nizārī imām 
had achieved much-needed peace and security for his community and state.
Nizārī fortunes in Persia were rapidly reversed after the collapse of the 
Khwārazmian empire which brought them into direct conflict with the 
invading Mongols. Indeed, the Mongols had assigned a high priority to 
the destruction of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī state, a task completed with much diffi-
culty by Hūlāgū who led the main Mongol expedition into Persia. Rukn al-Dīn 
Khurshāh, the last lord of Alamūt who reigned for only one year, entered into 
a complex and ultimately futile series of negotiations with Hūlāgū. The fall of 
Alamūt in the autumn of 654/1256 marked the end of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī state. 
Along with many other fortresses it was demolished by the Mongols, who also 
massacred countless Nizārīs. In the spring of 655/1257, Khurshāh himself was 
killed by his Mongol guards in Mongolia, where he had gone to see the Great 
Khan. Shortly afterwards, the Nizārī castles in Syria submitted to the Mamlūks. 
Having lost their political prominence, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs henceforth lived 
secretly as religious minorities in numerous scattered communities in Syria, 
Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.
In the aftermath of the Mongol debacle the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs survived the 
downfall of their state centered at Alamūt; and the Nizārī imāmate continued 
in the progeny of Rukn al-Dīn Khurshāh. However, the Nizārī imāms remained 
in hiding for several generations, and their centralised daʿwa organisation had 
also disappeared. Under the circumstances, various Nizārī communities devel-
oped independently under the local leadership of dynasties of dāʿīs, pīrs, and 
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mīrs. They also resorted to the strict observance of taqiyya and adopted differ-
ent external guises. In Persia, many Nizārī groups disguised themselves under 
the cover of Sufism. Thus, the imāms appeared to outsiders as Sufi masters 
or pīrs, while their followers adopted the typically Sufi guise of disciples or 
murīds (Daftary 1999: 275–289). This practice gained wide currency among the 
Nizārīs of Central Asia and Sind as well. By the middle of the ninth/fifteenth 
century, in fact, a type of coalescence had emerged between Persian Sufism 
and Nizārī Ismāʿīlism, as these two independent esoteric traditions in Islam 
shared common doctrinal grounds. All in all, the first two post-Alamūt centu-
ries in Nizārī history are shrouded in obscurity, mainly due to taqiyya practices 
and lack of sources of information.
By the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, the Nizārī imāms had emerged 
in the village of Anjudān, in central Persia, still dissimulating as Sufi pīrs, initi-
ating the so-called Anjudān revival in Nizārī Ismāʿīlī daʿwa and literary activi-
ties that lasted some two centuries (Daftary 2007: 422–442). With the advent of 
the Ṣafavids, who proclaimed Twelver Shīʿism as their state religion in 907/1501, 
the Nizārī imāms and their followers in Persia and adjacent lands also adopted 
Twelver Shīʿism in addition to Sufism as a taqiyya measure. By the end of the 
eleventh/seventeenth century, the revived Nizārī daʿwa had been particularly 
successful in Central Asia and several regions of the Indian subcontinent. In 
South Asia, the Hindu converts, who became known as Khojas, developed an 
indigenous religious tradition known as Satpanth or the ‘true path’ (to salva-
tion), as well as a devotional literature, the gināns, containing a diversity of 
mystical, mythological, eschatological, and ethical themes (Nanji 1978: 50–83; 
Asani 2011: 95–128; Daftary 2007: 442–451).
With the fortieth Nizārī imām, Shāh Nizār (d. 1134/1722), the seat of the 
Nizārī daʿwa was transferred from Anjudān to the nearby village of Kahak, near 
Maḥallāt. By the middle of the twelfth-eighteenth century, the Nizārī imāms 
had moved to the Persian province of Kirmān, where they acquired political 
prominence. The modern period in Nizārī Ismāʿīlī history commenced with 
the long imāmate of Ḥasan ʿAlī Shāh (1232–1298/1817–1881), the forty-sixth 
imām, who received the honorific title of Aga Khan (Āghā Khān), meaning lord 
and master, from the Qājār monarch of Persia; this title has remained heredi-
tary among his successors to the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī imāmate. After some prolonged 
confrontations between this Nizārī imām and the Qājār establishment, Aga 
Khan I permanently left Persia in 1257/1841. He finally settled in Bombay in 
1265/1848, and received the protection of the British in India (Daftary 2007: 
463–476).
Aga Khan I’s grandson, Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, Aga Khan III (1302–1376/ 
1885–1957), who led the Nizārīs for seventy-two years as their forty-eighth 
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imām, established his residence in Europe. He made systematic efforts to set 
the religious identity of the Nizārīs apart from other religious communities, 
especially that of the Twelver Shīʿīs, which for centuries had provided dis-
simulating covers for the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs. Large numbers of Nizārīs had, in 
fact, been assimilated into the dominant Twelver Shīʿī community. Known as 
a Muslim reformer, Aga Khan III worked vigorously to reorganise the Nizārīs 
into a modern community with high standards of education, health, and social 
well-being, also developing a new network of councils for administrating the 
affairs of his community. The education of women and their full participation 
in communal affairs received high priority in Aga Khan III’s reforms.
In 1957, Aga Khan III was succeeded by his grandson Shah Karim al-Husayni, 
Aga Khan IV, the present Harvard-educated forty-ninth Nizārī Ismāʿīlī imām. 
He has substantially expanded the modernisation policies of his predeces-
sor, also initiating numerous programmes and institutions of his own. Aga 
Khan IV has created a complex institutional network generally referred to as 
the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), which implements projects in 
a variety of social, economic, and cultural areas. In the field of higher edu-
cation, his major initiatives include The Institute of Ismaili Studies, the Aga 
Khan University, and the University of Central Asia (Ruthven 2011: 189–220). 
Numbering several millions, the global Nizārī Ismāʿīlī community, with signifi-
cant groups in Europe and North America, has emerged as a progressive Shīʿī 
Muslim minority with high standards of living.
6 Conclusion
As this chapter has touched on, the Ismāʿīlīs have had a very eventful history 
stretching back to the formative period of Islam when a diversity of communi-
ties of interpretation and schools of thought were articulating their doctrinal 
positions. Due to their revolutionary anti-establishment stances, the Ismāʿīlīs 
were from early on targeted for persecution and defamation. As a result, a host 
of myths and legends were fabricated and disseminated by their numerous 
adversaries, including the Crusaders who made the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs famous 
in medieval Europe as Assassins. The misrepresentations of the Ismāʿīlīs have 
been largely corrected by modern scholarship in Ismāʿīlī studies based on the 
study of a large number of primary Ismāʿīlī manuscript resources.
After the downfall of their Fāṭimid caliphate and the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī state of 
Persia, the Ismāʿīlīs lost forever their political prominence, surviving precari-
ously in many lands merely as religious minorities. However, their earlier con-
tributions to Islamic thought and culture had proved enduring. In this context, 
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particular mention should be made of two examples. In the Fāṭimid period of 
their history, the Ismāʿīlī dāʿīs of the Iranian lands elaborated an original intel-
lectual tradition of philosophical theology, the earliest such tradition in a Shīʿī 
community, anticipating the contributions of Twelver Shīʿī scholars, notably 
Mīr Dāmād (d. 1040/1630) and Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1050/1640), belonging to the 
so-called ‘school of Iṣfahān’. Meanwhile, a distinctive Ismāʿīlī school of juris-
prudence (madhhab) was founded through the efforts of al-Qāḍī al-Nu’mān, 
the foremost jurist of the Fāṭimid period.
All in all, despite numerous odds and rampant persecution, the Ismāʿīlīs 
have indeed stood the test of time. They have closely guarded their distinctive 
religious identity. The majoritarian Nizārī branch of Ismāʿīlism is the only cur-
rent Shīʿī community with a continuous line of present imāms. As enlightened 
Muslim leaders, the last two Ismāʿīlī imāms, Aga Khans III and his grandson 
Aga Khan IV, have devoted much time and resources to promoting a better 
understanding of Islam, not merely as a major religion but as a world civili-
sation with its plurality of social, intellectual and cultural traditions. Under 
the circumstances, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs have emerged as a progressive global 
community of Shīʿī Muslims. In every country where the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs live 
as indigenous religious minorities, they enjoy good standards of living with 
full emancipation of their women, and those who have migrated to Western 
countries have successfully adapted to their new environments.
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Chapter 11
The Dāʾūdī Bohras (Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlī Shīʿa)
Using Modernity to Institutionalise a Fāṭimid Tradition
Jonah Blank
1 Introduction
The Dāʾūdī (or Dawoodi) Bohras, a community numbering substantially 
over one million worldwide, represent one of the two branches of Ismāʿīlī 
Shīʿism to survive into the modern era. Mustaʿlī Ṭayyibī Ismāʿīlīs (as they are 
described in denominational terms) are the spiritual descendants of Egypt’s 
renowned Fāṭimid Caliphate. Unlike the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs (who believe that the 
line of imāms continued through the succession of clerics bearing the title 
Aga Khan), the Mustaʿlīs believe that the last Fāṭimid caliph was the twenty-
second and final present imām (Abū l-Qāsim Ṭayyib). Since the sixth century 
AH/twelfth century CE, both spiritual and temporal leadership of the commu-
nity has rested in a line of clerics bearing the title of Dāʿī al-muṭlaq, seated 
first in Yemen and since the tenth/sixteenth century in the Indian states of 
Gujarat and Maharashtra. Over the past four decades, the Dāʾūdī Bohra clergy 
has attempted, with great success, to establish a communal identity that is at 
once universally Islamic and unique to the denomination. It has done so not 
by rejecting modern or Western ideas and technologies, but by enthusiasti-
cally embracing many of them: in this sense, the Bohras have used ‘moder-
nity’ as a tool to reinvigorate and reinstitutionalise their core traditions.1 Thus, 
the Dāʾūdī Bohras demonstrate the resilience and ideological adaptability of 
Shīʿa Islam.
The name ‘Bohra’ is generally presumed to be derived from the Gujarati verb 
vohrvun (‘to trade’), reflecting the occupation of the overwhelming majority of 
Bohras throughout their history. The bulk of the group’s ancestors converted to 
Islam from mercantile Hindu jatis within the Vaishya varna, beginning in the 
fifth/eleventh century. The Bohra community experienced a number of schisms 
1 This chapter is adapted from sections of my monograph, Mullahs on the Mainframe: Islam 
and Modernity Among the Dāʾūdī Bohras (2001), supplemented by my analysis of the recent 
leadership schism within the Dāʾūdī Bohra community (2017). A brief history of the denomi-
nation with more complete sourcing is found in Blank 2001: 14–52.
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in the millennium since, most notably a split in the eleventh/sixteenth century 
between the followers of two rival clerical leaders named Dāʾūd ibn Quṭub Shāh 
and Sulaymān ibn Ḥasan (Mausam-e Bahar 1884: 343–345; Schimmel 1980: 
70–71). While the small sect of Sulaymānī Bohras has maintained a separate 
chain of clerical succession ever since (as has the still-smaller group of ʿAlawī 
Bohras, product of a subsequent schism), the term ‘Bohra’ is commonly used 
as shorthand for ‘Dāʾūdī Bohra’, the predominant group.2 While there is some 
tension between the group’s ethnic and spiritual definition—that is, whether 
the community should be bounded by Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlī doctrine (as the clergy 
maintains) or by shared ancestry (as some dissidents argue)—the overlap 
of ethnicity and religion is close enough to make these definitions largely 
interchangeable. As a practical matter, the term ‘Bohra’ is generally taken by 
members of the community to mean “a practitioner of Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlī Islam, 
who happens to be of Gujarati descent” (Abdulhussein 1995: 225; Davoodbhoy 
1992a: 4). It is in that sense that the term will be used in this chapter.
Until the turn of the fifteenth/twenty-first century, the Bohras were one of 
an exceptionally small set of societies about which no ethnographic study (at 
least, none conforming to the standards of academic anthropology) had been 
published.3 As a result of their sequestration the Bohras are one of the few 
major communities left to which Marcus Banks’ dictum of tainted evidence— 
2 The first important Bohra schism occurred even earlier, in the ninth/fifteenth century, when 
a theology student named Jafar of Patan led a significant number of followers to abandon 
Shīʿism for Sunnī practice; this group subsequently had no shared history or culture with its 
former coreligionists, and is outside the bounds of any modern definition of ‘Bohras’. The 
succession dispute betweeen Daud Burhanuddin ibn Qutbshah and Shaikh Sulaymān ibn 
Syedi Hasan al-Hindi was brought before the Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1005/1597, who ruled 
in favor of Daud; the modern Sulaymānī community is far smaller than the Dāʾūdī main-
stream (by some estimates, perhaps one-tenth its size), and concentrated in the Middle East 
rather than South Asia, but it preceded the Dāʾūdīs in adopting Western education and prac-
tices; a Sulaymānī Bohra (Justice Badruddin Tyebji) became India’s first Muslim barrister, 
the first Muslim judge to sit on the Bombay High Court, and the first Muslim president of the 
Indian National Congress. The ʿAlawī Bohras broke away from the Dāʾūdīs over a succession 
dispute in 1034/1624, and are today headquartered in the Gujarati city of Vadodara.
3 All prior works presenting primary-source ethnographic data on the Bohras fall into one of 
two categories:
  First, texts published by clerical authorities, generally through the Daʿwat-e-Hadiyah, 
Department of Statistics and Information (including Anjuman-e Burhani 1965; Bekhud 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c; Davoodbhoy 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Daʿwat-e-Hadiyah 1975, 1983, 
1985; Najmuddin 1992; Niazi 1992; Zaidi 1988). These often contain very useful information: 
For example, Abdulhussein (1995) is the work of a clerical scholar rather than a propagandist; 
Raik (1975) presents irreplaceable primary-source photographic documentation of the com-
munity shortly before the late-1970s program of orthopraxy Islamisation. Clerically-written 
histories such as Ismailji (1938); ‘Mausam-e bahar’ (1884); and Mubarakpuri (1978) provide 
narratives (albeit daʿwat-approved versions) often not available anywhere else.
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“the manifestations of ethnicity we study today contain within them the 
ghosts of previous academic formulations” (Banks 1996: 189)—does not apply. 
This was not due to geographical remove: far from being an obscure commu-
nity living in a remote corner of a rainforest, the Bohras are closely integrated 
to social life in Mumbai, Karachi, Surat, Ahmedabad and other cities in South 
Asia. Their absence from the anthropological record is due to self-selection: 
The structure of their society, with a degree of clerical control highly unusual 
among Muslim groups, enabled them to prevent outside researchers from 
making inroads into the orthodox community. The fieldwork on which this 
chapter is based, and the monograph from which most of the information was 
drawn, was enabled only by the permission of the late Dāʿī al-muṭlaq Syedna 
Muhammad Burhanuddin, who gave his duʿāʾ (blessing) for the undertaking 
on 8 Shabaan 1415/10 January 1995, at the Jamea-tus-Saifiyah in Surat, India.
2 History and Doctrine
The roots of the Bohra faith date to the Fāṭimid Caliphate, the most celebrated 
Ismāʿīlī dynasty in history. Like the later divisions within the Bohra lineage, 
the great schism of Shīʿa Islam into rival Ismāʿīlī and Ithnā ʿAsharī (‘Twelver’) 
  Second, texts written by or directly derived from a small group of dissidents placed under 
baraat (de facto excommunication) by the clergy (Contractor 1980; Engineer 1989, 1980/1993, 
1995; through them, Chopra 1982, Nathwani 1979, Roy 1984). The reasons for this are dis-
cussed in Blank (2001: 301–307). Due to their exclusion from all contact with members of the 
orthodox communities, these authors are reliant on information that was already outdated 
at the time of their excommunications in the mid-twentieth century. Of particular note is 
the surprising fact that all of these texts—and virtually every notionally-independent text 
published by a source outside the community over the past century—can be traced directly 
to material originally published (in 1317/1899, and more completely in 1338/1920) by a Bohra 
dissident named Mian Bhai Mullah Abdul Husain of Rangoon. For documentation of this 
lineage, see Blank (2001: 306–307).
  Several scholars have written usefully about the Bohras without conducting fieldwork 
in the orthodox community, and drawing their information largely from the excommuni-
cated authors above. The most useful is the great scholar of Ismāʿīlī history and theology 
Farhad Daftary (1990; others include Hollister 1953; Misra 1964; and Wright 1975). In addition 
to these, occasionally facts about Bohra life come up in news reports, or in scholarly texts 
only tangentially related to social science (for example, genetics: Basu and Gupta 1982, Basu 
and Jindal 1983).
  Independent sources on Ismāʿīlī (including Mustaʿlī) history and doctrine are more 
plentiful. An illustrative, but by no means exhaustive, list includes—in addition to Daftary 
(1990)—Ali (1954); Corbin (1956, 1967, 1982, 1984); Feki (1978); Filippani-Ronconi (1973); 
Fyzee (1934a, 1934b, 1965, 1969, 1974); Hamdani (1971, 1976, 1985); al-Hamdani (1932, 1933, 1934, 
1937); Hasan (1964); Ivanow (1936, 1942); Jafar (1942); Jafari (1965); Khan (1914); Lokhandwalla 
(1968); Poonawala (1970, 1973, 1974, 1977); Stern (1949, 1951, 1955, 1983); and Walker (1993).
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branches grew out of a succession dispute: Ismāʿīlīs believe that the imāmate 
was passed to the descendants of Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s son Ismāʿīl (b. circa 
100/720), while the Ithnā ʿAsharīyya believe it was inherited by the descen-
dants of Ismāʿīl’s brother Musa. Modern scholars have noted that the idea of 
an imāmate passed down in secret from second/eighth to the fourth/tenth 
centuries (as Bohras today believe)4 seems to have been first articulated dur-
ing Fāṭimid times: if such a doctrine was propagated contemporaneously, the 
veil of taqiyya—a doctrine accepted by most Shīʿa denominations permitting 
public dissimulation during times of extreme danger to the community (Nasr 
2016: 54)—prevented it from appearing in the documentary record.5 The dawr 
al-satr (period of concealment) ended with ʿAbd Allāh al- Mahdī, who was 
proclaimed imām in 286/899, and caliph eleven years later (Stern 1983: 96ff; 
Tabataba’i 1975: 81–82).
From the tenure of Imām ʿAbd Allāh al- Mahdī until nearly the end of the 
visible imāmate (as recognised by Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlīs), the line of imāms would 
be coterminous with that of Fāṭimid caliphs. At its height, the Fāṭimid empire 
encompassed North Africa, Sicily, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz 
(including Mecca and Medina). The Fāṭimids never succeeded in converting 
Egypt to Shīʿism, nor did they make a great effort to do so, but their rule marks 
the high point of Ismāʿīlī history. As the caliphate entered its terminal decline, 
it insured its legacy through missionary activity far afield. Imām al-Mustanṣir 
bi-llāh (427–487/1036–1094) saw his power ebb in the Fāṭimid heartland, but in 
450/1067 his missionaries established lasting footholds in Gujarat and Persia. 
The communities they established there would ensure the survival of the 
Ismāʿīlī faith, through its Mustaʿlī and Nizārī branches respectively, long after 
the Fāṭimid collapse nearly extinguished the denomination in the Middle East. 
(Hamdani 1976: 185–187; Qureshi 1985: 41–45).
Following Imām Mustanṣir’s death, the Ismāʿīlīs experienced another suc-
cession schism: Those who believe that the imām bestowed nass on his younger 
4 In ‘Twelver’ Shīʿa histories, Ismāʿīl died fifteen years before his father, so his nass (designa-
tion as successor) was invalid; in Ismāʿīlī interpretation, Ismāʿīl’s death had been faked by his 
father Jafar to protect the true line of the Imamate from ʿAbbāsid plots. In the words of the 
ninth/fifteenth century Bohra Dāʿīs Idris ibn Hasan, “[T]he time came for Isma’il to dissemble 
death, using this ruse against his enemies who were full of hatred, enmity and the ardent 
desire to extinguish the Light of God” (Ivanow 1942: 232–233).
5 Reliable historical dates are unavailable for the three hidden imāms: Abdullah al-Mastur, 
Ahmad al-Mastur ibn Abdullah, and Husain ibn Ahmad. When such dates are provided by 
much later sources, they are so arbitrary as to be virtually meaningless. Farhad Daftary (1990: 
126) states, “the early Ismailis, or at least by their overwhelming majority, originally recog-
nised only seven Imams.” When al-Mahdi declared himself the imām, Daftary argues, he ret-
roactively declared his three predecessors imām as well.
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son Mustaʿlī would become known as Western Ismāʿīlīs (because of their initial 
strength in Egypt and Yemen), and are today represented by the Bohras. Those 
who believe that nass was bestowed on the elder son Nizār would become 
known as Eastern Ismāʿīlīs (because of their initial strength in Syria and Iran) 
and are today represented by the Khojahs and other followers of the Aga Khan. 
The Western Ismāʿīlīs won out in the short term: Mustaʿlī was put on the throne 
by a powerful wazīr, and Nizār died in prison. But the First Crusade shook the 
weakened caliphate, and the line of the twenty-one imāms recognised by the 
Bohras ends with Mustaʿlī’s infant grandson Abū l-Qāsim Ṭayyib.6
The Mustaʿlī line of imāms, however, continued (and is believed still to 
continue) in secret. The period of satr continues to the present day, with the 
imāmate passed down through the descendants of Imām Ṭayyib. The cur-
rent imām, like all those since Ṭayyib’s time, lives anonymously in the world, 
utterly unknown to those around him, periodically in contact with the faithful 
through his Dāʿī al-muṭlaq (Daftary 1990: 283). Specific theological discussion 
of the ‘hidden imām’ generally falls under the category of bāṭin (secret) knowl-
edge, not permitted to be disseminated outside of specially-authorised clerical 
circles. As explained by daʿwat-authorised sources (personal communication, 
1994 and subsequently), Bohras know neither the hidden imām’s name, nor his 
age, nor anything about him whatsoever, but they consider his presence in the 
world absolutely essential for the perpetuation of mankind.
Ṭayyib inherited the imāmate on his father’s death (Bohras believe), but he 
lost the caliphate: his cousin al-Ḥāfiẓ seized the throne in 526/1132.7 The infant 
imām was protected by the most important woman in Mustaʿlī history since 
the death of the Prophet’s daughter Fāṭima. Al-Malika al-Sayyida, the wife of 
the Fāṭimid Dāʿī of Yemen, had taken over the work of her husband in his later 
years, and after his death had been promoted—in her own right—to the still-
loftier position of ḥujja. After Ḥāfiẓ’s coup, she ran a rival court based in Yemen, 
in the name of the infant Ṭayyib. To avoid assassination, the baby imām was 
hidden from public eye. Al-Sayyida elevated the existing office of Dāʿī al-muṭlaq 
6 Because they take Imām Ṭayyib as the last unconcealed imām, the Bohras are technically 
Ṭayyibī Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlīs, to distinguish them from the extinct branch of Ḥāfiẓi Mustaʿlī 
Ismāʿīlīs.
7 Al-Ḥāfiẓ passed the caliphate to his son and two grandsons, but their status as imāms (while 
contemporaneously acknowledged by the Fāṭimids for half a century) is unrecognised by 
either of the two surviving Ismāʿīlī denominations. Ḥāfiẓi Mustaʿlī Ismāʿīlīsm did not survive 
long after the fall of the dynasty: the last Fāṭimid wazīr finally dispensed with the fiction of an 
independent caliphate, and established his own dynasty under the auspices of the ʿAbbāsid 
empire: Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb, better known to the West as Saladin, officially ended 
Fāṭimid rule by having the khuṭba read in the name of the ʿAbbāsid caliph in 567/1171. On the 
death of his master Nūr al-Dīn, he established the Ayyūbid dynasty in his own name.
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to the highest visible title (apart from her own) of the Fāṭimid court-in-exile. 
When she died six years later, the office of ḥujjat died with her, leaving the Dāʿī 
al-muṭlaq the peak of the clerical order. Since that time, each succeeding Dāʿī 
has served as the titular head of a Fāṭimid dynasty that has never theoretically 
ended (Hamdani 1976 : 92–99; Ivanow 1942: 37–38).
For four hundred years, the seat of the denomination remained in Yemen. 
During these centuries, the community of Gujarati converts grew more numer-
ous and more prosperous generation by generation. While the daʿwat generally 
enjoyed good relations with local Ayyūbid amīrs and other Sunnī political fig-
ures on the Arabian peninsula, it was forced to engage in near-chronic warfare 
with various Zaydī Shīʿa shaykhs. And while the Yemeni Mustaʿlī community 
was often fractious and loathe to submit wholly to the authority of the Dāʿī, 
the Indian converts were far more accepting of central clerical control. (Corbin 
1954: 162–172; Ismailji 1937: 93–94).
The first Gujarati Dāʿī was Yusuf Najmuddin ibn Sulaymān, who assumed 
office in 946/1539: his Yemeni predecessor had been so impressed by the 
Indian cleric’s scholarly abilities that he passed over all of the Arabs in the 
court. Syedna Yusuf’s successor, Jalal ibn Hasan, served only a few months, but 
he transferred the seat of the daʿwat to India permanently. Syedna Jalal was 
also an Indian by birth, as would be all future Dāʿīs (with the exception of one 
Yemeni who served for a single year in the eleventh /seventeenth century). 
The decision to move the daʿwat was influenced not only by the importance 
of the Indian community, but also by the fall of Yemen to the Ottoman Turks 
and the persecution of Ismāʿīlīs that followed (Ali 1954, 74–77; Poonawala 1977: 
137–143).
In India, the Mughal rulers Jehangir and Shah Jahan introduced some 
repressive measures against Shīʿa (as had various pre-Mughal Gujarati sul-
tans), but the worst oppression suffered by the Bohras would come at the 
hands of Aurangzeb—first as governor of Gujarat, later as emperor. Bohras 
reverted to taqiyya, attending Sunnī services in public while carrying on their 
own rites in secret. Aurangzeb’s attempts to impose Sunnī practice throughout 
his domains stemmed from deeply-held personal conviction, but was further 
compounded by his experience of warfare against the Shīʿa sultanates of the 
Deccan. Grinding years of battle against these states had established the para-
digm of Shīʿa as political as well as theological adversaries (Mausam-e Bahar 
1884: 280–296; Pinault 1992: 60).
The fact that Ismāʿīlīs had no ties to the Deccan sultans (or to these king-
doms’ Ithnā ʿAsharī patron in Safavid Iran) earned them no mitigation of 
Aurangzeb’s harsh treatment. Bohras were forbidden to observe Eid-ul Fitr 
and other rites according to their own calendar, to make pilgrimages to their 
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shrines, or to practice Ashura rituals. Sunnī pesh-imāms were reintroduced to 
all mosques, and any congregants failing to attend were punished with flog-
ging. All marriage and death ceremonies were required to be performed by 
Sunnī qāḍīs rather than Bohra ʿāmils, and large sums of money (both official 
taxes and unofficial bribes) were extorted from community members at every 
possible occasion (Misra 1964: 32–38, following Abdul Husain 1920: 20–21, 
38–39).
The advent of British hegemony in India proved highly beneficial to the 
Bohras. Where many other Indian communities saw imperialistic encroach-
ment, the Bohras saw relief from Sunnī persecution. During the reign of 
the forty-second Dāʿī Yusuf Najmuddin ibn Abdul-Ṭayyib Zakiuddin (1200–
1213/1785–1798) the daʿwat moved its headquarters to Surat, to take advantage 
of the protection offered by this East India Company trading post.
The Bohras helped create modern Mumbai, and Mumbai helped create the 
modern Bohras; neither the city nor the community would have precisely its 
present-day form if not for the presence of the other. Moving to the rapidly-
developing metropolis in the thirteenth/nineteenth century, the Bohras (like 
fellow banias such as the Khojahs, Memons and Parsis—see Asani 1987; 
Damodaran 2008: 2–4; Sharma 2014: 15–18; Purohit 2012: 10–11) quickly took 
up work in professions traditionally shunned by caste Hindus: most often, sell-
ing hardware, glassware, plumbing supplies, paint, stationary, or soap. They 
avoided the more traditionally polluting occupations (butchers, sweepers, 
leather-workers, or vendors of spirits), but within the confines of mercantile 
trade they concentrated on niches not customarily filled by Hindus. Since 
Mumbai (until 1995, Bombay) was centred on trade with Europe, there were an 
ever-increasing number of these niches to be filled.
Modern-day Mumbai is the capital of the state of Maharashtra, but until the 
creation of this state in 1960 the city had always been at least as closely linked 
to Gujarati as to Marathi culture. In this cosmopolitan milieu, the Bohras were 
able to leave behind their stigmatised minority status and become full-fledged 
members of society. While the bulk of the community opened shops and small 
businesses, from the late colonial period onward a substantial number entered 
banking and larger industry as well. The Dāʾūdī Bohras were so successful in 
their new environment, both in Bombay itself and in the various Gujarati cities 
administered by the Bombay Presidency, that by the end of the century a colo-
nial gazetteer would write, “the trading Bohoras, originally all Shiahs [Shīʿa] of 
the Mustaʿlī branch of the great Ismaili sect, are the richest and most prosper-
ous class of Musalmans in Gujarat” (Campbell 1899: 24).
As the Bohra community rose in power and prosperity alongside the metrop-
olis they helped build, their clerical leadership lost stature in comparison with 
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the new class of Western-oriented businessmen. The daʿwat was racked by 
internal dissention. A succession dispute in 1255/1840 weakened the clergy’s 
credibility for the remainder of the century. In 1315/1897, yet another schism 
further discredited the establishment; the Dāʿī was subjected to the humilia-
tion of a civil suit brought by one of his own ʿāmils (priests), and even when 
accused of financial impropriety by one of his underlings he lacked the ability 
to enforce a writ of excommunication. Increasingly unable to collect commu-
nity taxes to fund their clerical bureaucracy, Dāʿī s were forced to cede large 
amounts of power to wealthy businessmen such as Sir Adamji Pirbhai (an 
industrialist who served as the first Indian sheriff of Bombay).
When Syedna Taher Saifuddin ascended the office of Dāʿī al-muṭlaq in 
1333/1915, the Bohra clergy was at perhaps its lowest ebb in centuries. Syedna 
Taher Saifuddin recognised the core problem: While much of the community 
had begun to assimilate into modern society, the daʿwat had run from it. As 
a result, the most dynamic, educated, and prosperous Bohras were distanc-
ing themselves not only from clerical control, but from the Ismāʿīlī doctrines 
and Islamic orthopraxy by which the community had been defined. The most 
forward-leaning individuals and families were melting into broader Indian 
society. The Dāʾūdī Bohra Dāʿī was on the path to becoming little more than a 
figurehead: a path that the Sulaymānī and ʿAlawī Dāʿīs had found ran in only 
one direction. The smaller Bohra communities had been essentially swallowed 
up already, and the Dāʾūdīs were likewise in danger of losing their unique cul-
tural, spiritual, and denominational identity.
To combat this threat, Syedna Taher Saifuddin set out to revitalise both the 
clergy and the community through a program of modernisation. He spent the 
first half of his reign rebuilding the legitimacy and authority of the daʿwat, 
fending off powerful challenges from dissidents, and by the time of Indian 
Independence his position was stronger than that of any Dāʿī in memory. 
Reversing of the policy of his immediate predecessors, Syedna Taher Saifuddin 
actively encouraged both modern education and the adoption of a wide vari-
ety of Western customs, technologies and practices. He reigned for half a cen-
tury (longer than his three predecessors combined), giving him enough time to 
institutionalise these policies.
Syedna Taher Saifuddin conveyed nass on his son early enough to avoid 
a succession dispute, and Syedna Muhammad Burhanuddin continued his 
father’s program through his own forty-nine-year reign. Inside the community, 
it is sometimes said that Syedna Taher Saifuddin focused more on the mod-
ernisation side of the equation, Syedna Burhanuddin more on the Islamisation 
side. But both leaders saw the two sides as halves to a complementary whole: 
Both aimed to use the tools of modernity to re-invigorate Bohra society and 
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faith. Not all members of the community support this ambitious program—
the strand of overt and covert dissidence has remained present to this day—
but few would deny that it has been very successful in achieving its goals. 
The death of Syedna Burhanuddin in 1435/2014 led to another disputed suc-
cession, raising the prospect of another community schism. It is noteworthy, 
however, that both camps remain firmly committed to the modernisation and 
Islamisation programme carried out over the past century (see Blank 2017).
3 Centrality of the Dāʿī al-muṭlaq as Distinguishing Feature  
of Bohra Practice
The centrality and all-encompassing authority of the top cleric set the Bohras 
(and other Ismāʿīlīs) apart from nearly all other Muslim groups. The Dāʿī is 
considered kal ma’ṣūm, a state just short of absolute infallibility. In the Sunnī 
world, no single member of the ʿulamāʾ holds anything like the unchallenged 
sway over believers that Bohra Dāʿī exercises. A Sufi pīr might wield such power 
over members of his order, but such jurisdiction extends only to initiates and 
does not generally reach entire communities. This extraordinary spiritual con-
trol has given the Bohra Dāʿī virtual hegemony in the political realm as well. 
Such centralisation of spirtual authority, perhaps more than any other factor, 
has enabled the Bohra clergy—particularly the two Dāʿīs reigning between 
1333/1915–1435/2014, to promote modernisation and reinstitutionalisation of 
tradition at the same time.
Even in comparison with other Shīʿa groups the level of spiritual authority 
enjoyed by the Bohra daʿwat is highly unusual. A Twelver mujtahid is expected 
both to guide his followers towards righteous actions and steer them away from 
prohibited ones, but this spiritual leadership has always been far more diffuse 
than that of Ismāʿīlīs. The modern Ithnā ʿAsharī clergy has never spoken with 
a single voice, even during the primacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; since 
Khomeini’s death, the diversity of top-level spiritual guidance has increased 
markedly (Nasr 2016: 35–39).
Shīʿa theology in general, and Ismāʿīlī theology in particular, is based on 
ta  ʾ wīl (esoteric interpretation of scripture). This doctrine holds that beneath 
the ẓāhir (apparent) aspect of revealed text and religious doctrine, a deeper 
and more important bāṭin truth lies hidden. While any Muslim can try to 
learn the ẓāhir by reading the Qurʾān and other religious texts, only a muʾmin 
(true believer) can hope to uncover the bāṭin learning with the guidance of 
the imām or his representative. Ismāʿīlīs regard the entirety of the Qurʾān 
as a text with hidden allegorical interpretations underlying even the most 
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seemingly straightforward of passages (Corbin 1984; Fyzee 1965; al-Hamdani 
1933; Stern 1983).
It is largely for this reason that Ismāʿīlīs regard the teachings of a living, pres-
ent human (whether the Bohras’ Dāʿī al-muṭlaq or the Nizārīs’ Aga Khan) as 
more authoritative than unexplicated scripture or aḥadīth, a significant point 
of divergence from Ithnā ʿAsharī Shīʿa. In the Bohra faith, even devout believers 
are not permitted to explore esoteric texts without the guidance of a master 
specially sanctioned by the daʿwat, and permission to delve into the deepest 
secrets is limited to a small group of highly trained clerics. It is their unique 
access to bāṭin knowledge—the true, inner meaning of the Qurʾān, aḥadīth, 
and all scripture—that gives both the Bohra Dāʿī and the Aga Khan their fun-
damental spiritual hegemony over their respective communities.
The Aga Khan’s status as present imām would seem to give him even greater 
great doctrinal hegemony for the Nizārīs than the Dāʿī al-muṭlaq exercises 
among the Bohras. This hegemony, however, does not manifest in the same 
way. Recent Aga Khans have lived in Europe, married outside the community, 
and maintained a regal distance from the bulk of their followers, and, in some 
cases, from Islamic orthopraxy itself: Sir Sultan Muhammed Shah, Aga Khan 
III, is said to have justified his consumption of alcohol by holding up a glass 
of champagne and remarking, “I am so holy that when I drink wine, it turns to 
water” (Lokhandwalla 1968: 162, n. 16). The Dāʿī, however, is intimately linked 
to every aspect of Bohra life: the very essence of his office is to be physically 
present. While the imām lives in the world but not of it, perhaps guiding by 
inspiration rather than specific instruction, the Dāʿī’s role is to serve as a bridge 
between the hidden imām and the faithful. He must be part of his followers’ 
daily lives: It is his central mission.
From the earliest times to the present, there has been relatively little Ismāʿīlī 
literature devoted to tafsīr (external explication) of the Qurʾān or other texts: 
the imām is regarded as a ‘speaking Qurʾān’ whose presence in the world makes 
tomes of ordinary exegesis unnecessary. During the imām’s concealment, such 
authoritative interpretation is carried out by his legitimately delegated Dāʿīs. 
One major result of this has been the liberation of Ismāʿīlī thought from the 
confines of strictly proscribed text: while much Sunnī intellectual debates (at 
least outside of certain Sufi circles) has been bounded by a literalist interpreta-
tion of the Qurʾān and aḥadīth, Ismāʿīlī speculation has been much less con-
strained. For the brief period of the Muʿtazila ascendancy during the ʿAbbāsid 
caliphate, Sunnī intelligentsia experienced a similar burst of speculative 
energy. With the triumph of the Hanbalites and the “closing of the door of 
ijtihād,” however, such experimentation fell to disfavor. In general Sunnī intel-
lectual exploration has been circumscribed by text and tradition, while Ismāʿīlī 
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philosophy has been free to draw on a far wider range of sources (both internal 
and external) for inspiration (Corbin 1984; Daftary 1990: 239–241).
Ismāʿīlī use of Western neoplatonic thought is particularly noteworthy in the 
context of the present study, for it shows the ancient provenance of modern-
day Ismāʿīlī openness to intellectual borrowings from other cultures. Whereas 
various Sunnī and Ithnā ʿAsharī schools have flirted with neoplatonism and 
other Western ideologies occasionally, few (if any) have embraced them 
so unreservedly or welcomed them so intimately to their hearts. This open-
minded, intellectually omnivorous attitude is exemplified by an encyclopedic 
compendium of knowledge entitled Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa, penned by Ismāʿīlī 
authors before the Fāṭimid zenith (Netton 1991).
When today’s Dāʾūdī Bohras seek out not only the technology but the edu-
cation and ideology of the modern West, therefore, they are merely following 
the example set by their spiritual forerunners. “Seek knowledge,” runs a ḥadīth 
attributed to the Prophet, often cited by Syedna Muhammad Burhanuddin, 
“even if it be in China.” Ismāʿīlīs have been harmoniously integrating the 
ideas of traditional Islam with those of outside societies for at least the 
past millennium.
As part of the ethnographic fieldwork underlying this chapter, 169 Bohra 
households containing 1,068 individuals were surveyed on various aspects of 
their demography, beliefs, and daily practices (for details of the methodology 
of this survey, and its admitted limitations, see Blank 2001: 7–10). When asked 
to select the most important aspects of their faith, an overwhelming ninety-
four per cent cited direct, personal contact with the Dāʿī as among the most 
crucial. The category was ranked higher than any other element of orthopraxy, 
including ḥajj, pilgrimage to Kerbala, rituals of birth, mīthāq (the oath of alle-
giance taken by Bohras), marriage and death, eating ḥalāl food, personal ethics, 
ties with other Bohras (including endogamy), dress codes, or ziyaret (pilgrim-
age to Bohra shrines). Contact with the Dāʿī was not only deemed the most 
important aspect of orthopraxy in each of the four cities where the survey was 
conducted, it was rated number one by almost every respondent giving com-
parative rankings.
The Dāʿī embodies personal charisma to a degree very rarely found in Islam 
outside of certain Sufi traditions (Blank 2000: 474–475). This charisma is trans-
ferable to a wide array of objects: any item touched by the Dāʿī is believed to 
have ingrained merit. Not only did eighty-four per cent of survey respondents 
report having asked the Dāʿī to name their children, but a great many reported 
seeking scraps from his discarded clothing for their newborn babies’ chatti gar-
ments. Nearly two-thirds of respondents reported regularly seeking the bless-
ing of Syedna or his ʿāmils for their home or business, through the ritual of 
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alamat. The Dāʿī confers this blessing by inscribing the word bismillāh (Arabic 
for the words ‘In the name of God’) or its numerical stand-in (‘786’) on a plaque 
mounted on the wall of a new house or office, or on the first page of an account 
book for a new fiscal year.
This close contact between the Dāʿī al-muṭlaq and his flock is an essential 
element of Bohra identity, perhaps the strongest barrier against assimilation 
to the mainstream of Indian Islam. Until the thirteenth/nineteenth century 
the Bohra community was small and compact enough for such direct contact 
to be relatively easy: the population was heavily concentrated in Bombay and 
Gujarat, and most muʾminīn could have personal access to the Dāʿī on a fairly 
regular basis. As the denomination grew larger and farther-flung, however, this 
direct access became increasingly difficult. By the late thirteenth/nineteenth 
century, daily contact had come to be monopolised by the coterie of Surti fami-
lies with kinship ties to the royal lineage of the Dāʿīs. This elite capture of the 
clergy served to weaken the institution: At precisely the period when Bohra 
businessmen were becoming wealthy and were monopolising access to the 
Dāʿī, the clergy dropped to its lowest level of influence and popular legitimacy 
in modern history. Without close, personal access to the Dāʿī, the faith could 
not have withstood the twin pressures of ossification and assimilation. It was 
in large measure to combat this trend that Syedna Taher Saifuddin began the 
process of modernisation, which served to reinvigorate the faith and bring the 
Dāʿī back into closer contact with the mass of believers.
4 Program of Modernisation and Islamisation
4.1 Modernisation
The modernisation piece of the century-long program has two overlapping 
goals. The first goal has been to provide community members access to the 
material, social and intellectual aspects of modern life enjoyed by their neigh-
bors, thereby lessening the centrifugal force of assimilation which was pull-
ing many Bohras away from the community in the early fourteenth/twentieth 
century. The second goal has been to draw community members closer to the 
clergy, and thereby to restore both clerical hegemony and spiritual unity. A key 
mechanism for the second goal has been adoption of all manner of modern 
communication technology and often the modernist ideology that accompa-
nies it (cf. Asani 1994; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).
In recent decades, Bohras have used modern technology to recapture the 
close access to their Dāʿī that had been the hallmark of their sect in previous 
centuries. This effort has not been an accident: it was carefully fostered first 
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by Syedna Taher Saifuddin and subsequently by Syedna Burhanuddin. Since 
at least the middle of the fourteenth/twentieth century the daʿwat has eagerly 
latched onto every advance in communications: from telegram to telex, from 
fax to Federal Express, from transatlantic telephone to transpacific email. A 
Bohra living in Kolkata, seeking advice on whether to expand his hardware 
business into electrical fittings, need only email the daʿwat’s headquarters at 
Badri Mahal to have his question relayed to the Dāʿī for consideration. A Bohra 
living in Auckland, seeking a scrap of Syedna’s used clothing for her new baby’s 
chatti-garment, can WhatsApp a Mumbai relative to have the cloth sent by the 
next morning’s DHL.
Air travel has shrunk the world, and well into his elder years Syedna 
Burhanuddin (who lived to be 103 years old, by the Islamic calendar) regularly 
jetted across South Asia, Europe and Afria. His successors are certain to con-
tinue the practice. This hypermobility gives almost all Bohras the opportunity 
to see their spiritual leader face-to-face at least once in their lives. The Dāʿī 
visits his flock, and his flock visits the Dāʿī: eighty-two per cent of respon-
dents in the aforementioned survey had seen Syedna in person more than 
five times.
The Bohras are hardly the only Muslim community to embrace modern 
communications technology, but they did so much earlier and with fewer res-
ervations than most other groups. What truly distinguishes the Bohras from 
most other groups in the adoption of communications technology, however, is 
the holistic nature of their modernisation: Where some Islamists view Western 
technology with moral ambivalence (in the mid-1990s, for example, the Afghan 
Taliban used Russian tanks to crush VCRs, televisions and other examples of 
‘decadent’ technology), the Bohras regard it as something beneficial even on 
its own merits. New technologies are not adopted solely for the sake of novelty, 
but anything brings the community closer, or simply makes life easier, is heart-
ily encouraged.
Computer ownership, use, and literacy are far more prevalent in the Bohra 
community than in most other segments of Indian society. At time the sur-
vey associated with this study’s fieldwork was conducted, the rate of computer 
ownership among the Bohra respondents was more than twenty times the 
national rate of Indonesia, more than ten times that of Thailand, nearly qua-
druple that of Malaysia, about fifty per cent higher than those of Taiwan or 
South Korea, and almost on par with that Japan. The rate for Karachi’s Bohras 
was marginally higher than that of ultra-high-tech Singapore. Respondents 
were a whopping seventy-two times as likely to own a computer as was the 
contemporary norm in India (see Blank 2001: 176–178). Rates for Bohras and 
non-Bohras alike have risen since.
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Bohras were on the Internet practically as soon as it became globally opera-
tional. By January 1995, three linked email networks had been initiated, and 
in their first year of operation grew to include several hundred subscribers 
in Canada, Hong Kong, Thailand, India, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Britain, and 
Egypt. One network was “a forum for mu’mineen [muʾminīn] professionals” to 
facilitate business ties, a second was for social or general messages, and the 
third was devoted to spiritual discussions. While not officially set up by the 
daʿwat, its stated purpose is the dissemination of spiritual material. By the late 
1990s, email had replaced the postal service as the primary pathway for Bohras 
to seek guidance or favors from the Dāʿī al-muṭlaq. Videos of important reli-
gious rituals were distributed as soon as broadband service made such access 
possible, and soon every appearance by the Dāʿī al-muṭlaq was viewable on 
YouTube within minutes of the rite’s conclusion. Additional streaming services 
like Periscope now permit such rituals to be viewed in real time. A member of 
the community in Mombasa can keep track of her co-religionists’ activities in 
the United States or Canada (to name just two) simply by checking the groups’ 
Twitter feeds (@Bohras_USA and @Bohras_Canada).
Dissident websites and chat groups soon followed the orthodox commu-
nity online, giving the movement a new avenue for its battle against daʿwat 
authority. When Syedna Burhanuddin passed away in 1435/2014, the succes-
sion dispute between his son Mufaddal Saifuddin and his brother Khuzaima 
Qutbuddin immediately took to cyberspace. Both camps set up rival websites 
and Facebook pages almost instantly, and each used a full range of multimedia 
to support its claims with scanned documents, photographs, and videos of the 
late Dāʿī’s pivotal (and disputed) public designation of nass on his son.8
The most recent manifestation of the role played by modern technology in 
the shaping doctrinal issues is a still-raging controversy over a practice vari-
ously termed khatna, khafs, female circumcision, and Female Genital Cutting.9 
8 Supporters of the Dāʿī’s son Mufaddal Saifuddin say that nass was given privately while 
Syedna Burhanuddin was in a London hospital, and reiterated at a public ceremony sev-
eral months later. Supporters of the Dāʿī’s brother Khuzaima Qutbuddin say that Syedna 
Burhanuddin had secretly conveyed nass decades earlier, and that his public designation of 
his son Mufaddal is invalid since he had recently suffered a stroke. Each camp cites a video 
of the public designation to support its own interpretation of the event. The video of the cer-
emony, which took place on 19 Rajab 1432/21 June 2011, is available at https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=Ge9wG2Irv-Q, accessed 31/10/2018. There is a more detailed discussion of this 
schism in Blank (2017). Khuzaima Qutbuddin passed away on 30 March 2016, after conferring 
nass (his supporters believe) on his son Taher Fakhruddin.
9 Even the nomenclature of the practice is controversial: Opponents often regard the first 
three terms as offensive, because they see these names as conferring an Islamic patina to 
a non-Islamic action; proponents object to the third, as well as to its ideologically-laden 
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While circumcision of boys is practiced almost universally throughout the 
Muslim world, the custom has no widely-accepted female counterpart (Boyle 
2005). Before the Internet era, it was nearly impossible to offer an informed 
response to the question of whether such a practice occurred occasionally, fre-
quently or almost never among the Dāʾūdī Bohras: During my initial fieldwork, 
all reports of which I became aware (whether through personal informants 
or mentions in the local press) were non-specific, and second- or third-hand. 
That is no longer the case:
Several recent studies published online (Taher 2017; Anantnarayan 2018) 
have used academic methodology to document the existence of the practice 
within the Bohra community, and to suggest that it may be far more common 
than had previously been assumed, even by community members themselves.10 
The collection of data in these reports would not have been possible prior to 
the explosion in Internet access of the fifteenth/twenty-first century, and the 
online dissemination of this data has sparked a growing demand within the 
community (particularly from previously-under-represented women) for a 
top-down clerical banning of the practice. This demonstrates two points rel-
evant to the current chapter:
First, these reformists are not necessarily challenging the theological status 
of the daʿwat, indeed, some of them are hoping to use this status to imple-
ment a religiously-authorative ban on a practice which they regard not merely 
as harmful, but as un-Islamic. Second, modernity (both technology, and the 
intellectual freedom that often accompanies it) works both ways: Just as the 
daʿwat has used the tools of modernity to reestablish its own position as sole 
arbiter on issues of theology (a position that had fallen into serious question 
before the fourteenth/twentieth century reinvigoration), so too have commu-
nity members used the tools of modernity to press their own interpretations 
  cousin ‘Female Genital Mutilation’, or FGM. The practise is well-documented in cer-
tain other communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in East and West Africa 
(Shell-Duncan and Hernlund 2001; Gruenbaum 2006) but is rarely documented in South 
Asian communities.
10  These studies surveyed a combined total of over 500 respondents: The study authored by 
Mariya Taher had 408 (Taher 2017: 45), and the one authored by Lakshmi Anantnarayan 
with research assistance from Shabana Diler and Natasha Menon had 94 (Anantnarayan 
2018: 10). While both studies are associated with advocacy organisations—Sahiyo and We 
Speak Out, respectively—both conform to generally-accepted global standards for aca-
demic research. This topic is worthy of far more discussion than the current chapter can 
provide, but one point is of particular relevance here: These studies, and other reports 
rapidly emerging, have moved a topic that might previously have been left to family cus-
tom and clerical firman from the realm of ad hoc rule-making into the arena of wide-open 
social and theological debate.
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of theological questions that most concern them. If the daʿwat fails to address 
such interpretations, it may find the movement shifting quickly from reformist 
to rejectionist.
4.2 Islamisation
Throughout the fourteenth/twentieth centuries, but particularly during the 
reign of Syedna Burhanuddin, the daʿwat has paired its embrace of modernity 
with an effort to re-institutionalise Islamic norms in a community which had 
run the risk of cultural absorption to the Indian mainstream. Modern technol-
ogy enabled the clergy to gain increased control over community members’ 
orthopraxy, for example, by instituting a program whereby all Bohras seeking 
daʿwat services are issued green, yellow and red cards indicating their level of 
compliance with doctrine and practice. The process is bureaucratised and (in 
many sites) computerised, and would have been extremely difficult to imple-
ment without the tools of modernity. Perhaps the most visible symbol of the 
Islamisation project (a term used in this chapter to denote a top-down com-
munal emphasis on Islamic orthopraxy), is the mandated code of dress and 
personal appearance for all Bohras worldwide.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s Syedna Burhanuddin issued several pro-
nouncements setting out guidelines for dress and personal comportment by 
all observant Bohras. The two most important of these were a 1399/1979 direc-
tive that male Bohras should wear a beard and female Bohras should dress in 
a burqa, and a 1401/1981 instruction setting the normative male dress code as 
white topi, kurta and sherwani. The modern dress code is both a reaffirmation 
of preexisting practice and the introduction of novel elements to create a uni-
form, coherent ‘tradition’ in place of a less standardised array of customs. Prior 
to the 1401/1981 firman, for example, Bohra men had often dressed in white 
clothing and headgear, but often had worn other colors as well. The newly-
mandated use of white makes Bohras immediately distinguishable from Ithnā 
ʿAsharī Shīʿa, who often favor black clothing for both men and women. Prior to 
1401/1981, Bohra headgear had not been uniform. In colonial times there were 
at least four types of turban commonly worn; by the middle of the fourteenth/
twentieth century, turbans were being worn primarily by clerics, with laymen 
favoring smaller, less elaborate skullcaps. For ritual settings, however, laymen 
would often wear a feta, a pre-shaped, permanently-coiled turban of gold silk, 
now seen primarily among the older generation. The specific type of topi now 
deemed mandatory is only rarely seen in pre-1401/1981 photographs, and is 
subtly different from the headgear of other Muslim communities.
Bohra women are required to keep their bodies covered from ankles 
to shoulders with a burqa and to wear a special style of rida (veil). A Bohra 
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rida—which is essentially unique to the denomination—is less like a veil per 
se than like a bonnet: it covers the hair, neck, shoulders and upper chest, but 
leaves the entire face exposed. The rida has flaps on either side of the face, 
so that a woman can (if she is particularly scrupulous to detail) obscure her 
mouth and nose when conversing with a man outside her family; this seems, 
however, to be most commonly observed in the breach.
Boutiques in many Bohra neighborhoods advertise a wide array of ‘fancy 
ridas’ (any rida with a colorful pattern), and this technicolor exuberance of 
dress immediately sets Bohra women apart from those of most other Indian 
Muslim communities. At important social or religious functions, it is not 
uncommon for a Bohra woman go through three or four changes of ‘fancy rida’ 
during the course of a day’s varied activities. In a conscious attempt to dis-
tinguish themselves from Sunnīs and Ithnā ʿAsharīyya, Bohra women seldom 
wear plain black clothing. Prior to the mandated dress code, Bohra women had 
often adopted the clothing styles of their Hindu neighbors.
Close examination of a 1395/1975 Gujarati text entitled Gulshan-e Malumat 
(Raik 1975) yields an extremely valuable baseline for analysis of the daʿwat’s 
dress code reforms. Privately published in a limited edition distributed to vari-
ous daʿwat offices, the Gulshan is a ‘Who’s Who’ of important Bohra commu-
nity leaders throughout the world. The directory contains photographs of 3,177 
men: 2,078 residing in India, 1,099 residing abroad.11 Of these dignitaries—who 
can be assumed to represent a higher-than-average level of orthopraxy—a 
mere thirty-seven per cent were in compliance with dress and appearance 
guidelines that are normative today. While the association of wearing a beard 
with the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad is well-established, a solid major-
ity of men pictured in the Gulshan had stopped wearing beards by the 1970s.12
11  As in most official or semi-official Bohra texts, for reasons of modesty no photographs of 
women are printed.
12  Nearly one-quarter (twenty-three per cent) of those living in India are shown in wholly 
untraditional ways (generally in Western clothing with no beard, but occasionally in 
Indian garb unassociated with Bohras). Well over another quarter (twenty-nine per cent) 
wear Bohra headgear but no beard, indicating easy mobility between the traditional and 
nontraditional worlds: all of these men could put on a topi for a photograph or for offi-
cial occasions, but would blend perfectly well into the Indian or Western mainstream as 
soon as they removed their headgear. For Bohras living outside of India, only sixteen per 
cent had an appearance that would be acceptable today. When figures for India and other 
countries are combined, the population of over three thousand individuals breaks down 
roughly into thirds: thirty-seven per cent have a traditional appearance, thirty per cent 
have semi-traditional appearance (community headgear, but no beards), and thirty-three 
per cent offer wholly non-traditional self-presentations.
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If such a work were published today, it is highly unlikely that any of the 
more than three thousand men pictured would present themselves without 
a beard or dressed in anything other than uniform topi/kurta. In every daʿwat 
publication examined for this study, and every Bohra function attended dur-
ing the course of the fieldwork on which it is based, adherence to mandated 
community dress codes has been close to universal. Dress is but one element 
of orthopraxy—but it is among the most visible, and stands as a statistically-
measurable proxy for a much wider range of behaviors (including fasting dur-
ing Ramadan, avoidance of alcohol, and communal prayer) that the Bohra 
daʿwat monitors with similar attention.
5 Conclusion
As Margaret Mead noted, “Technical change is as old as civilisation. Since time 
immemorial the ways of people have been transformed by the introduction of 
new tools and new technical procedures” (Mead 1953: 9). There would be little 
noteworthy about the Bohras’ modernisation if it were limited to the adoption 
of technological conveniences. What makes the program remarkable is its use 
of both ‘hardware’ (technology) and ‘software’ (modernist ideas, particularly 
in the educational field)—to reinvigorate core beliefs. The Muslim world has 
seen instances of reformers using Western practices to downgrade the position 
of Islam in society—for example, in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey (Okyar 
1984; Rahman 1984), or Mohammad Shah Reza Pahlavi’s Iran (Yalman 1991; 
Ansari 2001). The use of modern pedagogy and a Western intellectual frame-
work paired with a re-institutionalisation of Islamic orthopraxy, however, is far 
less common.
Syedna Taher Saifuddin began promoting modern education about a cen-
tury ago, and he is generally credited for the attitudinal sea change on Western 
pedagogy that has swept the community since that time. There are currently 
more than 350 Bohra schools throughout the world, all of them operating 
under the late Dāʿī’s educational philosophy of combining Western and Islamic 
learning into a single curriculum. The highest centers of Bohra education are 
three universities, the Jamea-tus-Saifiyah campuses in Surat (India) Karachi 
(Pakistan), and Nairobi (Kenya), whose students must all follow a full curricu-
lum of both Western and Islamic subjects.13 When asked to state the highest 
13  The Jamea-tus-Saifiyah was first established, in a less ambitious form, in the 1224/1814 in 
Surat, and became the cause of considerable contention between the clergy and dissident 
reformists before the daʿwat established full control in the fourteenth/twentieth century. 
The Karachi campus was inaugurated in 1404/1983. Construction of the Nairobi campus 
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level of education attained by any member of their household, ninety-one per 
cent of respondents to the survey cited secondary school or higher; only fifty-
eight per cent of the same families reported such educational levels for their 
previous generation. Such a survey, if carried out today, would almost certainly 
yield even higher numbers.
This adoption of Western pedagogical philosophy is directly related to 
unusually high levels of female education in the community: eighty-nine per 
cent of survey respondents reported full educational parity between the male 
and female members of their extended families. This is not an accident: over 
forty years ago, Syedna Burhanuddin explicitly directed Bohra families to pro-
vide equal educations to their daughters and sons alike. Education has led 
to economic and social empowerment: in the space of just two generations, 
Bohra women have moved into the professional world at a pace that would 
have astonished their grandmothers. Today, the presence of Bohra women 
(often wearing community dress and observing other elements of Islamic 
orthopraxy) in professions such as medicine, finance, law or scientific research 
is so common as to be almost quotidian.
Many traditionalist Muslim communities have adopted modern technology 
while rejecting the educational philosophy and other ideas accompanying it. A 
smaller number of Muslim groups—for example, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī followers 
of the Aga Khan—have taken on Western education and ideology even more 
unreservedly than the Bohras, but have placed less emphasis on using these 
ideas to re-institutionalise Islamic orthopraxy. Dāʾūdī Bohras have eagerly 
done both: they have enthusiastically embraced key elements of modern ide-
ology as well as technology, but paired this embrace with a conscious attempt 
to re-invigorate doctrines and traditions that were losing ground to assimila-
tionist pressures of the wider society. This is perhaps the most noteworthy and 
unusual part of the Dāʾūdī Bohra identity program, and bears study by scholars 
of other traditionalist communities facing similar challenges.
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Chapter 12
The Alevīs and ʿAlawīs
Yvette Talhamy
1 Introduction
Many confuse the Alevīs of Turkey with the ʿAlawīs of Syria, regarding them 
as one and the same because their names are similar. In both cases, the name 
indicates a loyalty to, or descent from, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the cousin and son-in-
law of the Prophet Muḥammad and a figure who is venerated by both groups 
and especially so in Shīʿa Islam. However, close examination of the two groups 
indicates that, despite some small similarities in their religious doctrines and 
practices, the differences between the two are far greater.
Although the ʿAlawīs constitute just a small percentage of the Syrian pop-
ulation (about twelve percent), they are the only minority that rules over a 
Sunnī-majority population; they are the ‘rulers’ of Syria, since the president 
of the state (from 1971 CE until today 2020 CE)1 is of an ʿAlawī origin. The 
term ʿAlawī’ became prevalent only in the early-twentieth century; up until 
then, they were known to most as the Nuṣayrīs. Since the thirteenth century, 
most of the group has inhabited the mountain region Jabal al-Nuṣayriyya (‘the 
Nuṣayriyya Mountain’ which is named after the group) in Northwest Syria, 
as well as the Hatay region in South Turkey. Today, however, followers can be 
found across many parts of Syria (Zisser 1999: 130).
Some sources consider the ʿAlawīs to be a sect, a stance taken in accordance 
with Shīʿite doctrine. Although there are some likenesses between the ʿAlawīs 
and Twelver Shīʿite Islam, such as their mutual reverence for ʿAlī and the twelve 
imāms, as well as their shared belief in religious dissimulation, the ʿ Alawīs hold 
many beliefs that are not accepted by the Twelver Shīʿites. These include the 
belief in the transmigration of souls and the placing of ʿAlī above the Prophet 
Muḥammad, among others (Friedman 2002: 89).
Today, the Alevīs are one of Turkey’s largest religious minorities. No accu-
rate data regarding the proportion of Alevīs within the Turkish population 
are currently available, and it could be anywhere between 10 to 40 per cent 
and “recent figures suggest Alevīs number in the region of 20 to 25 million” 
(Minority Rights Group International n.d.). Celia Jenkins, Suavi Aydin, and 
1 Dates are given in common era (CE) throughout unless specified.
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Umit Cetin point out that these numbers are confounded because the Alevīs 
are not recognised as a distinct religious group but are “subsumed under Islam” 
(2018: 5 n. 1).
The Alevīs are a set of religious groups with roots in Anatolia (Massicard 
2013: 4). During the nineteenth century, the term ‘Alevī’ was used occasionally 
in reference to the Kızılbaş (‘red heads’, named after a red bonnet with twelve 
folds that symbolises the twelve imāms2) to indicate loyalty to, or descent 
from, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Since the 1920s, however, the term ‘Alevī’ has been 
used widely, with the community itself coming to utilise the term (Martens 
2009: 12). Alevī literature, such as Alevī periodicals and newspapers, and 
many books, booklets, and articles on the Alevīs, have been published since 
the 1990s (Vorhoff 2005: 23–50). In addition, various research papers written 
by non-Alevīs have appeared. Nonetheless, the Alevī identity remains hard to 
define. Part of the reason is that it is hard to give a clear-cut explanation of 
their beliefs and practices because they are so diverse.
Although the Alevīs are frequently described as a branch of Twelver Shīʿite 
Islam because they share the Shīʿites’ reverence of ʿAlī, the two creeds have 
hardly anything else in common, as we shall see. Alevīsm is a syncretic, plu-
ralistic tradition, which includes elements of Islam, Shamanism, Christianity, 
and the pre-Christian religions of rural Anatolia (Jenkins 2007), while Twelver 
Shīʿites tend to reject any tradition that is not wholly Islamic.
This chapter will examine the two Islamic creeds of the ʿAlawīs and Alevīs 
and their religious doctrines, rituals, and historical backgrounds. It will con-
sider how they became organised sects with their own theologies and identi-
ties, as well as exploring the changes that they have both undergone over the 
years. In addition, the complex relationship both movements have with both 
Shīʿa and Sunnī Islam will become apparent.
2 Theological Background to ʿAlawīs and Alevīs
After the death of the Prophet Muḥammad in 632, the first signs of a divi-
sion in the Muslim umma (community) appeared in relation to the right 
to inherit his position as the leader of the umma. The majority of Muslims 
believed that they should not give preference to one Muslim over another and 
that every pious Muslim was suitable for this position; these Muslims were 
2 It seems that the term Kızılbaş originated at the turn of the sixteenth century, in the time of 
Shāh Ismāʿīl (1510–1524).
281The Alevīs and ʿAlawīs
called the Ahl-e-Sunna (Juynboll and Brown 1997: 878). However, another 
group of Muslims, the shīʿat ʿAlī (the party/partisans of ʿAlī), claimed that ʿAlī 
ibn Abī Ṭālib was the most suitable to inherit this position, given that he was 
the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law and, although he was very young, he was 
among the first to believe in Muḥammad’s daʿwa (‘call’/‘mission’). Moreover, 
they argued that the Prophet, while he was alive, had declared ʿAlī his heir, a 
nomination which was in accordance with the heavenly order (Al-Tawil 1924: 
60–89). Thus, they rejected the principle of choosing a leader; for them, ʿAlī 
had already been chosen by God (Madelung 1997: 420).
ʿAlī was named the fourth khalīfa (caliph) after the third khalīfa, ʿUthmān 
b. ʿAffān, was murdered in 656. The appointment strengthened the differ-
ences within the Muslim umma. During ʿAlī’s reign, a schismatic group named 
the Khārijites (literally ‘those who went out’) appeared and, in 661, ʿAlī was 
murdered by one of them. After ʿAlī’s death, his partisans, the Shīʿites, argued 
that the person most suitable to inherit his position was his son, al-Ḥasan: the 
grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad (Madelung 1997: 420–424). However, 
it was Muʿāwiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, who became the fifth 
khalīfa. The Caliphate was then held by the Umayyads until the year 750.
Most Shīʿites are Twelvers (Ithnā ʿAsharī); also referred to as the imāmiyya 
or Jaʿfariyya).3 They believe in the existence of twelve imāms, beginning with 
ʿAlī, al-Ḥasan, and al-Ḥusayn (respectively), and continuing along the line of 
al Ḥusayn’s descendants until the twelfth imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, who 
went into occultation in 873.4 Over the years, several splits occurred among the 
Shīʿites regarding who had the right to be the imām, thus causing the appear-
ance of different creeds such as the Zaydīs (supporters of Zayd bin ʿAlī’s revolt) 
and the Ismāʿīlīs (named after Ismāʿīl, son of the sixth imām, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq). 
As well as these groups, other creeds that deified ʿAlī also began to appear. 
Amongst these is the Nuṣayrī (later ʿAlawī) creed, which first appeared in the 
ninth century in Iraq (Friedman 2002: 28).
3 Ja‘fariyya is derived from the name of Ja‘far al-Sadiq, the sixth imām (d. 765), who developed 
Shīʿite jurisprudence during his lifetime.
4 Occultation—Ghaybah—concealment or absence. According to the Shīʿites the imām 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī has disappeared and he will return to establish justice and peace. 
There were two periods of occupations- the minor Occultation and the major Occultation. 
During the minor Occultation, which lasted until 941, the imām communicated with the 
community through four successive appointed agents. During the major Occultation, which 
continues to the present, there is no special agent.
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3 The Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs)
The founder of the Nuṣayrīs is believed to have been Abū Shuʿayb Muḥammad 
ibn Nuṣayr al-Namīrī (d. 883), known by his agnomen, Abū Shuʿayb (Dussaud 
1900: 9–10). According to some sources, ibn Nuṣayr was closely associated with 
the eleventh imām, Hasan al-ʿAskarī, who died in 873 (Kitāb al-munazara, Ms 
Paris, Fonds arabe 1450: 119). Indeed, ibn Nuṣayr claimed that he was the ‘gate’ 
(bāb)5 of the eleventh imām. In one Nuṣayrī text, it is stated that al-ʿAskarī said: 
“Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr is my light, my door, and my proof against mankind. 
Whatever he related to me is true” (Moosa 1988: 259). Moreover, ibn Nuṣayr 
asserted that he represented the occulted imām, a claim which led him to be 
excommunicated from the Shiʿi community (Friedman 2002: 8).
The circle of ibn Nuṣayr’s supporters expanded and became known collec-
tively as the Nuṣayrīs. Ibn Nuṣayr was succeeded by Muḥammad ibn Jundab, 
who, in turn, was succeeded by ʿAbdallāh al-Jannān al-Junbulānī (d. 900). 
Another figure that had a central role in the formation of the Nuṣayrī creed 
was al-Ḥusayn b. Ḥamdān al-Khaṣībī (d. 957), who, for several reasons, decided 
to move to al-Sham (Greater Syria). By the tenth century, there were already 
Nuṣayrīs on both sides of the Euphrates, in Iraq (mainly Baghdad and Kūfa), 
and in Syria (mostly Harran and Aleppo) (Halm 1995: 148–150; Friedman 2002: 
32–33). According to some sources, by the eleventh century, Nuṣayrī communi-
ties could already be found in Jabal al-Ansariyya (Friedman 2002: 42). Another 
important Nuṣayrī figure is Maymūn b. Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī (d. 1034/5), who is 
said to have assumed leadership by the beginning of the eleventh century. 
Al-Ṭabarānī is reported to have been an outstanding leader and theologian, 
and to have written more books than any other Nuṣayrī theologian (Friedman 
2002: 41).
During the thirteenth century, the Nuṣayrī population in Syria increased 
considerably, due mainly to migration from Jabal Sinjar (north-western Iraq, 
near the Syrian border). According to the ʿAlawī historian Muhammad Amin 
Ghalib al-Tawil, in 1220, the Nuṣayrīs were attacked by the Kurds and Ismāʿīlīs, 
and asked for help from Amīr al-Makzūn al-Sinǧārī (Al-Tawil 1924: 295–300). 
Al-Makzūn al-Sinǧārī came to the aid of the Nuṣayrīs but was defeated 
(Al-Tawil 1924: 296–297). Three years later, in 1222, al-Makzūn al-Sinǧārī, lead-
ing a large number of warriors and their families, came to the Nuṣayrīs’ rescue 
once more, this time defeating the Kurds and the Ismāʿīlīs. Al-Sinǧārī’s warriors 
5 The bāb (‘gate’) is a religious role, and the person holding this role is responsible for directing 
or leading the people to the imām by teaching them the religious doctrine. This term was also 
applied in early Shiʿism, being given to a senior disciple of the imām.
283The Alevīs and ʿAlawīs
and their families are considered the ancestors of most of the Nuṣayrī clans in 
Syria (ʿAli 1972: 349; Al-Tawil 1924: 298). After the Mongols raided Iraq (1258), 
they destroyed all the religious centers in the country, including that of the 
Nuṣayrīs. Their station in Syria became the sole Nuṣayrī missionary station, 
and it was thus that Syria became the center of Nuṣayrī settlement (Al-Tawil 
1924: 307).
3.1 Nuṣayrī Doctrine
The Nuṣayrī doctrine is secretive and, similar to other minority sects who were 
persecuted due to their religious believes, the Nuṣayrīs resort to religious dis-
similation (taqiyya) in times of danger, meaning that they are allowed to and 
even should hide their true religion in order to avoid persecution (Friedman 
2002: 143). Nevertheless, various Nuṣayrī religious books and treatises have 
been written by their theologians, including Kitāb al-majmūʿ (‘Book of the 
Totality/Synthesis’), Kitāb al-maʿārif (‘Book of Knowledge’), Kitāb majmūʿ 
al-aʿyad (‘Book of Festivals’), Kitāb al-mashyakha (‘The Manual for Shaykhs’), 
Kitāb al-usūs (‘The Book of Foundations’), Kitāb taʿlim al-diyanat al-Nuṣayriyya, 
(the Nuṣayrī Catechism), Risālat al- tawḥīd (‘The Epistle of the Unity of God’). 
From these texts, we can learn about Nuṣayrī doctrine.
At the heart of the Nuṣayrī creed is the deification of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib. 
According to the group, the essence of the divinity was personified in him. 
As a consequence, he is considered superior to the Prophet Muḥammad. The 
Nuṣayrīs also believe in the divine triad of ‘A.M.S.’:
1. ‘A’ stands for ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who is considered to be the maʿnā 
(‘essence’ or ‘meaning’). According to the Nuṣayrī catechism, “ʿAlī ibn Abī 
Ṭālib; he is God—there is no God but him, the merciful, the compassion-
ate” (Kitāb taʿlim al-diyanat al-Nuṣayriyya, Ms Paris, Fonds arabe 6182: 2). 
For the Nuṣayrīs, ʿAlī was not a human being but a docetic appearance of 
a human form, through which God contacted humanity (Friedman 2002: 
132). They believe that ʿAlī is the one who created Muḥammad, who is the 
second element of the divine triad of ʿAlī, Muḥammad, and Salman.
2. ‘M’ stands for Muḥammad the Prophet, who is considered by to be 
the ism (‘name’) or ḥijāb (‘veil’) that hides the essence: “know that the 
maʿnā entered the bāb, veiled himself in the ism” (Kitāb taʿlim al-diyanat 
al-Nuṣayriyya, Ms Paris, Fonds arabe 6182: 4). The ism was created from 
the divine light of the maʿnā, which, in turn, created the bāb (‘gate’).
3. ‘S’ stands for Salmān al-Fārisī, one of the Prophet Muḥammad’s compan-
ions, who is considered to be the bāb that leads to the ‘name,’ which, in 
turn, leads to the essence: “he is the only bāb which leads to the maʿnā, 
the causal determinant [ʿAlī], through the name [Muḥammad]. No one 
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comes to the God, ʿAlī, except through him” (Risalat al-bayan li Ahl al-uʿqal 
wa al-afham wa man talab al-huda ila maʿrifat al Rahman, Ms Paris, Fonds 
arabe 1450: 55).
According to the Nuṣayrī catechism, A.M.S. is “a trinity without separation, 
whose unity indicates the divinity of our master [ʿAlī]” (Kitāb taʿlim al-diyanat 
al-Nuṣayriyya, Ms Paris, Fonds arabe 6182: 4).
The Nuṣayrīs believe in metempsychosis (tanasukh) or transmigration, 
which is a sort of a punishment (Friedman 2002: 104). For them, at the begin-
ning of time, there was a pure world of light, and God was praised by his 
enlightened creations. God wanted to test them, so He changed his form, creat-
ing confusion among them. Two major sins were committed by His creations: 
doubt and pride. These sins were followed by other sins, thus causing their 
gradual fall from the ‘world of light’ to the ‘material world,’ where they were 
given human bodies. According to the Nuṣayrīs, when a person dies, his/her 
soul leaves the body and moves to another body. It could be a human body, 
plant, insect, or inanimate object, depending on the person’s actions and belief 
in ʿAlī. The sinner’s transmigration can occur on one of five possible levels 
(Friedman 2002: 105; Kitāb al-majmu‘ mentions seven levels; see Dussaud 1900: 
183). The more severe a person’s sins, the more inferior the creature into which 
the soul transmigrates will be. Gnosis is the path through which one can return 
to the pre-fall state in the world of light, and only a small minority of pious 
mystics (with no body defects) can return there. Even then, it is only after 
studying religious texts deeply and gaining extensive knowledge that one can 
reach the highest degree of piety required to return to that world (Friedman 
2002: 115–118).
The journey back to the world of light begins with the ‘initiation,’ a pro-
cess with several stages, in which an instructor (naqīb) and an initiate are both 
involved. Initiates range in age from fifteen to sixty and are all male, since 
women are not allowed to follow this path. In addition, initiates must have 
Nuṣayrī parents and must take an oath of secrecy. They are obliged to maintain 
a pure way of life and to keep away from any material temptation that might 
prevent their salvation. If the initiate disobeys his instructor or betrays him, he 
is expelled from the process. The relationship between the instructor and the 
initiate is that of a father and son—a kind of “spiritual fatherhood” (Friedman 
2002: 214). Rev. Samuel Lyde (d. 1860), who lived among the Nuṣayrīs in the 
1850s, offers extracts from the Nuṣayrī text Kitāb al-mashyakha in his book The 
Asian Mystery, in which the ‘contract’ between the instructor and the initiate 
is elucidated.6 In general, then, Nuṣayrīs can be divided into two groups: the 
6 “Now the rights due to the Seyyid from his son are that he reveal not his secrets, nor disobey 
his commands, nor bear malice against him in his breast […] And the rights due to a son from 
285The Alevīs and ʿAlawīs
khassa (‘initiated elite’), or the shaykhs (‘spiritual leaders,’ who are in a minor-
ity), and the ʿamma (the ‘ignorant mass,’ consisting of the majority of the pop-
ulation) (Friedman 2002: 144).
The Nuṣayrīs have no specific place of worship but pray in private houses 
(bayt/manzil), and the shaykhs take turns to invite the khassa to hold meetings 
at their homes for various purposes (Friedman 2002: 146). The main religious 
ceremony, which includes the sanctification of wine, is called the quddās, or 
‘mass’ (Moosa 1988: 398–408). The Nuṣayrīs also have their own festivals, which 
are elaborated in the Kitāb Majmūʿ al-aʿyād (‘Book of Festivals’) by al-Ṭabarānī. 
These festivals contain elements from different religious and ethnic sources: 
Sunnī, Shīʿite, Persian, and Christian. They celebrate, for example, Eid al-Adha, 
(the ‘festival of sacrifice’), Eid al-Ghadir (the celebration of the appointment of 
ʿAlī by the Prophet Muḥammad as his successor), Nawruz (Persian new year), 
and Laylat al-Milad (Christmas), but they are given their own Nuṣayrī interpre-
tations (Lyde 2003: 382–398).
The five pillars of Islam are also interpreted differently by the Nuṣayrīs. For 
example, the fast (sawm) of Ramadan is marked by fasting during the daytime, 
but also includes abstention from speech. Every day of the month of Ramadan 
represents a different Nuṣayrī figure (shaykhs), and the celebration of al-Fitr 
(‘breaking of the fast’) represents the abolition of the taqiyya at the end of 
time (Friedman 2002: 155). Moreover, the obligation to pay zakāt is interpreted 
as the giving of a spiritual gift, rather than a material one (although it should 
be noted that Nuṣayrīs do not exempt themselves from charitable giving) 
(Friedman 2002: 139).
Nuṣayrī society is segmented along the lines of tribes, religious schools, and 
classes (religious leaders, landowners, and peasants); there is no distinctive 
religious or secular leadership. Over the years, this has had a significant influ-
ence on the internal solidarity of the group (Al-Sharif 1994: 116–125; Al-Tawil 
1924: 469). The Nuṣayrīs can be split into four large tribes or tribal confedera-
tions (ʿashāʾir): the Khayyatin, the Hadadin, the Kalbiyya, and the Matawira. 
Each tribe is comprised of several smaller clans, each with its own chief. This 
setup has led to the Nuṣayrīs suffering severely as a result of internecine quar-
rels from time to time. Disturbances and bloody clashes have erupted between 
various Nuṣayrī clans, some of them lasting for decades and causing heavy 
losses, in terms of life and property (Al-Tawil 1924: 349–375). There have also 
his Seyyid are, good bringing up and proper instruction; and that he do not put hardships on 
him, nor teach him in a faulty way; […] and warn him against all transgression and lusts […] 
My wish is that he would […] direct me to the right knowledge of God […] know that if you 
[initiate] shall have known it [the secret], and shall reject it […] you will be transported into 
horrid shapes […] take care of your brethren […] you must observe prayer […] and give alms” 
(Lyde 2003 [1860]: 257–264).
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been some religious differences between the main Nuṣayrī religious school 
(Al-Hariri 1987: 194). The main religious schools, each of which has its own reli-
gious leaders, are the Shamsiya (from the word Shams-sun) or Shamaliya, and 
the Qamariya (from the word Qamar-moon) or Kalaziya (Moosa 1988: 337–341; 
Al-Tawil 1924: 468–469; Lyde 2003 [1860]: 188).
Besides the internecine quarrels, the Nuṣayrīs have been persecuted by suc-
cessive Sunnī Muslim rulers, who have considered the group to be a danger 
to Islam. Over the years, several Sunnī scholars have issued fatwās against the 
Nuṣayrīs, declaring them heretics. During the fourteenth century, for exam-
ple, the Sunnī scholar Taqī ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) issued three 
fatwās against the Nuṣayrīs. Though they contain false theological and histori-
cal accusations against the Nuṣayrīs, the fatwās were (and still are) exploited 
by some extremists to justify their attacks against the group (Talhamy 2010: 
175–194).
Two other Sunnī fatwās were issued during the period of Ottoman rule 
(1516–1918). One of these fatwās was issued in the sixteenth century. According 
to various sources, the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, who was at war with the Shīʿite 
Ṣafavids that ruled over Persia (Iran) from 1502 onward, feared a possible col-
laboration between the various Shīʿite creeds living adjacent to the border 
with Persia and the Ṣafavid state. He requested a fatwā to justify the conduct 
of an expedition to tackle these groups, among which were the Nuṣayrīs. The 
second fatwā, issued during the 1820s, stated that the property and lives of the 
Nuṣayrīs were at the Muslims’ disposal (Talhamy 2010: 183). It is worth men-
tioning that, even though the Ottomans referred to the Nuṣayrīs as heretics, 
they did not require them to pay the jizya (the poll tax that the non-Muslims 
had to pay). For the purposes of the census, they were counted as part of the 
Muslim community and, later on, were recruited into the Ottoman army 
(Talhamy 2011b: 33).
These fatwās and the persecution by the Ottomans caused the Nuṣayrīs to 
retreat to the Nuṣayriyya Mountain and live in small, mainly homogenous vil-
lages or in areas surrounding the coastal cities such as Tripoli, Latakia, and 
Jablah. They lived in seclusion, avoiding the cities and any encounters with 
the Ottoman authorities or the Muslim community. Isolated in their mountain 
fortresses and living in ramshackle villages, they had to endure famine and 
poverty, as well as exploitation by their landlords, most of whom were Sunnīs 
and held contempt for their tenants, considering them to be infidels (Talhamy 
2010: 182).
Due to their miserable situation, during the nineteenth century, the Nuṣayrīs 
revolted against the Ottomans, refusing to pay taxes. They attacked and plun-
dered their neighboring villages before their attempts were brutally subdued 
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by the Ottomans (Talhamy 2008: 905). In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the Nuṣayrīs, as a religious minority, became a prime target for the 
Protestant missionaries. This motivated the Ottomans to take action to inte-
grate them into official state religion—or, in other words, ‘Sunnify’ them—
by building schools and mosques in their villages, as well as sending Sunnī 
imāms to them. However, neither the Ottomans, nor the Protestant mission-
aries had much success in converting the Nuṣayrīs (Talhamy 2011a: 218–236). 
Indeed, they maintained a lowly existence in poverty until the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire.
3.2 Becoming ʿAlawīs
After World War I, and in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 
Syria, Lebanon, and Alexandretta were to be put under French control in what 
came to be known as the French Mandate. Under the French Mandate, the 
Nuṣayrīs faced major changes. One of these changes pertained to their name: 
during the 1920s, they became known as ʿAlawīs or ʿAlawites (‘followers of 
ʿAlī’). Indeed, as the 1920s and 1930s progressed, the group started fostering 
this change itself. As Nuṣayrīs, they were outcasts; as ʿAlawīs, however, they 
could position themselves as part of Shīʿite Islam and, thus, part of the Muslim 
community. Hence, during those years, a gradual denial of the Nuṣayrī iden-
tity began to occur, along with the emergence of a substantial body of apolo-
getic literature on the issue. At the same time, serious measures were taken 
by the newly named ʿAlawīs to stress their links to the Shīʿite doctrine (Firro 
2005: 1–31).
Some ʿAlawīs, such as the historian Muhammad Ghalib al-Tawil, say that 
this was an inevitable step; it allowed the ʿAlawīs finally to restore their origi-
nal name and discard the name given to them by their opponents in order 
to denigrate them: “after the World War the ancient name of the community 
[ʿAlawī] was returned to them […] They were deprived of it for 412 years” 
(Al-Tawil 1924: 388). In 1926 a group of ʿAlawī ʿulamāʾ issued a proclamation, 
which stated that: “Every ʿAlawī is a Muslim […] The ʿAlawīs are Shīʿite Muslims 
[…] they are the adherents of the imām ʿAlī” (Al-Ibrahim 1992: 87–88). Then, in 
April 1933, some ʿAlawī ʿulamāʾ asked to be recognised in the population reg-
isters under the name ʿAlawī Muslims’ (Yafee 1992: 251–257). In 1936, another 
important step toward becoming part of the Muslim faith was taken when the 
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Sunnī Hajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, (d. 1974), issued a 
fatwā that described ʿAlawīs as part of the Muslim community: “the ʿAlawīs are 
Muslims and the whole Muslim community should cooperate with them for 
good deeds and move away from the bad deeds […] they are brothers in faith” 
(Boneschi 1940: 42–45, 134–152). This was the first time in history that a high 
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religious authority had recognised the ʿAlawīs as belonging within the Muslim 
community, rather than as an extremist heretic creed that endangered Islam. 
Following this, a series of declarations were made by ʿAlawī ʿulamāʾ, stating 
that they were Shīʿite Muslims (Al-Ibrahim 1999: 79–81, 93–96). Although some 
may argue that the main purpose of the fatwā was to ensure the integrity of 
Syria, rather than to reconcile with the ʿAlawīs, it certainly paved the way for 
the group’s integration into the Muslim community, being crucial in the end-
ing of their long period of isolation (Talhamy 2009: 564).
Politically, however, some ʿAlawī leaders saw the French Mandate as an 
opportunity to gain power by capitalising on the notion of religious difference. 
The French, who pursued a policy of ‘divide and rule,’ split Syria into small 
territories along religious and ethnic lines, and so the ʿAlawīs asked for their 
own independent state to be granted. It was thus that the ‘State of the ʿAlawīs’ 
(1920–1936) was established in the Nuṣayriyya Mountain area. While some 
ʿAlawīs were pleased to have their own ‘independent state,’ others opposed 
it—mainly the young and the educated. They felt that the only way to preserve 
their existence was through integration with a united Syria, rather than by hav-
ing their own state (Firro 2005: 17–26).
It was after the French departed Syria in April 1946 that the ʿAlawīs’ ascen-
dance to power began. This happened through two main channels: the army 
and the secular-nationalist Baʿth Party (Zisser 1999: 133). There were several 
reasons why the ʿAlawīs became so prominent in the army. During the 1920s, 
the French formed the Special Troops of the Levant (Les Troupes Spéciales du 
Levant), which were composed of troops recruited locally in the Levant. The 
majority of these Syrian troops came from rural backgrounds and minority 
groups: the ʿAlawīs, Druze, Kurds, and Circassians. This army, which, by the 
end of 1945, numbered about 5,000 (in addition to about 3,500 gendarmer-
ies) became the regular armed forces of the newly independent state of Syria 
(Collelo 1987: 236–237). Though many Sunnīs joined the post-independence 
Syrian army, various Sunnī urban-, middle-, and upper-class families consid-
ered the army unfit for their children (Faksh 1984: 143). In contrast, ʿAlawī boys, 
who tended not to go to secondary school and suffered from grave economic 
situations, often chose the military academy, seeing it as a promising start for 
social advancement. Some of them reached top ranks in the army. Indeed, the 
political instability in post-independence Syria facilitated ʿAlawī dominance of 
the armed forces (Moosa 1988: 281, 293). During the 1960s, prominent ʿAlawī offi-
cers such as Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad and Ṣalāḥ Jadīd were placed in important positions 
in the armed forces high command (Moosa 1988: 299) and, by the mid-1960s, 
the ʿAlawīs have been prominent in both the army and the security services 
(Devlin 1991: 1404). At the same time, the socio-economic circumstances of the 
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ʿAlawī peasants improved considerably as the ʿAlawīs started moving eagerly 
into education and gained strong representation in key professions and within 
senior state positions (Van Dam 2011: 9).
The secular Baʿth Party was founded in 1947 and drew its strength from the 
lower socio-economic classes, minorities, and populations inhabiting rural 
and peripheral regions of the country (Zisser 2001: 7). During the 1960s, the 
party was under ʿAlawī leadership. It seized power in Syria and managed to 
retain it, coming to rule the nation (Faksh 1984: 141). Then, in November 1970, 
the Corrective Revolution (al-Thawra al-Tashihiya) brought Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad 
(d. 2000) to power and, in 1971, he became the first ʿAlawī president of Syria 
(Zisser 2001: 1). Asad (also Assad) managed to unite the ʿAlawīs under his lead-
ership and change their social and economic situation. The ʿAlawīs, under 
Asad, became the most dominant political force in Syria. As Matti Moosa puts 
it, “[t]he Nuṣayrīs, who once would have been content to have autonomy in 
their own area, now were in control of Syria” (1988: 309).
During the 1970s, Asad made conciliatory moves to gain the trust of the 
Sunnī majority: he prayed at mosques on Fridays (Dekmejian 1995: 107) and 
during major Muslim holidays and undertook ʿumra (‘small ḥajj’) to Mecca. 
He abolished restrictions on religious institutions and allowed the construc-
tion of new mosques (Maʿoz 2004: 182). In addition, he tried to win religious 
legitimacy for the ʿAlawīs. In September 1972, Hasan Mahdi al-Shirazi (d. 1980), 
an Iraqi Shīʿite cleric, stated that “the beliefs of the ʿAlawīs conformed in every 
respect to those of their Twelver Shīʿite brethren” (Kramer 1987: 249; Al-Mazlum 
1999: 127–128; Al-Sharif 1994: 7–8). Then, in July 1973, al-Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, 
the leader of Lebanon’s Shīʿite community, recognised the Muslim ʿAlawīs as 
brothers of the Shīʿites (Al-Nahar 1973).
Some groups in Syrian society, however, refused to accept this new ʿAlawī 
status. They included the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (henceforth SMB), who 
were outlawed by the Baʿth Party in 1964. In 1976, the SMB revolted against 
the regime’s socio-economic policy, sectarian character, and secular worldview 
(Zisser 2001: 10). The group believed that Islam should be declared as the state 
religion and that sharīʿa should be the basis of legislation (Hinnebusch 1990: 
278). They accused the regime of being tyrannical, corrupt, oppressive, and 
unjust (Abd-Allah 1983: 43). The SMB was joined by other secular opposition 
forces, who protested against Asad’s intervention in Lebanon (1976), official 
corruption, and the domination of the ʿAlawīs in every sphere of life in Syria. 
They expressed their intentions to overthrow “tyrant Asad’s regime” (Syria 
Unmasked 1991: 8).
ʿAlawī military officers, government personnel, and Baʿthists were assassi-
nated, and the tensions continued into the 1980s. In June 1980, the SMB were 
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accused of a failed attempt to assassinate President Asad. As an act of revenge, 
many SMB held in Tadmur Prison, Palmyra, were executed (Syria Unmasked 
1991: 16). A month later, membership in or association with the SMB was made 
a crime punishable by death (Dekmejian 1995: 109). In retort, in November 
1980, the SMB issued a manifesto emphasising that “a minority cannot and 
should not rule over a majority” (Abd-Allah 1983: 201–267). The peak of the 
conflict between the two sides was in February 1982, during the ‘Hama mas-
sacre.’ For quite some time Hama has been one of the centers of conflict and 
the site of several armed clashes between the opposition, mainly the SMB, 
and the regime forces. On 2 February in 1982 the Defense Brigades and units 
of the Special forces entered the city to quell the opposition movement once 
and for all. The consequences were devastating: thousands were killed, many 
more were injured and left homeless as the city was severely damaged (Syria 
Unmasked 1991: 17–21).
In the years that followed, the SMB, along with various other secular oppo-
sition parties and organisations both inside and outside Syria, continued to 
protest against the repressive political atmosphere, official corruption and 
domination by the ʿAlawīs in Syria under both Ḥafiz al-Assad and his son, 
Bashar al-Assad (who came to power in July 2000) (Talhamy 2012: 34–39). In 
March 2011, the protest accelerated, with the streets of Syria being dominated 
by groups of citizens calling for freedom and democracy. The then-supervisor 
general of the SMB, Mohammad Riad al-Shaqfa, announced optimistically: 
“I believe that the Asad regime will collapse within the next few months […] 
the regime’s days are over” (Asharq al-Awsat London 2011). Soon, the protests 
evolved into a violent war. In 2020, after more than nine years, the Asad regime 
has not collapsed as al-Shaqfa and others have predicated but Syria has suf-
fered great damage, as have the ʿAlawīs. Accused of being loyal to the Asad 
regime, the ʿAlawīs have thus been attacked by various radical Islamic opposi-
tion groups. Serving in the Syrian army has also led to significant loss of life 
from the ʿAlawī population. Additionally, relations between them and the 
Sunnī majority have deteriorated, and their sense of insecurity has increased. 
This war has, once again, highlighted their position as a religious minority.
4 The Alevīs
The term ‘Alevīs’ refers not only to the Kızılbaş to indicate loyalty to, or descent 
from, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib but also refers to a variety of religious groups. Indeed, 
it has been suggested that the Alevī identity was “a new trans-regional iden-
tity linking previously only partially connected groups which shared similar 
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narratives, beliefs, as well as social and ritual practices” (Dressler 2006: 271; 
Dressler 2013: 1–19, 275–287). The vast majority of Alevīs are from the Kızılbaş 
and Bektaşi groups, with the Tahtaci (‘woodcutters’), Abdal, and Cepni groups 
also being involved (Dressler 2013: 245).
Linguistically, the Alevīs can be divided into four different categories: 
Azerbaijani Turkish speakers, Arabic speakers, Turkish speakers, and Kurdish 
speakers (both Kurmanci and Zaza dialects). The majority of Alevīs speak 
Turkish or Kurdish. Up until the middle of the twentieth century, the Turkish 
Alevīs lived mainly in central Anatolia—around Hacibektaş, Ankara, and the 
regions of Çankiri, Çorum, and Tokat. The Kurdish Alevīs, meanwhile, tended 
to live in the regions of Tunceli, Elaziğ, Erzincan, Bingöl, and Kars (Masssicard 
2013: 5). Arabic-speaking Alevīs are found mainly in southern Turkey, especially 
around Adana and in the region of Iskenderun.7 They have close links with the 
Syrian ʿAlawīs and have only few, if any, historical ties to the Anatolian Alevīs 
(Masssicard 2013: 5). The term ‘Alevīsm’ homogenised the aforementioned 
groups, connecting them to Turkish culture and integrating them into Islam. 
At the same time, however, they still asserted their ‘heterodoxy’ (Dressler 2013).
4.1 Historical Background
The native soil of the Alevīs is Anatolia (Massicard 2013: 12). From the end of 
the eleventh century up until the thirteenth century, Turkman tribes travelled 
to Anatolia (Mélikoff 2005: 1). It is believed that in 1230, after escaping the 
Mongol invasion, a dervish known by the name of Haci Bektaş also arrived in 
Anatolia. Haci Bektaş was a mystical healer and a thaumaturge, who, despite 
being a Muslim, had not given up the ancient practices and customs of Central 
Asia. While some sources from the late-twelfth century indicate that Haci 
Bektaş founded an order, others suggest that the order in question was not 
founded until after his death, when a woman named Kandincik Ana, together 
with her disciple, Abdal Musa, founded a new group (Mélikoff 2005: 2).
Out of the tribes that settled in the area, two groups appeared: the Bektaş 
and the Kızılbaş. The Bektaş derive their name from Haci Bektaş and are a pre-
dominantly urban group. They claim that membership is open to any Muslim. 
The Kızılbaş are mainly rural, and claim that one can acquire identity only 
through parentage, that is, you cannot become an Alevī; rather, you are born 
one (Massicard 2013: 5).
7 Iskenderun, or Alexandretta, is the largest district in the province of Hatay. It was annexed to 
the Turkish Republic in 1939, causing some of the ʿAlawīs living there to move south toward 
the Nuṣayriyya Mountain (although others chose to stay).
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The Kızılbaş were partisans of the Shīʿite Ṣafavids,8 and had joined several 
revolts against the Ottomans. This troubled the Sunnī Ottoman Sultan Selim I 
(1512–1520), who was at war with the Ṣafavids. Some sources mention that, in 
1514, prior to his march to meet Shāh Ismaʿil at Chaldiran (where the latter was 
badly defeated), Sultan Selim ordered a census of the Shīʿites living adjacent 
to the border with Persia. He feared the possibility of a collaboration between 
the local Shīʿite creeds and the Ṣafavid state, and so he massacred those Shīʿites 
identified through the census (Farid Bik 1896: 74). As discussed earlier, as Sultan 
Selim’s expedition was an attack against the various Shīʿite-inclined creeds, it 
may have targeted the Kızılbaş, too, as some sources imply (Issa 2017: 72).
Following the victory at Chaldiran, the Ottomans persecuted the Kızılbaş, 
who were repressed for centuries (Arslantaş 2013: 92). In the conception of 
the Ottomans and the surrounding Sunnī society, the Kızılbaş had strayed 
from the true path of Islam. They were referred to as zındıks (‘heretics’) and 
mulhids (‘atheists’), who were endangering Islam (Vorhoff 1998: 229). To avoid 
the Ottomans’ persecution many Kızılbaş retreated to inaccessible regions of 
Anatolia, living in relatively isolated villages, far away from the Sunnīs. It is 
believed that it was during this period of relative isolation that the Kızılbaş 
developed their own political, social and religious institutions, practices, tradi-
tions, and doctrines (Massicard 2013: 15). These elements enabled them to sur-
vive in small, self-sufficient and isolated local communities (Zeidan 1999: 76). 
Due to their beliefs and secretive rituals, however, myths proliferated regarding 
their “moral deviance” (Zeidan 1999: 76).
From the seventeenth century onward, Haci Bektaş came to be consid-
ered an important saint by most of the Kızılbaş (Massicard 2013: 15). Today, 
his picture is displayed at their associations and worship centers. The group 
also names associations after him, and members are often heard quoting say-
ings attributed to him. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Alevīs visit Bektaş’ 
tomb in Kirşehir every August (Shindeldecker 1998: 15).
8 The Ṣafavids derive their name from Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn Isḥāq, who died in 1334. Ṣafī, who 
chose to live the Ṣūfi life, became the head of the Safawi Ṣūfi order (the title deriving from 
his name). Ala al-Din Ali, Ṣafī’s grandson, became the leader of the Safawi order, which was 
joined by many Shīʿites. To make the new Shīʿite members of his order more prominent, Ali 
ordered his men to wear a new cap divided into twelve plates, representing the twelve imāms. 
Later, the Safawi order became a political force, whose rallying point was Twelver Shīʿism 
(Ithnā ʿAsharī). It seems, however, that the term Kızılbaş did not emerge until the turn of the 
sixteenth century, in the time of Shāh Ismāʿīl.
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4.2 Alevī Doctrine
The Alevīs accept ʿAlī as the only legitimate successor to Muḥammad. They 
venerate the ‘House of the Prophet’ (ahl al-bayt) and reject all their enemies 
(Zeidan 1999: 79). Some Alevīs consider both the Prophet Muḥammad and 
ʿAlī to be emanations of the ‘Divine Light.’ Here, Muḥammad is seen as the 
announcer and ʿAlī is the preserver of ‘Divine Truth,’ and both seem to merge, 
at times, into one divine figure: the Alevīs use the following saying: “ʿAlī is 
Muḥammad, Muḥammad is ʿAlī” (Shindeldecker 1998: 13). Some Alevīs believe 
in a trinity consisting of Allāh, Muḥammad, and ʿAlī. They assert, however, that 
this trinity is not the same as that of the Christians (Shindeldecker 1998: 14).
For a proportion of Alevīs, ʿAlī is the ultimate example of the perfect 
human. They consider him the ‘gate’ (bāb) to esoteric knowledge (Zeidan 1999: 
79). Thus, certain divine attributes are ascribed to him, such as the ability to 
have created the world and the dispensation of the livelihood of his creatures 
(Moosa 1988: 51). The following poem (Olsson 2005: 174–175) demonstrates 
how ʿAlī is viewed by the Alevīs:
You are the first and the last of this world
Shah, who is the sultan of the universe
I wander around in every corner of the world
I never saw any other man than Ali
Who bestowed destiny and created the worlds
I never saw any other man than Ali
One of his names is Ali, one of his names is Allah
By God, I swear by God, I do not deny
Facing the way of Ali and Muhammad
I never saw any other man than Ali
In addition, ʿAlī’s picture is displayed in every Alevī place of worship and asso-
ciation, and it often appears on the cover of Alevī publications (Shindeldecker 
1998: 12). Here is another example (Olsson 2005: 173) illustrating the identifica-
tion of ʿAlī with the divine reality composed by Melıniet Ali Hilmi Dedebaba 
(d. 1907):
I took the mirror to my face
Ali appeared to my eye …
He is Jesus and Christ
He is the refuge to the believers
He is the Shah of the two worlds
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Ali appeared to my eye
Ali is the pure, Ali is the clean
Ali is the hidden, Ali is the manifest
Ali is the first, Ali is the last
Ali appeared to my eye
Ali is the life, Ali is the Beloved
Ali is the religion, Ali is the belief
Ali is the Merciful, Ali is the Compassionate
Ali appeared to my eye
The Alevīs believe that the four major holy books, the Torah, Psalms, the 
Gospel, and the Qurʾān, are God’s written revelations, and that the Qurʾān 
is the last written revelation from God (Shindeldecker 1998: 5). Most Alevīs 
believe that the ‘original’ Qurʾān stated clearly that ʿAlī was to be the Prophet’s 
successor, and that parts of the text related to ʿAlī were taken out of it by his 
rivals. The Alevīs interpret the Qurʾān in an esoteric, allegoric, and symbolic 
(rather than literal) manner (Shindeldecker 1998: 5). They also look to the fol-
lowing religious books as sources for their beliefs and practices: 1. the ḥadīth 
(the traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad); 2. Nahj al-balāgha (the tradi-
tions and sayings of ʿAlī); 3. the Buyruks (collections containing the doctrine 
and practices of several of the twelve imāms, claimed to have been written 
by important leaders (Zeidan 1999: 79); and 4. the Vilayetnameler and/or 
Menakibnameler (books that describe events in the lives of important Alevī 
figures, such as Haci Bektaş). Another important source of Alevī belief and 
thought comes in the form of the mystical poems and musical ballads/liturgi-
cal hymns (deyisler; nefesler) that are passed down orally from one generation 
to the next (Shindeldecker 1998: 5).
According to the Alevīs, in order to approach God, the faithful must pass 
through the following four consecutive ‘gates’ (each of which includes ten ‘lev-
els’ or duties) Zeidan 1999: 79): 1. sharīʿa (Islamic law); 2. tarīqat (‘the path’), 
which is at the core of the community (and is an Alevī mode of worship, where 
strangers are not welcome); 3. marifet (‘knowledge’): the esoteric intuitive 
knowledge of God; 4. ḥaqīqat (‘ultimate truth’): union with God—the highest 
stage (it is believed that the dede lineages are at this level) (Zeidan 1999: 79). 
For the Alevīs, salvation exists in imitating perfect models such as ʿAlī, Haci 
Bektaş, and other Alevī saints. According to them, every Alevī must “be master 
of his hands, tongue and loins,” meaning that theft, lies, and adultery are for-
bidden because every man must seek “purity of heart” (Shankland 2005: 19). 
Additionally, love and forgiveness are seen as important elements in interper-
sonal relationships (Zeidan 1999: 79).
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The Alevīs reject external forms of Islam, including its five pillars. They do 
not have mosques and do not pray five times a day. They believe that relation-
ships with people are more important than observing formal religious ritual: “If 
you hurt another person, the ritual prayers you have done are counted worth-
less” (Shindeldecker 1998: 10). Although, one can find mosques in the Alevī 
villages today, few residents attend the five daily prayers (Shankland 2005: 21). 
Alevīs do not undertake pilgrimage to Mecca and do not fast during the month 
of Ramadan (Moosa 1988: 121). Their main fast is held during the first twelve 
days of the month of Muharram, during which they mourn the murder of ʿAlī’s 
son, al-Ḥusayn, during the battle of Karbalāʾ. During this fast, they avoid any 
sort of comfort or enjoyment (Shindeldecker 1998: 11).
Their rituals differ markedly from Sunnī rituals (Zeidan 1999: 79). Their form 
of community worship, which is attended by both men and women, is referred 
to as the ‘assembly meeting’ (cem or ayini cem)9 and is held either in a private 
home or in a building or a room known as ‘assembly house’ (cem evi). In con-
trast with mosques, cem evis do not have minarets and cem meetings are not 
announced by a call to prayer (Shindeldecker 1998: 10).
The assembly meeting is led by a ‘grandfather’ (dede): a man recognised 
to have spiritual and moral authority in the community and who claims to 
have a direct bloodline connection to the family of the Prophet Muḥammad 
through one of the twelve imāms. Only dedes are allowed to lead the rituals 
and prayers. Before the dede holds the religious service, he must make sure 
that all the members of the congregation are at peace with one another. If 
he finds that there are any quarrels, he will act as a judge to foster a recon-
ciliation between those involved; anyone who refuses to be reconciled in this 
way is prevented from participating in the assembly (Shindeldecker 1998: 10). 
Additionally, those who do not confess their personal sins or are not reconciled 
with others are disciplined by the dede and are sometimes excommunicated 
until they repent (Moosa 1988: 90; Shindeldecker 1998: 9).
During the cem ayini, the dede sits on a sheepskin on the floor on one side 
of the room. The participants, who enter the room barefoot, sit in a circle on 
the floor, facing each other. They are instructed to cleanse themselves all over 
before attending an assembly meeting. Most Alevīs also believe that being 
clean on the inside when coming to worship is at least as important as being 
clean on the outside; indeed, many regard inner cleanliness as even more 
important than outer cleanliness. The dede says prayers, gives short religious 
messages, sings solo ballads, and leads the congregation in singing, while play-
ing the saz (a seven-stringed lute). A select group of men and women also 
9 Cem can be translated as community/congregation and ayin means rite/ceremony.
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perform the semah: a ritual circle dance characterised by turning and swirling 
(Massicard 2013: 15), which symbolises unity with God (Grove 2008). At the 
end of the service, which is held entirely in Turkish, the congregation shares a 
meal (Shindeldecker 1998: 10).
One of the Alevīs’ customs is to visit holy shrines (ziyārāt) dedicated 
to figures such as Haci Bektaş and Abdal Musa. They pray at these people’s 
tombs, asking for spiritual cleansing and blessings for themselves and others 
(Shindeldecker 1998: 8). The Alevīs also hold festivals and celebration days. For 
instance, they celebrate Nawruz (21 March), which is believed by many to be 
ʿAlī’s birthday. Others believe that the date is ʿAlī and Fāṭima’s wedding anni-
versary, the day that Joseph was pulled out of the well, or the day God created 
Earth; in any case, it is considered a significant celebration (Shindeldecker 
1998: 11). In addition, they observe numerous folk religious practices, such as 
lighting candles at saints’ tombs, not stepping on the thresholds of holy build-
ings, and writing wishes on cloth strips before hanging them on trees that are 
considered spiritually powerful (Shindeldecker 1998: 17).
The Spiritual Brotherhood ceremony (musahiplik) is very important in the 
Alevī faith and society. In this ceremony, two unrelated men, along with their 
wives, enter into an irreversible, lifetime kinship of total solidarity, in which 
they share all possessions and the responsibility for all debts, as well as agree-
ing to support each other and any children in the two families (Shindeldecker 
1998: 10). Importantly, this relationship is considered deeper than a blood rela-
tionship (Zeidan 1999: 80). The practices and rules followed in Alevī society, 
such as monogamy, the prohibition of divorce, Spiritual Brotherhood, and 
the acquisition of the Alevī identity by parentage only, help to guarantee the 
group’s survival (Massicard 2013: 16).
Most Alevīs believe that one can change his or her position in life through 
education and work. They say that “the greatest act of worship is to work” 
(Shindeldecker 1998: 7). Observers have noted that Alevī society is divided into 
two separate endogamous groups: the Ocak (‘hearth’), which consists of the 
spiritual and social elite, who claim descent from ʿAlī, al-Ḥusayn, the imāms, 
legendary Saints, or religious warriors and who constitute a priestly caste; and 
the Talips (disciples), the lay majority. Religious knowledge is passed down 
orally by the Ocak families, who are responsible for the religious and social 
leadership of the community. The Ocaks are the central authority for the sur-
vival of Alevī religious knowledge and identity, and comprise some ten percent 
of the Alevī community (Zeidan 1999: 79).
4.3 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic
Up until the late Ottoman period, the Kızılbaş were considered heretics. They 
had no official status, being neither members of the dominant Sunnī group, 
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nor protected by the status afforded by the millet system (Massicard 2013: 16). 
During the middle of the nineteenth century, however, shortly after the estab-
lishment of the Protestant millet (1850), Protestant missionaries started work-
ing among the Alevīs (as was the case with the Nuṣayrīs of Syria). This alarmed 
the Ottoman authorities and, as with the Nuṣayrīs, the Ottomans reacted by 
seeking to integrate the Alevīs into official state religion by building mosques 
and sending imāms to their villages (Massicard 2013: 17).
After the founding of the Turkish republic in 1923 and the ascendance of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938), who instituted state secularism, there was a 
change in the attitude of the Alevīs. The Alevīs were supportive of the secular 
ideals of Atatürk (Van Bruinessen 1996: 8). Atatürk’s policy on secularism was to 
remove religion from the public realm and reduce it to a matter of the faith and 
practice of the individual. In 1924, he established the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), an arm of the state responsible for oversee-
ing religious matters and ensuring their separation by law from other affairs of 
state. The Diyanet provides religious services and, at the same time, regulates 
the majority of religious activities in Turkey (Hurd 2014: 417). According to the 
Diyanet, the Alevīs are Muslims who were pushed away somehow from the 
‘true path.’ The Alevīs’ religious status was not recognised and cem evis were not 
recognised as places of worship, unlike mosques, churches, and synagogues, 
which were exempted from water and electricity charges due to their status 
(Massicard 2003: 169). Alevī places of worship were not given these privileges.
Despite all this, the Alevīs still chose to stay in their isolated villages. A 
change in the Alevī attitude began, however, in the 1950s, when group mem-
bers started leaving the villages to settle in the towns in Western Turkey. Some 
even migrated further west to other parts of Europe, mainly Germany (Van 
Bruinessen 1996: 7). On one hand, when the Alevīs migrated to the towns, 
became educated, and began working in the public service sector, this helped 
them to integrate into wider society and put an end to their marginalisation. 
It brought them into closer contact with the Sunnīs, from whom they had 
remained socially separate for centuries (Van Bruinessen 1996: 7). On the other 
hand, however, migration largely weakened their religious practice, since they 
could not perform their religious practices publicly in places where a mixture 
of citizens with different beliefs resided (Massicard 2005: 4). In addition, in 
some regions, relations between the Sunnīs and the Alevīs were marked by 
tension. During the 1970s, there were bloody clashes between some conserva-
tive Sunnī groups and the Alevīs, resulting in the death of hundreds of Alevīs 
(Martens 2009: 19).
During the 1980s there was a change in the state’s policy towards Islam. The 
Diyanet was strengthened, new mosques were built, imāms were appointed in 
different parts of Turkey (and included some Alevīs), and religious education 
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was made obligatory. These measures were viewed by some as governmental 
efforts to bring the Alevīs into the Sunnī fold (Van Bruinessen 1996: 8). During 
those years, an Alevī cultural revival was witnessed. In an attempt to recon-
struct the Alevī culture, community, and identity, the newly educated Alevī 
elite leadership organised foundations and trusts, rebuilt Saints’ tombs, and 
restored rituals. Alevī voluntary associations sprang up all over Turkey, Alevī 
rituals were performed publicly, and new cem evis were opened. Alevī intel-
lectuals published several works in which they reinterpreted Alevī history, doc-
trine, and rituals, and defined its relationship to Sunnī Islam, thus resulting 
in a ‘reinvention’ of Alevī traditions. The Alevīs stopped ‘hiding’ their identity 
and started calling for its recognition (Massicard 2013: 4). These efforts con-
tinued into the 1990s, when the Alevīs increased their political activity. They 
demanded the legalisation of their religious rituals and practices, the inte-
gration of their doctrine into the state education system, and a fair share of 
broadcasting time in the official media (Zeidan 1999: 78). The state, for its part, 
began assisting in the organisation of the annual Alevī festival commemorat-
ing Haci Bektaş, which became a place for “political bargaining, [and] express-
ing demands and promises” (Massicard 2000: 29).
The Alevīs in Europe were active, too, but in a different way. In 2004, due to 
Alevī demands, the EU officially categorised the Alevīs as a “non-Sunnī Muslim 
minority” (Massicard 2013: 9), while the Venice Commission defined them as 
a disadvantaged minority in need of legal recognition and protection (Hurd 
2014: 430). At the same time, the chairman of the Dede Commission of the 
Federation of Alevī Communities in Germany, Hasan Kılavuz, openly rejected 
attempts to associate Alevīsm with Islamic tradition:
Alevīlik is a belief in its own right. Alevīs possess a belief that sees God 
everywhere in the universe. Alevīs performed their worship and beliefs for 
a thousand years in a modest and extremely pure form; today, some dedes 
try to decorate this form of belief with fake pearls. These dedes, which are 
insecure about themselves, which are carried away by a minority com-
plex towards the Sunnī Muslim faith, distance the essence of Alevīsm 
from our traditions and customs […] We cannot connect the faith of the 
Anatolian Alevīs with the basic principles of the Islamic religion.
Dressler 2006: 285
In contemporary Turkey, however, the Diyanet promotes a version of Sunnī 
Ḥanafī Islam that incorporates Alevīsm into Islam, considering it an interpre-
tation of the faith. Here, reference is made to the “common share of Islam,” 
a phrase that overlooks the complexity of Islamic traditions, which, like all 
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religious traditions, are fundamentally indeterminate and contested (Hurd 
2014: 432). Moreover, despite these attempts at bringing the Alevīs into the 
wider community, Alevī community leaders are still not trained via or funded 
by state resources. To this day, cem evis are treated more like cultural centers 
than houses of worship, and Alevīsm is not taught at state schools or included 
in textbooks (Özyürek 2009: 124–125).
5 Similarities and Differences between the ʿAlawīs and the Alevīs
The historical and ethnic backgrounds of the two creeds discussed here are 
very different. The ʿAlawī creed developed from Arab Islamic origins in Iraq in 
the ninth century and, up until the 1920s, they were known as Nuṣayrīs. The 
Alevī creed developed in Anatolia during the thirteenth century, however, 
from Turkoman tribes in the main, and followers came to be known as Alevīs 
in the 1920s. There are similarities in terms of their names: both were named 
to indicate their loyalty to, or descent from, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who is vener-
ated by both creeds. Moreover, both groups have lived in isolated villages and 
have been persecuted by Muslim Sunnī rulers as they were considered heretics 
(zındıks) that endangered Islam. Since the 1920s, the political influence of both 
the ʿAlawīs and the Alevīs has increased considerably—especially that of the 
ʿAlawīs, who, ultimately, have become the rulers of Syria.
There are also some similarities and differences with regard to Alevī and 
ʿAlawī religious doctrine and practices. They both believe in a trinity, but 
while the ʿAlawī trinity consists of ʿAlī, Muḥammad, and Salmān, the Alevī 
trinity includes Allāh, Muḥammad, and ʿAlī. The way in which they tend to 
view ʿAlī differs, too. The ʿAlawīs see ʿAlī as a human form through which God 
contacted humanity in a docetic appearance. Here, ʿAlī is considered superior 
to the Prophet Muḥammad. Some Alevīs, however, consider both Prophet 
Muḥammad and ʿAlī to be emanations of the divine, while others believe ʿAlī 
is the ultimate example of the perfect human and a gate to esoteric knowl-
edge. The ʿAlawīs believe in the transmigration of souls, while the Alevīs do 
not. Neither group prays at a mosque; the ʿAlawīs pray at private houses and 
the Alevīs pray at cem evis. Moreover, neither group prays five times a day nor 
performs pilgrimage to Mecca. During Ramadan, the ʿAlawīs, like the rest of 
the Muslims, do fast, but also obstain from speech and give it (Ramadan) a 
mystical meaning, while the Alevīs do not which are typical aspects of other 
Islamic traditions.
In terms of the social makeup of the two creeds’ followers, the ʿAlawīs are 
divided into two groups: the khassa (the initiated elite, who are in a minority) 
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and the ʿ amma, who are the majority. Similarly, the Alevīs also form two groups: 
the Ocak (the spiritual and social elite, who are a minority) and the Talips (lay 
members). This, however, is not a unique feature of these two movements, but 
a common feature to many Islamic and non-Islamic religious groups.
6 Conclusion
Looking closely at the doctrine, practices, and history of the Alevīs and the 
ʿAlawīs, it is evident that the differences between these two creeds exceed their 
similarities. Their historical and ethnic backgrounds are different, and so are 
their geopolitical conditions. While the ʿAlawī/Nuṣayrī creed developed in Iraq 
in the ninth century and is of Arab origin, the Alevī creed was born several 
centuries later, stemming mainly of Turkoman tribes that settled in Anatolia 
during the thirteenth century. As we have seen, the ways that they view ʿAlī 
and Muḥammad, their interpretations of the divine triad, their festivals and 
prayers, and their religious assemblies and practices differ, too.
Where they are similar is in that they have both suffered from aggressive-
ness leveled at them by Sunnī rulers, who, historically speaking, have viewed 
them as heretics endangering Islam. Moreover, the two groups’ reactions to 
Sunnī oppression were similar. To avoid persecution and for self-preservation, 
followers of both creeds chose to live in homogenous villages in inaccessible, 
mountainous regions. Since their rituals and beliefs were different from those 
of the Sunnī majority, they resorted, in both cases, to secrecy, thus causing 
Sunnīs to accuse them of moral deviance.
Even though such comparisons can be made, the creeds have certainly 
evolved very differently. Within forty years, the ʿAlawīs of Syria, despite com-
prising only twelve percent of the total population, managed to become the 
rulers of their country; the Alevīs of Turkey, however, are still striving for 
state recognition and equality. What can be said is that, although both groups 
changed their names in the 1920s for different reasons, such changes did, 
in some ways (and perhaps in one case more than the other), help them to 
become integrated into Islam.
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Mélikoff, I. 2005. “Bektashi/Kızılbaş: Historical Bipartition and its Consequences.” In 
T. Olsson, C. Raudvere, and E. Ozdalg eds, Alevī Identity: Cultural, Religious and 
Social Perspectives. London: Routledge, 1–9.
303The Alevīs and ʿAlawīs
Middle East Watch. 1991. Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad 
Regime. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Minority Rights Group International. N.d. “Turkey: Alevīs.” At https://minorityrights 
.org/minorities/Alevīs/. Accessed 15/07/2020.
Moosa, M. 1988. Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. New York: Syracuse University 
Press.
Olsson, T. 2005. “The Gnosis of Mountaineers and Townspeople. The Religion of the 
Syrian Alawites, or the Nuṣairīs.” In T. Olsson, C. Raudvere, and E. Ozdalg eds, Alevī 
Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. London: Routledge, 167–184.
Özyürek, E. “Beyond Integration and Recognition: Diasporic Constructions of 
Alevī Identity between Germany and Turkey.” In T.J. Csordas ed., Transnational 
Transcendence: Essays on Religion and Globalization. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 121–144.
Risalat al-Bayan li Ahl al-Uʿqal wa al-Afham wa man talab al-Huda ila maʿrifat al 
Rahman. Ms. Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale), Fonds arabe 1450.
Shankland, D. 2005. “Anthropology and Ethnicity: The Place of Ethnography in the 
New Alevī Movement.” In T. Olsson, C. Raudvere, and E. Ozdalg eds, Alevī Identity: 
Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. London: Routledge, 19–27.
Shindeldecker, J. 1998. “Turkish Alevīs Today.” At http://www.Alevī.dk/ENGELSK/
Turkish_Alevīs_Today.pdf. Accessed 19/12/2015.
“Sykes-Picot Agreement.” The World War I Document Archive. At http://wwi.lib.byu 
.edu/index.php/Sykes-Picot_Agreement. Accessed 19/12/2015.
Talhamy, Y. 2008. “The Nusayri Leader Isma’il Khayr Bey and the Ottomans (1854–58).” 
Middle Eastern Studies. 44:6, 895–908.
Talhamy, Y. 2009. “The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship.” 
The Middle East Journal. 63:4, 561–580.
Talhamy, Y. 2010. “The Fatwas and the Nusayris/ʿAlawīs of Syria.” Middle Eastern Studies. 
46:2, 175–194.
Talhamy, Y. 2011a. “American Protestant Missionary Activity among the Nusayris 
(ʿAlawīs) in Syria in the Nineteenth Century.” Middle Eastern Studies. 47:2, 215–236.
Talhamy, Y. 2011b. “Conscription among the Nusayris (ʿAlawīs) in the Nineteenth 
Century,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 38:1, 23–40.
Talhamy, Y. 2012. “The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn.” Middle East Quarterly. 19:2, 33–40.
Van Bruinessen, M. 1996. “Kurds, Turks and the Alevī revival in Turkey.” Middle East 
Report. 200, 7–10.
Van Dam, N. 2011. The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the 
Baʿth Party. London: I.B. Tauris.
Vorhoff, K. 1998. “‘Let’s Reclaim our History and Culture!’ Imagining Alevī Community 
in Contemporary Turkey.” Die Welt des Islams. 38:2, 220–252.
304 Talhamy
Vorhoff, K. 2005. “Academic and Journalistic Publications on the Alevī and Bektashi 
of Turkey.” In T. Olsson, C. Raudvere, and E. Ozdalg eds, Alevī Identity: Cultural, 
Religious and Social Perspectives. London: Routledge, 28–58.
Yafee, G. 1992. “Between Separatism and Union: The Autonomy of the ʿAlawī Region in 
Syria, 1920–1936.” PhD Thesis. Tel-Aviv University, Israel.
Zeidan, D. 1999. “The Alevī of Anatolia.” Middle East Review of International Affairs. 3:4, 
74–89.
Zisser, E. 1999. “The ʿAlawīs, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect.” In 
O. Bengio and G. Ben–Dor eds, Minorities and the State in the Arab World. Boulder & 
London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 129–145.
Zisser, E. 2001. Asad’s Legacy, Syria in Transition. New York University Press.
© David Thurfjell, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004435544_017
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Chapter 13
The Heyʾati Movement
Charismatic Preachers, Politics and Youth Culture
David Thurfjell
1 Introduction
This chapter explores the role of charismatic prayer leaders or eulogists, 
maddāhān, in the religious landscape of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A youth 
movement centred around these lay religious authorities has expanded dur-
ing the last three decades. For instance, eulogists played a pivotal role in the 
mobilisation of popular support for former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
These charismatic leaders and the movement around them represent a form 
of Iranian folk religiosity that in connection to certain religious celebrations 
draws broad popular support. Lately it has also developed into a particular 
subculture with its own lifestyle, ritual repertoire and aesthetic expression.
In the following I will sketch the modern history of this movement based on 
the oral history of some of those who were a part of it. Having done this, I will 
analyse its place within the changing landscape of Islamic authority in Iran. 
Describing the movement as an expression of what I will call the amalgama-
tion and aesthetics of authority I suggest that it may exemplify some ways in 
which religious authority is changing in our time. The movement around the 
maddāhān, it is argued, represents a renegotiation and a relocation of author-
ity: not through the articulation of new jurisprudential or political positions, 
but through the reinterpretation of the ways in which people are letting reli-
gion become a part of their lives. The text is based on fieldwork and interviews 
conducted in Qom and Tehran from 2013 to 2016.1
It is the first of the month of Shaʿbān, ten o’clock in the evening, and the night 
is pleasantly hot in Qom. Tonight is the evening before the birthdays of Imām 
Ḥusayn (in the Persian colloquial: Hoseyn) ibn ʿAlī and his brother ʿAbbas, both 
of whom were martyred in Karbalāʾ. To commemorate the occasion, one of 
the many local congregation halls (hoseyniehs) is organising an evening with 
religious talks and singing. Shaʿbān is a joyous month in the Shīʿite calendar 
1 For the sake of anonymisation, the dates and specific locations of the interviews will not 
be revealed.
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and the walls of the hoseynieh where we have gathered are carefully dressed in 
pink and green cloth. Plastic flowers are placed on the podium and most of the 
visitors are dressed in pale colours. The speaker of the evening is a scholar and 
a eulogist who has profiled himself as a demagogue on the conservative side of 
Iranian politics for some years, and lately he has built himself quite a reputa-
tion in hardliner circles. He is dressed all in white this evening with a white 
turban, a long, greying beard, and the traditional dress of a clergyman. His 
glasses are square-shaped and metal-framed, of the type the Supreme Leader 
himself wears and that was given out to the soldiers in the Iraqi war. Along 
with the folded Palestinian kefiyeh that he wears around his neck, the glasses 
evoke memories of that war. In today’s Iran, these are recognisable signs of a 
hardliner position and declare an affinity to the sepāh or basīj organisations.
This preacher is hostile to reformist clergy such as Ayatollah Montazeri 
(1922–2009) and Ayatollah Yousef Sanʿei (b. 1937). He is not happy with the 
way these two clerics were critical of the way the authorities dealt with the 
Green movement and the reformist demonstrations following the disputed 
presidential election of 2009. Following the funeral of Montazeri in the same 
year, he was involved in attacks on their offices and in calling for their defrock-
ing. Although it is now more than five years since these events took place, 
the talk this night circles around the same theme. He is critical of the former 
president Mahmoud Khatami and his understanding of the notion of velāyat-e 
faqīh. “Khatami and Montazeri wanted to limit the scope of the velāyat of the 
Supreme Leader [rahbar],” he explains, “but that was wrong. The authority of 
the Supreme Leader is wide and no one can change that.” He then continues 
with what seems to be a threat of what may come if people mess with these 
principles. “Montazeri criticised the leader [valī] himself and not the whole 
notion of velāyat-e faqīh and for this he was attacked.” The preacher here raises 
his index finger in affirmation, and then, reproachfully shaking his head, he 
continues solemnly, “had he criticised the notion as a whole, his punishment 
would have been much harsher.” The topic of the speech then moves on to 
the fighting in Syria and a legal discussion about whether mercenaries who 
fight for Ḥizballāh in that conflict for the pay—rather than out of conviction—
should still be considered martyrs if they are killed. The preacher declares that 
they should.
When the speech is over, he moves on to the singing of tonight’s eulogy. He 
has the lyrics written on a piece of paper and sings the eulogy with a strong 
voice, leaning forward and gesturing as if to emphasise his eagerness to get the 
message across. The poem is on the theme of the night, Hoseyn’s birth, and—
this being Shīʿism—also about his tragic martyrdom. There is an undertone of 
violence to the content of both speech and eulogy, but the atmosphere in the 
307The Heyʾati Movement
room is anything but violent. The men gathered there listen with varying levels 
of attention. Some fiddle with their mobile phones. A few of them are drows-
ing, and there are a number of children running around and playing, despite 
their fathers’ half-hearted cautioning. At the end of the session, the preacher 
rewards their endurance by smilingly picking up a bucket filled with sweets 
from under his chair and sprinkling its contents over the audience.
This preacher is a maddāh (literally ‘eulogist’), and the group assembled in 
his hoseynieh is a heyʾat (literally ‘gathering’, plural heyʾathā). These are insti-
tutions with a long history in the Shīʿite world. Over the last two decades, 
however, their role in Iranian society and politics has changed. The popular 
influence of the maddāhān has increased, and the widespread folk tradition 
of the heyʾat has grown into what could be described as a subculture youth 
movement, a movement sometimes referred to as the new heyʾatī and one 
with ambiguous connections to the ever-ongoing intrigues and negotiations 
of religio-political authority in Iran. Although the borders of this subculture 
remain indistinct, and although there are vast differences within it, heyʾat com-
munities have today developed into a subculture with institutions, informa-
tion channels, ritual practices, leaders and aesthetic features that are distinct 
from other Islamic movements in the Islamic Republic.
2 The Modern History of Heyʾathā and Maddāhān
The word heyʾat is an Arabic loanword that literally means ‘group’ or ‘delega-
tion’. In a Persian religious context, the word signifies a group that gathers to 
mourn for Hoseyn and the other members of the household of the Prophet 
(ahl-e bayt). Heyʾatī (plural heyʾatīhā) is the adjective that signifies some-
one who belongs to such a group. Heyʾat groups constitute a common fea-
ture in the popular Iranian religious landscape, and they have a long history. 
Traditionally, informal groups have formed on a neighbourhood basis to com-
memorate events in the Shīʿite calendar. Often the organisational responsibil-
ity has rotated between households. In connection to religious celebrations, 
they have organised sermons, Qurʾān classes or, most prominently, mournful 
lamentation sessions known as rouzeh or nuhe in people’s private homes or in 
hoseyniehs. Individuals may also organise gatherings as a sign of gratitude for 
a prayer answered or recovery from illness. There is a traditional connection 
between the heyʾathā and the bāzāri class, but groups have also been formed 
based on ethnicity, friendship or gender (Momen 1985: 238–240). Heyʾat 
groups, furthermore, have also played a role in the organisation of ziyārat, 
that is, pilgrimage visits to the shrines of Mashhad and Qom as well as other 
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religiously significant sites. Here the local heyʾathā have organised the practi-
cal arrangements as well as the ritual content of these journeys (Fischer 1980: 
134–135). In connection to the commemorative rituals of the first ten days of 
Muharram, the heyʾathā have also played a pivotal role. And in the processions 
that fill the streets of most Iranian cities on the day of Ashura the most fervent 
chest-beaters who constitute the core groups often consist of heyʾatīhā. It is no 
exaggeration, therefore, to say, with Michael Fischer, that the heyʾathā have tra-
ditionally provided the skeleton of popular religion in Iran (Fischer 1980: 135).
Every heyʾat pivots around its maddāh. A maddāh (plural maddāhān, from 
Arabic madh, eulogy) is a eulogist or a performer of mourning prayers. A person 
given this task may in Persian also be referred to as a zāker (from Arabic dhākir, 
meaning commemorator) or a rouzeh khān (reader of rouzeh). Traditionally, 
maddāhān are not clergy. They do not wear a turban and they usually have no 
theological or jurisprudential education. They are typically lay people of other 
professions who are engaged because of their good singing voice, their knowl-
edge of pious poetry, and their skills in evoking religious emotion. Usually they 
are called hājji or seyyed by their followers.
Non-clerical religious authorities have existed in Iran for a long time, and 
maddāhān have had a role in Iranian religious culture since Ṣafavid times 
(Mitchell 2011: 144). But before the Revolution their societal authority was 
confined to the festivals at which they said their prayers, and they constituted 
no threat or challenge to the monarchy or the jurisprudential authority of the 
ʿulamāʾ. During the Pahlavi era it was the tradition to end heyʾatī gatherings 
with prayers for the king. This practice was criticised by revolutionary pioneers 
such as Murtaza Mutahhari and ʿAli Shariati, who allegedly even quoted Karl 
Marx in describing the pro-monarchist heyʾathā as an opium of the people, 
offering quick-fix heavenly rewards without any demand for righteous engage-
ment (Mazaheri 2008: 9).
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and in the chaos that endured dur-
ing its first years, mourning rituals of various types flourished. The activities 
around local shrines increased dramatically as people gathered to listen to 
maddāhān, pray, and, not least, praise the Hidden Imam. Some entirely new 
traditions were even invented, like ten days of mourning in honour of Fatemeh 
Zahra (Amanat 2009: 226). According to the Iranian-British historian Abbas 
Amanat, it was in this apocalyptic and revolutionary environment that a new 
spirit of camaraderie emerged in connection to the heyʾatī culture. According 
to him, it was especially among the young basīj and Revolutionary Guards that 
this new spirit evolved, and it was especially flavoured by the messianic aware-
ness of the early days of the Revolution (Amanat 2009: 226). The maddāhān 
now proved to be resourceful also in mustering political engagement, and for 
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this reason they have since become a force to count with in Iranian politics. 
Iranian anthropologist Mohsen Mazaheri, who has written the most extensive 
study on the modern history of the movement, categorises the heyʾathā into 
five types: traditional, wartime revolutionary, post-war revolutionary, popular, 
and quasi (Mazaheri 2008). These categories differ in style but also in their age 
range, social base, and gender distribution.
The important position that the heyʾathā have attained in today’s Iran 
evolved in several steps. The early years of the Revolution and the impact of 
Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) himself mark a first such step: the immediate 
post-revolutionary upsurge of heyʾatī culture. Khomeini showed an apprecia-
tion for Shīʿite folk traditions by partaking in mourning rituals himself. He also 
had a maddāh, Hajj Seyyed Kowsari, who would follow him around and sing 
in traditional rouzeh khāni style for a few minutes at the end of the ayatollah’s 
speeches. Khomeini, too, would weep at these sessions.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 and the eight-
year-long war with Iraq started, a formative period for the modern heyʾatī 
movement began. In pro-revolutionary circles, the war became an opportu-
nity to realise the self-sacrificial lifestyle that is celebrated in the Karbalāʾ com-
memorations. Perhaps it can be said that it was the ritual logic of revolutionary 
heyʾatī culture that created the emotional regime that made thousands of 
young Iranian men volunteer to fight in the war. “All those volunteers,” one of 
my heyʾatī interviewees tell me, “came from this Hoseyn culture that tells you 
to give your blood for your honour, and you were so happy, and your family was 
so happy and proud” (interview with author, 2013). The clerical establishment 
that had risen to power in Iran used the maddāhān to stir the emotions needed 
to mobilise young men to enlist. Two particularly prominent maddāhān 
who rose to fame during this time were Sadeq Ahangaran and Gholam 
Koveyti Pour.
Since the ceasefire with Iraq in 1988, the war has continued to be an 
important reference for many heyʾatī groups. Many heyʾatīhā were angry with 
President Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaie Mirqaed, chief commander of the 
sepāh (the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), for not continuing the war. 
Some of them, one interviewee told me, even wrote a letter to Khomeini him-
self, offering their readiness to fight even if they had no weapons left to fight 
with. “Imam Hoseyn never gave up,” they are supposed to have told him (inter-
view with author, 2013). Today, romanticisation of the war is still an impor-
tant element of the heyʾatī lifestyle. The soldiers who fought and died in the 
war constitute a powerful image of the type of self-sacrificial lifestyle that the 
maddāhān promote. “It is the image of those martyred people,” one former 
heyʾatī tells me,
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their lifestyle, how they left everything, their studies, their money, women, 
everything to go to war. That became a utopian lifestyle for us that we 
wanted to imitate today in the cities also: the free, amazing, happy, spiri-
tual way of life that they experienced in the war.
interview with author, 2014
Veterans from the war also played an important part in forming the heyʾatī 
culture that developed in the period after the ceasefire. “In our group there 
were lots of people who survived the war and they were so influential,” another 
interviewee tells me,
they missed the spiritual lifestyle that they had during the war. Now 
when they had come back life was so complicated. They needed to orga-
nise things and earn money and they could not be as spiritual as they 
had been in the war. They cried over this in the meetings and gave the 
young people [who had not been in the war] this sense that they missed 
that time.
interview with author, 2014
In the dramaturgical logic of the Karbalāʾ narrative, many heyʾathā built up 
their post-war identity as a reflection of the tawwabūn (the Penitents). The 
tawwabūn were those who came too late to assist Hoseyn at Karbalāʾ. Just as 
they were too late to help Hoseyn at Karbalāʾ, some heyʾatīhā today think of 
themselves as coming too late to fight for Islam in the Iraq war. One maddāh 
I interview tells me that he tries to convey this “feeling of being late” in his 
meetings because this feeling is particularly efficient in stirring the emotions 
of the crowd (interview with author, 2014).
Now the post-war era in Iran coincides with the succession from Khomeini 
to ʿAli Khameneʾi. This change of leadership also entailed a professionalisa-
tion of the maddāhān. Khameneʾi was not as unequivocally endorsed by the 
ʿulamāʾ and their theological seminars as Khomeini had been. In order to 
secure his legitimacy, he sought support among groups in Iranian society that 
had been important in defending and supporting the revolutionary ideals dur-
ing the time of the war. The maddāhān were one such group. The new leader 
endorsed this group, and some of them became important mouthpieces for 
him. A particularly important figure here is Hajj Mansour Arzi. He is probably 
the most influential political maddāh in modern Iranian history. Endorsed by 
Khameneʾi in the first years of his leadership, Hajj Mansour Arzi profiled him-
self as a charismatic spokesperson of the hardliner camp in Iranian politics 
and a fervent supporter of the Supreme Leader. Hajj Mansour Arzi is based 
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in Masjed-e Ark in Tehran and from there he has tightened up Iranian rouzeh 
culture and endeavoured to bring the stories told in the heyʾathā more into line 
with officially sanctioned Shīʿism.
Hajj Mansour Arzi also brought about a change in ritual style. Under 
Khomeini, the endorsed eulogies of maddāhān like Kowsari had been short 
and traditional; under Khameneʾi and maddāhān like Arzi, the ritual tradition 
found new expressions and expanded in influence. My interviewees tell me 
that much of this lay in the organisation. Arzi and his contemporaries were 
much more organised and professional in their approach to the whole thing. 
Kowsari was respected and knowledgeable, but he was not a professional 
singer or performer. “He sang some simple songs for five minutes and there 
would be some weeping,” one interviewee tells me,
but Arzi, he would go on for more than an hour with perfect planning. 
First he would read a poem, then tell a story of Imam Zaman [i.e. the 
mahdī] which would lead into an eulogy which would initiate some pre-
chest-beating which in its turn led to loud chest-beating, hard weeping 
and a few minutes of shur [passionate style]. He was a masterful singer.
interview with author, 2014
Cassette recordings of Hajj Mansour Arzi’s gatherings spread across the coun-
try, and his performances were sometimes broadcast on television. In this way 
his new style became a government-endorsed norm of heyʾatī culture that 
came to be imitated in hoseyniehs across the country in the mid-1990s (inter-
view with author, 2013).
The rise of Hajj Mansour Arzi entailed an important change because it made 
heyʾatī culture a part of the power play between rivalling camps in Iranian poli-
tics. This marked the next phase of the development of heyʾatī culture in Iran, 
unfolding in the late 1990s. From this time the heyʾatī movement (with few 
exceptions) became firmly rooted in the conservative camp that was later to 
be referred to as usulgarān (principalist). Thus it came to play an increasingly 
important role in the power struggle of Iranian politics (interview with author, 
2013). Hajj Mansour Arzi was instrumental in this change. He was involved in 
several controversies due to his explicit criticism of reformist leaders and cur-
rents in the politics of the time. He was also associated with the hardliner vigi-
lante group known as Ansar-e Hezbollah (Ḥizballāh), and he wielded massive 
influence over the young students of the theological seminars (houzehā) as 
well as the Revolutionary Home Guard movement known as basīj.
The politicisation of the heyʾathā had started already in the early years 
of Khameneʾi’s leadership, but it gained its present ascendancy during the 
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presidency of the reformist Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005), and mainly 
after the repression of the student riots in Tehran and Tabriz of 1999. In that 
period the usulgarāyān groups in Iran felt the need to counteract the liber-
alisation process that the new president and his many voters wanted to pur-
sue. My interviewees describe the victory of Khatami in the 1997 elections as 
a shock:
We gave everything we had for Nouri [Nateq Nouri was the opponent 
of Khatami in the 1997 elections] and some heyʾatīhā really demonised 
Khatami. They said he was like Yazid who killed Hoseyn. And then sud-
denly 20 million people vote for him. It was like “What happened here?” 
And people would laugh at us because they knew we were defeated.
interview with author, 2013
Khatami’s landslide victory made many heyʾatīhā feel politically and socially 
isolated in Iranian society since such an overwhelming majority of the people 
had voted for liberalisation and reform. “Many of us became a bit more cau-
tious after that,” another interviewee tells me. “At the same time there was 
a strong feeling that the revolutionary values were threatened and that this 
called for a major mobilisation against the reformist tendencies” (interview 
with author, 2013).
During Khatami’s second presidency, the heyʾatī movement became instru-
mental in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidential campaign. Ahmadinejad 
became mayor of Tehran in 2003 and in this position he allocated resources to 
the heyʾathā and maddāhān in the capital. These groups, as well as maddāhān 
across the country, would later publicly endorse his candidacy, and some 
of the most influential ones would even take part in his promotion. Hajj 
Mansour Arzi himself was one of these. He travelled around the country with 
Ahmadinejad to promote his candidacy, and he was also criticised for doing 
this, mainly because of his closeness to the Supreme Leader, who is supposed 
to take a neutral stance in presidential elections. Another prominent maddāh 
who supported Ahmadinejad was Hajj Mansour Arzi’s former student, Hajj 
Said Haddadian (interview with author, 2013).
In the years prior to the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, the heyʾatī move-
ment grew on a massive scale. In many small cities, my interviewees from the 
movement tell me, they had not even had hoseyniehs until this period. Before, 
heyʾatī meetings had taken place in mosques or shrines (imāmzādeha), but 
now purpose-built hoseyniehs were erected for the first time as a part of the 
general mobilisation of conservative forces against the reformists (interview 
with author, 2013). Some of these relatively new small city hoseyniehs would 
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later become the gathering places for some of the most radical heyʾatī commu-
nities. My interviewees remember heyʾatī life during this period as a popular 
movement characterised by increasing enthusiasm and the return of revolu-
tionary spirit. When Ahmadinejad won the elections in 2005, they saw it as the 
expected outcome of their efforts (interview with author, 2014).
The re-election of Ahmadinejad in June 2009 was the beginning of a tur-
bulent time in Iran. Ahmadinejad’s foremost rival, Mir Hoseyn Mousavi, was 
a close associate of Khatami, with massive support among certain strata of 
Iranian society. For months before the election, his supporters had gathered 
in the streets of Tehran and other cities to manifest their support for his can-
didacy and their disappointment with the hardliner politics of Ahmadinejad. 
When it was announced that Ahmadinejad had won the election with 63 per 
cent of the votes, Mousavi and other reformist leaders accused the authori-
ties of having stolen the election, and the reformist rallies in Tehran contin-
ued in what was soon to become the most massive public protest since the 
Revolution, thirty years before.
Many of the heyʾatīhā I have interviewed think that the allegations of cheat-
ing are absurd. As they describe it, they had experienced the massive popular 
support for Ahmadinejad and felt the tailwind of their own movement (inter-
view with author, 2014). For them, the Green movement (jonbesh-e sabz)—as 
the pro-reformist protestors came to be called—was an expression of deca-
dence and a result of manipulation by the enemies of the Islamic Republic. “It 
has been proven,” one of them told me, “that the whole thing was instigated by 
American infiltrators” (interview with author, 2014). Of course there most cer-
tainly were also people with a heyʾatī background among those who demon-
strated in the sea of green, but as a movement the heyʾatīhā, or a vast majority 
of them, were on the side of Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader.
During and since Ahmedinejad’s presidential terms, the maddāhān and 
their heyʾathā have become increasingly present in Iranian society and pub-
lic debate. On the one hand the visibility of the maddāhān has increased in 
the Iranian broadcast media through the growth of social media like YouTube, 
or the Iranian counterpart, Aparat.com; at the same time, the elaborate indi-
vidual websites maintained by many maddāhān, with clips of maddāhān 
performing their eulogies, have become more accessible than ever before. 
This development has not passed without criticism. On the contrary, many 
influential thinkers on the reformist side—among them the famous philos-
opher Abdolkarim Soroush—have openly criticised the role that usulgarān 
maddāhān have begun to play in Iranian public debate (Soroush 2016). There 
have also been a number of controversies connected to various maddāhān and 
their connections with dubious fractions in the political establishment.
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As a religious institution of growing importance, the heyʾathā’s activities 
have also been further formalised and professionalised. Measures have been 
taken to control the heyʾathā gatherings and to make sure that the maddāhān 
style of singing, as well as the ideological and theological content of their 
poetry, is in line with the doctrines of the clerical establishment. For instance, 
state-sanctioned education and a special maddāh diploma have been estab-
lished in order to certify this (Deutsche Welle-Persian 2016).
3 Madāhān in a Changing Landscape of Islamic Authority
In Twelver Shīʿism, the question of the limits and status of religious author-
ity has constituted perhaps the most prominent focus point of the last cen-
tury’s theological and jurisprudential debates. This focus is also reflected in 
the scholarly research on this branch of Islam, where much energy has been 
put into the analysis of the changing role of religious authority following the 
Islamic Revolution.
In the broader field of religious authority studies, a recent shift is the turn 
away from a one-sided focus on the discursive aspects of authority and a devel-
oping interest in material and bodily aspects. Much research emphasises that 
religious authority cannot be explained if the social and aesthetic framing 
of authoritative words are ignored. Max Weber’s categorisation of authority 
into charismatic, traditional and legal-rational types—which has dominated 
the study of religion and authority for so long—has also been challenged by 
a theoretical movement that emphasises the fluid, relational and narrative 
aspects of culture, religion and power at large (Krämer and Schmidtke 2010: 
2). Furthermore, an increased emphasis on the agency of those subordinated 
to religious authority can also be distinguished in much research (see, for 
instance, Mahmood 2005, Hirschkind 2001).
In the following I will connect to these trends by foregrounding the vernac-
ular aspects of Shīʿite authority that the maddāhān represent in today’s Iran 
and by highlighting the complex and fluid relationships between the aesthetic 
and charismatic authority that these leaders possess and the bureaucratic 
authority of the political establishment. I will focus my discussion on three 
particularly prominent characteristics of the Iranian authority situation: the 
amalgamation of clerical and charismatic authority, the aesthetics of author-
ity, and the relocation of authority.
The Islamic Revolution led to a situation in which the clergy tightened 
their grip and control over the maddāhān. At the same time, it entailed a 
great upsurge for heyʾatī culture at large. Indeed, the Islamic Republic was 
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from its very beginning upheld by a combination of clerical and charismatic 
authority. Ruhollah Khomeini himself strikingly combined these two types of 
authority in his person. As an emotional preacher, he stirred the feelings and 
frustrations of his followers; as a high-ranking scholar and a marjaʿ of Shīʿite 
jurisprudence, he bestowed his legislative authority on these feelings (Mishal 
and Goldberg 2012: 89). Khomeini maintained the two types of authority by 
bringing along the above-mentioned maddāh, Kowsari, to his speeches. In this 
respect Khomeini’s practice set the example for an alliance and a division of 
labour among the two types of religious authority in the velāyat-e faqīh system: 
at the centre stands the ʿ ālem with his jurisprudential expertise, and at his side, 
the maddāh who—with his ability to stir the pious emotions of the people—
would anchor the message in their hearts. Khomeini’s example secured a place 
for the traditional maddāh in the religious and political landscape that was 
taking shape, and it gave legitimacy to the ritual expressions of the heyʾathā.
This alliance has to a large extent remained intact. Today, most maddāhān 
are fervent supporters of the Supreme Leader, and among them we also find 
the most outspoken critics of those who challenge his power. A common view 
in Iran is that the Supreme Leader uses the maddāhān as emissaries who, 
through their semi-independent position, can express criticism or verbally 
attack opponents much more bluntly than he himself can.
At the same time, the alliance and the division of labour between establish-
ment clergy and maddāhān has been challenged. Many have criticised the way 
maddāhān have advanced their position in the Iranian political debate and the 
crude and impolite language that some of them have used in their critique of 
reformists. The former chair of the Assembly of Experts (a deliberative body of 
clerics assigned to supervise the activities of the Supreme Leader), Mohammad 
Yazdi, recently criticised maddāhān for delivering “banal and false content.”
Yazdi, however, has also criticised them for preaching and performing 
eulogies in a style that is inspired by Western music (Deutsche Welle-Persian 
2016). Now these statements are symptomatic of the ambiguous relationship 
between different types of religious authority in today’s Iran. At the same time 
as the maddāhān function as mouthpieces for the less sanitised messages of 
the Supreme Leader, they are not an entirely controllable asset. As I have men-
tioned above, some of the leading clerics of the Islamic Revolution were criti-
cal of the maddāhān and their role in society in pre-revolutionary Iran. The 
major agenda of the Islamic Revolution was to overthrow the monarchic sys-
tem. Another side of it, however, was to reform Iranian Islamic culture, and one 
aspect of this was to bring order and control over the many and varying expres-
sions of vernacular religion. From the early days of the Revolution, efforts were 
made to tighten up the eulogies of the heyʾatī meetings and to remove stories 
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that were not in line with the official teachings of the new political establish-
ment. The ʿālem and philosopher Murtaza Mutahhari wrote a book called 
The Story of Hoseyn (Hamāse-ye Hoseyni) already before the Revolution for 
this purpose. In this book, originally a compilation of lectures, he criticised 
and sought to correct the falsehoods and exaggerations that were conveyed 
by some maddāhān, and in the immediate post-revolutionary period it was 
widely used as a basis for criticism of some preachers and for the call for more 
orthodox content in their poetry and eulogies. Hence already from the begin-
ning of the Islamic Republic the relationship between the maddāhān and the 
clerical establishment was ambiguous, and this ambiguity prevails today.
Now, Iranian politics is a complicated field in which a number of parallel 
and often contradictory processes are unfolding at the same time. Two pro-
cesses that can be discerned over the last decades are the intertwinement 
of decision-making structures and the centralisation of power. The Islamic 
Republic’s unique constitution is designed with several parallel chains of com-
mand: there is the democratic decision-making structure, with the elected 
parliament and the president; the clerical establishment, with the houzeh sem-
inars and the assembly of experts and the Supreme Leader; the military, with 
its various regiments; and the Revolutionary Guard, with its many subsections. 
In the constitution, the Supreme Leader is at the top of all these decision-
making structures, but in all other respects they are largely independent of one 
another and separated by Chinese walls. Or at least, that was the original idea.
What has happened over the last decades is that this separation has begun 
to falter. The Revolutionary Guard’s increased involvement in politics (Golkar 
2015) is perhaps the foremost example of this. The original idea—declared in 
the constitution from 1982 and emphasised by Khomeini in his final publica-
tion Imam’s Final Discourse (1990)—was the sepāh should remain outside poli-
tics. Their duty was to execute the decisions decided on by the jurisprudential 
experts, not to make the decision themselves. This role has now changed. When 
Mohammad ʿAli Jaʿfari was appointed commander of the Revolutionary Guard 
Corps in 2007, he declared that he considered “dealing with internal threats” 
to be one of the Guard’s most important assignments. He also stated that the 
Guard should not settle with being solely a military organisation, but that it 
has to be political and ideological as well (Thurfjell 2014). The consequence 
of this new ambition by the Revolutionary Guards is apparent in large num-
bers of individuals with a sepāh background who now hold seats in the par-
liament, the cabinet, as governors, and so forth. The connection between the 
sepāh, the basīj and the maddāhān has also been strengthened lately. There are 
today specific branches for maddāhān within the basīj, and several prominent 
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maddāhān, such as Mahmoud Karimi or Mehdi Salahshor, are themselves 
members of the Revolutionary Guard.
Another separation that is dissolving in Iran is the one between clerical and 
political decision-making structures. Of course, there never was a strict separa-
tion between these two. But the idea has at least been that the position of the 
Supreme Leader—with his jurisprudential expertise and his status as deputy 
for the Hidden Imam—corresponds to the democratically based authority of 
the elected president and parliament. A brief glance at the modern history of 
Iranian politics, however, shows that these structures have not been mutually 
exclusive. There are many individuals who have built their career in the system 
on both sides of the fence. ʿAli Khameneʾi and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani are 
perhaps the two best-known examples, but the constitutional idea is at least 
that the two sides should fall back on different forms of authority.
What I seek to pinpoint here concerns the position of the maddāhān and 
their heyʾatīhā in relation to these two sides. Traditionally the maddāhān have 
been on the side of the Islamic jurisprudential authority. After the Revolution, 
most heyʾatīhā endorsed the Supreme Leader and the system of velāyat-e faqīh, 
but they were often critical of elected authorities in the system. “We were so 
critical of politicians,” one former heyʾatī told me, “we felt that they didn’t pro-
mote the feeling of Moharram as much as they should” (interview with author, 
2014). The presidential campaign and subsequent election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad as president of the Islamic Republic in 2005 changed this. As dis-
cussed above, many maddāhān were heavily involved in mustering the support 
for this candidate, and his election marked a change in the relation between 
the heyʾatī subculture and the political establishment. Ahmadinejad, my inter-
viewees tell me, was not perceived as a politician type of person. Instead they 
felt he was more deeply rooted in the pious Shīʿite grassroots culture to which 
they too belonged. Ahmadinejad’s two terms as president also entailed that 
the maddāhān’s involvement in politics—and with politicians—increased: for 
instance, governmental resources were earmarked to fund maddāhān during 
this period. In this sense, clerical and political authority were brought closer.
This also meant that the connection between the maddāhān and the clergy 
was strengthened. As mentioned above, the position of the maddāhān has 
been sanctioned by the clerical establishment since the Revolution. The heyʾatī 
movement has never been an outspokenly anti-clerical movement, and some 
maddāhān have been clerics, but at the same time the movement is an expres-
sion of lay folk religion and there has often been some kind of tension between 
it and the educated, bookish and clerical Islam of the houzeh seminars. Under 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency, this would change somewhat. All in all, therefore, 
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what has befallen during the ten years that has passed since Ahmadinejad was 
first elected to the presidency is that the different types of authority in the 
Islamic Republic have become more intertwined. The Islamic jurisprudential 
authority of the houzeh, the legal authority of the elected bodies, the political 
and military authority of the sepāh and the charismatic folk-religious authority 
of the maddāhān have become increasingly amalgamated.
The maddāh cleric in Qom with whom I began this chapter exemplifies the 
amalgamation of the different decision-making structures in the country. He 
is not a folk-religious maddāh, but a trained clergyman from Qom who in his 
preaching style has picked up elements from heyʾatī culture. In other words, 
a houzeh scholar with political ambitions and ties to both the sepāh and basīj 
organisations who is also a maddāh and a demagogue on the conservative side 
of Iranian politics. After we left his gathering, a heyʾatī interviewee whom I had 
accompanied there spoke of him in appreciation:
He is a little bit gentler and smarter than other clergymen. The language 
that he uses is more understandable for young people. He doesn’t speak 
the way they usually do but uses simpler words. I love his style of talking 
because he can bring new aspects to what they always repeat. He reads 
rouzeh gently and finds some artistic aspect that you never saw before, so 
that you love it little bit deeper.
interview with author, 2014
What he embodies, then, is a consolidation of the various types of author-
ity around the Supreme Leader. This process is unfolding at a time when the 
usulgarāyān camp of Iranian politics is coming under challenge by the prog-
ress of the reformists—including the nuclear deal, the recent electoral suc-
cesses and the defrosting of international relations—but also at a time when 
Iran’s presence in the many armed conflicts of the region is increasing, the 
struggle against Daesh in Iraq and Syria being the most prominent example. 
Both these challenges—domestic and external—are being construed among 
the heyʾatīhā as calls for the reawakening and reinvigoration of the “spirit of 
Moharram” around which their subculture pivots.
On a structural level, the situation can be described as a struggle over the 
interpretative prerogative to the legacy of the Islamic Republic and the nation 
of Iran. This struggle is today framed within the polemic between the usulgarān 
and the eslāh talab camps. In the late 1990s these camps grew out of a more 
unified political establishment. The emergence of clear political alternatives—
in connection with the election of Khatami in 1997—brought with it a diver-
sification of Iranian politics that was much clearer than anything that had 
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existed before. Of course, Iranian Islamism has been divided in fractions since 
before the Revolution. Today’s eslāh talabān movement are the inheritors of 
the Iranian Islamic left and the organisation Mojahedin-e enghelāb-e eslāmi, 
including its founder Behzad Nabavi. Already during the Khomeini period the 
dividing line between this Islamic left and more hardliner fractions was deep, 
but Khomeini, most of the time, managed to curb the conflict and uphold an 
image of unity. Just months before Khomeini’s death in 1989, however, the 
conflict came out in the open in relation to the defrocking of leftist Grand 
Ayatollah Montazeri, who up until then had been the expected successor of 
Khomeini. Under the rule of Khameneʾi and in the presidency of Rafsanjani, 
the conflict gradually intensified in order to bloom fully in the Khatami period.
The surfacing of the conflict between eslāh talab and usulgarān in Iranian 
politics can be said to have become the starting-point for the above-mentioned 
attempt to consolidate the different decision-making structures. The diversifi-
cation of open political stances hence coincided with the amalgamation of 
various power structures in and around the usulgarān camp. The maddāhān 
had an important role to play in this process. In order to understand their role, 
however, we need to look into the way heyʾatī culture is lived and performed in 
everyday life.
A shift of focus that has occurred in scholarly work on religion lately, and 
which also can be observed in the study of religious authority, can be found 
in the increased emphasis on aesthetic, sensorial, bodily and material dimen-
sions (Meyer 2009, 2010; Schulz 2006; Stolow 2005, 2007). Such a focus also 
turns out to be fruitful when it comes to analysing the changing role of the 
maddāhān in Iran. I have argued that the new position of the maddāhān in 
Iran can be construed as a part of the mobilisation and consolidation of the 
usulgarāyān camp across sections in Iranian society. The maddāhān and their 
heyʾathā are here used as vehicles for political mobilisation, filling the function 
of anchoring the political and religious messages of the usulgarāyān in the 
hearts and lives of young people.
As a majority of heyʾatīhā are young, it is reasonable to approach the 
heyʾatīhā as a youth movement and to analyse it analogously with other youth 
movements. Many heyʾatīhā that I have interviewed are people who have little 
or no religious engagement beyond their heyʾatī engagement and who may 
even be critical of the Islamist system in Iran. Although no statistics are avail-
able on this point, this observation gives a hint that the link between a heyʾatī 
lifestyle and the political establishment can at times be rather weak. And 
when that is the case, heyʾatī engagement is more like that of football support-
ers than other Islamic organisations in the country. Heyʾatīhā have their own 
community, their own pop-star-like maddāhān, their own fashionable style of 
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clothing, their own shops where they can buy cassettes, posters, pictures of 
their maddāh and other gear specific to their group, and they have their own 
places where they socialise. Let me therefore move on to say something about 
this style-connected side of the movement.
The clothing style of heyʾatī groups varies, and not all heyʾatīhā wear any 
distinguishable outfit. In certain communities and among the most active 
members, however, it is common to display a heyʾatī identity through certain 
attributes. In some places these attributes have some kind of military conno-
tation. Among some groups it has been common to wear army trousers; the 
kefiye scarf—generally associated with the Palestinian struggle and militaristic 
Islamist activism—is another common feature, and so is a certain crocheted 
green cap associated with the Ḥizballāh leader Emad Moqanieh. Most heyʾatī 
communities, however, have a less militaristic approach. In the community 
surrounding Seyyed Zaker, in Qom, to take but one example, it is common to 
wear fashionable and tightly cut black shirts, often with a special type of collar 
associated with Seyyed Zaker himself. It is also common to wear metal brace-
lets, rings and other group-specific attributes.
In the post-war period, the heyʾatī culture also began to change in terms 
of ritual style. Up until then it had existed as a ritual extension of the revolu-
tionary movement, which was modern in its connection to Khomeinist ide-
ology, but traditional in its ritual style and musical expression. In the 1990s 
this would change, as the various heyʾatī groups became more profiled and the 
ritual expressions started to change. Many heyʾatīhā that I have interviewed 
tend to speak of this stylistic development as a very central aspect of maddāh 
practice and heyʾatī life. They speak of different styles and rhythms, of how 
maddāhān differ from and are inspired by each other much as a young person 
belonging to a musical subculture in Europe—be it techno, electronica, R & B 
or progressive rock—might be. Here the style of performance is in focus. 
This does not mean that the wider societal context or the political content is 
entirely disregarded, but these are not what appear to be in the forefront of the 
interviewees’ minds when asked about the movement.
An important contributor to the stylistic development of the heyʾatī expres-
sion was a maddāh by the name of Narimane Panahi. He was active in Tehran 
for a short period during the Ahmadinejad period and his style became influ-
ential among heyʾatīhā across the country. He sang with a hoarse voice and 
introduced a certain type of backbeat tempo (dam) to the chest-beating ses-
sions. He was also famous for downplaying the poetry aspect of his eulogies. 
Sometimes, one of my interviewees tell me, he could start a session completely 
without rouzeh and limit himself to a few lines of poetry, then build the whole 
session around subtle changes in melody and rhythm, somewhat similar to the 
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stylistic manner of much Western techno music (interview with author, 2014). 
One maddāh I interviewed called Panahi’s style a revolution of the whole musi-
cal paradigm of heyʾatī culture (interview with author, 2013).
Another very important maddāh in furthering the development of this pro-
cess was, and is still, the above mentioned Mahmoud Karimi. Besides perform-
ing traditional eulogies and reading his own poetry, he developed and brought 
the style of Arzi and Panahi one step further. Like Panahi, he expanded the 
duration of the repetitive chest-beating, but he also developed a particularly 
passionate style (sabk-e shur) of doing this. The term shur refers to the passion-
ate form of presentation. The specific heyʾatī expression that Karimi developed 
is characterised by a clear rhythm that is built up and amplified through loop-
ing and reverberating effects. He sings his eulogies on top of a beat created by 
the rhythmic repetition of, for instance, the name of Hoseyn and the thump-
ing of the heyʾatī crowd beating their chests. His performances are known 
for their highly moving and atmospheric feeling, his charismatic persona, 
and the wholehearted engagement of the crowd. One of his early followers 
I interviewed tells me that the fascinating thing about him was that he could 
go on for more than an hour just repeating the name of Hoseyn. Maddāhān 
like Panahi had reformed the style before him, but no one has yet become as 
influential as he is. Perhaps this is because of his very professional approach to 
the task. Karimi, I am told, has a group of assistants around him who help with 
writing his poetry, and his recordings are professionally produced (interview 
with author, 2013).
The development of what is sometimes referred to as ‘new’ heyʾatī culture 
can be said to begin with the stylistic changes made by Karimi in the mid-1990s. 
These new expressions created a new role for the maddāh. More than before, 
the prayer leaders became performers, the central focus of heyʾatī gatherings. 
People started to choose what meetings to go to based on which maddāh was 
performing. The most renowned maddāhān today achieve a status similar to 
that of a pop star: they attract large followings of fans, recordings of their sing-
ing are sold and spread on the internet, and their pictures and other objects 
connected to them are sold as merchandise. For some young heyʾatīhā the 
maddāhān are more important as religious authorities than the ʿulamāʾ, and 
many are very loyal to them (interview with author, 2014).
Following the reforms of Karimi, heyʾatī culture can be said to have divided 
into two styles. The sunnati style is characterised by traditional eulogy read-
ings and is less spectacular in its expression, whereas the shur (sometimes 
referred to as jadīd or new; interview with author, 2014) heyʾathā that follow 
Karimi’s line are more ecstatic and modern in their expression. These latter 
also tend to attract younger people (interview with author, 2013). One maddāh 
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I interviewed told me that Karimi had paved the way for musical reformation 
also in other heyʾathā. “I had lots of problems because I wanted to sing in a new 
style,” he tells me,
I wanted to create this excitement and have some jumping. But it was a 
catastrophe and there was lots of fighting and they would not accept it. 
But then we got this [Hajj Mahmoud] Karimi, you know, a very famous 
maddāh, and he brought a whole new frame of music and a new way of 
chest-beating (sīne zanī) that was more flexible and that became the pro-
totype for a new generation of singers.
interview with author, 2014
Some of the more influential of these maddāhān are Hajj Seyyed Mahdi 
Mirdamad, Mehdi Salahshor, Hajj Seyyed Haddadian, Hoseyn Sibsorkhi, 
Abdolreza Helali and Seyyed Javad Zaker. How are we to understand the popu-
larity of these religious leaders? One way is to look at the situation of the young 
people who are their followers and the historical timing of their popularity. 
During the Khatami presidential period (1997–2005), two major developments 
fundamentally changed the everyday situation of young Iranians. One was 
the liberalisation of society that Khatami’s election brought about, at least for 
some time. One aspect of this was that the ban on Western and popular music 
became less strict. A second development was the introduction of the inter-
net. This meant that Iranians could now access information—including films, 
television shows, music and other expressions of global youth culture—more 
easily than ever before. The election of Ahmadinejad was a setback for those 
who wished for a continued liberalisation of Iran, but the conservative ele-
ments of Iranian society are not blind to the demands of young people and 
the rise of the heyʾatīhā coincided with increased efforts to hinder the spread 
of Western youth culture. This may, therefore, be construed as a more or less 
conscious attempt to satisfy young people’s demands for aesthetic, physical, 
passionate and youth-oriented activities in a way that also has Islamic sanc-
tion. Under Ahmadinejad more resources were allotted to heyʾathā, and some 
other changes that professionalised and brought them closer to the govern-
ment were also introduced, for instance formal educational programmes for 
maddāhān. Individual maddāhān have also come to be involved in the politi-
cal economy of the country in other, sometimes controversial ways. Certain 
endorsed maddāhān—and through them heyʾatī culture at large—have also 
increasingly been given space in broadcast media.
Dutch anthropologist Ellen van de Bovenkamp has argued that the popular-
ity of Muslim preacher Tariq Ramadan in Morocco can be explained by the fact 
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that his charismatic and attractive appearance in a performative way provides 
young people with a way out of the paralysing dichotomy between the modern 
and secular on the one hand and the Islamic and traditional on the other that 
is dominant in their country (Bovenkamp 2015: 226). This analysis is helpful 
also in understanding the Iranian new heyʾatīhā. They have managed to carve 
out a religious space that is both youthful and traditional, and also one that 
succeeds in the delicate task of combining the feel of youthful rebellion with 
governmental sanction. Despite their passionate commitment to the Shīʿite 
religion, however, the heyʾatīhā have also become something of a challenge to 
the Islamist establishment. Let me now move on to say something about this.
4 The Renegotiation and Relocation of Authority
In the following I will connect the heyʾatī movement to processes that are devel-
oping today within the field of religious authority at large. The maddāhān, and 
the societal processes that they represent, constitute a challenge to the clerical 
establishment, not primarily as alternative spokespersons for Islam but in so 
far as they present a new idea of what role this religion should play in the lives 
of the faithful. The area that is contested here, then, is not primarily about 
jurisprudential authority or religio-political ideology but—on a more near-life 
and everyday note—about what it means to be a Shīʿite Muslim in Iran today. 
The maddāhān do not challenge the jurisprudential authority of the ʿulamāʾ 
in any way; on the contrary, many of them are quite eager to stress that they 
lack formal education in jurisprudential matters. The challenge to jurispruden-
tial authority that they constitute, rather, is not about legal interpretation, but 
about defining what aspects of a person’s life it is that Islam should primarily 
address. The question of authority is thus in this movement moved from its 
traditional location among scholars and kings to the arena of aesthetics, physi-
cal experience and youth culture. This is also something that is discussed in 
the Iranian public debate.2
This connects to what Gudrun Krämer has described as a proliferation 
of religious knowledge. The authority structures in the Islamic world have 
changed, not only as a result of the fragmentation of traditional religious 
authority associated with the new media situation, but also because of the 
multiplication of actors who provide religious knowledge. The ʿulamāʾ are still 
around, but new and, more importantly, additional and alternative types of 
authority have reached prominence alongside them (Krämer and Schmidtke 
2 See for instance, Alef.ir, http://alef.ir/vdcfyydjcw6dxja.igiw.html?401418. Accessed 28/10/2016.
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2010: 12). The heyʾatī movement, then, represents a relocation of authority not 
on the level of scholarly or political position, but by reinterpreting where and 
in what ways people are letting religion become a part of their lives.
Let me illustrate this point by referring to one of my interviewees. Kalb-e 
Hoseyn is a man in his late forties. Kalb-e Hoseyn is a pseudonym that he him-
self chose. It means, literally, Hoseyn’s dog, and it reflects the type of piety that 
is encouraged in this heyʾat. Kalb-e Hoseyn belongs to a heyʾat in Qom that is 
dominated by the new heyʾatī style, and he thinks of himself as a heyʾatī. When 
I ask him what this identity means to him, he immediately starts talking about 
his own emotional development and about the performative style of his favou-
rite maddāh. For Kalb-e Hoseyn, heyʾatī engagement is all about the feeling. He 
lived a wild life before he got involved in the movement. There were drugs and 
a constant seeking of highs. He used to be a bodybuilder and weightlifter and, 
besides his daytime job as a painter, he used to spend his days working out in 
the gym and drinking vodka with his friends. “I have been an outsider in many 
ways,” he tells me, “I used to live a crazy life, I tried everything to get a little bit 
of excitement. But it was a joy that was for myself only, only myself, myself, 
myself all the time.”
One day, Kalb-e Hoseyn tells me, he collapsed. His lifestyle had worn him 
down and this is when he found relief in the heyʾat of a young maddāh in his 
city. Kalb-e Hoseyn had participated in Shīʿite devotional rituals in connection 
to Ashura since his childhood, but what he met now, he tells me, was something 
new. “The first time I went there I was caught,” he says, “I liked the shur style, it 
made me interested, I felt happiness, you could say that I fell in love.” For him 
the heyʾat was something new and a way out of his destructive lifestyle. “My 
maddāh lit a fire in my heart and I found true happiness,” he explains, “This is 
the path of Imam Hussein” (interview with author, 2014).
Kalb-e Hoseyn was twenty-four years old when he became engaged in the 
movement. Ten years have passed since that day, and his life has changed for 
the better. He goes to the hoseynieh as often as he can, and he works as a vol-
unteer with the events they arrange there. He has also married and has a one-
year-old son with whom, he tells me, he likes to listen and cry to recordings 
of eulogies at home. The heyʾatī life has come to dominate his everyday. He 
prays in the car as he drives between different jobs and he constantly listens 
to recorded heyʾatī meetings. The maddāh who lit the fire in his heart has died, 
but Kalb visits his grave at least once a week. “This is what makes us different 
from other Muslims,” he tells me, “that we think more about Hoseyn. We don’t 
think about money and material stuff. We are not rich. We are satisfied with 
this life, and this is the sweetness of Imam Hoseyn, this feeling of satisfaction.”
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For Kalb-e Hoseyn his religion is all about the feeling: the feeling that fills 
him at the heyʾatī meetings, the feeling about his maddāh, the feeling of satis-
faction in his life. This does not mean that he disrespects the jurisprudential 
or theological aspects of Islam. There are ʿulamāʾ who come to the hoseynieh 
sometimes, he tells me, and he likes them. They give some speech before the 
rouzeh begins and that is good and okay, “but,” he tells me, since he “cannot 
explain things theologically it is better to go with the feeling. And the feel-
ing is the love for Hoseyn.” When I ask about having a marjaʿ, he tells me that 
“if we need a marjaʿ we will pick one who loves Hoseyn.” “Some people,” he 
continues with a smile, “have called us kāfers because of what we say”—in 
his hoseynieh, it is said, they once paraphrased the Islamic creed and shouted 
lā-ilāha-ill-Hoseyn (there is no god but Hoseyn)—but Kalb does not seem so 
bothered about this. He knows what he has found in the heyʾatī lifestyle. It has 
changed his life and filled him with a feeling of satisfaction and joy that he 
takes as proof of its authenticity.
5 Conclusion
The rise of the heyʾathā as a popular youth culture based on aesthetics and 
emotion constitutes a fundamental challenge to the authority of the ʿulamāʾ 
in virtue of the fact that it neglects their very idea of what authority should 
be built on. Many heyʾatīhā, like Kalb-e Hoseyn, do not care much for fīqh or 
jurisprudential evidence. They, like most young people, care about emotions. 
Now as long as they respect and support the authority of the ʿulamāʾ, this is in 
line with Khomeini’s idea of a division of labour within the velāyat-e faqīh sys-
tem, with the jurisprudential expert at the centre and the maddāh at his side, 
anchoring the message in the hearts of his followers.
But what seems to have happened with the professionalisation of the 
maddāhān and the development of heyʾatī culture in the direction of youth 
culture over the last decade is that this division of labour has been challenged. 
Some heyʾatīhā—although probably not most of them—see their maddāhān, 
not as a complement, but as a substitute for the clergy. This, naturally, makes 
them potentially unreliable for the jurisprudential elite to build their authority 
on. The above-mentioned maddāh diploma can be understood in this context 
as an attempt to bring the maddāhān back into line.
These processes are unfolding at a time when Iranian civil society is going 
through a process of change. Civil society can be defined as “the space between 
the state and the family, where citizens on a voluntary basis engage with issues 
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of societal relevance” (Aarts and Cavatorta 2013: 6). In recent research on Iran, 
the dynamics of this space have become the subject of increasingly sharp focus. 
Studying “the dynamics that occur outside formal groups,” ʿAli Fathollah-Nejad, 
for one, has shown that the international sanctions were counterproductive 
for civil society because they led indirectly to reduced space for democratic 
activism. In this period, then, the heyʾatī movement managed to seize a part 
of the youth cultural space where the interest in—and the authority of—the 
Shīʿite Islamist governmental establishment is waning.
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Introduction to Part 3
The term ‘fundamentalist’ was first used by American Baptists to describe 
themselves as a wave of revivalism of ‘fundamental’ Christian beliefs swept 
through various protestant communities in the US in the 1920s (Shepard, 
2004). In the following years, the term begun to be applied to other religious 
traditions including Islam (especially in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution). After the events of September 11, 2001, Islamic fundamentalism 
has become the fundamentalism. In the Islamic context, fundamentalism is 
characterized by opposition to the West and any who rule Muslim-majority 
countries with Western support, and the belief that the pure practice of Islam 
is in decline. In this way of thinking the only way to make Islam glorious again 
is by going back to the beliefs and practices of the first Islamic communities 
that lived under the Prophet and the first leaders (the four righteously guided 
Caliphs in the case of Sunnīs and the first imāms in the case of the Shīʿites). 
Islamic fundamentalist groups often reject what they perceive as Western val-
ues, particularly, individual freedoms, women’s rights, and secular governance.
A term closely related to fundamentalism is extremism. Extremism is gener-
ally understood to be a set of religious beliefs and practices that fall outside of 
the norm for their group (Sotlar 2004). In order to identify extremist beliefs 
and practices among Muslims, we would need to identify norms of beliefs 
and practices among world’s 1.8 billion Muslims. The problem is that norms 
vary not only between different ideological group and regional groups but also 
between subgroups that form parts of these larger groupings. Because of these 
challenges, Islamic extremism is often defined by a particular set of beliefs, par-
ticularly, beliefs about religious sanctions for violence. Those groups that sup-
port jihād with the sword against those that are perceived to be non-believers 
are considered to be extremists. Those that support the notion of takfīr (the 
belief that some of those who claim to be Muslims are really non-believers) are 
considered to be extremists.
Fundamentalist and extremist beliefs are often related-many groups that 
hold fundamentalist beliefs also hold extremist beliefs. Many anti-western 
groups committed to a revival of the lost glory of Islam also believe that jihād as 
a violent, even self-destructive, war against the West is the best way to achieve 
these goals. They also believe that those Muslims who are co-operating with 
the West and advocate Western values are not true believers and also deserve 
to be confronted violently. Teasing apart these related beliefs and distinguish-
ing between fundamentalist and extremist Muslims is challenging, nonethe-
less this section of the book engages with this challenge by discussing themes, 
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motivations, and tactics of varied movements and ideologies. Here, the sig-
nificant and impactful topics of Salafism, the Taliban, Ḥamās, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
Boko Haram, Ḥizballāh, the Faizrakhmanisty, and ISIS are each the focus of 
a chapter.
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Chapter 14
The Citadel of Salafism
Joas Wagemakers
1 Introduction
“Salafism […] is a danger to Muslims themselves and thus a danger to France 
as well.” This is how former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls referred to 
Salafism in late July 2016. A certain level of hyperbole in talking about Islam 
was perhaps to be expected a few weeks after the French city of Nice had been 
the target of a terrorist attack by what appeared to be a radical Islamist, killing 
over eighty people. Yet it was significant that Valls apparently felt the need to 
single out Salafism, which he blamed for having “destroyed and perverted part 
of the Muslim world,” despite the fact that the perpetrator of the Nice attacks 
did not appear to be a Salafi at all (AFP 2016). A French Member of Parliament, 
Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, even went so far as to call for a ban on Salafism 
altogether (Lefeivre 2016).
Such criticism of Salafism as being dangerous and even calls for ban-
ning this trend altogether are not limited to France. A similar call was heard 
in the Netherlands, for instance, from Ahmed Marcouch, a former Member 
of Parliament for the Dutch Labour Party, who considers Salafism a “breed-
ing ground of jihadism and the ideological cradle of [the Islamic State (IS)]” 
(Marcouch and El Bouch 2015). In Kazakhstan, to mention one more exam-
ple, a Muslim-majority country with an officially secular regime, President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev indicated in October 2016 that his country intended to 
ban Salafism, which he said, “poses a destructive threat to Kazakhstan” (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2016).
Salafism, in other words, is controversial. Ironically, this is also the case 
among Salafis themselves. Issues such as who may be labelled a Salafi and what 
types of Salafism exist are highly contested among adherents to this branch 
of Sunnī Islam themselves, which—as we will see later on in this chapter—
indicates that Salafis are far less unified than the politicians quoted above 
appear to believe. This chapter will shed light on such contestations by deal-
ing with the definition, history and ideological development of Salafism, the 
means adherents to this trend use to defend their doctrinal turf, its spreading 
throughout the Muslim world, Salafis’ everyday practices, and the faultlines 
that exist within the trend.
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I argue that Salafism is like a citadel or a fortress, experienced by Salafis as, 
on the one hand, a refuge providing them protection from their daily frustra-
tions and unwanted outside influences and, on the other, as a place where they 
can safely pursue an alternative project of living and breathing a religiously 
purposeful life. Although this ‘fortress-factor’ is not the only reason for the rise 
of Salafism, it does account for at least part of its popularity among people 
who—frustrated as they are by repression, corruption and/or Islamophobia—
seek solace in the eternal truths they believe Salafism embodies and live their 
lives keeping them ‘pure’.
2 Constructing the Citadel: Definition, History, and Ideological 
Development
Based on the meaning of the word, a ‘Salafi’ is someone who is ‘salaf-like’. 
According to several ḥadīths, the Prophet Muḥammad once stated that his 
“generation” are “the best people” or “the best of my community” and then the 
two generations following his.1 These words have led many to equate the term 
al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (the pious predecessors) with these first three generations of 
Muslims. This chapter concentrates on the trend in Islam whose adherents 
claim to have made being salaf-like the be-all and end-all of their ideology. It 
is therefore justified to base our label for them on this characteristic, to name 
them Salafis and to define them as those Sunnī Muslims who claim to emulate 
the first three generations of Muslims as closely and in as many spheres of life 
as possible.
Salafis are, of course, not the only ones who read the ḥadīths mentioned 
above and, as such, are not the only Sunnī Muslims who hold the salaf in very 
high esteem. A crucial difference between these non-Salafi Sunnīs on the one 
hand and Salafis on the other is that the latter gear their entire teachings and 
lifestyles to emulating the predecessors, rather than ‘merely’ seeing the salaf 
as an inspirational example, as many non-Salafi Sunnīs do. This difference 
can be difficult to spot for the uninitiated, however, and it is therefore not 
surprising that Salafis are sometimes viewed as merely very pious or doctrin-
ally ‘pure’ Sunnīs, both by Muslims and non-Muslims (Hamid 2009: 387–390; 
Hegghammer 2009: 249). Indeed, while Salafis can be distinguished from other 
1 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, book 57 (“Kitāb Faḍāʾil Aṣḥāb al-Nabī”), chapter 1 (“Faḍāʾil Aṣḥāb al-Nabī”), 
nos. 2–3; Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, book 44 (“Kitāb Faḍāʾil al-Ṣaḥāba”), chapter 52 (“Faḍl al-Ṣaḥāba, 
thumma lladhīna Yalūnahum, thumma lladhīna Yalūnahum”), nos. 2533–2536.
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Sunnīs, the site on which their citadel was constructed and the bricks with 
which it was built were produced in debates with scholars and trends within 
Sunnī Islam as a whole.
2.1 Law: The Ahl al-Ḥadīth as a Construction Site for Salafism
With regard to law, modern-day Salafism’s genealogy goes back to the question 
of how to live one’s life after the Prophet had died, when Muslims could no 
longer rely on his legal verdicts. One group of early scholars (ʿulamāʾ) advo-
cated the view that, when searching for answers, Muslims should rely on the 
Qurʾān, the memorised practices (sunan, sing. sunna) and considered opinion 
(ra  ʾ y) of early believers (including, especially, the Prophet) and the consensus 
view (ijmāʿ) of the scholars themselves. Because of their reliance on their own 
considered opinion in establishing rulings, these scholars were referred to as 
the ahl al-ra  ʾ y (the people of considered opinion) (Coulson 1999 [1964]: 38–41; 
Schacht 1982 [1964]: 29–33).
Not everyone agreed to the ahl al-ra  ʾ y’s approach of emulating the Prophet, 
however. Some scholars, including the eponymous ‘founder’ of the Ḥanbalī 
school of Islamic law (madhhab, pl. madhāhib), Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (780–855), 
argued that the example of Muḥammad should be searched for in the tradi-
tions (ḥadīths) ascribed to him. The emulation of the Prophet, in other words, 
was to be done on the basis of ḥadīths, which led to the name ahl al-ḥadīth 
(the people of tradition) for those who subscribed to this view. The debates 
between these two different trends resulted in a compromise—forged partly 
by the eponymous ‘founder’ of the Shāfiʿī school of Islamic law, Muḥammad 
ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (767–820)—that came to embody what may be termed 
the mainstream legal approach to Sunnī Islam: the Qurʾān and sunna of the 
Prophet as central sources, complemented by the insights and judgements of 
scholars (Coulson 1999 [1964]: 41–61; Hallaq 2009: 55–59; Schacht 1982 [1964]: 
33–48).
The legal compromise between the approaches of the ahl al-ra  ʾ y and the ahl 
al-ḥadīth became embodied in the four schools of Islamic law (Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, 
Mālikī and Ḥanbalī) and has had a great impact on Sunnī Islam. This does not 
mean, however, that the ideas of the ahl al-ḥadīth have died. Their view that 
only direct recourse to the primary sources of Islamic law (the Qurʾān and the 
sunna) suffices and that everything else distracts from the alleged purity of 
early Islam—when believers did not have madhāhib either—is one that can 
be found among many Salafis today. This does not mean that the original ahl 
al-ḥadīth were Salafis; Salafism, after all, encompasses more than just the 
legal sphere. Yet it does entail that today’s Salafis’ derive one aspect of their 
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ideological citadel—reverting to the salaf in legal matters and circumventing 
the madhāhib in doing so—from an early-Islamic trend and that they have 
built their edifice on a construction site put in place by the ahl al-ḥadīth.
Salafism’s debt to the ahl al-ḥadīth also shows us how Salafis differ from 
mainstream Sunnī Muslims in the legal sphere: whereas the former often 
seek to avoid the schools of Islamic law in favour of referring directly to the 
Qurʾān and the sunna according to the understanding of the salaf, the latter 
believe the Prophet should be emulated through the prism of the madhāhib, 
thereby allowing more room for scholarly input in the legal sphere (Brown 
2015: 117–144).
A natural consequence of Salafis’ approach to legal issues is the use of inde-
pendent reasoning on the basis of the Qurʾān and the sunna (ijtihād), rather 
than the blind following (taqlīd) of the madhāhib that many non-Salafi Sunnīs 
make use of. The concept of ijtihād was used in varying ways by scholars that 
are held in very high esteem by Salafis today, including Ḥanbalī ʿulamāʾ such as 
ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and his student ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292–1350). 
Through scholars such as these, as well as others on the Indian Subcontinent 
and the Arabian Peninsula, the practice of ijtihād was kept alive and turned 
out to be an important tenet in the beliefs of many Salafis today (Brown 2007: 
314–321; Haykel 2003: 89–108; Haykel 2009: 43–44).
2.2 Theology: The Bricks of the Salafi Citadel
As important as the issue of ijtihād may be for modern-day Salafis, it was not 
always agreed upon by all of them. Although the practice seems to have been 
accepted by many Salafis now, a famous scholar like the Saudi mufti Muḥammad 
ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh (1893–1969) advocated a less far-reaching approach 
to ijtihād. His rulings were therefore mostly limited to those found within the 
Ḥanbalī school of Islamic law (Lacroix 2009: 66). The ahl al-ḥadīth can thus 
be said to have laid some of the groundwork for Salafism and the question of 
ijtihād is certainly an important one to Salafis, but it is not central to them in 
the way theology is, in which Salafis really distinguish themselves from other 
believers and which provides the bricks to the walls of the Salafi citadel that 
protect their ‘pure’ lifestyle.
The theological concept most central to modern-day Salafism is tawḥīd (the 
unity of God), which Salafis—unlike other Muslims, for whom this concept is 
also of great importance—divide into three different aspects: the unity of God’s 
lordship (tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya), the unity of his divinity (tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya) 
and God’s unity of names and attributes (tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt). The first 
of these signifies the belief in one Lord and Creator, while the second one more 
clearly distinguishes Salafis from pre-Islamic polytheists by denoting the need 
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to worship the one true god (Allāh) alone. Tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt, finally, 
refers to the idea that God is utterly unique and incomparable.
The latter aspect of tawḥīd has been linked to the word ‘salafī’ since at least 
ibn Taymiyya (Haykel 2009: 38) and is of crucial importance to today’s Salafis 
in their attempts to distinguish themselves from other trends in Islam. For 
example, when other Muslims read references to God’s physical attributes such 
as his hand (Qurʾān 38:75, 67:1), they may apply metaphorical interpretation 
(ta  ʾ wīl) or anthropomorphism (tashbīh). To Salafis, however, neither approach 
is acceptable. While ta  ʾ wīl clashes with their desire to read the Qurʾānic text 
literally, tashbīh does not square with their belief in the uniqueness of God as 
expressed in Qurʾān 42:11 (“like Him there is naught” [Arberry’s translation]) to 
underline their belief that nothing can be compared with God. Adherents to 
the mainstream Ashʿarī and Māturīdī schools of Islamic theology have solved 
this problem by reading the texts literally but allowing for some speculation 
about the character of God’s attributes, while Ḥanbalī scholars accepted the 
texts simply as they are “without [asking] how” they could be explained (bi-lā 
kayfa) (El-Bizri 2008: 122–131). The Salafi position on this matter strongly 
resembles the Ḥanbalī one, with Salafis believing that God does have a certain 
form, but without ascribing any descriptive designation to him (bi-lā takyīf ) 
(Gharaibeh 2014: 112–124).
The issue of tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt separates Salafis from other Sunnī 
Muslims today, just as it separated ibn Taymiyya and his followers from medi-
aeval trends such as the rationalist Muʿtazila, who used ta  ʾ wīl as an interpreta-
tive tool. In a similar way, today’s Salafis use the theological concepts of faith 
(īmān) and unbelief (kufr) not only as tools to express what they see as the 
true creed (ʿaqīda), but also as the very bricks with which to build walls meant 
to separate them from other trends in Islam. Firstly, according to Salafis, faith 
consists of belief in the heart (al-iʿtiqād bi-l-qalb), speech with the tongue (al-
qawl bi-l-lisān) and acts with the limbs (al-aʿmāl bi-l-jawāriḥ) and is incom-
plete without any of these three elements. Today’s Salafis (as well as some 
other Sunnī Muslims) not only believe this to be the correct doctrinal posi-
tion, but also hold on to this to distinguish themselves from, for example, the 
early-Islamic (and long extinct) Murjiʾa, who generally believed faith consisted 
only of belief and speech. Secondly, there is the question of whether īmān can 
increase (yazīdu) and decrease (yanquṣu) or is indivisible. The adherents to 
some trends in Islam, such as many scholars belonging to the Ḥanafī school 
of Islamic law, believe that faith is either present or absent and cannot change 
in size. Salafis, however, believe īmān does increase with every good belief, act 
of speech or deed and decreases whenever a person thinks, says or does some-
thing sinful (Wagemakers 2016a: 46–48).
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Apart from the different elements of faith, today’s Salafis also divide īmān 
into three different levels on which sins can take place: ṣiḥḥat al-dīn (the sound-
ness of the religion), wājib al-dīn (the compulsory of the religion) and kamāl 
al-dīn (the perfection of the religion). The first of these encompasses beliefs 
such as the existence of God, which are so basic to Islam that any opposition to 
this is seen as unbelief. Wājib al-dīn refers to the level of faith on which trans-
gressions are seen as major sins (kabāʾir, sing. kabīra), but which do not in and 
of themselves make one guilty of kufr. Beliefs, sayings or acts on the level of 
kamāl al-dīn, finally, are not seen as sins at all and can therefore not decrease 
one’s faith, only increase it. Salafis believe that mistakes on the level of ṣiḥḥat 
al-dīn as well as consciously perpetrated sins on the level of wājib al-dīn are so 
grave that they are labelled ‘major unbelief ’ (kufr akbar) and expel the culprit 
from Islam as an unbeliever (kāfir, pl. kuffār). Sins on the level of wājib al-dīn 
made without a sinful intention—but, for example, because of compulsion 
(ikrāh), out of ignorance (jahl) or by mistake (khaṭa  ʾ )—mean the person in 
question is only guilty of minor unbelief (kufr aṣghar), which does not expel 
one from Islam (Wagemakers 2009: 97–99).
Modern-day Salafi views on this issue mean that they only apply excommu-
nication (the expulsion of a Muslim from Islam [takfīr]) in cases of kufr akbar. 
In fact, even Salafis who are accused of being too restrictive or, conversely, too 
casual in using takfīr emphasise that they are adhering to the doctrinal posi-
tions outlined above. Salafis stress this not only for doctrinal reasons, but also 
to distinguish themselves from the early-Islamic Murjiʾa and Khawārij trends 
(although neither still exists anymore in its earlier form), who are, respectively, 
said to have refrained from applying takfīr even in cases of kufr akbar and to 
have applied excommunication for ‘mere’ cases of kufr aṣghar (Wagemakers 
2012b: 154–156).
3 Defending the Citadel: Salafi Means of Maintaining ‘Purity’
Through their views on law and theology, Salafis thus distinguish themselves 
from ‘blind’ followers of a madhhab, mainstream Ashʿarī-Māturīdī theologians, 
the Murjiʾa, many Ḥanafī scholars and the Khawārij. The result is a legal and 
especially theological fortress that Salafis believe represents a resurrected 
form of what the Prophet and the salaf themselves stood for. Salafis believe 
the ‘purity’ of their creed to be under constant attack, however, from out-
side influences coming from the Islamic trends mentioned above, as well as 
Shīʿites, who are often viewed with great scepticism, and members of other 
religions (Wagemakers 2016a: 71–72). In order to defend their citadel from 
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such influences and keep their own house in order, Salafis have developed or 
adopted several concepts from Islamic tradition that aid them in warding off 
unwanted views and the people who hold them.
The first of these concepts is al-firqa al-nājiya (the sect saved [from hellfire]) 
or al-ṭāʾifa al-manṣūra (the victorious group). These terms are derived from a 
number of ḥadīths that differ slightly in content and in which the Prophet says 
that his community (umma) will split up into seventy-three sects ( firqa), “all 
of which are in hell, except for one.” This one sect is believed to be linked to 
another ḥadīth, which states that “a group (ṭāʾifa) from my umma will remain 
committed to the truth.”2 Salafis believe that they are the people referred to 
in these ḥadīths and they thus equate themselves with al-firqa al-nājiya and 
al-ṭāʾifa al-manṣūra and their beliefs with “the truth” (Haykel 2009: 34).
While Salafis believe the concepts of al-firqa al-nājiya and al-ṭāʾifa 
al-manṣūra set them apart as different, the term ghurabāʾ (sing. gharīb; strang-
ers) underlines this. Again based on a ḥadīth, the Prophet is said to have stated 
that “Islam began as a stranger (gharīban) and it will return as it began, a 
stranger” and added “so good tidings (ṭūbá) to the strangers (al-ghurabāʾ).”3 
Another ḥadīth states: “Be in the world (kun fī l-dunyā) as if you are a stranger 
(gharīb) or a traveller (ʿābir al-sabīl).”4 Although this tradition and those follow-
ing it in collections of ḥadīths seem aimed at keeping believers from attaching 
too much value to earthly pleasures and possessions, the concept of ghurabāʾ 
easily lends itself to more specific interpretations of ideological and doctrinal 
purity and exclusiveness. As such, Salafis see the label of ghurabāʾ as a badge 
of honour5 and may even view their being marginalised as a sign that they do 
not belong anywhere but in Islam (De Koning, Wagemakers, and Becker 2012: 
128–129; Köpfer 2014: 449, 451–460).
Given the exclusive claims to truth that Salafis make, it is obvious that they 
want to keep their supposedly pure beliefs from becoming sullied. This atti-
tude is not only translated in a doctrinal position that differs from other, ‘devi-
ant’ trends in Islam, as we saw above, but also from any addition to the religion 
2 See, for instance, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, book 56 (“Kitāb al-Manāqib”), chapter 27 (“Bāb”), nos. 834 
and 835; book 92 (“Kitāb al-Iʿtiṣām bi-l-Kitāb wa-l-Sunna”), chapter 10 (“Qawl al-Nabī Ṣallá 
llāh ʿalayhi wa-Sallam: Lā Tazālu Ṭāʾifatun min Ummatī Ẓāhirīna ʿalá l-Ḥaqq wa-Hum Ahl 
al-ʿIlm”), no. 414.
3 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, book 1 (“Kitāb al-Īmān”), chapter 65 (“Bāb Bayān anna l-Islām Bada  ʾa Gharīban 
wa-innahu Ya  ʾ ziru bayna l-Masjidayn”), no. 145.
4 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, book 76 (“Kitāb al-Riqāʾiq”), chapter 3 (“Bāb Qawl al-Nabī Ṣallá llāh ʿalayhi 
wa-Sallam: Kun fī l-Dunyā ka-annaka Gharībun”), no. 425.
5 See, for example, the famous nashīd (song) “Ghurabāʾ” at www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLR 
j2u475RU, accessed 18/11/2016, which is particularly popular among militant Salafis.
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as Salafis believe it was understood by the salaf. They refer to such additions as 
bidaʿ (sing. bidʿa; religious innovations) and condemn them in matters of law, 
theology, lifestyle, customs, rituals and language (Wiktorowicz 2001: 116–117). 
Precisely because such bidaʿ were allegedly absent among the salaf, Salafis see 
them as steps toward the slow corruption of Islam. It is for this reason that 
Salafis often cite a ḥadīth that states that “every novelty (muḥdatha) is an inno-
vation (bidʿa) and every innovation is an error (ḍalāla) and every error is in hell 
( fī l-nār)” (Wagemakers 2016a: 43).
The main tool that Salafis use to keep alleged threats to their legal and 
theological views and their general ‘purity’ at bay is al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (loy-
alty and disavowal). This concept is used to stimulate a strong sense of alle-
giance toward God, Islam and other Muslims (particularly Salafis), on the one 
hand, and a clear repudiation of everything else, on the other. This is applied 
in the personal sphere, with regard to clothing, names, (religious) holidays 
and dealing with non-Salafis, but also in the political sphere, where Salafis 
believe in solidarity with Muslims in times of conflict and principally oppose 
asking ‘unbelievers’ for help (al-istiʿāna bi-l-kuffār) against other Muslims 
(Wagemakers 2008).
Al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ is thus used by Salafis to stick together inside the citadel 
and keep others away from its walls. In practice, however, it is important to 
note that Salafis have built an ideological fortress, not an actual one. In other 
words, Salafis do not live in physical seclusion but among people who have 
very different beliefs, which may hamper their efforts to disavow others, partic-
ularly in non-Muslim countries. Friendly relations with Christian neighbours, 
for example, can easily be portrayed as causing one to stray from ‘true’ Islam 
if they are not framed in the context of missionary activities (daʿwa) (Shavit 
2014: 71–78). Al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, precisely because it is meant to keep Salafis 
away from any ‘un-Islamic’ influences, can therefore be an effective instrument 
against the ‘corruption’ of Islam but can simultaneously cause friction with 
non-Salafis when zealously applied.
4 Expanding the Citadel: The Spread of Salafism
The spread of the Salafi message based on the ideas espoused by men such as 
the aforementioned ibn Taymiyya, ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and their ideologi-
cal heirs has perhaps had less drastic consequences than Salafi ideology may 
suggest. While it is true that Salafism represents a break with the Islamic tradi-
tion of following a madhhab and adhering to Ashʿarī-Māturīdī theology, it is 
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also true that its adherents claim to merely follow the Qurʾān and the sunna, a 
principle that few Sunnī Muslims will reject, even if they disagree with Salafis’ 
precise way of doing so. This means that while Sunnī Muslims cannot simply 
be labelled potential Salafis, they can be said to be somewhat susceptible to 
the core Salafi message of returning to the Islam’s primary sources.
In this context, and in addition to factors specific to certain countries or 
communities, several reasons can be mentioned that strongly aided the spread 
of Salafism, all of them related to Saudi Arabia. The reason Saudi Arabia is 
involved in all of them stems from that country’s unique historical ties with 
Salafism. Influenced by the writings of ibn Taymiyya and others, the Arabian 
reformer Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703–1792) started spreading 
his Salafi message across the Arabian Peninsula, particularly from 1744 on, 
when he made a pact with the tribal leader Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd (d. 1765), 
the ancestor of the Saudi royal family. Together, they conquered most of the 
Arabian Peninsula and made Salafism, often referred to as “Wahhabism,” the 
Saudi state’s guiding ideology, which it has remained ever since (Commins 
2005; Crawford 2014).
Despite Salafism’s importance to Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, other 
parts of the Arabian Peninsula, it did not spread much outside its borders 
initially. This changed with the exploitation of the kingdom’s oil reserves after 
the Second World War. Because of Saudi Arabia’s booming oil industry and its 
lack of qualified personnel to run it, the kingdom had to employ many foreign 
workers (often Muslim Arabs), who not only lived and worked in the Saudi 
state, but frequently also adopted its religious customs, which they subse-
quently took home with them after several years. This trend was abetted by a 
second factor that influenced the spread of Salafism, namely the Saudi efforts 
use the kingdom’s oil wealth to spread Salafi beliefs, for example through 
the Muslim World League (MWL) (Schulze 1990) and the Islamic University 
of Medina (Farquhar 2017). In response to the socialist rhetoric of Egypt’s 
President Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir or Nasser (r. 1954–1970) and, later, the revo-
lutionary propaganda emanating from Iran after 1979, the kingdom poured 
great amounts of money into spreading a conservative Salafi message. This, 
in turn, was connected with a third factor allowing Salafism to spread: the 
decline of Nasser’s Arab socialism after the Arab defeat against Israel in 1967 
and the search for an alternative that very often turned out to be religion. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia was therefore spreading a Salafi message, 
both through individuals and through organisations to a Middle East that was 
increasingly susceptible to it. As a result, Salafism grew extensively (Kepel 
2002: 62–75).
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5 Inside the Citadel: Living the Life of a Salafi
So far, this chapter has focussed on the first half of the ‘fortress-factor’ of 
Salafism: seeking refuge from outside influences considered detrimental to the 
‘purity’ of Islam. Yet once inside the citadel—constructed by legal and theo-
logical means and defended by various instruments of maintaining ‘purity’—
Salafis can safely pursue their alternative lifestyle of strictly emulating the 
salaf in every detail of their lives, provided they stay within the fortress’ walls. 
This latter condition is quite important since it speaks for itself that for Salafis, 
life in any country—even in Saudi Arabia—is often stubborn and unruly 
because of the simple fact that it is difficult to keep up a lifestyle that differs so 
much from the one preferred by many other people. That is a clear drawback 
from living in an ideological citadel, rather than one made of actual bricks and 
mortar. Salafis therefore strive to withdraw into the safety of their religious 
fortress, which guarantees doctrinal soundness and provides them with the 
best opportunity to live their daily lives in accordance with the example of the 
predecessors.
5.1 Citadel Life: Salafi Everyday Practice
Given the importance of doctrine, it is obvious that for many Salafis the study 
of the sources (the Qurʾān and the sunna) and the books based on those by 
scholars considered Salafi is of great importance. Precisely because Salafis 
attach such great value to emulating the salaf, they believe it is highly impor-
tant to know what those predecessors said and did and, conversely, what they 
did not say or do. This process of ‘cleansing’ Islamic tradition to look for ‘true’ 
Islam is referred to as taṣfiya (cleansing) and it is a process in which many 
Salafi scholars engage, most famously Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī 
(1914–1999), who compiled several volumes of ‘sound’ and ‘weak’ ḥadīths in 
order to establish exactly what the Prophet did and which of his sayings should 
be dismissed as inauthentic (Amin 2004).
For ‘ordinary’ Salafis, who may not always have the time to engage in such 
scholarly endeavours, life according to the predecessors’ example is often 
found in the exact performance of many rituals concerning things like prayer, 
good manners and personal hygiene. Quite often, instructions on how to per-
form these are given in small booklets that are handed out or can be picked up 
free of charge at mosques and other Salafi places of gathering. As such, ritual 
purity is a theme that plays a major role in Salafis’ everyday lives (Gauvain 2013; 
Wagemakers 2016a: 170–171).
One booklet that is perhaps more popular than any other is Ḥiṣn al-
Muslim, which gives a highly detailed description of what one must say when 
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awakening, putting on clothes, leaving one’s home, entering a mosque, etcet-
era, all based on texts from the Qurʾān and the life of the Prophet (Al-Qaḥṭānī 
2010). Although the use of this booklet—whose title, aptly, can be translated as 
“The Citadel of the Muslim”—is not limited to Salafis, it is ubiquitous among 
the latter, who really try to live in accordance with these verses and sayings 
(Wagemakers 2016a: 172–173). This same attitude can also be discerned with 
regard to speech and clothes, in which Salafis also try to emulate the prede-
cessors. Islamic phrases such as jazāka llāh khayr (‘may God bless you for it’) 
when thanking someone, instead of the more common shukran (‘thanks’), are 
frequently used by Salafis. Similarly, Salafi women very often wear a facial veil 
(niqāb) and a wide dress (‘abāya) covering their entire body, while men often 
dress in a white tunic (thawb or dishdasha), generally wear a skullcap (qulun-
suwa) and usually have long beards. All of this is done not only to emulate 
the predecessors, but also—again in an effort to keep outside influences away 
from their Salafi citadel—to clearly distinguish themselves from non-Muslims 
(Amghar 2011: 148–149; Bonnefoy 2011: 49; Wagemakers 2016a: 173–174).
5.2 A Citadel Divided: Faultlines within Salafism
While few Salafis would be against the lifestyle described above, a truly pur-
poseful life lived within the Salafi citadel does not just focus on one’s own 
situation, but also on that of others. The term Salafis use for the way they deal 
with society is manhaj (“method”), but the way this concept takes shape differs 
greatly. The first and probably biggest group of Salafis in the world are the ones 
I label ‘quietists’6 because of their unwillingness to engage in political activism 
such as setting up political parties, attending demonstrations or debating topi-
cal issues in political terms. Instead, they focus mostly on studying the sources 
and teaching others about them through daʿwa. Their relationship with politi-
cal authorities is one of quiet obedience and sometimes extends into work-
ing in the service of regimes, either through loyalty to or explicit propaganda 
for the rulers (Wagemakers 2016c). Examples of such groups exist in many 
countries, including, for example, France (Adraoui 2013), Jordan (Wagemakers 
2016a), and Yemen (Bonnefoy 2011).
The second major group within Salafism I refer to as ‘political Salafis’ because 
of their commitment to extending their ideas on religion to the political sphere 
in the form of demonstrations, political parties, participating in elections and 
engaging in political debates. This is not to suggest that quietists do not care 
about, for example, the civil war in Syria after 2011, but that they discuss this 
6 It should be borne in mind that ‘quietists’ and other labels are ideal types and that, in prac-
tice, Salafis sometimes cannot be placed in one single category.
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issue strictly in religious terms (sectarian, doctrinal, theological), not political 
ones like international relations, the involvement of Russia and the regional 
balance of power, as political Salafis do. Some political Salafis do not engage 
in actual party politics, such as the so-called ṣaḥwa (renaissance) movement 
in Saudi Arabia, which started in the kingdom in the 1960s through a cross-
over between Muslim Brotherhood ideas and Salafism (Fandy 1999; Lacroix 
2010; al-Rasheed 2007; Teitelbaum 2000). Others do engage in elections and 
run for public office, but do so with different reasons: some want to engage in 
the actual political process and discuss issues like taxes, such as some Salafis 
in Kuwait before the Gulf War in 1990, while others see parliament as another 
platform for daʿwa, such as Kuwaiti Salafis after the Gulf War and the Nur Party 
in post-coup Egypt, and are therefore perhaps best seen as quietist Salafis in a 
political guise (Lacroix 2016; Lahoud-Tatar 2011: 190–197).
The third and final group within Salafism is the one I call ‘Jihadi-Salafism’. 
The adherents to this trend believe that the regimes in the Muslim world do 
not rule (entirely) according to the sharīʿa and, as such, should be overthrown. 
This does not always mean that Jihadi-Salafis actively strive to topple regimes 
in Muslim countries, although they do believe such action would be legitimate 
(Wagemakers 2012a: 9). Organisations adhering to this trend include al-Qāʿida 
and, most recently, the Islamic State (IS), although there are strong disagree-
ments between these two, with supporters of the former accusing the latter of 
extremism in ideology and actions (Wagemakers 2016b).
The accusations levelled at IS by members of al-Qāʿida are not exceptional 
among Salafis. In fact, Salafis verbally attack each other quite often, with qui-
etists labelling political Salafis ‘Ikhwānīs’, after the highly political Muslim 
Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), and framing Jihadi-Salafis as takfīrīs 
or ‘Khawārij’, because of their views on takfīr. Conversely, Jihadi-Salafis (and, 
to a lesser extent, political Salafis) accuse quietists of being like the Murjiʾa, 
because of their alleged tendency to exclude acts from their definition of faith 
and thereby letting supposedly apostate rulers and their ‘sinful’ acts off the 
hook (Lav 2012; Wagemakers 2012a). As such, Salafis often deny each other the 
very label of ‘Salafi’, epitomising the fact that—despite sharing a strong desire 
to emulate the predecessors—the citadel of Salafism is deeply divided.
6 Conclusion
Considering the long history of Salafism’s various concepts, Salafis’ detailed 
arguments and the strictness and wide range with which they apply their 
beliefs, it is easy to understand that Salafism baffles a lot of people, including 
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policy makers. Moreover, given the fact that Salafis more or less look the same 
and are all engaged in keeping up, defending and living inside a citadel that 
often appears, and sometimes is, unwelcoming to others, it seems natural 
to generalise about them. Furthermore, the critical views that Salafis take 
toward others (including other Muslims) in their doctrine—not to mention 
the fact that some Salafi groups, such as al-Qāʿida and IS, actually engage in 
terrorism—makes it seem all the more obvious to echo former French Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls’ words mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Yet 
Salafism is an ideology adhered to by people who mostly never engage in vio-
lence of any kind, let alone terrorism. Their views may be too strict for many 
from a societal point of view, but this cannot simply be equated with destruc-
tion. While IS may be responsible for the latter, it is an over-generalisation to 
suggest that all Salafis are guilty of this. For that claim to be justified, the Salafi 
citadel is simply too divided.
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Chapter 16
Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement
Shaul Bartal
Allāh is our goal. The prophet is our leader.
The Qurʾān is our law. Jihād is our way.
Death in the way of Allāh is our exalted hope.
Article Eight, Hamas Covenant (1988)1
∵
1 Introduction
Ḥamās (or Hamas) is one of the better-known and the largest of several 
Palestinian Islamist groups.2 Ḥamās, the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya), is one faction of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Palestine. It was founded on 14 December 1987 at the beginning of the first 
intifāḍa by Shaykh Aḥmad Ismā‘īl Ḥasan Yāsīn (also Yassin, 1937–2004). Other 
opinions believe that it already existed in 1986 (Yousef 2010: 19–20). Ḥamās 
is usually described as a case study of political entities and, as such, employs 
and interprets doctrines and beliefs in a flexible and incentive manner. Ḥamās’ 
call to jihād has been cast in nationalist hues and ‘customised’ to the specific 
Palestinian milieu (Dalacoura 2011: 66; Dunning 2016).
After a brief overview of the history of the movement and the role of 
women, this chapter will turn its focus to the ideology of Ḥamās. Palestinian 
(Arab-Islamic) nationalism, the elimination of not just Israeli but specifically 
Jewish control over Palestinian territory, and both specific and geo-political, 
and broader theological and cultural, holy war are all essential features of 
the group’s outlook. Ḥamās sees itself as a movement of the people that is 
1 “Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” Avalon Project. 
At https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/Hamas.asp. Accessed 06/07/2020. This phrase 
has also been used as a slogan and appears on other Muslim Brotherhood sites. See also 
ʿAzzām (1989: 25).
2 This study is based on my book, Jihad in Palestine, Political Islam and the Israeli-Arab 
Conflict. See Bartal (2016: 44–83).
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responsible to all of the Palestinian public. The establishment of Ḥamās by 
Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn during the first intifāḍa heralds a new decisive stage, 
one where the Muslim Brotherhood activists began to carry out their world-
view in relation to an Arab-Islamic Palestinian state established in the land 
of Palestine. This chapter will touch on events such as Ḥamās’ 2006 electoral 
victory and its connection to the Islamic Movement in Israel to provide further 
contextualisation for the rise of influence of this religio-political group.
2 The Ideology of Ḥamās
Ḥamās is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood which was established in 
Egypt in 1928. Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the Ḥamās Political Bureau since 
May 2017, (and the Ḥamās ex-prime minister of the Palestine Authority 
2006–2014), has described it as the “Jihad movement of the Brotherhood 
with a Palestinian face” (Coughlin 2015: 163). Ḥamās was deeply influenced 
by the Muslim Brotherhood’s jihād ideology of Ḥasan al-Bannā, Sayyid Quṭb, 
ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām, Sa’ad Hava, and other less familiar philosophers (Lajna al-
Thaqafiya al-Aama et al. 2013a: 26, 58–59, 82–85, 91–93).
The main source of Ḥamās’ philosophy can be seen in the Ḥamās Covenant 
which was published by Aḥmad Yāsīn on 18 August 1988 (Hamas Covenant 
1988). The principles of the charter emphasise that ideologically this is an 
Islamic revivalist movement with a militant dimension. The two main pillars 
of Ḥamās ideology are: Palestinian nationalism and Arab Islamism (Gleis and 
Berti 2012: 134–143). In May 2017, Ḥamās published “A Document of General 
Principles and Policies” emphasising the nationalistic character of the move-
ment (Hamas 2017). According to Ḥamās, the Jews do not have a right to any 
portion of Palestinian land. The derogation of the Jewish people in Ḥamās 
rhetoric and strategy has lead scholars like Meir Litvak to propose antisemi-
tism as a third pillar of the Ḥamās ideology (Litvak 2005: 41), and jihād, with an 
end goal of “the destruction of Israel and the elimination of the Jews,” as the 
fourth (Litvak 2010: 716).
2.1 Arab-Islamic Nationalism
On each Palestinian memorial day, such as the day that the Balfour Declaration 
was issued, the day the State of Israel was established, or the anniversary of 
the decision to partition Palestine, Ḥamās takes pains to explain its allegiance 
to only one political solution in all of Palestine and that is that Palestine can-
not be divided in any way, shape or form. Take as an example the anniversary 
381Ḥamās
of the sixty-third year of the UN resolution of the partition of Palestine 
(Resolution 181 from 29 November 1947):
Palestine from the sea to the river belongs only to the Palestinian nation. 
This decision [Resolution 181] is cancelled legally and politically. Palestine 
from the sea to the river is the private property of the Palestinian nation 
and an inseparable part of the Arab homeland and the Islamic nation. 
One must adhere to the rights of the Palestinians which include full 
return of all of the Palestinians to all of the Palestinian land.3
The recognition of Israel by the PLO and its cooperation on security issues 
with Israel during the period of the agreements, even for a short time, have 
caused ongoing tension with Ḥamās. According to Ḥamās, in order for the 
PLO to return and become a leading factor in the Palestinian society, it must 
retract its recognition of Israel, stop its security coordination with Israel, and 
re-adopt the armed struggle approach while redefining the supreme aim—the 
liberation of all of Palestine (Levy and Madzini 2011). Using Ḥamās’ Covenant 
and its summary of Ḥamās history, Ḥamās’ refusal to recognise Israel can be 
seen as a natural progression of its ideology based upon its radical view against 
the Jews.4
2.2 Antisemitism
The slogan that Shaykh Yāsīn coined during the first intifāḍa—Khaybar, 
Khaybar Ya Yehud, jaysh Muḥammad Sawf Ya’ud (“Khaybar, Khaybar, Oh Jews, 
the army of Muḥammad will return,” quoted in ʿAzzām 1989: 41)—gives an 
indication of how anti-Jewish attitudes neatly segue with Ḥamās’ religio-
nationalistic agenda. A theological right to land is embedded in Ḥamās ide-
ology, for example, Ḥamās prisoner, Fahmi ‘Aid Ramadhan al-Mashaira, who 
called himself Abu ʿUbayda al-Muqaddasi,5 wrote the following explanation of 
the first verses of Sura 17, according to Ḥamās commentators:
3 A public statement by Ḥamās from a Palestinian information site affiliated with the move-
ment, 28 November 2010. At www.palestine-info.info.
4 It is no surprise that Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Quṭb’s book, Marakatuna maa al-
Yahud or Our Struggle Against the Jews, became a best seller among members of Ḥamās.
5 Fahmi ‘Aid Ramadhan al-Mashaira, from Jabel Mukaber, Jerusalem, was arrested together 
with his brother Ramadan in July 2002. The two planned and carried out a terrorist attack at 
the Pat Junction in Jerusalem where 19 people were murdered. In addition, according to the 
indictment where they were found guilty, the two also planned on blowing up a cruise ship in 
the Gulf of Eilat. The brothers are currently serving out life sentences in an Israeli jail. During 
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The Jews corrupted the land, the first time in Medina and al-Hijaz before 
and after the messenger and his fellows arrived. They succeeded with the 
grace of God to remove this corruption. The second time of their [the 
Jews] corruption is here in our land, in Palestine. As this is clarified by 
modern commentators … ‘You will surely cause corruption on the Earth 
twice’ [Qurʾān 17:4].
Abu ʿUbayda al-Muqaddasi 2012: 3
The second corruption mentioned is Israel’s existence. In Ḥamās’ Covenant, 
the Jews are the presented as a hidden source of evil on earth, continuing a long 
history of antisemitic themes (Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018; Patterson 
2015: 101–103).
In Article 7 of the Hamas Covenant (1988) the war with the Jews, like Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Sayyid Quṭb said, is eternal (Coughlin 2015: 123–125; Quṭb 
1954: 37–38). In Ḥamās’ first proclamation in the intifāḍa, the following words 
were said:
Hey! the al-Murabitun (the defenders) on Palestine, the pure and the 
loved land. Hey! All ye residents, men and women. Hey! Children of ours. 
Here are the Jews, the brothers of monkeys, the murderers of the proph-
ets, the bloodsuckers, the war agitators—murdering you, depriving you 
of your life after they have stolen the Motherland and your home. Only 
Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream:
Therefore, they proclaimed in their faces, ‘Allāhu akbar, Allāhu akbar’ 
[‘Allāh is great’] from their army, ‘Allāhu akbar’ from their planes and 
from their weapons. Take into account that when you are fighting with 
them to ask one of two favors: The martyr’s death or victory over them 
and their rout.
Mishal and Aharoni 1989: 199
According to a short film which appears in the Ḥamās educational curriculum 
from 2007, for Ḥamās the first intifāḍa lasted up until the year 2000, while the 
second intifāḍa began in September 2000 and continues up until today. The 
period of the agreements, from September 1993 until July 2000, is considered, 
in the eyes of the movement, a cynical but successful attempt by Israel to divide 
Palestinian society and to cause a fitna—a war between brothers. Article 13 of 
the years that Fahmi sat in jail, he wrote his memoirs and was even able to smuggle the book 
that he wrote out of prison. The book was published and distributed among Ḥamās activists 
and on Ḥamās sites in 2012.
383Ḥamās
the Hamas Covenant (1988)—“There is no solution for the Palestinian ques-
tion except through Jihad”—continued to be the position of the group in their 
ongoing narrative of resistance.
2.3 Jihād
Jihād or holy war6 is the epitome of the aspirations of Ḥamās and the organisa-
tion sees jihād as its mission (Litvak 2010: 716–734; Bartal 2016a). Resistance 
to opposing forces and infidels has been a long-standing aspect of Islam from 
its earliest form into the colonial era up until today, and the implicit and 
explicit call to overcome oppression, often with military might (for example, 
Qurʾān 4:97, 29:69), continues to inspire participation in armed combat. In 
their official announcements, Ḥamās emphasises that jihād on the land of 
Palestine has lasted from 1 May 636, from the time of the second Caliph ʿUmar 
ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 644) who, following the death of Muḥammad, captured 
the city of Jerusalem. Afterwards the need for jihād arose again as a result of 
the Crusader occupation in 1099. Palestine was freed by Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Yūsuf 
ibn Ayyūb (d. 1193) but experienced attacks, such as the one by Napoleon in 
1799, and foreign occupation. Under the control of the Ottoman empire and 
then the British in the early twentieth century, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 
established Palestine as a home for the Jewish people, seen by some as the ful-
fillment of the Zionist mission. Following decades saw tensions increase expo-
nentially between Arabs and Jews living in the region and intervening foreign 
powers, sparking violent reactions from all sides in an ongoing conflict that 
continues today. For Ḥamās, jihād is an essential response to the conflict and 
will continue until Palestine has achieved total freedom (Lajna al-Thaqafiya al-
Aama 2013b: 4–12). As Tristan Dunning has argued “by invoking jihad, Ḥamās 
imbues its political actions with existential weight and religious legitimacy. In 
short, Ḥamās has proven adept at appropriating social and religious traditions 
to justify and legitimise resistance—violent or otherwise” (Dunning 2016: 9).
Ḥamās is a frequent user of many different internet websites and social 
media sites in order to advance its jihadist mission. On the website of its mili-
tary arm, the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades, one can see a list of the martyrs 
killed in confrontations with Israel as well as military manifestos of the organ-
isation (Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades n.d.). In many cases, songs of praise 
to the martyrs killed in the struggle against the occupational forces can also 
be found here. Next to the name of each martyr is the date of the attack and 
its results. Additional Ḥamās advertisements glorifying these acts of valor also 
appear in al-Qassāmiyun, the magazine of the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades, 
6 The word jihād is multivalent: see, for example, Esposito (1992: 26–37).
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as well as in various booklets commemorating the deeds of various organisa-
tion leaders who were killed during their confrontations with Israel. For exam-
ple, there is a pamphlet praising the heroism of Nizar Rian, killed in January 
2009 in Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008–18 January 2009). This pam-
phlet was written by Fathi Hamad who, at that time, served as the Minister of 
the Interior in the Ḥamās government (Hamad 2010). This is proof of the great 
importance that the organisation’s leaders gave to these pamphlets. An addi-
tional example is the highlighting of Ibrahim al-Makadmeh’s book, Milestone 
for the Liberation of Palestine, on various Ḥamās sites. Makademeh’s was one 
of the first ideologists of Ḥamās who was killed by Israel on 8 March 2004. 
His book advocates the destruction of Israel through jihād in a well-organised 
manner through harnessing the entire Muslim world to the destruction of 
Israel, emphasising the use of the military, politics, and economics in order to 
free Palestine (al-Makadmeh 2002).
Through the use of these pamphlets and others, Ḥamās fulfills two main 
purposes:
1. Publicity of its jihād activities against Israel using all of the means avail-
able to it including the various types of electronic media;
2. An emotive call to join and support the organisation and commit to jihād 
against Israel. On the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades website one can find 
calls to donate to Ḥamās through various tracks (Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam 
Brigades n.d.).
Thus organisations such as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) can comfortably 
state “the military wing is an integral part of Hamas and not a separate entity,” 
that “Ḥamās’ military power is also the main reason for its decade-long con-
trol of the Gaza Strip.” The IDF classifies Ḥamās, unquestionably, as a terror-
ist organisation responsible for the deaths of “over 650 innocent civilians” via 
“mortar and rocket fire, terrorist raids, tunnels and suicide attacks” from the 
1990s to the present day (Israel Defense Forces n.d.).
3 History of Ḥamās
Ḥamās has very deep roots. In the eyes of the movement these roots were 
already intertwined with those of the Muslim Brotherhood, when, in the 
1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood began to act in Palestine. ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām 
(d. 1989) was a Palestinian from the Jenin area who belonged to the Muslim 
Brotherhood of the West Bank during the 1970s. Later on he become one of 
the most influential pro-jihād thinkers.7 His book on the origins of the Ḥamās 
7 For more about ʿAzzām see Bartal (2016: 9–29).
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movement begins with a description of the establishment of the Islamic move-
ment in Egypt by Ḥasan al-Bannā in the year 1928 and with the movement’s 
ties to Palestinian nationalists like the Grand Mufti Ḥājj Muḥammad Amīn al-
Husseini and resistance fighter Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam in the 1930s and 1940s. It 
is Ḥamās and not the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) which is the 
real movement that follows in the footsteps of Ḥājj Amīn al-Husseini and Izz 
ad-Dīn al-Qassam (ʿAzzām 1989: 13–16, 29, 33).8
The Ḥamās organisation sees itself, according to its basic documents, 
(mainly the Covenant of 1988 and “A Document of General Principles and 
Policies” from 2017), as a widespread Palestinian nationalistic movement, 
one which is worthy of leading the Palestinian people to independence and 
to the total liberation of its land. As a movement aspiring to rule the entire 
Palestinian public, Ḥamās has developed and established local Islamic institu-
tions which provide services for the whole population. These religious, social, 
and educational activities also won limited cooperation on the part of the 
Israeli regime which saw the organisation as a counterweight to the activities 
of the PLO (Mishal and Aharoni 1989: 34; Litvak 1993: 58; Higgins 2009).9
The activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine officially began with 
the establishment of a Jerusalem branch in May 1946. This branch was nomi-
nally led by Mufti Ḥājj Muḥammad Amīn al-Husseini who had been banished 
from Palestine after World War II due to his support for Nazi Germany during 
the war. In reality, there were already branches of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which were subordinate to the parent organisation in Egypt which had been 
founded in Ismailia by Ḥasan al-Bannā in 1928. According to statements by 
Ḥamās activist Hatem Abu Ziyada, approximately 10,000 activists of the 
Muslim Brotherhood enlisted in droves in the war against the establishment of 
the Jewish state (Hatem Abu Ziyada 2009: 5–6). Ḥasan al-Bannā, the founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood told his students:
The problem of Palestine is a top central problem for the Muslims because 
Palestine is a part of the Islamic Nation and defending Palestine and its 
8 ʿAzzām also especially emphasised his close ties with Ḥasan al-Bannā, the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood together with the mujahideen in Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s. 
See also the pamphlet without a date called ‘Al-Mathuwrat lil-Mu’alam al-Shahid Ḥasan 
al-Bannā, Kanuz la Tiendab’ (Tradition of the Shahid Teacher, Ḥasan al-Bannā, Inexhaustible 
Treasure). This pamphlet, carrying the Muslim Brotherhood movement’s slogan and the 
movement’s message, was found in the hands of Ḥamās activists in Jerusalem.
9 Al-Mujama al-Islamiya was established in 1973 under the leadership of Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn. 
In the year 1978, the organisation received recognition from the civilian administration. 
According to Litvak, Jordan also worked to strengthen the stand of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank as a counterweight to the strength of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO).
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holy places protects Islam. The exploiting entity [the State of Israel], is 
the head of the weapon of the Western colonial cultural war against the 
Muslim nation and its treasures. This entity [meaning Israel] is supposed 
to be the base and its mission is to cause a rift in the unity of the [Muslim] 
nation and to tear it into weak, contemptible entities which capitulate to 
the colonial western countries.
Hatem Abu Ziyada 2009: 5
After the 1948 war the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine 
became divided. The branches in the West Bank came under the control of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The Gaza branches of the Muslim Brother-
hood became under the control of the parent organisation in Egypt where 
they were exposed to the ideology and influence of the Egyptian leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, especially the most prominent Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī and 
Sayyid Quṭb.
At the beginning of the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip 
took part in anti-Israel activities; but after the 1956 War, and in light of the 
clashes between the then president of Egypt Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, cruel and serious persecutions began which also 
affected Brotherhood activists in the Gaza Strip. Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn, who 
later founded the Ḥamās organisation, experienced this himself. Yāsīn became 
a refugee in 1948, wandering with his family, exiled to Gaza from his home 
in al-Jura (a village near Ashkelon). In Gaza, Yāsīn taught in various religious 
institutions while continuing his activities in the Muslim Brotherhood. Up 
until 1946 Yāsīn was employed as an Arabic language and religious teacher by 
the Egyptian regime. In 1966, the Egyptian regime conducted a wave of wide-
spread arrests among Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Yāsīn was arrested 
together with many other activists including Sayyid Quṭb, the head of the 
section for the propagation of the message in the Muslim Brotherhood. Quṭb 
was executed in1966, but Yāsīn was released. After the 1967 war, he began to 
rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood organisation in the Gaza Strip and renew 
the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the West Bank (Hatem Abu Ziyada 2009: 113–128; ‘Atef ‘Adwan 
1991: 14–69).
Unlike the other jihād organisations which view themselves as pioneers (like 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihād, which emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood 
in 1979 in Egypt) and which do not invest a lot of energy and resources on 
‘civilian’ topics that do not directly affect the struggle with Israel, Ḥamās theol-
ogy rejects this way of thinking. The Muslim Brotherhood traditionally sup-
ports daʿwa (invitation to Islam and, in this case, to the Ḥamās social welfare 
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network), the building of mosques, widespread diverse activities, and the 
strengthening of the faith until the long-term goal of jihād is reached. This is 
the way that Mufti Ḥājj Amīn al-Husseini viewed these activities up until the 
Great Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. That was also the Ḥamās’ point of view up 
until the first intifāḍa, called the intifāḍat al-jihād, which began in December 
1987. Up until that time, the organisation kept busy with the preparation of 
hearts and minds for jihād. For Ḥamās, it was the first intifāḍa which ripened 
the moment for the eruption of the jihād of the Muslim Brotherhood (Litvak 
1993: 58; ʿAzzām 1989: 24–25; Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 100–101, 105).
The money for Ḥamās’ daʿwa is received as donations from different char-
ity associations from all over the world. Some of them, like the Holy Land 
Foundation, were run by Ḥamās members such as Mousa Mohammed Abu 
Marzooq who lead this charity organisation in the United States. Others were 
part of I’htalf al-Khayr (the Charity Coalition) by Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī. 
The Shaykh sent millions of dollars from Qatar which he had received from 
donors throughout Europe, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries, and the United 
States. This is in accordance with his fatwā (religious ruling) of 2003, that 
stated that Muslims must give zakāt (charity) and the best use of that charity 
was to earmark it for jihād (Levitt 2006: 160–161; Coughlin 2015: 164–172). In 
doing so, he called for Muslim dedication to this ‘holy matter’ to match the 
devotion of the Jewish people to Israel: “The Jews throughout the world helped 
Israel before it was established and they don’t cease helping it even now. Aren’t 
the Arabs able to act like them for the sake of this holy matter, the Palestinian 
cause?” (al-Qaraḍāwī 2003: 487–488; see also Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer: 
2018: 90–91).
There are many events which led the movement to the understanding that 
the time was ripe for a visible armed struggle. The main cause was the inspi-
rational success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The end of the 1970s and 
the beginning of the 1980s was a period where Islamic movements all over the 
Palestine and Greater Israel area blossomed (Marwan 2006). The Islamic move-
ment in Israel was founded in the year 1979 by Abdullah Nimer Darwish who 
established the Usrat al-Jihād (The Jihād Family) and by Shaykh Asa’ad Byud 
al-Tamimi who established the Islamic Jihād-Bayt al-Maqdis organisation. In 
1979, the Islamic Jihād in Palestine was also founded by Fathi Shaqaqi which 
began to carry out its activities in the beginning of the 1980s. It was influenced 
mainly by the Egyptian jihād organisation. In this period, the Sarya al-Jihād 
(the military companies of the jihād), which was tied to the Fataḥ movement, 
also began its activities (Cook 2015: 114–115).
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In 1984, a group of activists under the leadership of Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn, 
which included Salah Shahada (assassinated in 2002), was imprisoned. The 
activities of the Islamic Jihād movement challenged the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Yāsīn thought that the hour was right to move on to the next stage. The 
movement began to hoard weapons and prepare for a military confronta-
tion. Instead, they were exposed by Israel’s General Security Services and its 
activists were arrested. They were later freed in the framework of a prisoner 
exchange with the Ahmed Jibril organisation in the year 1985 (Litvak 1993: 59; 
‘Adwan 1991: 134–144).
After his release from prison, Shaykh Yāsīn was very careful about his 
activities until the first intifāḍa broke out on 9 December 1987 (‘Adwan 1991: 
145–149; Kuntzel 2002: 103–107). On 18 August 1988, the Ḥamās Covenant was 
publicised. This charter was filled with anti-Jewish motifs such as the notion 
that Jews run the media and referring to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
and made unequivocal statements that only Islam was the path toward vic-
tory over Israel. The Covenant also drew on the philosophy of the founder of 
al-Qāʿida, Palestinian Shaykh ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām (d. 1989) who, from his base 
in Pakistan, had supported Ḥamās politically, financially and logistically 
(Maliach 2010: 85–6). The Afghanistan mujahideens’ success in expelling the 
Soviets in 1989 created an amazing incentive and raised hopes that perhaps 
Ḥamās in Palestine would also succeed through constant military pressure, to 
bring about the destruction of the State Israel and the return of Palestine to its 
legal owners, read Palestinians (Hegghammer 2013: 376–378).
In 1988, after the publication of Faisal Abdel Qader Al-Husseini’s “principle 
for peace letter with Israel” and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence 
(Anthony and Nusseibeh 2008: 212–214), the PLO began to sound more moder-
ate. As the Hamas Covenant was publicised, the belief that there was “noth-
ing to talk about with the Jews and the rest of the infidels” became popular. 
Ḥamās’ answer to the PLO was “Israel will rise up and continue to exist until 
Islam will destroy that which preceded it” (ʿAzzām 1989: 55–73).10
The establishment of a military arm enabled Ḥamās to carry out military 
activities in an established and organised manner. The first groups in the 
West Bank were established by Salah Aruri and were named after the martyr 
ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām. In 1991, Zakaria Walid Akhel established the Izz ad-Dīn al-
Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip, named after the resistance figure Izz ad-Dīn 
al-Qassam. At the beginning, the military activities focused on the kidnap-
ping of soldiers and those that collaborated with Israel. The murder of Doron 
Shorshan in December 1991, a resident of Kfar Darom, was the first murder 
10  In the opening of the Ḥamās Covenant this sentence is attributed to the Imam al-Shahid 
Ḥasan al-Bannā.
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incident of an Israeli resident by the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam military group (IDF 
Official Publication 1995: 6). On 13 December 1992, the al-Qassam activists, 
among them Mussa al-Akari, (a resident of the Shu’afat refugee camp in East 
Jerusalem,) kidnapped and murdered Nissim Tolidano, an act that led to the 
expulsion of 415 Islamic Jihād and Ḥamās activists to Marj al-Zohour in south-
ern Lebanon for about a year. This act created an operational tie and a sharing 
of military tactics between the Ḥamās and the Ḥizballāh (or Hezbollah) (Gleis 
and Berti 2012: 121–122).
In 1993, after the Oslo accords, Ḥamās’ military groups expanded their activ-
ities and began to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their attacks. 
They also began to use shooting attacks and later on suicide attacks against 
Israeli soldiers and civilians. The first suicide attack carried out by an activist 
from Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam took place on 16 April 1993 when Shaer Hamadallah 
Tammam blew himself up inside a car near a group of soldiers. An additional 
seven incidents of suicidal terrorist attacks (ishtishad) were carried out against 
the security forces after this attack (IDF Official Publication 1996: 6–9).
In February 1994, American-Israeli terrorist Baruch Goldstein slaughtered 
twenty-nine Palestinians in the mosque and the Cave of the Patriarchs in 
Hebron. This incident caused an increase in the amount of sacrificial attacks 
carried out by Ḥamās, including civilian targets. On 6 April 1994, a car bomb 
was activated by a suicide terrorist at a bus station in the center of Afula. As a 
result of this attack, eight civilians were killed and forty-four were injured. This 
rise in Ḥamās sacrificial attacks led Israel to take action against the organiza-
tion by approving ‘targeted’ killing of the Ḥamās military leadership and its 
engineers who shared responsibility for a whole series of attacks by suicide 
terrorists during the 1990s. The most famous of these attacks were the targeted 
killings of Imad ‘Akel (d. November 1993) and Yahya Ayyash (d. January 1995). 
Since the 1990s, the kidnapping and murder of soldiers were replaced with 
suicidal attacks on busses and other places teeming with people, shooting 
attacks, and IEDs. These became the calling card of the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam 
Brigades despite the serious attempts made by Israel’s military to control them 
as well as attempts made by the Palestinian Authority, the interim government 
established after the Oslo agreements and through an agreement between the 
PLO and Israel (Hamas Official Publication 2013: 26–55). Ḥamās succeeded in 
spreading an ideological content that inspired activists and supporters to holy 
martyrdom for al-ʾAqṣā and Palestine which even justified the activities of indi-
viduals against the Israeli enemy and in creating in Israel an atmosphere of 
fear of Ḥamās (Hatina 2014: 108–122).
When the al-ʾAqṣā intifāḍa broke out on 28 September 2000, it led to a 
period of unification between all of the Palestinian organisations. Ḥamās, 
the Islamic Jihād, and the PLO all worked together against the Zionist enemy 
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in both military and propaganda activities. The activists of the military arm 
of the Islamic Jihād and the Jerusalem companies (Saraya al-Quds) acted 
hand-in-hand with the military arm of the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades. 
The Islamic factions, which were previously outwardly persecuted by the 
Palestinian Authority, now worked together in cooperation with the Katā’ib 
Shuhadāʾ al-ʾAqṣā (al-ʾAqṣā Martyrs’ Brigades), the new military arm affili-
ated with the Fataḥ-PLO. During this stage of the second intifāḍa, all of the 
Palestinian organisations were involved in suicide operations including Fataḥ. 
On 22 March 2004, Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn was assassinated as he exited the al-
Mujama al-Islamiya Mosque after the early morning prayers. Like ʿAbdallāh 
ʿAzzām in his time and Usāma bin Lādin (d. 2011) afterwards, Shaykh Yāsīn 
also died with a few relatives—his nephew and his daughter’s husband—who 
were with him at the time: the paralysed shaykh turned into “a symbol and 
example together with all of the Arab and Islamic symbols of the holy war-
riors” (Al-Resalah 2004).11
Ḥamās also used other names of small organisations to hide its activities. 
One such example is The Defenders of al-ʾAqṣā, a military group. According 
to the Shab’ak (Israel’s General Security Services) site, it was found that Iyub 
Azam Abu Karim admitted under investigation that he acted under a subsid-
iary of Ḥamās called the Defenders of al-ʾAqṣā. In his own words, he tells how, 
already in 2007, he was drafted into Ḥamās and how, in this framework, he car-
ried out a number of attacks against Israeli targets as part of his understanding 
of jihād against Israel. The organisational purpose of the Defenders of al-ʾAqṣā 
was, in his words, “to create an additional framework to carry out jihād against 
Israel without being directly tied to Ḥamās.” That gave Ḥamās much more 
flexibility. The directives for such organisational activities came straight from 
Fathi Ahmad Muhmmad Hamed, the Minister of the Interior in the Ḥamās 
government at that time (General Security Services 2011).
Ḥamās has continued its war against Israel from the Gaza Strip. The last 
one was in 2014, when Ḥamās launched rockets at all of Israel’s cities without 
discrimination. This was supported by Shaykh Yousf al-Qaraḍāwī (Bartal 2015: 
99–115). Ḥamās operatives also kidnapped young children in the West Bank 
(2014) and a soldier (Gilad Shalit) during battles in the Gaza Strip. Ḥamās’ 
11  This Ḥamās newspaper, published in the Gaza Strip, emphasised that the Shaykh’s liq-
uidation was carried out by an American Apache helicopter. Eight other Ḥamās fight-
ers were killed that day and an additional fifteen were injured. Among the dead were 
also Khamis Sami Mustahi, the shaykh’s nephew, and his son-in-law. The newspaper also 
emphasises that the liquidation was carried out as a response to an activity carried out 
earlier in Ashdod by the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades of the Ḥamās and by the Shuhadāʾ 
al-Aqṣā of the PLO. In this activity eleven Israelis were killed and dozens wounded.
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aim was to release Palestinian prisoners by exchanging those kidnapped for 
the prisoners as in the 2011 Shalit deal.12 There was also a renewal of ‘lone-
wolf ’ methods during the years 2015–2016, including suicide bombers, as in 
Jerusalem on 18 April 2016 (Bartal 2017). Ḥamās described the attacks since the 
end of the Gaza War in 2014 as Intifāḍat al-Quds, an intifāḍa that will continue 
until the victory (Bartal 2017; Ḥamās 2016).
3.1 Women in Ḥamās
According to Ḥamās thinking, women are only seen as national agents insofar 
as they literally reproduced national citizens. According to Article Seventeen 
of the Hamas Covenant: “The Moslem woman has a role no less important 
than that of the Moslem man in the battle of liberation. She is the maker of 
men. Her role in guiding and educating the new generations is great.” However, 
when faced with its political rivals’ mobilisation of women in politics, Ḥamās 
also reluctantly allowed for affiliated women warriors and female electoral 
candidates (Khalili 2007: 30).
Over the years Ḥamās has succeeded in receiving support from women’s 
organisations. This has enabled women believers to express their faith through 
commitment to the values of the organisation like the Muarabitat (defenders 
of the faith) women in the Temple Mount/Haram as-Sharif. The most promi-
nent among them are Hanadi Halawani and Khadija Khwes who are known 
as teachers of religious studies in al-ʾAqṣā. Their activities include demonstra-
tions and calls against allowing Jewish visitors on the Temple Mount. They 
also have active ties with Ḥamās and the Islamic movement headed by Shaykh 
Ra’ed Salah. They were removed from the Temple Mount and even arrested a 
number of times by the Israeli authorities (Cohen 2017).
Ḥamās also succeeded in drafting women’s political support by presenting 
these women as models for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The most promi-
nent woman is Umm Nidal Farhat (Maryam Mohammad Yousif Farhat), the 
mother who lost three of her children, her sons, at three different times in their 
struggle against Israel. She became a symbol of the Palestinian women and a 
model of a woman who raised her children to sacrifice for the motherland and 
the return of Palestine to its rightful owners. In 2006, Umm Nidal Farhat was 
chosen as one of six women to run in the 2006 election and represent Ḥamās 
in the Palestinian Legislative Council (Khalili 2007: 203). In an interview given 
after she was chosen for the Palestinian Legislative Council, Umm Nidal Farhat 
explained what the duty of a Palestinian woman was in her eyes, and in the 
12  In the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange Ḥamās released one Israeli soldier for 1,027 
prisoners.
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eyes of the Ḥamās organisation that she represented till her death in 2013: 
“A Muslim mother should raise her children on prayer, good deeds, and, of 
course, on jihād, which is one of the duties on which we should raise our chil-
dren” (“Palestine: Special Dispatch No. 1063” 2006).
The integration of women in actual fighting is, however, uncommon. 
Fighting is still thought of as a man’s task. Aḥmad Yāsīn tended to prohibit 
women’s suicide. According to Yāsīn, there was no reason for women to die a 
holy death since there were enough men who were willing to risk their lives. 
Also, the integration of women in the fighting could endanger the survivability 
of Islamic society (Hatina 2014: 121).
During the second intifāḍa, the military arm of Ḥamās chose to adopt the 
model of the suicide female bomber in line with an additional fatwā of Shaykh 
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī published on his internet site. According to his fatwā from 
2003, women are permitted to sacrifice themselves for Allāh. Al-Qaraḍāwī 
justified this as due to the need to overcome the inferiority of the arms and 
the other existing Palestinian means. Reem Saleh al-Reyashi, a mother of two 
small children from the Gaza Strip, was the first Ḥamās female martyr who 
carried out a suicide attack on 14 January 2004. Al-Qaraḍāwī praised her cour-
age before God. (Bartal 2018: 107–108). After Yāsīn’s death on 22 March 2004, 
al-Qaraḍāwī become the spiritual leader of Ḥamās’ members.
4 Ḥamās and the Palestine Authority
On 25 January 2006, the Ḥamās party, called Change and Reform, won 74 out of 
the 132 seats in the Palestinian legislative council and formed a government of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) with a Ḥamās-heavy cabinet under the leader-
ship of Ismail Haniyeh. Abdallah Frangi, the holder of the foreign affairs port-
folio in the opposing Fataḥ party and the most senior man in the Fataḥ in the 
Gaza Strip until the 2007 revolution, was optimistic after the Ḥamās election 
victory. In an interview with Der Spiegel, in an answer to the question if the 
participation of Ḥamās in the elections could be explained as recognition of 
the State of Israel, he had this to say: “This [participation in the elections] is 
de facto recognition, despite the fact that Hamas does not say this explicitly … 
Hamas [must] assume political responsibility for itself” (Frangi 2006). It was 
his opinion that the Ḥamās and the PLO would reach a compromise:
A disagreement between Hamas and the Fataḥ is not in the interest of 
the jihad in Islam. The sides declared clearly that they were interested in 
an agreement which would include all of the parties. But they [Ḥamās] 
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have achievements as it relates to the agreement in Israel. The rejection 
of the agreement with Israel will not have a great effect on the Palestinian 
society.
Frangi 2006
Frangi’s optimism did not last. The unity government between the PLO and 
Ḥamās that was established after the elections fell apart as a result of the 
Ḥamās revolution in Gaza. It took only six days (in June 2007) for the Ḥamās 
fighters to control all of the Gaza Strip. The PLO men who were caught alive 
were led through the streets of Gaza, naked. Afterwards, they were taken out to 
the desert to be killed. Some of them met a quick death when they fell out of or 
were thrown out of a fifteen-story building. 100 PLO men were killed and about 
200 were injured. A different version reports that there were 161 Palestinian 
dead and 700 injured (Schult 2007). This activity deepened the rift and the 
division in the Palestinian nationalistic movement between the two streams 
which are represented internally by the Ḥamās and Fataḥ organisations.
Immediately after the January 2006 elections, the Quartet, which included 
Russia, the United States, Europe, and the United Nations, placed conditions 
on Ḥamās if it wanted to receive international recognition. These conditions 
included the official recognition of the State of Israel, a clear rejection of vio-
lence, and a willingness to carry out negotiations in the framework of a peace 
process: the Ḥamās government refused (Schanzer 2008: 95–98; Wilson 2006). 
Israel also began to withhold its monthly transfer of approximately 50–60 mil-
lion US dollars. The Ḥamās government started dealing with fiscal and eco-
nomic crises to make it more flexible due to the loss of financial support. This 
led Ḥamās to attempt cooperation with Fataḥ: On 8 February 2007 the two 
parties signed the Mecca agreement to create a Ḥamās-Fataḥ government, 
but this agreement failed like all of the others that followed it after April 2011 
(Levi and Madzini 2011. The last agreement was signed in April 2014 but also 
failed after a short period). Ḥamās and Fataḥ’s disagreements about Israel 
spurred the Ḥamās takeover of the Gaza strip in 2007. It led to a division of 
the captured 1967 areas between two separate political entities hostile to one 
another—a Fataḥ-state in the West Bank and a Ḥamās-state in the Gaza Strip 
(Gleis and Berti 2012: 123–133).
Historically, Ḥamās supporters actually took part in the 20 January 1996 
elections under different party names as a party of Change and Reform which 
did not explicitly associate itself with Ḥamās (Mishal and Sela 1999: 191–202).13 
13  This is integration without identification. Thus, for example, Imad Falluji the editor of al-
Watan, a Ḥamās journal that closed down, was appointed Communications Minister and 
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This was in order to avoid direct participation which would have required it 
to support the Oslo agreements which the party found not only unfortunate 
from their point of view, but to which they strongly objected. Yasser Arafat 
was shaping the PA and his popularity was still very high. But in 2006, Ḥamās 
chose to officially participate in the elections as they believed there was now 
a distinct possibility of their victory, thereby enabling them to impose other 
conditions on the discussions with Israel.
The Ḥamās approach is to carry out a struggle with Israel with ceasefires 
from time to time but without arriving at a final permanent solution. Ḥamās 
leaders do not agree with the PA that the Oslo Accords with Israel are like the 
Treaty of Hudabiyyah, signed by the Prophet Muḥammad and the Qurayshi 
tribe of Mecca in 628/AH 6 to ensure peace in the region (Coughlin 2015: 82). 
The battle with Israel is a battle for awareness, a sort of competition on strength, 
decisiveness, and the deepness of will. According to the Ḥamās, it is clear that 
in the end, slowly and patiently, as-saber—patience until the victory—and 
Islam will win: Palestine will be liberated again, and there will be an Islamic 
Palestinian State (Mishal and Sela: 124–125; Steinberg 2008: 272–386). Ḥamās’ 
position since the start of the 1991 peace process—that “sell[ing] the Holy 
Land and Palestine according to a humiliating US-Zionist formula and condi-
tions in exchange for illusory promises and getting a submissive autonomy is 
an illegitimate delegation and presence … does not represent the Palestinian 
people” (Khatib 2010: 66)—remains intact today.
5 Ḥamās Connections to the Islamic Movement in Israel
Since 1989, Ḥamās has succeeded in organising ties to the Palestinian Arabs 
living in Israel and East Jerusalem, especially with the Islamic Movement in 
Israel, headed by Shaykh Ra’ed Salah. Throughout the years, a group of youths 
from East Jerusalem, known by the nickname Shabab al-ʾAqṣā (the al-ʾAqṣā 
youth), have associated themselves with the Ḥamās organisation and have 
worked hard in order to show support, especially for activities within region 
of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Shabab al-ʾAqṣā actively opposed Jewish 
Shaykh Talal al-Sider of Hebron was appointed by Arafat as an advisor on religious affairs 
and after 1997 he became the Minister of Youth and Sports for twenty months. He then 
served as a state minister for three years. Both of these men were well-known Ḥamās men 
who ran as independents in the 1996 elections and were appointed by Arafat as members 
of the Palestinian cabinet.
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settlement in this area, the archeological digs close to the Temple Mount, the 
King’s Garden project in Silwan, and other projects.14
In 2011, the group was outlawed in Israel and declared a terrorist organisa-
tion by the Israeli authorities. Its members were occasionally arrested and 
among the members convicted of Ḥamās activities were Haytam and Majed 
J’ubah and Nihad Zghyer. The most prominent among the members of the 
organisation was Mesbah Abu Sabih who, on 9 October 2016, carried out a ter-
rorist attack in the Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood of Jerusalem where he shot at 
passers-by and killed one civilian and a policeman. Although Abu Sabih was 
killed during this incident, due to his actions additional arrests were carried 
out against the members of the group that included his sons Izz and Emad 
(Anon. 2016; Winer 2017; Gross 2018).
The Islamic Movement in Israel has had two branches, the Northern and 
the Southern. Since the mid-1990s, substantive differences between the two 
regarding Ḥamās are hard to find.15 The Northern faction is considered to 
be closely aligned with Ḥamās but support appears to come from the South 
as well. For example, in 2008 Shaykh Ibrahim Sarsur, leader of the Southern 
faction, sent his condolences to the leader of Ḥamās Mahmoud al-Zahar, on 
the death of his son, Hussam al-Zahar, an activist in the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam 
Brigades, by Israeli forces. In an announcement published in al-Mithaq (The 
Faith), a newspaper of the Southern faction, it was written:
With solidarity with our brothers and our Palestinian nation … the Islamic 
movement feels great sorrow and sends its condolences to the sons of the 
Palestinian people, to the residents of Gaza and to Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar 
on the circumstances of the falling of his son Hussam on his way to Allah. 
14  See for example Al-ʾAqṣā Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, Sarakha Tahdhir min 
Mukhatat ‘Kedem Yerushalaim ’Urshalim Awalan. There is no publishing date, but, accord-
ing to content, this was written sometime between the years 2009–2010 for the al-Quds 
Foundation for Development and the al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee of Silwan, 
Silwan Siraa Bekaa Wawagud (Jerusalem, April 2010). Abd al-Karim abu Sanina appears 
in the pamphlet alongside Ali Ahmad Jabareen, one of the leaders of the Northern Islamic 
Movement who lives in Umm al Fahm.
15  During the 1990s, the Islamic Movement in Israel separated into two streams. The first 
stream was led by Shaykh Abdullah Nimer Darwish and Ibrahim Sarsur from Kfar Kassem 
which is found in the southern part of the area nicknamed ‘The Triangle’. This stream was 
in favour of participating in the elections for the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. The sec-
ond stream, under the leadership of Shaykh Ra’ed Salah and Kamaal al-Khatib objected to 
becoming integrated politically in the elections for the Knesset. They were located in the 
Wadi ‘Ara, in other words in the north of the Triangle. This is the root for the differentia-
tion between the southern and northern branches.
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Our prayers are that Allah should have mercy on all of the slain of our 
Palestinian people and that they will be settled in higher heaven. [Signed] 
Sheikh Ibrahim Abdullah [Sarsur], head of the Islamic Movement.
Further on in the condolence letter Sarsur condemns the actions of the Israel 
Defense Forces against Ḥamās, and calls Hussam al-Zahar’s death “a barbaric, 
wild massacre” (Al-Mithaq 2008).
From an ideological point of view, however, Ḥamās is closer to the Northern 
faction headed by Shaykh Ra’ed Salah. In 2003, Shaykh Ra’ed Salah and friends 
from the Northern faction were convicted of giving aid to a terrorist organ-
isation through fundraising campaigns for the families of Ḥamās martyrs. In 
the various Ḥamās publications, the Shaykh is described with admiration as 
‘Shaykh al-ʾAqṣā’ due to his non-compromising stand against the Israelis on 
the Temple Mount. The support of Shaykh Ra’ed Salah in the organisation is 
also expressed in his speeches and writings. Due to close ties between Ḥamās 
and the Northern faction of the Islamic Movement the Northern faction of the 
organisation was declared illegal in Israel in 2015 (Cohen 2017; Hamas 2020).
The Ḥamās faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip also has a tendency to create artificial distinctions between the 
Muslim Brotherhood branch in Jerusalem, who are Israeli residents, and who 
work mostly in daʿwa, similar to the Islamic movement in Israel, and Ḥamās, 
which works more in the military field in the areas of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. This artificial divide was revealed when four movement activists—
Muhammad Mahmoud Abu Tir, Minister Khaled Ibrahim Abu ‘Arafeh, 
Muhammad Imran Tutah, and Ahmad Muhammad Attoun—were arrested 
and exiled from Jerusalem. All of the above were residents of Jerusalem and 
activists in the Muslim Brotherhood, Jerusalem, which was recognised as a 
Ḥamās branch in the city (Bartal 2016a: 229–265). All of them were chosen 
to serve as members of the Palestinian parliament from the Ḥamās party of 
Change and Reform. As a reaction to the 2006 kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, 
Israel arrested these Ḥamās representatives and, with their release, the interior 
minister instructed the removal of their status as permanent residents in Israel 
and expelled them to outside of Jerusalem’s borders. Their activities deviated 
from the mere expressing of support and daʿwa activities for the Islamic move-
ment. This is not just ‘preparing the hearts’, but also preparing for attacks to be 
carried out by Ḥamās members.16
16  This is an official magazine published by the Palestinian parliament. In this issue the strug-
gle of the four Islamic representatives, led by the former Minister on Jerusalem Affairs in 
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The Muslim Brotherhood organisation in the Gaza Strip is split into many 
different small rebellious groups which act separately from the Ḥamās move-
ment. The Muslim Brotherhood movement in Israel and Palestine has influ-
enced the different factions. Some of them carry out jihād activities against 
Israel, (a recent example being the Temple Mount operation on 14 July 2017).17 
Several of them use their Israeli citizenship or their legal status as residents 
or citizens of Israel in order to help each other in different and varied ways. 
There is mutual reciprocity between all of the Muslim Brotherhood factions 
as all of them are a part of the Islamic Movement. Thus, for example, both fac-
tions of the Islamic movement in Israel donate funds to the families of Ḥamās 
shuhadāʾ (martyrs) under the category of charity to orphans and widows.
6 Conclusion
As of 2020, Ḥamās is a varied organisation which is divided into a political arm 
headed by Ismail Haniyeh and his second in command Saleh al-Arouri (who 
have been in their current positions since 2017) and the military arm which 
is called the Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades, led by Muhammad Deif (born as 
Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri). It is the political arm that decides on the 
way the organisation will move forward. Saleh al-Arouri himself was founding 
commander of Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades.
In May 2017, Ḥamās published a document of principles that included 
Ḥamās’ explicit support for the idea of the establishment a Palestinian state 
whose capital was Jerusalem alongside Israel as a temporary stage until the 
time that all of Palestine would be free (Hamas 2017). The heads of the political 
arm, Khaled Mashal (1996–6 May 2017), and his replacement Ismail Haniyeh 
presented their views as representing the Palestinian consensus of a State on 
the lands of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1967 borders) whose capital would 
be Jerusalem, a state without any concessions on the right of return and with-
out a permanent solution that would bind future generations.
the Ḥamās government, Khaled Ibrahim Abu ‘Arafeh, who were exiled from their homes, 
is described. The issue opens with the blessings of the head of the Palestinian municipal-
ity legislature, Dr Aziz Duwaik. See also The Electronic Intifada 2011.
17  On 14 July 2017, three IM members killed two police officers on the Temple Mount. It 
was indicated that one of the murderers said to one of the policemen that he was “from 
Umm al Fahm and from Ra’ed Salah’s group” (PM”H 5580/18–3205/17; from the indictment 
served on Shaykh Ra’ed Salah Mahajna by the Shalom Court in Haifa on 24 August 2017).
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The military arm, Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades, which was established at 
the beginning of the 1990s, acted very closely with Iran on matters relating to 
funding activities and military supplies. The military arm, together with the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihād organisation, are an Islamic front fighting against 
Israel. In negotiations between the political arm and military arm, which acts 
mainly from the Gaza Strip, the internal Ḥamās leadership in the Gaza Strip 
headed by Yihye Sanwar tries to balance between the need to rule a population 
of two million people while somehow coordinating in some way with Israel—
even if through a third party—and despite his ideological commitment to act 
for the destruction of Israel and to use the Gaza Strip as a base for continuing 
the jihād against Israel.
Additional factors influencing the decision-making process are the security 
prisoners in Israeli prisons whose stand is seen as the organisation’s battlefield. 
Ḥamās makes a serious effort to free these prisoners as it did with the Gilad 
Shalit prisoner exchange on 18 October 2011, serving as the most prominent 
example. Yihye Sanwar was the leader of the Ḥamās prisoners before he was 
released in the Shalit prisoner exchange. Today, Muhammad Naji Sabha and 
Abbas as-Sayed are the leaders of the Ḥamās prisoners in Israel. Both are sen-
tenced with life imprisonment because they ordered suicide attacks on Israeli 
targets during the second intifāḍa.
Jihād can take many different shapes—personal, economic, social, legal, via 
propaganda, and militarily. To Ḥamās, even suicide acts can be seen as part 
of survival, retaliations, and computations (with Fataḥ) (Singh 2011: 15–22). 
Jihād also needs patience and ṣumūd (steadfastness) alongside political activ-
ity. All of these means are legitimate in the eyes of Ḥamās in order to carry out 
their goal of establishing an Islamic-National Palestine State at the expense 
of the State of Israel. Ḥamās believes that the all the territory of Palestine/
Israel is holy land (waqf) for the Muslim people until Judgment Day. This belief, 
enshrined in the Ḥamās Covenant, stipulates that war with Israel will cannot 
end without the total destruction of the Jewish State.
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Chapter 17
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Dreaming of Caliphate
Meerim Aitkulova
1 Introduction
Against the background of turmoil in Muslim majority countries that began 
with escalation of the Palestine and Israel conflict, and the processes of the 
decolonization and internal collisions between Arabic states, the appearance 
of Islamic movement like Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) struggling for 
own version of justice was not unexpected.1 However, in a world where the 
conjunction of religion and politics was long ago dismissed as regressive, the 
ideas of a new movement claiming to be a political party, but obstinately fight-
ing for an Islamic Caliphate on the Prophet’s model, was definitely unusual. 
The Party persistently spreads this message among Muslims on the global 
level, while rejecting cooperation with other Islamic movements, and perhaps 
has never been so popular as it is now. It is the particular focus of close atten-
tion by security services and social and political institutions in Central Asia, 
where Hizb ut-Tahrir attained wide popularity since the collapse of the Soviet 
system. Yet, Hizb ut-Tahrir gained less international attention than other fun-
damentalist Islamic movements and often research on this Party is rather con-
troversial, oscillating between labelling it as a ‘terrorist’ or a ‘peaceful’ group. In 
this regard, this chapter attempts to provide more insights into the history and 
ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the position it takes on violence.
2 Hizb ut-Tahir: Historical Background
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) was founded in 1953 as an Islamic politi-
cal organization in Jerusalem by an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin, Taqī 
al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1909–1977). He received his education at several presti-
gious Islamic institutions including the prominent Al-Azhar University in 
Egypt. Upon completion of his university studies, he began his career as a 
1 An earlier version of this research was published as: M. Aitkulova, 2017, “Hizb Ut-Tahrir: 
Dreaming of Caliphate,” Alternative Spirituality and Religion Review, 8:1, 95–106. This chapter 
has been revised and updated.
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teacher and later as an appeals court judge in Palestine. The historical back-
ground of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s appearance is in many ways related to the situa-
tion in the “Muslim countries” (al-Nabhani, 1998: 240) in the middle of the 
twentieth century. Deeply disturbed bу the occupation of Palestine, the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war, and the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1914, al-Nabhānī 
enters the political arena with a new program, generated primarily as a reac-
tion to these factors (Wali 2017: 102). Reflection on the broader question of 
what happened to the Islamic world that until recently shone in all its might 
and ruled half of the world, led him to the idea that only the revival of the 
single pan-Islamic state (Caliphate) could eliminate disunity among Muslims 
and restore the former glory (Azad 2017: 7). It is worth noting that through-
out Islamic history the political component was an inseparable part of Islamic 
religion, and this complementarity largely influenced on the ideology of many 
intellectuals since the twentieth century, who also searched for appropriate 
answers and reactions towards challenges of the post-colonial world. Other 
influential movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (established in 
1928), and Jamaat-e-Islami in India (established in 1941), also claimed the right 
to be present in the political arena in the name of Islam, and campaigned for 
the reestablishment of an Islamic state (Nuruddin 2017: 276).
The activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was a source of inspira-
tion during the early years of al-Nabhānī’s career, when he began to explore 
the opinion that West threatened not only the physical borders of the Muslim 
majority countries, but also the spiritual and intellectual development of 
Muslims (Nuruddin 2017: 276). However, al-Nabhānī’s disagreement over the 
proper way to reestablish the Caliphate and his vision of the future of this sys-
tem resulted in an ideological split with the leaders of Muslim Brotherhood 
like Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). Al-Nabhānī 
criticised them for being too moderate and deviating from the model of the 
state that was already present in its complete form during the lifetime of the 
Prophet and Caliphs (Nuruddin 2017: 277).
Unlike some other Islamic religious groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir is well structured 
and its ideology is clearly defined. This ideology promotes the revival of Islamic 
umma (community of believers) through the creation of a Caliphate, similar 
to the one that existed during the era of the Prophet Muḥammad and his first 
four successors (the four ‘rightly guided caliphs’). The Party sees the flaws of 
other Islamic movements in their lack of a strong political program and coop-
eration with secularists and proclaims itself not as a purely religious organiza-
tion but rather as a political movement which gets its inspiration from Islam 
(Taji-Farouki 2000: 22). Therefore, it opposes any other ideologies—whether 
they be communism, capitalism, or anything else—as alien to Islam.
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For Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam is a self-sufficient totality revealed by God and can-
not comply with any humanly created ideologies (Taji-Farouki 2000: 22–23). 
The main principles of Hizb ut-Tahrir have not changed since the day of its 
foundation and, despite frequent changes of leadership and changing con-
ditions in the contemporary world, al-Nabhānī’s initial ideas constitute the 
immutable ground of Hizb ut-Tahrir and continue to inspire many Muslims 
today. The name of the Party reflects its primary aim of liberating Muslim 
countries from the influence of the systems of the kufr (non-believers) (Hizb 
ut-Tahrir n.d. b).
Muhammad Iqbal and Zulkifli Zulkifli (2016: 39) consider Hizb ut-Tahrir as a 
group that has all the characteristics of the fundamentalist movement, though 
it is often inaccurately confused with a ‘terrorist’ group. They define Islamic 
fundamentalist movements as groups that view themselves as both religious 
and political movements, believing in the coherence of Islam as an alterna-
tive to Western domination, and considering jihād as a necessary element in 
defending and expanding the Muslim umma, though varied groups may inter-
pret jihād differently.
Today, Hizb ut-Tahrir is one of the largest Islamic movements in the world 
(Stuart and Ahmed 2010: 143). From its humble beginning in Palestine, the 
ideas of Hizb ut-Tahrir swiftly spread throughout many countries, largely 
thanks to the strategy of al-Nabhānī who encouraged his followers to travel 
extensively, his own charismatic personality and his welcoming approach to 
all Muslims regardless of race, gender or the madhhab (school of thought) to 
which they belonged (Osman 2012: 90). Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir actively dissemi-
nates its ideas through leaflets, booklets, lectures, and regular meetings. Today, 
its media branch is perhaps the most organised and modern, when compared 
with the media outlets of other Islamic organizations (Iqbal and Zulkifli 2016: 
49–50). During the first decade of its activity, Hizb ut-Tahrir experienced rela-
tive success in many Arab countries, and had official premises in those coun-
tries until it was outlawed after being involved in two coup attempts in Amman, 
and for fomenting coup plans in number of other Arab countries (Taji‐Farouki 
2000: 22). It is known that military elements in Jordan, Syria and Egypt closely 
cooperated with Hizb ut-Tahrir during the coup planning, and it was not until 
1977—with the launch of more repressive measures against the Party—that 
Hizb ut-Tahrir members started to emigrate to the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and following the Cold War, to Central Asia, the Caucasus 
and Southeast Asia (Wibisono 2018).
After the death of al-Nabhānī in 1977, Sheikh Abdul Qaleem Zalloum (1924–
2003) took over the leadership of the Party. It was during his tenure that Hizb 
ut-Tahrir expanded beyond the limits of its early geographical presence and 
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could claim with confidence that it was a truly international organization. 
However, this expansion was less the result of a conscious strategy and more 
the result of coercion, as mass persecution and growing resentment in the 
countries with the greatest numbers of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members forced them 
to migrate, predominantly to the US and to European countries (International 
Crisis Group 2003: ii). Later, the processes of globalization in combination 
with Hizb ut-Tahrir’s media strategies, facilitated the internationalization of 
this organization (Iqbal and Zulkifli 2016: 49–50). Currently it is present either 
officially or clandestinely in more than forty countries (Hasan 2017). Effective 
use of media potential is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the move-
ment; it adapts the latest modes of communication, through professionally 
composed printed and media brochures, official and unofficial pages in social 
media, web sites in the countries where it is present. For example, for a long 
time, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Central Asian office had pages on the online social media, 
until they were blocked by security agencies. However, the flexibility of social 
media allows them to continue own activity under different names and they 
are easily recognizable due to the specific vocabulary used (terms like ‘revival 
of Caliphate’, ‘the hypocrisy of the system of the kufr’ and so on).
Since it is not easy to estimate the number of followers due to its partially 
underground nature, the Party’s regular conferences and meetings may give 
some indication of the level of support. For example, the largest Hizb ut-Tahrir 
conference took place in 2007 in Jakarta (Indonesia), and brought together 
something like eighty thousand people (Reuters 2007). According to other 
estimates there were from ten thousand (Filiu 2008) to one million people 
involved (Dyett 2014); yet this diverse assessment of attendance reflects the 
fact that it is extremely difficult to provide even rough estimates of their mem-
bership and supporters.
It is important to mention Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activity in Central Asia 
(Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan), where the 
Party is widely present today, albeit clandestinely (Baran 2004: 2). Following 
the downfall of the Soviet regime in 1991, Islam, a dominant religion in Central 
Asian countries, returned in all its diversity of traditions, virtues and new chal-
lenges, after being excluded from public sphere by the communist ideology of 
the Soviet Union. The opening up of society allowed the entrance of many reli-
gious movements, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, that swiftly found new members 
in fertile soil. In the political arena, the Party’s enthusiastic activity is usually 
considered as being more a response to repressive and corrupt regimes in this 
region, while, from a spiritual point of view, the Party was attractive to the 
masses, as it could effectively fill the ideological vacuum created by the col-
lapse of the Soviet system (Khamidov 2003: 11). Emmanuel Karagiannis writes 
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that today “Hizb ut-Tahrir is among the most feared Islamic groups in Central 
Asia, but it is also, apparently, the least understood” (2005: 137). Central Asian 
regimes have a pronounced authoritarian character and tend to be more intol-
erant toward any movements that could undermine the existing status quo 
(Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014: 7). Thus Hizb ut-Tahrir’s calls for change 
in the political order—said to be inspired by God himself—have triggered 
an uncompromising struggle against them. The position of the Central Asian 
population does not differ much; it is secular in the main, with citizens finding 
religion a relic of the past that hinders progress. People are skeptical towards 
any and all religious groups. There are no official statements or statistics about 
the Party’s engagement in acts of violence (Frances 2015), and accusations are 
mainly based on the presumption that Hizb ut-Tahrir members can be “a con-
veyor belt” to terrorism (Baran 2004: 11) and their ideology “sanctions military 
coups and the mass killings of innocent peoples” (Stuart and Ahmed 2010: 143). 
Yet, their activity attracts attention regarding the question of proportionality 
of measures against them taken by the authorities. Evidence of brutal persecu-
tion, like torture unto death and long term imprisonments for disseminating 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature, on the one hand confer to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members 
status of innocent victims of the regime (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006: 321), 
while from the human rights perspective the uncompromised struggle against 
non-violent Party members has come to demonstrate the repressive nature 
of Russia and the Central Asian states (Human Rights Watch 2017). Today, 
the Party is banned in all Central Asian countries, in some Middle Eastern 
countries, in Russia and Germany, and since 2017 in Indonesia (Al Jazeera 
2017). Many Hizb ut-Tahrir members have found asylum in European coun-
tries, where they regularly conduct demonstrations and conferences against 
the authorities of their home countries and actively deploy their self-image 
as victims.
3 Aim and Ideology
Let there be among you a group that invites to the good, orders what is 
right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are successful.
Qurʾān 3:104
According to al-Nabhānī’s interpretation, Islam is a complete and coherent 
system of thought that can regulate all aspects of life (al-Nabhani cited in Azad 
2017: 70). According to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official website:
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Its aim is to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the Islamic 
da  ʾ wah [preaching] to the world. This objective means bringing Muslims 
back to living an Islamic way of life in Dar al-Islam [Land of Islam] and 
in an Islamic society such that all of life’s affairs in society are admin-
istered according to the Shariʾah [law] rules, and the viewpoint in it is 
the halal and the haram under the shade of the Islamic State, which is 
the Khilafah State [Caliphate]. That state is the one in which Muslims 
appoint a Khaleefah [Caliph] and give him the bay’ah [an oath of alle-
giance to a leader] to listen and obey on condition that he rules accord-
ing to the Book of Allāh (swt) and the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allāh 
(saw) and on condition that he conveys Islam as a message to the world 
through da  ʾ wah and jihād.
Hizb ut-Tahrir n.d. a
This aim embodies, in brief, the core idea of Hizb ut-Tahrir; all other docu-
ments and programs processed by the Party are issued in accordance with the 
main points of this central aim.
Being revealed by God, Islam is the only true way of life and all sovereignty 
in this system belongs to God, not humankind. Its political ideology encom-
passes two principles: sharīʿa or Islamic law, needed for the foundation and 
operation of a just society; and second, the Islamic state or Caliphate that can 
ensure and protect sharīʿa. Therefore, all-regulative character of Islam is only 
possible within the Caliphate system, where faith (dīn) and state (dawla) are 
inseparable (Hizb ut-Tahrir n.d. a). In upholding its ideology, the Party refers to 
the historical Caliphates, when this system of governance granted stability for 
the Muslim people and independence from other countries. Al-Nabhānī writes 
of the Islamic state that “it is not a dream, nor is it a figment of the imagination, 
for it had dominated and influenced history for more than thirteen hundred 
years” (cited in Azad 2017: 70). Al-Nabhānī expected that at first the Caliphate 
or Islamic state would be established in one of the Arabic-speaking countries 
and would eventually encompass all Islamic countries. However, his ideas later 
proved to be more popular in other places.
Al-Nabhānī synthesised classical Islam with modern politics, which resulted 
in a draft constitution (1953) of the future Caliphate that contains a code of 
laws for the political, economic and social system of the state and its foreign 
policy (Stuart and Ahmed 2009: 17). According to the constitution, the head 
of the state, the Caliph, is an elected figure and should be just and account-
able leader, as he is a symbol of the God’s absolute power and his representa-
tive on earth (Draft Constitution of the Khilafah State 2011: Article 34). The 
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constitution stipulates that the state will be governed by sharīʿa law and that 
people of the book (Christians and Jews) will be allowed to practice their reli-
gion freely by paying jizya (a special tax, historically levelled on Christians and 
Jews), while other faiths will not be tolerated until they convert to an accept-
able religion within the Caliphate (al-Nabhani 1997: 228).
Unlike other Islamic parties, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a comprehensive constitu-
tion encompassing ready-to-implement policies for every sphere of life. While 
there is some slight accommodation to modern realities, all of al-Nabhānī’s 
views on the Islamic state are available in the official documents of the Party 
and are actively distributed by its members. The Party, although espousing 
the uncompromised pursuit of the Prophet’s model of life and governance, 
is unable to replicate this in its ‘purest form’ and faces some paradoxes in its 
activities. The constitution, although tailored for the Caliphate system, takes a 
lot from the Western systems of law and governance; also many Party members 
found asylum in Western kufr countries,2 and in Indonesia the democratic cli-
mate allowed the Party to flourish and conduct large demonstrations, despite 
the stark criticism of Indonesia’s democratic model by Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Despite his zeal for the idea of the Caliphate, al-Nabhānī was no less realistic 
and expected many obstacles on the way, like the influence of the colonial leg-
acy on economy, culture and politics in majority Islamic countries that might 
participate in the future Caliphate. In the modern stage of the Party’s develop-
ment, the idea of Caliphate appears more like a dream, one that might never 
come true, but will be an eternal source of inspiration. According to Iqbal and 
Zulkifli, today Party members “are not interested in discussing the details of 
the proposed Islamic Caliphate … more important for them here is a psycho-
logical need to believe that great Islamic Caliphate will emerge as inescapable 
entity to bring back the Muslim glory” (2016: 56). Sabara Nuruddin (2017: 277) 
also has an impression that “HT is a model of romantic political conscious-
ness that idealises the past for the future.” In addition, many authors find the 
re-establishing of the Prophet’s model of the Caliphate as utopian, unless the 
blueprint model is adapted for modernity, which would be a major deviation 
from the Party’s position (Nuruddin 2017: 283).
The Party makes many statements on the governmental system of 
democracy. While acknowledging many commonalities between Islam and 
democracy, the Party nevertheless finds them incompatible on the matter 
2 Although Party justifies this based on the story of migration of the Prophet Muḥammad from 
Mecca to Medina, where he and his followers found refuge and welcoming approach from 
Jewish and pagan Arab tribes, most of whom later converted to Islam.
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of sovereignty (Baran 2004: 18), and on the basis that democracy was largely 
developed in the kufr lands. The supreme role of the demos (people) in a dem-
ocratic state is not acceptable for the Islamic state as envisaged by Hizb ut-
Tahrir, where God is the only source of governance and the people are those 
who submit to his power (Azad 2017: 9). All other states where governance is 
not based on this principle—that is, the primacy of God—live in the state of 
jāhiliyya (ignorance) (Azad 2017: 9). Therefore, the Party rejects democracy 
and other political ideologies as being man-made, and thus un-Islamic and 
inherently flawed. Due to this basic contradiction, Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that 
“we are already in an ideological clash between the secular democratic ideol-
ogy and the God-given system” (Robin interview by Baran 2004: 18). Moreover, 
the Party has a divine duty to bring people to the correct path, that of Islam, 
since with the downfall of the last Caliphate, all Muslims are in a state of 
jāhiliyya and, by living under Western-composed concepts, their situation is 
only worsening. Even Islamic states like Saudi Arabia and Iran are dismissed 
as non-Islamic for their policy of double standards and for sharing the ideolo-
gies of the kufr (Iqbal and Zulkifli 2016: 51). On this point, the Party refers to 
pre-Islamic history when Arabic tribes lived in similar state of ignorance and 
polytheism until the Prophet Muḥammad introduced the only true religion 
of Islam. According to the Party, in the new world order—by God’s mercy—
land, resources, and power to regulate them within the limits set by God, 
will be given to the people and all merits will be equally shared (Stuart and 
Ahmed 2009: 17).
Born in the era of upheaval in the Muslim world, Hizb ut-Tahrir from the 
very beginning has yearned for justice and is actively propagating this notion 
today to resist the era of neo-colonialism and capitalism. Anti-Zionism and 
anti-Western rhetoric are particularly strong in the Party’s propaganda. Hasan 
Azad finds Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology in comparison with other radical Islamic 
movements “as a clear (some say radical) alternative to Western modes of 
being and thinking, upholding (and preaching) a clear message of political, 
epistemological, and religious-ethical unity in the face of an overweening 
West” (2017: 16). Suha Taji-Farouki notes that this animosity is largely based on 
the conspiracy theories shared by Party members since they strongly believe 
that “Jewish and Christian unbelievers allegedly form a united front against 
Muslims, and are engaged in a permanent effort to destroy Islam: haunted by 
echoes of the historical cry of ‘Allāhu Akbar’ at the Gates of Vienna, they are 
terrified at the mere prospect of an Islamic reassertion” (2000: 24).
In recent decades, with the geopolitical problems in the world and the dete-
riorating situation in Muslim majority countries, the Party’s ideals of struggling 
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for a just world look increasingly reasonable to many Muslims around the 
globe. This fosters the Party’s zeal to disseminate the divine order. Hizb ut-
Tahrir members believe that working for the Party is the same as serving God 
(Sinclair 2014: 4).
4 Hizb ut-Tahrir Methodology
The Party strongly opposes gradual and ‘soft’ approaches to implementing 
Islam, as real changes are only possible through uncompromising radical 
actions; otherwise, it would mean that “Allāh has sent something impractical 
that has to be made practical by Muslims” (Mayer 2004: 14). Hizb ut-Tahrir often 
refers to historical events depicting the success of radical changes, like the rise 
of communism and, more importantly, the life of the Prophet Muḥammad, 
which was full of drastic measures. However, the notion of radicalism in the 
Party’s ideology means achieving radical change within the existing order of 
the Muslim world without resorting to violence. As of 2017, “the Method” of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir outlined online included the statement that Party members 
“consider that Islamic law forbids violence or armed struggle against the 
regime as a method to reestablish the Islamic State” however the most recent 
update of this website in 2020 gives some indication of when taking up arms 
is in the Party’s purview, that is, in the case of jihād, discussed below (Hizb ut-
Tahrir n.d. a).
Instead of advocating the forceful seizure of the State, it rather opts for 
peaceful methods to attract more members. The Party pays keen attention to 
the education, both religious and secular, as the daʿwa (preaching) and intel-
lectual debates require a sophisticated knowledge to recruit new members 
on both grassroots and higher levels and get wider outreach (Zahid 2014: 4). 
Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir finds it important to win over the minds of members of 
the military, as they are capable of carrying out peaceful coups when the right 
moment arrives (Zahid 2014: 4). The amalgam of passion for the Caliphate 
and competence in religious questions makes their ideas highly attractive 
and distinguishes it from other religious movements criticised for superficial 
knowledge.
For the Party, Islam as a universal religion is based on proper ideas ( fikra) 
and methods (ṭarīqa), and no other inventions are needed to justify this divine 
combination (al-Nabhani cited in Osman 2012:95). In this regard, the Party is 
unwilling to cooperate with other Islamic organizations, viewing their errors 
as misunderstandings of the basic tenets of Islam. Al-Nabhānī emphasised 
that other parties had unclear ideas that were often influenced by modern 
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concepts and undefined methods (Baran 2004: 19). Additionally, members 
of other parties responsible for change were often disorganised and incoher-
ent in their actions. To resolve these problems, the Party argued that the best 
approach was demonstrated by the Prophet himself, and during the golden 
age of Islam under the rule of the four righteous Caliphs. Thus, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
does not claim originality in its plan of action for Caliphate building. Rather, 
by adopting the three-staged program of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Party 
anticipates the same divinely-inspired success that was attained more than a 
thousand years ago (Baran 2004: 20).
4.1 First Stage: Culturing
The first stage involves recruiting and developing intellectually candidates 
“to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party, so 
that they form the Party group” (Hizb ut-Tahrir n.d. a). Hizb ut-Tahrir reminds 
its recruits about the patience and individual approach demonstrated by the 
Prophet during his preaching activities, as well as his tireless efforts to edu-
cate his community of believers. After the potential member initially accepts 
the Party’s basic ideas, the process of more nuanced teaching on an individual 
basis about their ideas and methods begins. According to Baran “by the end 
of the first stage, the HT member is ideologically, theologically and spiritually 
prepared to deal with any hardship that may befall him or her by being certain 
that this is God’s path” (2004: 21). This part is considered important for the 
growth of the group, capable of spreading its ideas to others.
During the first stage potential Party followers get an education in study 
circles called ḥalaqa that replicates the historical Islamic study method (Azad 
2017: 10). The method is still widely used in the Islamic world when students 
sit in a circle on the floor in the mosque or teacher’s home. Ḥalaqas cover dif-
ferent topics related to Islam, moreover, since Islam is considered by members 
as a complete way of life all other ‘non-religious’ subjects are also relevant for 
study. In ḥalaqas followers listen to al-Nabhānī’s basic ideas, by reading his 
main books or listening to the teacher’s lections about his ideas. All lectures 
have a heavy focus on the idea of the revival of the Caliphate infused with the 
criticism of the modern systems. New recruits in the initial stage of the study 
are not allowed to question the Party goals and are expected to comprehend 
the ideas through hard study and practical work (finding new members and 
practice of Islam) (Azad 2017: 11).
4.2 Second Stage: Interacting with the Muslim Umma
At this stage, the Party continues to introduce its ideas to the larger Muslim 
population so that they implement its ideology in life. It is described as:
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The collective culturing of the masses of the Ummah with the thoughts 
and the rules of Islam which the Hizb had adopted, through lessons, lec-
tures, and talks in the mosques, centres and common gathering places, 
and through the press, books and leaflets. This was done in order to cre-
ate a common awareness within the Ummah and to interact with her.
Hizb ut-Tahrir n.d. a
Here the Party operates more decisively, and openly propagates ideas that cre-
ate conflict between the umma and ruling regimes (Khamidov 2005: 7). Again, 
this is inspired by a key event in Islamic history, when the Prophet Muḥammad 
raised his umma, composed of people from different nations and social classes, 
to resist the corrupt regime of the Quraysh tribe in Mecca. On the way to unit-
ing all Muslims into single umma, the Party is rather flexible in its approach to 
other interpretations of Islam practiced by different Muslims.
4.3 Third Stage: Establishment of the Islamic State
According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the final stage will eventually come after the whole 
umma embraces the Party’s ideology (Khamidov 2005: 7). However, the work of 
the Party does not stop on this stage, because only after the entire world comes 
under the rule of Islam can the Party claim that its mission is completed. At 
present, the Party can be considered to be at the second stage (Baran 2004: 21). 
Initially, al-Nabhānī set an ambitious thirteen-year timeframe for accomplish-
ing these stages, which was later extended to thirty years (International Crisis 
Group 2003: 3). When this period proved to be unrealistic as well, the Party 
claimed that it will patiently continue its tireless efforts for the order of God to 
be established on earth as long as needed (Hizb ut-Tahrir n.d. a).
5 Attitude to Violence and Jihād
It is widely reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects violence as a method to achieve 
its aim, and extensively uses primarily propaganda tools (Khamidov 2005: 4; 
Karagiannis and McCauley 2006: 315; Stuart and Ahmed 2009: 18). In taking 
such a position, Hizb ut-Tahrir also regards itself as pursuing the path of the 
Prophet Muḥammad, who “limited his struggle for the establishment of the 
Islamic State to intellectual and political work. He established this Islamic 
state without resorting to violence” (Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain 2007), and instead 
looked for support from other tribes and relied on his followers. Hizb ut-Tahrir 
adopted such an approach in the concept of nusra, which means looking for 
assistance from outside (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006: 326). It seems that, 
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in order to avoid violence, the ideal scenario for the Party would be a peaceful 
coup d’état undertaken by military forces, that in turn would hand over power 
to the Party (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006: 326). This is why it is so impor-
tant for Hizb ut-Tahrir to gain the nusra from the military block.
Despite their harsh criticism of US policy in the Middle East, Party mem-
bers have never been involved in acts of violence (Safi 2015). Acts of terrorism 
committed by other Islamic groups evoke the Party’s official condemnation 
and serve to accentuate their ideological and methodological distance from 
such organizations. The Party has argued that jihadist terrorism is counter-
productive to their goal. Furthermore, even if conditions were to make jihād 
a valid option, the killing of innocent civilians is unacceptable (Hizb ut-Tahrir 
2014). For example, in relation to the Caliphate pronounced by ISIS, the Party 
claimed it to be “islamically illegitimate” (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2014) due to the purely 
militaristic character of ISIS and a number of other Islamic factors which ISIS 
violated when established a Caliphate. Regarding Al-Baghdadi’s proclamations 
against the Iraqi government Hizb ut-Tahrir has described his words as “empty 
speech without substance” (Al Jazeera 2014). Indonesia is an interesting case of 
the counter terrorist achievements of Hizb ut-Tahrir when some former mem-
bers of violent Islamic organizations denounced violence and joined the Party 
(Osman 2012: 98). As a demonstration of its allegiance to non-violent means, 
the Party often brings up the example of the peaceful resistance of its own 
members from Central Asia who are under close surveillance from security 
services and often end up imprisoned or even tortured to death.
However, many experts consider the Party’s relation to political violence as 
more nuanced than it appears at first glance. Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark 
McCauley (2006: 328) provide two ways of describing the Party’s ideology on 
violence: “the first is to say that they have been committed to non-violence 
for fifty years. The second is to say that they have been waiting fifty years for 
the right moment to begin violent struggle.” For Mohamed Osman (2012: 98), 
“Hizb ut-Tahrir’s general non-violent position does not mean that the party is 
avowedly non-violent at all times.”
The Party’s envisioning of the concept of jihād may provide more clarity on 
the question of violence. Jihād in Islam is a complex concept, basically mean-
ing that it is the religious duty of Muslims to struggle in the way of God (Shah 
2013: 344). This struggle has two aspects: first, inner struggle against one’s own 
ego, one’s harmful desires, and resistance to the temptations that corrupt the 
soul. In the Islamic tradition, this version of non-violent jihād turned inward 
is often referred to as the greater jihād, since mastering the self is considered 
more difficult than engaging in a physical struggle. The second aspect of jihād, 
also referred to as ‘lesser jihād’, is warfare against the enemies of Islam, which 
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can take the form of offensive or defensive struggle. Defensive jihād is usu-
ally set in motion when Muslim territories are occupied by foreign invaders, 
while offensive jihād is warfare launched by Muslims to expand Islamic rule to 
other territories.
For the Party, it is obligatory for every Muslim to fight if their lands are 
invaded and occupied, regardless of whether or not the Caliphate has been 
established (Abedin 2005). As such, for the Party, fighting against foreign occu-
piers in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan is considered to be defensive jihād. 
Focusing on this distinction, it can be said that there might exist a fragile bor-
der between defensive and offensive jihād, as the first may easily turn into the 
second under specific social and political circumstances (Ahmed and Stuart 
2009: 22).
If the Party resorts primarily to peaceful means for the revival of the 
Caliphate, then the potentially ‘violent’ part of jihād may be launched later 
after the establishment of the Caliphate, since this model of expanding the 
Caliphate is acceptable in Islam. This model of expanding or offensive jihād is 
detailed in the Party’s publication, The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilizations 
(2002), in which, along with calls for the intellectual struggle against Western 
culture, the Islamic legitimacy of offensive warfare is emphasised as well. The 
Party argues that the Muslims with their dīn (faith) and civilization on one 
side, and Christians with their capitalistic worldview on the other side, were 
always clashing with each other:
The clash of civilizations as an inevitable matter. It existed in the past, 
exists now and will remain until the clash ends shortly before the Hour, 
since it does not come except upon the worst of creation. Do not be 
deceived, O Muslims, by the callers to the dialogue who place their heads 
in the sand and condone humiliation and defeat. Make the preparations 
required for the conflict, since the Capitalist Western civilization has 
knocked you down militarily, politically and economically.
Hizb ut-Tahrir 2002: 62
Yet, the Party stresses that they cannot legitimately launch an offensive jihād, 
as it is the prerogative of the Caliph only (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006: 
325). Thus, until his Caliphate is established, the Party continues its intellec-
tual struggle to persuade Muslims and non-Muslims about the righteousness 
of their aims.
As for criticism of the notion of offensive jihād, the Party responds that it is 
legitimate for every nation state to declare war under certain conditions (Hizb 
ut-Tahrir 2002: 25). For example, they state online:
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The fact that the Party does not use material power to defend itself or 
as a weapon against the rulers is of no relevance to the subject of jihād, 
because jihād has to continue till the Day of Judgement. So whenever the 
disbelieving enemies attack an Islamic country it becomes compulsory 
on its Muslim citizens to repel the enemy. The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
in that country are a part of the Muslims and it is obligatory upon them as 
it is upon other Muslims, in their capacity as Muslims, to fight the enemy 
and repel them. Whenever there is a Muslim amīr who declares jihād to 
enhance the Word of Allāh (swt) and mobilises the people to do that, the 
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir will respond in their capacity as Muslims in 
the country where the general call to arms was proclaimed.
Hizb ut-Tahrir n.d. a
The Party also refers to the unlawful acts of the US and the state of Israel 
against Muslims under the guise of democracy building. Thus the Caliphate 
as a legitimate Muslim state has even more justification, given that it is con-
cerned with bringing global justice under Islam. In recent times, against the 
background of the growing religious terrorism in the world and severe perse-
cution of Hizb ut-Tahir members in some countries, the Party’s ‘classical’ per-
ception of violence is being strained. Thus, the official web sites in general try 
to stand by al-Nabhānī’s vision of violence, and official leaders preach divine 
punishment. However, on the individual level, some voices welcoming violent 
acts can be traced in the online social media. Some experts also claim that the 
Party acts as a gateway for jihādi terrorism (Baran 2004: 11; Stuart and Ahmed 
2010: 143), and that non-involvement in acts of violence does not mean that the 
Party does not contribute to it through its own ideology that may inspire some 
‘violent jihadists’.
6 Structure and Funding
The structure of the Party is strictly hierarchical and resembles a pyramid with 
an amīr (supreme leader) positioned on the top (Osman 2012: 92). The spe-
cific aim of the Party is incompatible with their secular surroundings, and this 
demands a highly centralised and disciplined structure. The primary leader-
ship centre, located in Arab territory, is primarily concerned with the general 
coordination of the Party’s ideological activities, as well as being responsible 
for the promotion of the Party’s ideas on the higher levels (among politicians 
and armies for the realising of the so-called nusra concept) (Osman 2012: 
92–93). At the next level are committees responsible for the coordination of 
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a particular region or country (Baran 2004: 24). For example, the Party has an 
administrative committee regulating the Central Asian region. However, due 
to bans on the activity of the Party in that region, the committee’s office is 
located in London. At the lower levels are local committees that oversee cit-
ies and the Party’s smaller cells (Baran 2004: 24). As noted, the centralised 
character results in a top down approach when it comes to passing along the 
Party’s documents and directives. According to Taji-Farouki (2014: 46), unlike 
other revolutionary organizations, Hizb ut-Tahir has managed to maintain this 
structure since the day of its establishment, and has demonstrated long term 
ideological cohesion, as well as a lack of serious disagreements and splits in 
internal structures.
The membership in the Party requires a period of indoctrination that is 
needed to detect possible security agents and to keep ideological unity. By the 
end of this intensive period of the study of al-Nabhānī’s primary documents, 
a new member pledges allegiance to the Party’s ideals with an oath of loyalty 
and an agreement to obey orders (Baran 2004: 25). Karagiannis and McCauley 
(2006: 317) compare the effectiveness of the Party’s structure to that of the 
Bolshevik revolutionaries in Russia, when each level had a clear vision and a 
task toward attaining an ultimate goal. Depending on the legal status of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir in different countries—whether it is either recognised or banned—
the Party accordingly acts openly or in a chain of secretive cells. Ironically, the 
Party, which is so antagonistic towards the Western world and its concepts, 
has more freedom for its activities in Western countries, but is not tolerated in 
many Muslim majority countries.
The Party stresses the importance of the role of women. Women in Hizb 
ut-Tahrir act as main recruiters of other women, as cross gender recruiting is 
forbidden, and carry out religious education in line with the Party’s ideology 
in female-only cells (Baran 2004: 32). Though it is not easy to give the statisti-
cal data on female membership, we can assume significant numbers as male 
members will try to engage their wives, mothers, or sisters to the new ideology. 
It can also happen the other way around. Women also actively support the 
women of an imprisoned member’s family (Cragin and Daly 2009: 52).
Funding mainly comes from the donations of the members, who, depend-
ing on their own income, contribute a percentage to the Party, and propaganda 
activity, being an effective and non-violent tool for raising awareness, is the 
primary expense (Osman 2012: 99). Donations from wealthy Muslim patrons 
also constitute an important part of the Party’s income. Mutual assistance and 
support for the families of members who are imprisoned or in need is also a 
characteristic activity of the Party, and this perhaps is another factor in the 
popularity of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
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7 Conclusion
The ideas of Hizb ut-Tahir have stood the test of time and its current transna-
tional character reflects the ideological success of this group. Spreading from 
the Arab world to America and Asia, it is insensitive to gender, race or madh-
hab biases, welcoming all who believe in one God and who are ready to share 
the Party’s ideology. The ideas of Caliphate building and the awakening of the 
whole umma as a single entity seem to have a strong utopian flavour, even after 
years of the Party’s activity. Yet, with al-Qāʿida and ISIS in the background and 
growing resentment among contemporary Muslims, the idea of the Caliphate 
does not seem so fantastic. The Party was able to launch a wide-scale ideologi-
cal propaganda campaign to win over the hearts and minds of many Muslims. 
However, despite many accusations of being an inspiration for jihādi terrorism, 
in its official rhetoric of the Caliphate revival in the current century, the Party 
continues to adhere to the initial method advocated by its founder al-Nabhānī, 
who stressed that an Islamic state represents the only safe haven, but the way 
to that goal should not be paved with blood (at least there is no official infor-
mation of Party members being involved in violence). Based on the character-
istics and the methods of the Party considered in this chapter, it is likely that 
the movement will continue to expand.
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Chapter 18
Ungoverned or Alternatively Governed Spaces  
in North-Eastern Nigeria
A Critical Exploration of Boko Haram’s Ideological Motif
Benson O. Igboin
1 Introduction
The whole question of what was happening to us, which is now called 
Boko Haram, has never been subjected to any critical intellectual analy-
sis. We’ve just been interested in the burning of houses, suicide bombers 
and so on, but we have never attempted to ask what is the moral economy 
or what really predisposes people to this kind of attitude, where did this 
come from? Beyond thinking of intelligence as gathering gossip and infor-
mation from people, there are intellectual views. It is possible to trace the 
historical processes that have produced what we have now in the name 
of Boko Haram. Is there any connection between Boko Haram and other 
forms of violent protests that precede it, whether it’s Maitatsine or what-
ever? Can we explain why this Boko Haram is dominant in Maiduguri, 
Yobe and not Sokoto or Kebbi? These are questions that only intellectual 
analyses, dispassionate, taken away from politics, can help us to come to 
the conclusion because there must be a reason and it may be sociological, 
cultural, religious or historical, as to why certain things happen where 
they do. If this was about religion, and Muslims are trying to expand the 
frontiers of Islam, which kind of a stupid man will be fighting inside his 
own house and hope to conquer other people?
Kukah 2013: 39–40
Matthew H. Kukah, the Catholic Bishop of Sokoto, has been one of the few dis-
passionate and committed crusaders of good governance in Nigeria. His aver-
ments above provide a template for undertaking an in-depth historical and 
ideological analysis of Boko Haram, a group which by 2015 was declared by the 
Global Terrorism Index as the most deadly terrorist group in the world, followed 
by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), on the basis of their capacities for 
actual violence (Botha, Ewi, Salifu, and Abdile 2017). Many media outfits, gov-
ernments at both national and transnational levels, and commentators and 
422 Igboin
scholars have been more interested in the outward manifestations or opera-
tions of Boko Haram and military counter operations, while leaving the histori-
cal trajectory that underlined the ideological anchorage of the group. While 
efforts geared towards counter-terrorism are salutary for their immediate 
effects, they do not, as the Nigerian experience has shown, address the funda-
mental inspiration that results in collective violence again and again. Kukah is 
therefore challenging us to go beyond the politics, politicisation, and economi-
cal factors that are often adduced for the rise of the group and engage in a more 
nuanced historical and ideological investigation to unravel the remote factors 
that have made northern Nigeria a hotbed of inveterate violence.
Kukah’s reference to Sokoto and Kebbi in the North-western geo-political 
zone is instructive because at the time of the rise of Boko Haram, Sokoto and 
Kebbi states were the poorest of all the 36 states of Nigeria (The National 
Bureau of Statistics 2005). In other words, if poverty is actually the cause of 
the rise of Boko Haram, as the West widely believed and theorised (Ini 2013; 
Ayegba 2015), the states of Sokoto and Kebbi should have been the proper 
provenance. In addition, studies have shown that even though Sokoto and 
Kebbi are extremely poor, they are the most peaceful in the North coming 
behind only Jigawa state (Obinna-Esiowu 2018). Zamfara state, where sharīʿa 
was instituted in 1999 as Nigeria returned to civil rule, is now one of the states 
being devastated by bandits. Studies have shown that poverty cannot always 
be connected to violence or insurgency, especially when religious nationalis-
tic ideology, collective hatred, or moral conviction are involved (Mandel 2002; 
Yanay 2002; Skitka and Mullen 2002; Ogunfolu, Assim and Adejumo 2018: 190). 
Furthering this argument, Christopher Smith, reporting to the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, pointedly notes:
I think it is all too convenient to suggest that somehow just because there 
are deprivations, somehow people then automatically know Osama bin 
Laden was rich. Ideology that is highly, highly radicalised may exploit 
poverty at times, but poor people don’t necessarily become terrorists and 
killers. That is an insult, frankly, to poor people. I think we made the same 
mistake, with all due respect, with South Sudan.
“US Policy Toward Nigeria” 2012: 32
Thus, Kukah’s last question above is germane in an attempt to underscore the 
ultra-jihādi-Salafism that defines the ideological bent of the group, which has 
a long history stretching back to pre-colonial era. Of course, by fighting inside 
its house, Boko Haram is contesting space with the government of Nigeria with 
the aim to institute its own kind of rule and form of Islam—a sharīʿa-governed 
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space—as a forestate to what it probably ‘plans’ to extend to other parts of 
the country. Its capture and brief administration of Gwoza apodictically dem-
onstrates this, where it hoisted its flag and announced the headquarters of its 
caliphate (Azama 2017: 83; MacEachern 2018: 155). Boko Haram’s reference to a 
caliphate expressly underscores that it wants an exclusive rule based on sharīʿa 
and an Islamic identity. Accordingly, Michael Ibanga and James Archibong 
(2018: 147) state that “Boko Haram has established a strong administration 
based on Islamic Law. During the duration of its occupation of Mubi town 
in Adamawa State, ten people were tried and convicted of looting and other 
offences and had their hands amputated.”
In the light of the foregoing, to deny as Nigerian President Muhammadu 
Buhari (2015) has done that the ideology of Boko Haram is influenced by Islam, 
seems patently incorrect and is, in fact, provocative. The present study is pro-
voked by the inauguration speech of President Buhari delivered on 29 May 
2015. Although the speech touches on many issues of national life, a significant 
space is given to security challenges especially those posed by Boko Haram. 
Since July 2009, Boko Haram has not only continued to contest space with 
the Nigerian government but has also taken over some spaces where it has 
raised its flag and declared independence. Past administrations of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria—Presidents Musa Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan—
might have tried their best in either curtailing or exacerbating the occupation 
of swathes of spaces in the North-eastern part of Nigeria, especially in Borno, 
Yobe, and Adamawa states, by the group. The line that President Buhari treads 
in the speech under review is that Boko Haram is not only “mindless” and 
“ungodly” but also “un-Islamic.” These comments are critical in understand-
ing and contending with the group, for, the first is emotive—being an ethical 
judgement that might not have added much to the meaning and essence of 
the group—and the second and third are theological and ideological—which 
provides the cannon fodder for its persistence and motivation. It is the second 
that President Buhari has denied, which is the thrust of this chapter.
The argument here is that Boko Haram draws strong ideological inspiration 
from its reading of Islam, and to deny it is to misunderstand the group alto-
gether, the consequence of which is that wrong diagnosis can result in wrong 
prescription and administration. On the other hand, to accept that its ideol-
ogy is, at least in its own estimation, ‘Islamic’ would enable counter-narrative 
processes, which have the potency of blocking recruitment, de-radicalisation, 
and possible resurgence in the near future. Although the securitisation pro-
cess is important as the Nigerian and other regional governments are trying to 
intensify anti-terror efforts, it is mainly to reclaim the contested spaces from 
those who have established an illegal sovereign government. To achieve the 
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aims of this chapter, we shall conceptualise ungoverned spaces or alternatively 
governed spaces from global and Nigerian contexts, analyse Buhari’s speech as 
it relates to our leitmotif, and finally emphasise the ideological implications 
involved, arguing that counter-narrative processes cannot be ignored as they 
are effective responses to ideologically-induced terrorism.
2 Conceptualising Ungoverned Spaces
The concept of ‘ungoverned spaces’ is sly and controversial. It is so because 
many definitions proffered to encapsulate its contents have either failed woe-
fully or succeeded only partially. One question is whether there can be actual 
ungoverned spaces. We are poised to think that there is no such space that 
remains ungoverned in the physical or in the orbital. Put differently, every 
available space, even at interplanetary level, is governed by some persons or 
forces who dictate their affairs rightly or wrongly. These persons or forces hold 
the belief that they are legitimately, even if not legally empowered, to exert 
authority over the spaces under their control. An attempt to oust them makes 
the space a contested one. In the interim, the contested space is governed 
by an alternative force. This line of thinking is what leads us to the concept 
of ‘alternatively governed spaces’, since there is no actual absence of control 
over the space.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014: 1) argues that it is not just 
that there are no such spaces called ungoverned spaces but even “the very 
existence of truly ‘ungoverned space’ is questionable.” Six reasons are adduced 
for this position. One, the term does not take into cognisance the variations 
that practically exist between and within states. Two, it is state-centric, that is, 
it does not recognise the fact that it is not only the state that exists as a govern-
able space. Three, it does not envisage the fact that other forms of government 
other than the state such as monarchy or sectarian government exists: these 
are in fact forms of government that exercise enormous power and author-
ity, which Western theories may not recognise within a state-oriented struc-
ture, but are essentially are alternative governments in their own right. Four, 
it is also generally assumed that the so-called ungoverned spaces are high 
risk areas that produce violence or terrorism. This may not always be the case 
because: consider cyberspace, for example, as a form of ungoverned though 
not strictly physical space, acquired by terrorists to operate effectively. Five, 
much attention is drawn towards weak or failing states without a correspond-
ing consideration that the ‘strong’ states may not be insulated from the inci-
dence of ungoverned space. In fact, terrorists are more interested in spaces 
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that have modern facilities that can ease their operations rather than vast 
expanse of ‘barren’ spaces that can make them ineffective. Finally, six, it does 
not empirically demonstrate, as it is commonly theorised, why many of the ter-
rorist operations are in advanced states rather than developing or fragile ones 
which are majorly conceived as less-governed, ungoverned, or mis-governed 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014: 1–2).
Michael Clark and Renad Mansour argue that what is at stake in ungov-
erned space discourse is “spaces of contested governance and mis-governance” 
(2013: 2). Working with data generated from Syria, Clark and Mansour main-
tain that the logic of ungoverned space is unsound for the simple fact that 
spaces termed ungoverned are actually either disintegrated or lack the pres-
ence of governance at all, and are now being alternatively governed. It is the 
alternatively governed spaces that are indeed spaces of contested governance 
and mis-governance. They note that since there are no absolutely ungoverned 
spaces, it is better to talk about space voluntarily ceded, which falls within the 
ambit of mis-governance, and space which is not ceded voluntarily, which can 
be referred to as contested governance. In the latter case, the state only per-
forms its normal governance functions where other actors are not in control, 
but contest with non-state actors in the performance of governance functions. 
Spaces of contested governance, just like the state, strive to perform its nor-
mal responsibilities and non-state actors struggle to do the same. In reality 
however, since the state does not voluntarily cede its space, the idea of mis-
governance readily explains the reason for contested governance.
Since governance is pivotal to space ownership, Clark and Mansour insist 
that the fundamental questions to ask should be: “who is governing, how are 
they governing, and what are the consequences of this mode of governance?” 
(Clark and Mansour 2013: 3) This does not obviate the contest, for, as they hold:
In the case of spaces of contested governance, this core problem—how 
the space is governed and by whom—takes on added significance. By 
definition, in such areas it is frequently unclear who is governing; often, 
even when the identity of the dominant actor is established, the man-
ner in which governance is being implemented and its consequences 
remain opaque.
Clark and Mansour 2013: 3
According to Clark and Mansour, contested spaces are ‘safe havens’ for non-
state actors that have come to occupy them. Ilija Djugumanov and Marko 
Pankovski (2013: 9) succinctly define ‘safe haven’ as a “space for operational 
activity,” spaces where non-state actors can galvanise and mobilise forces for 
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expansionist purposes. From there, they “are able to establish themselves, 
consolidate, plan, organise, fundraise, recruit, train, and operate” (Clark and 
Mansour 2013: 3). Safe havens are spaces governed by non-state actors, which 
may also be contested.
Jennifer Keister (2014) like other scholars who have contributed to ungov-
erned spaces discourses focuses on either their legal or political economy 
dimension. This is understandable because their thrust is towards policy for-
mation on how best to either manage or eradicate ungoverned spaces. The 
more prominent factor, which is political economy, does not answer the thorny 
question that borders on why there are ungoverned spaces in states that are 
well governed, which have modern military soft and hard wares. It does not 
also proffer solution to the radicalisation of those (especially terrorists) who 
believe that such spaces are their portion where their form of independent 
government should exist. For radicalised groups and individuals, ideological 
bent of mind is more important than political economy of those they conceive 
as enemies of their ideology. The question is: why, in spite of favourable politi-
cal economy will people choose to operate a separate space from the state? The 
examples of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
point to ideological suasion for deliberately creating alternatively governed 
spaces. Why would a British Muslim fly to fight on the side of ISIS rather than 
Britain? Or, why would Boko Haram raise its flag and set up an alternative gov-
ernment in areas it has conquered within and around the Nigerian borders? 
The obvious reason is theologically ideological, and not political economy as 
many have argued. It is this vacuum in literature of ungoverned spaces this 
paper fills with particular reference to Boko Haram and its ideology being 
denied by President Buhari. But before analysing President Buhari’s speech, it 
is pertinent to give a brief historical development of Boko Haram.
3 The Evolution of Boko Haram
Many opinions have been canvassed as regards the evolution of Boko Haram, 
a group which calls itself Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awatiwal-Jihad meaning 
‘Association of Sunnīs for the Propagation of Islam and for Holy War’ or ‘People 
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihād’. Literally, 
boko in the Hausa language means ‘book’, while ḥarām in Arabic means ‘for-
bidden’. It is the combination of these two words that form Boko Haram, a 
nickname given to the group by the people of Bauchi State and popularised by 
the media, because of its preaching against Western education. For the group, 
Western education is forbidden for a true Muslim because of its corruptible 
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contents and inferiority to an Islamic education (Igboin 2014a). The group 
believes that Islamic education should hinge on the teachings of the Qurʾān 
and the sunna (practices of Prophet Muḥammad). But along this line, how-
ever, Boko Haram has clarified this perception: it argues that it is not against 
Western education exclusively, but Western culture more broadly. According 
to Boko Haram,
Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western education is a sin’ as the 
infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually mean ‘Western 
civilisation’ is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the 
impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the 
West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our believe 
[sic] in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is 
broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education. 
In this case we are talking of Western Ways of life which include: constitu-
tional provision as if [sic] relates to, for instance the rights and privileges 
of Women, the idea of homosexualism, lesbianism, sanctions in cases of 
terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multiparty democ-
racy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films … alco-
hol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilisation.
quoted in Thurston 2018: 11
This modification became necessary because the group wanted to firmly root 
its origin and cause in an Islamic theology and ideology posited as opposi-
tional to that of the West.
A further indication of this modification can be gleaned from the name it 
calls itself, namely Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jihād. As Alexander Thurston (2018:11) 
analyses it, this name means that the group claims that it is a model of the 
Prophet’s teaching and the authentic Muslim community. In addition, the 
group also claims that it is in the right position to dictate the ‘true state of 
the religion’, and further emphasises their Sunnī ideology, which is grounded in 
Salafism. No matter the name by which the group has called itself, the fact of 
its antagonism towards the West is established, and in fact, legendary among 
radical Muslims in the northern part of Nigeria. Paradoxically, while there is 
much hatred towards Western civilisation, these Muslims have continued to 
utilise the products of this civilisation to prosecute their religious agenda. 
Indeed, after analysing many of the speeches and sermons of Boko Haram’s 
founder Mohammed Yusuf, as they touch on the stance of Boko Haram with 
Western values and modernity, Edlyne Anugwom (2019: 212–213) argues that 
Yusuf was mostly ambivalent in his handling of this issues. Yusuf tended to 
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oscillate between total rejection and implicit acceptance. More critically, 
Yusuf had sometimes borrowed from Western political ideologies and move-
ments in his organisation and execution of his group’s agenda. The weapons 
he used and which the group continues to use today are products of Western 
technology and culture.
The most popular version of the evolution of the group is that it was a 
political outfit or instrument of the former governor of Borno State, Ali Modu 
Sheriff, who in 2002 used it as support for his political ambitions. This school 
argues that it was the disagreement between the group and the governor that 
led to its radicalisation. This school views the emergence of the group as politi-
cally motivated. Marc-Antoine de Montclos (2014: 5) for instance, argues that 
even though Boko Haram as an Islamic group has a religious background, it is 
“political in nature because it contests Western values, challenges the secular-
ity of the state and reveals the corruption of a system that relies on a predatory 
ruling elite.” The immediate past governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, 
while supporting the 2002 thesis, argues that the Boko Haram started as a 
group known as the Taliban, with the codename Kandahar, a name borrowed 
from Afghanistan. The group aimed “to freely worship as an Islamic body 
that sought to commit members to spiritual devotion to Allāh” (Shettima 
2015). Of course, this was the grooming stage of what would later become a 
violent group.
In 2004, the group attacked police formations in Bama and Gwoza, and had 
to be repelled by soldiers. There was another sudden attack in 2007 in Kano, 
which also resulted in inviting the soldiers to quell the group. By 2009, the clash 
between the Boko Haram and the police once again resulted in the full mili-
tarisation of the group, following the order of Mohammed Yusuf who called 
for jihād. While the opinion of this school is legitimate, it does not unravel 
the historical facts behind the ideological development that encouraged this 
metamorphosis into a radicalised organisation as Boko Haram has come to be 
known today. After all, Shettima (2015) agrees that his “chronicles of the Boko 
Haram [were] based on some respected accounts” but in fact, the political nar-
rative has been largely associated with Western media, which in the course of 
time became an overarching narrative of the motif of the group.
Monica Emmanuel (2016) gives the impression that the emergence of 
Boko Haram can be viewed in the light of the politicisation of religion, a phe-
nomenon that is widespread in Nigeria. This argument of politicisation goes 
even further to say that the group was carefully orchestrated to frustrate the 
administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the 
southern part of Nigeria. In other words, Boko Haram was a militant resistance 
group against the change of political power in the Nigerian federal structure, 
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often more than not dominated by the Muslim North. She posits that even 
though religion has a role to play in the activities of the group, it is mostly a tool 
of mobilisation. For her, Islam helps the leadership of the Boko Haram to easily 
convince poor members of society to enter its fold, and thereafter radicalise 
them. As true as this may sound, it does not address the historical and ideologi-
cal trajectory of the movement. Her analysis basically countenances the con-
flict and insurgency that resulted long after the group had been in existence.
In another vein, Scott MacEachern (2018: 3) argues that an eclectic approach 
to understanding the origin of Boko Haram is in order because radical groups 
usually have different motivations. This is not to ignore the religious back-
ground to the emergence of the group as “religion is certainly a central element 
in any comprehensive understanding of Boko Haram” (2018: 3). MacEachern 
observes that there are religious, political, social, military, gendered, economic, 
and cultural ways of making sense of the group. As an archaeologist, he started 
his investigation by looking at the history of the cultural and human landscapes 
involved in the emergence of Boko Haram. Emphasising instead the military 
and theological outlook of Boko Haram, Sadau Azama (2017: iv) argues that the 
group was established in 2002 with the sole aim to “establish an Islamic state 
and institutionalise Sharia law in Nigeria, particularly the northeast region.” 
As Azama notes, a key motivation was the establishment of a caliphate with 
distinctive Islamic law and enforcement over the ‘corrupted’ Sokoto caliphate 
that has embraced Western civilisation.
Rather than 2002 as the year of origin of Boko Haram, S.O. Anyanwu 
(2012), Abdulkareem Mohammed (2010), and Shehu Sani (2011) have traced 
the nascence of the group to 1995. According to them, Boko Haram started in 
1995 under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan from Kano as the Sahaba group. 
When Lawan left for further studies at the University of Medina, he handed 
over to Yusuf. Yusuf made allegations of corrupt practices against the founder 
and senior clerics “in order to subdue them. They gave in to his blackmail and 
he took over control” (Mohammed 2010: 40). Soon after, Yusuf changed the 
doctrines bequeathed to him and began to form a separatist movement against 
the establishment. Sani (2011) notes that Yusuf did not hide his puritanical, 
fundamentalist, and theocratic vectors, which he carved after the thirteenth 
century controversial scholar, Taqī ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyya, a prominent 
personality in Salafi thought and who was an uncompromising defender of 
Sunnī Islam. Ibn Taymiyya believed that the Qurʾān and the sunna were suf-
ficient for the guide and salvation of Muslims. He also thought that the four 
prominent schools of jurisprudence had become sectarian and unhelpful, 
particularly because of the influence of Greek thought, logic, and Ṣūfi mysti-
cism. Consequently, he strongly advocated a return to the Qurʾān and sunna as 
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exemplified by the Prophet Muḥammad in Medina. It is this religious persona 
that Yusuf named his mosque after in Maiduguri: the Ibn Taymiyya Markaz 
(centre). Yusuf made ample references to Taymiyya’s teachings and ideologi-
cal bent as the basis for a quintessential umma (Islamic community), and fre-
quently drew moral boosts and authority from his teachings and style (Salkida 
2012; Thurston 2018). Yusuf further drew inspiration from ibn Taymiyya’s aus-
tere lifestyle, which was notably uncommon for most religious and political 
leaders in northeast Nigeria (Smith 2015). As Ahmad Salkida (2012) concludes 
“the root cause of the [Boko Haram] conflict is ideological in nature” contrary 
to Ahmad Murtada’s (2013: 5) position that before 2002 “the group had no ideo-
logical agenda,” while Shettima (2015) maintains that it had “misguided ideolo-
gies.” Salkida elaborates his argument thus:
Clearly, there’s huge and frightening degree of unemployment in Northern 
Nigeria. But the real fuse that drives this level of terror is with the sect’s 
doctrinaire and ideologue. What we are dealing with is a growing Islamic 
ideologue that greatly appeals to young people. The doctrines that the 
leaders of the Boko Haram founded their sect cannot be separated from 
the global jihad movement that exploits the widespread suffering, resent-
ment, and anger in the Muslim world.
Salkida 2012
Before 2002, Yusuf had become prominent in Borno state as he was a mem-
ber of the state’s committee on the implementation of sharīʿa. In his own 
capacity as a religious preacher with an ideology and agenda for an alterna-
tive state, Yusuf had also established “laginas (departments), had a cabinet, the 
Shura, the Hisbah, the brigades of guilds, a military wings [sic], a large farm, 
an effective microfinance scheme, and late Yusuf played the role of a judge 
in settling disputes. Each state had an amir (leader) including amirs in Chad 
and Niger that gave account of their stewardship to Yusuf directly” (Sani 2011: 
27–28). Yusuf was already administering a state-like structure based on sharīʿa 
within the fringes of the Nigerian state or what Thurston (2018: 80) calls “an 
imaginary state within a state.” This bordered on a social justice and welfare 
scheme which enticed the poor masses into his Ibn Taymiyya Markaz centre 
in Maiduguri. In fact, before the start of the Boko Haram crisis in 2009, Yusuf 
could conveniently boast of five hundred regular members plus other admirers 
all over the place.
This was what attracted politicians to woo the group’s support in order to 
win elections, hence its widespread political prominence. Yusuf’s fundamen-
talist ideology led to a theocratic formation governed by puritanical rules, 
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which he tried to extend to general society, especially in the North. Yusuf’s rule 
became a prototype for his subsequent followers who established a govern-
ment over conquered spaces or alternatively governed spaces. Shettima (2015) 
reveals that of the 27 local government areas in Borno State, 20 were at a time 
(between 2014 and 2015) under the control of Boko Haram where it “hoisted its 
flag and instituted quasi-administrative structures” and “declared a caliphate 
over captured areas” (Asiwe 2015). Although former Governor Ibrahim Gaidam 
(2015) of Yobe State countered his Borno counterpart that it was not true that 
“five local government areas in the two states are still under Boko Haram con-
trol,” there is no disagreement about the intentions of the group to establish 
political control.
The teachings of Boko Haram under Mohammed Yusuf did not differ 
substantially from other examples of global Islamism, especially Salafism. 
Salafism is a fundamentalist-theological interpretation of the Qurʾān, and 
seeks to return Islam and Muslims to a vision of the puritan, pure religion 
that existed in Medina under the direct governance of Prophet Muḥammad. 
Salafism derives from the Arabic etymology, salaf, meaning ‘predecessors’ 
(pl. aslāf ). The notion of al-salaf al-sahif, that is, ‘pious predecessors’, rose to 
prominence in global Salafism when it became obvious that there was a need 
to carefully select personalities and aspects of the early Islamic community to 
emulate in the course of reforming or advancing Islam in the contemporary 
world. Salafism emphasises literal interpretation of the Qurʾān and the sunna 
and according to Thurston (2018: 18), “Salafis narrowly interpret the Islamic 
injunction to worship one God, and they try to ‘purify’ other Muslims of alleged 
deviations in belief and practice.” Thurston (2018: 109) tends to generally view 
Salafism as non-violent yet in the case of Boko Haram, he argues that Yusuf 
“tried to smuggle jihadist thought into a Salafi community that had originally 
been oriented toward non-jihādi Salafism.” However, Abdulbasit Kassim (2018) 
notes that Thurston’s averment cannot completely be true considering Yusuf’s 
mentor, Salafi shaykh Ja’far Adam, who gave support to al-Qāʿida’s global jihād 
against the ‘far enemy’ rather than the ‘near enemy’ of ‘westernised’ Nigeria.
Meanwhile, according to Stephen Schwartz (2012), neo-Salafis consider 
themselves as authentic followers of the aslāf. Distinguishing between Salafi 
and neo-Salafi, he states: “The difference between the authentic aslāf and the 
‘neo-Salafis’ is defined additionally by things Muḥammad and the aslāf did not 
do. Muḥammad is never known to have pronounced any Muslim an apostate, 
to cite the most obvious example, while the ‘neo-Salafis’ are avid to expel those 
of whom they disapprove from the worldwide community of Muslims.” Indeed, 
Abubakar Shekau, leader of Boko Haram, emphasises neo-Salafi thought when 
he insists that Muslims outside Boko Haram are infidels. He denounces Saudi 
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Arabia as “not Islamic” because it fails to strictly adhere to the teachings of 
Prophet Muḥammad, and consequently it will “enter the Hellfire.” Shekau has 
threatened that Boko Haram would soon perform the ḥajj and visit the Kaʿba 
in Mecca, ostensibly for ‘cleansing’ (Bodansky 2015: 38).
Adam had preached sermons supporting the use of violence to achieve 
Islamic goals when necessary. As a mainstream Salafi, Adam had predicted 
that “the jihād in Nigeria is coming, either they, the infidels, chase us out of 
Nigeria or we chase them out” (in Kassim 2018: 14). In fact, Yusuf himself con-
firmed the use of violence as a Salafist in some of his sermons before his death. 
According to him:
Our religion is Islam, our creed is the creed of the al-salaf al-sahil Ahlul 
Sunna Wal Jama’ah, and our manhaj [path] is jihād. We believe that the 
Shariah is the only truth. The constitution is a lie it is Kufr [disbelief]. 
Democracy is a lie; it is Kufr. Working with the government that does 
not rule by Shariah is a lie; it is Kufr. Working with the security agencies 
is a lie; it is Kufr. For those who are ignorant, let them be aware that it 
is important for the Muslim to make hijrah from the institutions estab-
lished by the tawaghit [idolatrous governments].
Kassim 2015: 189
Kassim (2018: 14) further reveals that as far back as 2001 when the Grand Mufti 
of Saudi Arabia Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah Al Ash-Shaykh condemned the use of 
suicide bombs by Muslims, the Kano-based Salafi cleric Aminu Daurawa, who 
is at present the Commander General of Kano’s Hisbah board countered the 
condemnation of suicide bombing and described “God as a suicide bomber.” 
These precedents of preaching and ideological confirmations laid the founda-
tion for the eventual ascendancy of Yusuf’s jihādi-Salafi disposition. Kassim 
observes that when it mattered most, the mainstream Salafists became “jihādi 
revisionists” and subsequently “backtracked from the jihādi project” for which 
some of them were to later pay the supreme price.
Kassim (2015) espouses that jihādi-Salafism holds a theological belief that 
leans towards legitimising violence and violent rebellion, not only against infi-
dels but also those Muslims who have even implicitly adopted a progressive 
form of Islam. Relying on Petter Nesser’s definition of jihādi-Salafism as encap-
sulating “a revolutionary program of overthrowing unjust and un-Islamic 
regimes in the Muslim world, as well as irredentism aiming at expelling non-
Muslim military presence and influences from Muslim lands” (Kassim 2015: 
176), Kassim argues that a historical excursus into some Salafists operations 
reveals the fact that they are rarely quietist. Jihādi-Salafists have interpreted 
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Islamic texts in ways that have justified the use of violence to carry out their 
operations: “Jihādi-Salafi doctrinal underpinnings on the legitimacy of jihād 
as a tool to overthrowing the political rulers in the Muslim world developed 
from the interpretation that ruling by other than God’s law is major unbelief” 
(Kassim 2015: 179).
In relation to Boko Haram, Kassim (2015) and Igboin (2020) point out the 
historical trajectories that developed and established jihādi-Salafism in the 
Nigerian Muslim society, from where Yusuf and Boko Haram, would eventu-
ally draw inspiration. In line with jihādi-Salafi ideology, Yusuf thought and also 
taught that secularism, democracy, and Western education, values, and civili-
sation should be replaced with Islamic education and sharīʿa law. He preached 
that democracy is intricately linked to secularism and thus to shirk or impiety, 
as according to him, secularism ousts God from society and human affairs. This 
can be seen in the mace which is the symbol of authority of a legislative assem-
bly. In this sense, Muslims who bow to the mace are worshipping an idol, the 
penalty for which is death:
Parliamentarians and members of assemblies have combined between 
[sic] them making themselves gods and ascribing partners to Allāh. This 
is because their mace is their object of worship in various ways such as 
bowing to it, subjecting themselves to it, loving it and using it as a symbol 
of shirk [apostasy], as they do not pass any bill or make decisions without 
it. [Without the mace] such decisions are unacceptable and has [sic] no 
legal backing.
in Mohammed 2014: 16
In addition, Yusuf argued that though Western education is not bad in itself 
its contents must be censored. He insisted that Western education can be 
accepted to the extent that it does not clash with the Qurʾān, ḥadīth and the 
sunna. Yusuf preached that Western geography, aspects of biology, geology 
and sociology are forthrightly forbidden for Muslims because they contradict 
the Qurʾān. “These branches of knowledge,” according to him, “are not knowl-
edge but full of unbelief. Even those studying it are aware if they are fair to 
Allāh, except they haven’t studied Islam. If you have read geography, you’ll 
know that in geography there is danger” (in Mohammed 2014: 18). He also con-
demned the ‘big bang’ theory, Darwinism, and “the law of conservation of mat-
ter and energy” because they oppose creationism (in Mohammed 2010: 52). 
Consequently, he urged true Muslims to “take up arms to purge our curricu-
lum of heresy” (in Mohammed 2010: 52). Thus ‘heretical’ and ‘false’ teachings 
are argued to be at the core of secularism, and democracy is the agent which 
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secularism uses to impose the corrupt Western values on other nations of the 
world including Nigeria (Mohammed 2010: 56–57). In this sense, Boko Haram 
has it as one of its objectives to overthrow the vestiges of Western values and 
civilisation and replace them with sharīʿa law and education. Hence the group 
entrenched radicalised Islamic values in its agenda in conquered spaces in 
North-eastern Nigeria.
4 Islam as Ideological Gristmill of Boko Haram
Like many religions Islam offers not just a religious belief system but a total 
way of life for the follower. This can clash with the idea of the compartmen-
talisation of life, which secular political structures, particularly the Western 
type, have promoted. Islamism, in vehemently rejecting this, enunciates and 
reiterates a structure that is essentially God-centric and clearly instantiated 
in divinely inspired sharīʿa law and praxis. While sharīʿa manifests in differing 
ways in Islamic communities around the world, it is also from this law that 
actions that have been viewed as violent or terroristic are drawn. In the con-
temporary West sharīʿa and Islam generally are popularly associated with acts 
of terror and oppression.
Those who have studied terrorist groups have mostly ascribed their acts of 
terror to an ideology. For instance, Christopher M. Blanchard (2007) observes 
that al-Qāʿida’s messages are ideologically situated and steeped in religion. 
Importantly, the idea that religion and politics are separable is uniquely 
Western: in religions like Islam the two worlds are intertwined. David C. 
Rapoport (1972), a renowned scholar of religion and terrorism, also argues that 
any attempt to deny religion as a key motivation for terrorism would mean 
that a proper process of arresting the trend might be forfeited. Accordingly, 
Rapoport (1984: 659) argues that until the rise of nationalism, anarchism 
and Marxism, “religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror.” 
Security analyst David Brannan (2007) corroborates the position that religion 
provides the cannon fodder for terrorist acts and as such religion is equally 
important for counter-terrorism, noting that religion provides the framework 
and organisational structure while theology legitimises action through inter-
pretive science. Scholars such as Joshua Wright have pointed to Islam as a lived 
religion where certain “psychosocial religious factors” have made it especially 
prone to violent extremist expression (2016).
Hugh Segal and Serge Joyal (2011) suggest there are four stages believers pass 
through to become radicalised—though not all those who begin eventually 
complete the processes, this potentially transforms one from a ‘seeker’ to a 
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‘terrorist’. The first stage is Pre-Radicalisation, which has to do with life before 
the journey into radicalisation, that is, lifestyle, religion, social status, and edu-
cation. The second is Self-Identification, which “involves the beginning of a 
religious seeking often following an economic, social, political, or personal cri-
sis” (Segal and Joyal 2011: 10). The third is Indoctrination: “the individual wholly 
adopts jihādi-Salafi ideology and concludes that militant jihād is required to 
support and further the Salafist cause, and joins a cluster of like-minded indi-
viduals” (Segal and Joyal 2011: 12). The fourth stage they call Jihadization and 
designate as the critical stage that leads to planned violence: “members of the 
cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihād, and begin planning 
for a terrorist attack” (Segal and Joyal 2011: 13). Segal and Joyal further reveal 
that the social, economic, and political reasons often cited as precursors of 
terrorism are secondary and insufficient. According to them, many terrorists 
and terrorist groups more often than not originate from the middle or upper-
middle classes rather from the poverty-stricken population. They argue that it 
is these upper classes that possess the wherewithal to mobilise and radicalise 
the poor people and not vice versa.
Rogelio Alonso et al (2008: 14) add that “a Jihādi Salafist ideology that pro-
motes violence as a way to achieve the creation of a new caliphate as well as to 
recover territories that were once under Muslim rule is utilised to form a com-
mon bond.” David Mandel (2002) also explains how religio-nationalist ideol-
ogy and theology can motivate a wide-scale program of collective violence and 
counter-violence, citing the case of Usāma bin Lādin and President George 
Bush. bin Lādin’s recourse to religious nationalism with al-Qāʿida worked and 
still works to rally support for other terrorist groups like Boko Haram who seek 
to establish religio-political control over states. Bouzerzour Zoubir (2014) notes 
that the action of jihād to carve or create an Islamic state is usually promoted 
by radicalised Muslims as religiously sanctioned because it is the will of God to 
implement sharīʿa globally.
We have gone this far to demonstrate the critical role religion—Islam in 
this context—plays in the radicalisation process that culminates in the kind 
of violence deployed by Boko Haram. In the case of Mohammed Yusuf, the 
former leader of the Boko Haram, he vehemently disagreed with his tutors and 
held stringent, extremist views about the Qurʾān and the implementation of 
a caliphate. Yusuf’s “blistering speeches” were widely circulated which won 
him a large following across the cadres of his society. His group was made up 
of both educated and wealthy and poor and uneducated members of society, 
who appear to have been drawn to his teachings. Mohammed Kyari (2014: 14) 
sums it up as follows: “The message of Boko Haram, as outlined by Mohammed 
Yusuf, derived from and fed into the extant discourse and ideology of Islamism 
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worldwide. Boko Haram narratives were framed within the radical Islamic dis-
course with which Mohammed Yusuf had become conversant … The rejection 
of secularism, democracy, Western education, and Westernisation were the 
major planks of the narratives.” The group itself has stated as follows:
We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out jihād in 
Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the Holy Prophet. 
We will never accept any system of government apart from the one stipu-
lated by Islam because that is the only way that the Muslims can be lib-
erated. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional 
or orthodox, except the Islamic system and that is why we will keep on 
fighting against democracy, socialism and whatever.
Agbo 2011: 47
Olufemi Vaughan (2016) observes that the rise of Boko Haram was predicated 
upon the failure of the northern state governments to fully implement and 
abide by the ethos of sharīʿa law since 1999. The resurgence of sharīʿa in 1999 
as the country returned to civil rule was hinged on the notion that it would 
produce a better society. The politicisation of sharīʿa and the crises that fol-
lowed demanded a reform of Islam, which Boko Haram largely now represents, 
though in its extremity. This neo-Salafist outfit insistently preached hard mes-
sages of messianic revivalism that roundly condemned the northern Muslims, 
particularly the political leaders who Yusuf saw as compromisers with the 
idolatrous and corrupt systems entrenched by democracy. The haphazard 
implementation of sharīʿa and its complete failure and abandonment was fre-
quently cited by Yusuf as an indication that a new order was needed to salvage 
Islam from further profanity. As a puritan, Yusuf expected Muslim politicians 
to live strictly moral lives, and the unconscionable corruption of politicians 
stimulated his Salafist spirit, which ultimately resulted in levels of “lethal vio-
lence unprecedented in Nigerian history” (Vaughan 2016: 219). Thus, contrary 
to popular expression, “Boko Haram’s militancy did not cause Nigeria’s politi-
cal crisis … rather, it reflects the endemic crisis of governance, especially in 
Northern states” (Vaughan 2016: 219). In other words, it was the situation in 
northern Nigeria that provided the impetus for Yusuf to practically and vio-
lently express his ‘reform agenda’. Olufemi Vaughan (2016: 229) further eluci-
dates this:
In the specific case of Boko Haram, its militancy does not simply reveal 
the extent of the crisis of national governance; it shows the eroding 
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legitimacy of traditional Muslim rulers in Northern communities because 
of their essential role as a critical component of Nigeria’s neopatrimonial 
state system. Furthermore, since militant Islamic groups such as Boko 
Haram have consistently exploited the pressure for sharia to stake their 
claims in Northern Muslim communities, the custodians of Nigerian state 
have had to confront a major constitutional dilemma between Nigerian 
secularism and a clamor for an Islamic theocracy.
The neo-Salafi orientation of Yusuf can also be seen in the religious philosophy 
of the Maitatsine sect in the 1980s, which many scholars have argued has many 
similarities with Boko Haram (Danjibo 2009; Walker 2016; Anugwom 2019; 
Igboin 2019). Maitatsine’s threat to national security started before Nigerian 
Independence in 1960. Led by Mohammed Marwa, the sect erratically and 
violently propagated its doctrine of total rejection and eradication of Western 
civilisation. Marwa publicly denounced religious leaders before him as infidels 
because he considered them idolatrous, flirting with democracy and Western 
ideologies and cultures. His erratic nature came to a crescendo when he and 
his followers “denigrated Prophet Muḥammad and had the popular … phrase, 
‘may Allāh curse those who disagree with this (our) version’” (Anugwom 2019: 
42). Marwa also rejected Isa (Jesus) as a prophet and regarded the ḥadīth and 
sunna as illegitimate but emphasised the Qurʾānic verses he thought right for 
his ideology, especially his doctrine of millenarianism. He preached an immi-
nent end of the world and the emergence of a redeemer who would lead God’s 
army against the infidel and compromised Muslims. This ultra-fundamentalist 
revivalism could not accommodate Muslim leaders whom the group had 
already declared infidels, hence many of them were killed in the riots which 
preceded the war he prophesied. It was a strategy that Boko Haram would later 
adopt, which led to the “civil war” (Kassim 2018: 3) in the group, as we shall 
show below.
5 Schisms and ‘Civil War’ in the Alternatively Governed Space
The disagreement between Ja’far Adam and his protégé Yusuf has been inter-
preted in many ways, and the most prominent for us here is ideological incon-
sistency underlying the interpretation of Islamic texts in the context of the 
prevailing political situation in the country. The reality is that the disagreement 
resulted in the contestation of space and governance in a kind of schism. Yusuf 
moved on to create an alternative space where he felt his doctrines could better 
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be served. Using the Ibn Taymiyya Markaz as his platform, Yusuf developed 
his theological and ideological teachings and mobilised a militant unit (Guitta 
and Simcox 2014). The confrontation with the security agencies and eventual 
extra-judicial killing of Yusuf by police in July 2009 introduced another phase 
in the development of Boko Haram. Abubakar Shekau, who succeeded the 
late Yusuf, resurged the group with violent attacks on the country. Shekau’s 
unflinching Salafi orientation earned him several descriptions such as “crazy,” 
“rabble-rouser,” “deranged,” “mad-man,” “a brutal psychopath,” “bloodthirsty 
lunatic” and the leader of “ignorants who are the antithesis of contemporary 
values” (Barkindo 2018: 53–54). Edlyne Anugwom (2019: 113) also describes 
Shekau as an “unstable character.” Atta Barkindo (2018) argues that such per-
ceptions about Shekau are merely emotive as they do not countenance the 
strategic and ideological prowess of Yusuf’s successor. Shekau’s successful cam-
paigns, affiliation with international terrorist organisations, and funding of the 
group’s operations are critical to properly situating the presence of mind of 
Shekau. While Barkindo’s focus on Shekau’s versality as a corporatist-strategist 
is important for policy-making and counter-terrorism, here we will focus on his 
religious philosophy and its underlying Salafist ideology.
Shekau’s aversion for Western civilisation resonates in his attacks on per-
ceived Western-style institutions and demonstrates continuity with the ideol-
ogy of Boko Haram. This can be substantiated in the attacks carried out on 
schools, United Nations’ buildings in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, and on police, 
the army, Christians and churches, and on moderate Muslims who criticised 
his religious credentials. Anugwom (2019: 114) posits that the schools are 
attacked because they represent Western civilisation, and the primary focus of 
attack on schools populated by Christian students testifies to this claim. The 
cases of abductions, such as the kidnapping of 276 Chibok school girls in 2014 
and 110 school girls from Dapchi 2018, in Borno and Yobe states respectively, 
are quintessential. While the attacks on police and military formations and 
personnel are understandable, the attacks on Muslims raises questions as to 
the ultra-jihādi-Salafi ideology of the group.
However, Shekau defends the group’s attacks on Muslims on the grounds 
that he has credible information that such Muslims were working against the 
goals of Boko Haram. According to him, “even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, 
if we confirm that he exposes us to the government, his children will become 
orphans and his wife will become widow, in God’s name” (in Anugwom 2019: 
139). Boko Haram’s killing of Muslims is defended on the basis of takfīr, the 
accusation of apostasy levelled by the group against Muslims for allegedly 
practising impure, fake, or adulterated Islam. Adam was indeed likely one of 
the victims of Boko Haram: he was killed during prayer in a mosque in 2007 for 
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allegedly opposing the group. Kassim (2018: 17) captures the rising extremism 
of Shekau thusly:
Shekau began to manifest signs of deviation on the issues of al-‘udhr bi-
l-jahl and takfir al-Muthlaq by declaring the entire Muslim population of 
Nigeria as infidels on the basis that they did not disbelieve taghut [the 
idolatrous government], their children still attended government schools, 
and they participated in democratic elections. Shekau’s farthest level of 
extremism on the issue of takfir spurred his launching of an indiscrimi-
nate campaign of violence and confiscation of the wealth and properties 
of Muslims population that did not pledge allegiance to him.
Subsequently, Shekau would declare himself a Caliph over the territories 
taken, and demanded unalloyed loyalty, declaring as apostates those who 
had deserted the group or opposed him. Unquestioned obedience to his com-
mands was expected from all members of the group including the highest 
echelons. Within the group, the Consultative or Shura Council is vested with 
the powers to deliberate and take decisions on issues to be implemented by 
the group (Sheehan and Porter 2014: 8; Omenma, Abada and Omenma 2020). 
According to Yossef Bodansky (2015: 14), “The Shura is Boko Haram’s highest 
decision-making body, and the Amir ul-Aam cannot launch major operations, 
formulate strategy or issue communiques without the approval of the Shura.”1 
Shekau totally disregarded the decisions of the Consultative Council and 
superimposed his views or opinions onto it. In June 2012, Ansaru (or Jama’ atu 
Ansaru Muslimina Fi Bilad al Sudan, which is translated as ‘Vanguards for the 
Protection of Muslims in Black Africa’), emerged as a faction of Boko Haram, 
founded on their ideological diversion from Boko Haram’s killing of fellow 
Muslims. Although Ansaru’s activities centred on abduction of foreigners in 
Nigeria, it maintained its ideological disagreement with Boko Haram (Igboin 
2014b; Faluyi, Khan, and Akinola 2019).
A further schism occurred in 2015 when a group headed by Abu Musab al-
Barnawi broke away under the name Islamic State of West Africa Province 
(ISWAP). As Kassim explains it the “transmutation from Boko Haram to ISWAP 
was fraught with newfound agreements at the Consultative Council on the 
issues of ideology and strategy as well as the persuasive efforts intended to 
discipline the megalomaniac idiosyncrasies and highest level of extremism 
of Shekau” (Kassim 2018: 19). Shekau and his lieutenants would later regard 
1 Members of the Boko Haram’s Consultative Council are not fully known except two that were 
listed by the Joint Task Force ( JTF) to include Mamman Nur and Khalid al-Barnawi.
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al-Barnawi as an infidel, who “does not follow a sound doctrine from authen-
tic Salafism” (in Kassim 2018: 21), and who “condones living in an un-Islamic 
society without waging jihād” (Anugwom, 2019: 196). It is reported that this 
ideological conflict led Shekau to assassinate some of his close associates 
(Vanguard 2017).
Although it has been argued that these sub-groups have reconciled and 
re-united, a claim Kassim (2018) seriously doubts, it has, however, shown the 
mosaic of ideological stranglehold that has run through the development and 
sustenance of Boko Haram. Even when there is division, it does not in any way 
suggest a reduction in the sub-groups’ capacities to inflict violence, in fact, as 
the period of the ‘internal’ civil war shows (see Anugwom 2019), they were 
attacking in different forms and areas which make it difficult to strategically 
confront them. But the ideological leaning towards ultra-jihād-Salafism, no 
matter how it is interpreted and applied, is the cannon fodder of Boko Haram.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that Boko Haram, whether or not it is a sobriquet for the 
group that calls itself Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awatiwal-Jihad, is based on 
ultra-jihādi-Salafist ideology that has a long history in Nigeria. Even though 
the group has attempted to clarify that it does not condemn all aspects of 
Western civilisation as sinful, it has actually maintained an ambivalent pos-
ture. Western culture such as multi-party democracy, constitutionalism and 
any other aspects the group considers anti-Islam are declared ḥarām, that is, 
forbidden. Sharīʿa is presented as the absolute divine law that ought to guide 
human society, a body of law that is believed would purify all immoral behav-
iour in society. The absence of sharīʿa, or its haphazard implementation and 
lacking support by the Nigerian Muslim leaders, is considered antithetical to 
the spirit and letter of the law, and this is blamed on the influence of Western 
democracy. However, sharīʿa appears to have had the capacity to foster a demo-
cratic approach in post-colonial Nigeria. Even when the expanded sharīʿa issue 
arose in 1999, it was vehemently argued that since the majority of northerners 
expressed their faith in sharīʿa, as a democratic process would entail, opposi-
tion against it should be rested (Vaughan 2016: 173–174). This same ambiva-
lence has trailed after the jihādi-Salafi ideology upon which Boko Haram is 
founded. In global Islam, Salafism has been interpreted in different ways, and 
different groups either hold to the quietist persuasion or jihādi-Salafi option, 
which Boko Haram has consistently aligned itself. The schisms and civil war 
within the group are borne out of ideological disagreement despite the fact 
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that all the sub-groups have the belief in the establishment of sharīʿa in the 
territory they are holding sway.
Rather than the popular argument that Boko Haram arose as a consequence 
of political economy factors prevalent in the North, however, we have argued 
that the group grew from an Islamist basis for the creation of an anti-Western 
caliphate. The desire to maintain alternatively governed space within Nigeria 
is part of the political history of the country. Nevertheless, while it is germane 
to intensify efforts towards addressing the socio-economic factors that might 
have been the immediate causes for the militancy of the group, and also 
deploy securitisation processes by the government and allied forces, more 
nuanced efforts need to be emplaced to deepen the understanding of the ideo-
logical diversity and influence that characterise the belief and operations of 
this group.
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In 2012, news about a police raid on the premises of an Islamic group named 
the Faizrakhmanisty (after its leader and initiator, Faizrakhman Sattarov) was 
reported across the Russian media.1 During the raid, it was said, the police 
found tens of children living underground in unsanitary conditions. Different 
versions of the story of this sect,2 which was said to be waiting for the end of 
the world in an isolated compound, spread rapidly throughout not only the 
Russian media, but also the Western media. The story of the Faizrakhmanisty 
brings together several topics that have been prominent in the recent political 
attitude toward Islam in Russia and representations of Islam in the Russian 
media. This chapter argues, first, that the term ‘sect’ is used frequently as an 
evaluative concept in the construction of certain Islamic organizations or phe-
nomena in the Russian media. Second, it is suggested that the idea of the ‘total-
itarian sect’, used in particular by ‘experts’ committed to the anti-cult stance to 
combat non-institutionalised or ‘non-traditional’ forms of Islam, is often intro-
duced in the media to guide interpretations of Islam-related content.
The chapter begins with a discussion about Islam, religious freedom, and 
media representations of religion in Russia. The first part of the analysis 
focuses on the ways that the term ‘sect’ is used in the Russian media by focus-
ing on four very different phenomena that have been labeled as Islamic sects: 
Wahhābism, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Nurdzhular, and the National Organization of 
Russian Muslims (NORM). The second part of the analysis examines the case 
of the Faizrakhmanisty and its coverage in the media.
1 I wish to thank Renat Bekkin for his insightful and helpful comments on the earlier version of 
this chapter. This chapter reproduces some of the material published in K. Aitamurto, 2018, 
“The Faizrakhmanisty: The Islamic Sect as a Social Problem in Russia,” Alternative Spirituality 
and Religion Review, 9:2, 165–189.
2 In this article, I use the term “sect” as it appears in the media and scholarly analyses of the 
Faizrakhmanisty and other Islamic groups, without going into debates on the theoretical 
basis or relevance of the term in relation to these groups.
459The Faizrakhmanisty
2 Non-Traditional Religiosity and Sects in Russian Discussions
In contemporary Russia, the word ‘sect’ has even more negative connotations 
than in Western Europe or North America. The reason for this can be found in 
the social history of the 1990s, when the idea that new religious movements, 
often referred to simply as ‘sects’, were socially dangerous phenomena gained 
ground. This shift toward more authoritarian and conservative religious poli-
tics began soon after the post-Soviet religious revival that followed the intro-
duction of an extremely liberal religious freedom law in 1990. One aspect of 
this religious renaissance was an upsurge in new religions, religious influences, 
and foreign missionaries arriving in Russia. These elements upset the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) in particular. It claimed that missionaries were acting 
impudently in relation to Russia’s own religious traditions. The ROC appealed 
to its disadvantaged position in comparison with Western-originated Christian 
organizations here; while the ROC was still recuperating from the material and 
educational damage caused during the Soviet era, many of its competitors had 
much more solid financial bases. The ROC capitalised on the claim that the 
Soviet period had alienated Russians from their own religious heritage, mak-
ing them religiously illiterate and therefore vulnerable to all kind of religious 
propaganda (Fagan 2013: 53–62).
Some challenges to new and foreign religion also came from below, although 
they tended to have been designed carefully by the ROC itself or by social cir-
cles close to it. Western anti-sect activists and scholars of religion who held 
negative attitudes toward such groups (but hardly represented the mainstream 
with regard to academic views on new religions) were invited to Russia. Some 
Orthodox Christian activists, such as Alexander Dvorkin, aimed to introduce 
the new discipline of ‘sectology’ (sektovedenie) and the title ‘scholar of sects’ 
(sektoved) to academic circles (Baran 2006). Although sectology was mostly 
rejected by the academy, expressions like ‘totalitarian sect’ and ‘destructive 
sect’ became established in the media, where the so-called ‘scholars of sects’ 
were presented as authoritative experts on the development of sectarianism in 
Russia. The common definition put forth by the press indicated that a ‘sect’ was 
an organization controlled by a power-hungry leader who brainwashed people 
and dissolved families for his/her own financial benefit. As a consequence of 
the religious developments in the country at this time, the new, stricter Law 
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations was introduced in 1997. 
Since then, some amendments have been made to impose still further lim-
its on the activities of minority religions (Shterin and Richardson 2000; Fagan 
2013: 62–74).
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Although the 1997 law did not mention any religions in particular, it has 
been referred to surprisingly widely in discussions and policies as legitimizing 
the four ‘traditional religions’ of Russia: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, 
and Buddhism. Unsurprisingly, then, many official Islamic organizations and 
leaders joined the Orthodox Christians in demanding stricter control of new 
and Western-originated religions. At the same time, however, Islam has not 
been overlooked as a possible source of societal problems. In post-Soviet 
Russia, Islamic organizations faced similar challenges to the ROC: an insuffi-
cient amount of religious buildings, many of which were in a bad condition; a 
shortage of religious literature; a lack of trained religious professionals. In such 
a dire situation, aid from Islamic countries was crucial for Russian Muslims, in 
terms of both providing education for future imams and supporting the build-
ing of new mosques and madrasas. As a result, the perceived influence of for-
eign Islam on Russia caused concern over the radicalization of Muslims. This 
tendency was reinforced by the rise of negative attitudes toward Islam than 
began after 9/11 and certain terrorist actions in Russia (Verkhovsky 2010: 30; 
Kemper 2012: 120).
The idea of the need to control Islamic religiosity and Muslims in Russia can 
be traced back, however, to Catherine the Great. Ivan the Terrible’s conquest 
of Kazan in 1552 had given Russia’s crown a substantial number of Muslim 
subjects. Catherine the Great was the first ruler to grant some (albeit limited) 
religious rights to them, including the right to build new mosques and to per-
form ḥajj. Although the liberal philosophy of the Enlightenment undoubtedly 
influenced Catherine’s political line, another significant motivation in her 
politics concerning the Muslim minority was to guarantee the loyalty of her 
subjects. In addition to providing them with a new level of freedom, Catherine 
decided to create a single, centralised, hierarchical organization, which could 
act as a mediator between the state and the Muslim community, as well as 
having control over the latter. Thus, the Orenburg Mohammedian Spiritual 
Assembly was founded and was based on the Christian tradition of hierar-
chical organizations—a concept quite alien in Islam. Over the centuries, the 
name of this organization changed several times, but the centralised structure 
was preserved until the end of Soviet times (Crews 2009: 33, 49–53).
At the end of the Soviet period, four Muftiates governed the Central Asia/
Kazakhstan, South Caucasus, North Caucasus, and European Russia/Siberia 
areas, respectively. In the 1990s, religious liberation, coupled with dissatis-
faction with the old, Soviet-time religious authorities, led to the burgeoning 
of new religious communities, as well as divides within existing organiza-
tions (Bukharaev 1996; Yemianova 2003: 140, 143–7). Nevertheless, a substan-
tial proportion of the Islamic religious establishment continued to express a 
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preference for having a single organization that could represent all Russian 
Muslims. It was felt that a unified voice would allow Muslims to be heard bet-
ter in society and to be more efficient in controlling the radicalization of the 
youth. Admittedly, internal power struggles between Muslim organizations 
challenged this aim, discrediting the community in the eyes of both Muslims 
and non-Muslims, thus leading to further social divisions. Despite such con-
sequences, in the aspiration to centralise Islamic activity, one can discern a 
wish to monopolise Islam in Russia once again. Furthermore, the idea of cen-
tralization reproduces the evaluative dichotomies of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-
traditional’ or ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ religiosity (Aitamurto 2015).
It should be noted here that the policies put in place to protect ‘traditional 
religions’ refer mainly to certain institutions that represent those religions. 
Orthodox Christian Churches other than the ROC, for example, have also faced 
difficulties or even oppression, but have had little protection. In a similar vein, 
newer Islamic organizations have often been refused the right to become reg-
istered as religious groups. Instead, their premises have faced raids and even 
closure. Indeed, the situation is more complex in the Islamic case than in the 
Orthodox Christian one. The preferred Islamic organization varies by region, 
and there are constant struggles to adopt the position of most powerful organi-
zation. For example, almost all of the mosques in Moscow are controlled by the 
Religious Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie 
Musul’man Rossiiskoi Federatsii, or DUMRF), a group which has sought to 
extend its control further but has had difficulty in establishing its activities in 
places like St Petersburg (Aitamurto and Gaidukov 2018).
The discussion about certain forms of Islam posing a social problem has 
mainly revolved around the concepts of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial Islam’ (and, later, 
‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ Islam—see Makarov and Mukhametshin 
2003; Aitamurto 2015). Ironically, some of the Islamic traditions that were 
seen as the main reference points for ‘unofficial Islam’ in Soviet times are now 
accepted as authentic, local, traditional Islam; this is the case, for instance, 
with Ṣūfism in Central Asia and the North Caucasus. The category into which 
a religious organization is placed can have significant consequences for its 
social position because authorities will lend official support to traditional 
Islam, while working to prevent the growth of non-traditional Islam because 
it is seen as problematic. The term ‘traditional Islam’ has been criticised by 
some Russian scholars and Muslims (Malashenko 2013; Mukhametov 2015) 
for its vagueness and normativity, but it is still used frequently by politicians, 
authorities, and the most prominent Islamic leaders to distinguish ‘good’ Islam 
from its ‘bad’ counterpart. There are, indeed, countless ways to interpret this 
concept; most often, however, ‘traditional Islam’ is conceived as including 
462 Aitamurto
features like loyalty to the Russian state and a long history of operating in a 
given area. This means that types of Islam considered traditional in certain 
parts of Russia are seen as non-traditional in others; the Shāfiʿī madhhab, for 
example, is viewed as non-traditional in Tatarstan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, 
despite being accepted as traditional in North Caucasus. Likewise, in 2011, the 
Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Tatarstan (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man 
Respubliki Tatarstan, or DUMRT) announced that all imams of the republic 
should base their teaching on the Hanafi madhhab, In addition, in 2012, the 
President of the Republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnihanov, signed a law stat-
ing that imams who had studied abroad must have their diplomas confirmed 
in Russia before being allowed to work in local mosques, thus posing a risk 
to the survival of non-traditional Islamic groups. As eminent Islam scholar 
Alexey Malashenko points out, such restrictions can drive unofficial religious 
organizations underground where they are more difficult to be controlled and 
in a greater risk to get radicalised (Andrukhaeva 2012).
Surprisingly, given the prevalence of conversations about ‘sects’ in the 
Russian media, the phrase ‘Islamic sect’ is seldom used. A quick survey of the 
use of this combination of words in the Russian media database Integrum 
between 2000 and 2015 reveals that it usually (but not always) refers to foreign 
groups, such as Boko Haram. Sometimes, Russian groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
Nurcular (Nurdzhular in Russian), and the Wahhābists are also labeled as such, 
as is militant Islam in general. Journalists, politicians, and Muslim leaders 
seem, at times, to issue warnings about Islamic sects in general terms—to sup-
port calls for tighter control of the religious behavior of Muslims, for example.
In the book on Islamic sects published by Mir Islama and recommended 
for use in religious education, author Murat Mamirgov (2007: 6) writes that 
sects have brought no additional value to Islam; rather, they have only caused 
division and discordance within the umma. His views represent a widely 
shared attitude toward sects among Russian Muslims. According to the Deputy 
Director of the Foundation for the Support of Islamic Culture, Science, and 
Education, Ali Vyacheslav Polosin, the undesirable features of sects include the 
existence of religious innovations (bidʿa) and ‘exclusive truth’ claims. Among 
his examples of sects, Polosin mentions Salafism. According to him, a sect can 
never become a religion and is typically “bloody and criminal” (Khizrieva 2011). 
Less condemnatory attitudes toward sectarianism can also be found in Russia. 
An eminent scholar of Islam, Aleksandr Ignatenko (2003), defends the con-
cept of the Islamic sect, seeing it as a natural part of the religion. He stresses 
that for Muslims and scholars of Islam, such developments do not have the 
negative connotations that are associated with the emergence of sects in other 
religions—especially in Christianity. The concept of the ‘totalitarian sect’ has 
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been used, however, by Muslim clerics; the head of the Central Spiritual Board 
of Muslims of Russia (Tsentral’noe Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man Rossii, or 
TsDUM), Talgat Tadjuddin, has referred to the danger posed by ‘totalitarian 
sects’ within the Russian umma (Crews 2014).
3 The Study of Islam and Anti-Extremist Legislation
In Soviet times, the study of Islam was focused mostly on two topics: 1) the role 
of Islam in the politics of foreign countries and 2) classic Islamic literature and 
culture. There was hardly any research conducted on Muslims or Islamic reli-
giosity within the USSR. In contemporary Russia, a new generation of scholars 
has engaged in the ethnographic and sociological study of the Muslim commu-
nities of the country, but the number of specialists in this field is still relatively 
modest. There are also individuals working at various think tanks or institu-
tions and are considered by the public to be specialists in Islam (Kovalskaya 
2017). Some of them have clearly indicated preferences for certain organiza-
tions within the Russian umma—or have even displayed political ambitions. 
Of course, these matters influence their interpretations of Islam. One of the 
best-known examples of such an expert is Roman Silantyev, who has also been 
a member of the prestigious Inter-religious Council of Russia and works in the 
Department of External Affairs at the Moscow Patriarchate. In his writings, 
Silantyev expresses his sympathies for the TsDUM, which can be considered 
more compliant, where the demands of the ROC are concerned. Moreover, 
Silantyev does not hesitate to make accusations of extremism and radicalism 
against the TsDUM’s main rival, the DUMRF (on Silantyev, see Kovalskaya 2017: 
143–146). According to Roland Dannreuther (2010: 18), Silantyev represents the 
not-so-rare tendency of Islam scholars in Russia to “entrench, rather than to 
problematise the dualistic bifurcation between foreign radicalism and mod-
erate traditional Russian Islam” and to “view political Islam as primarily an 
ideological threat and something that needs to be eliminated rather than con-
tained.” As a consequence, the titles of ‘expert’ or ‘scholar’ of Islam can be con-
sidered somewhat dubious in the Russian context. Indeed, some of the work of 
experts like Silantyev can be thought of as bordering on Islamophobia.
Scholarly discussions about religious radicalism have gained special impor-
tance in Russia, where the authorities have tightened up procedures regard-
ing religious ‘extremism’ significantly in recent years. Now, suspicions about 
extremist activity can be fatal to religious organizations. The first anti-extremist 
law was implemented in 2002 and, since then, several new statutes have been 
introduced. From the outset, however, these anti-extremist laws have been 
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criticised for their vague wording, which allows a wide range of activities to 
be labeled ‘extremist’ and prohibited. Where religiosity is concerned, one of 
the most problematic aspects is the ban on preaching ‘religious superiority’. 
Not surprisingly, this means that religious publications account for a very large 
proportion of the list of banned literature in Russia (Ledovskikh 2013; Fagan 
2013: 158–70).
The labeling of a religious organization as a ‘sect’ in the media often has tan-
gible consequences for the organization in question. Geraldine Fagan draws a 
parallel between the Soviet-time media campaigns against some enemies that 
led to administrative measures against them and the current branding of reli-
gious communities as sects. She suggests that some of these media campaigns 
are ‘ordered’ by local authorities or representatives of the ROC (Fagan 2013: 
99–100). Vladimir Lukin, who served as the Human Rights Commissioner of 
Russia from 2004 to 2014, has commented that the policy for passing verdicts 
of extremism often involves the “misguided personal opinions of experts, who 
have no training in the study of religion, who are not basing their arguments 
on the scholarly literature of the study of religion, but on the accusatory ‘secto-
logical’ directories. In these experts’ statements about the activity of religious 
communities, the accusations of activity that is allegedly harmful to the moral, 
mental and physical health of their members and other citizens, are often 
unfounded and do not prove that these communities would have committed 
such offenses” (Smirnov 2008; see also Shterin & Dubrovsky 2019).
This article does not seek to provide evidence regarding a link between 
media accusations of sectarianism and court verdicts of extremism, although 
such links certainly do appear in the published literature. However, an exami-
nation of the wide and indiscriminate usage of the term ‘sect’ in public dis-
cussions reveals that it is often utilised as a derogatory label through which 
certain forms of religiosity are discredited, rather than as a concept based on 
any scholarly understanding of the term. Next, I will discuss four very different 
organizations that are often referred to in the Russian media as sects.
4 The Wahhābists, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Nurdzhular, and NORM
4.1 The Wahhābists
Geraldine Fagan argues that in the internal quarrels within the Russian 
umma, Wahhābism plays the same role as the ‘totalitarian sect’ does in pub-
lic debates (Fagan 2013: 162). In Russia, the usage of the term ‘Wahhābism’ 
is broad, to say the least; it tends to be used, according to Alfrid K. Bustanov 
and Michael Kemper, to refer to “all Salafi trends in Islam, which are critical 
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of the theological, legal and Ṣūfi ‘traditional’ schools and brotherhoods in the 
country, and which are believed to have been ‘imported’ from the Arab world, 
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey” (Bustanov and Kemper 2013: 809).
In 1999, under an initiative driven by the local Muftiate, Wahhābism was 
banned in the Dagestan Republic of the Russian Federation. Similar laws were 
soon introduced in other southern republics, including Chechnya. There were 
also attempts to widen the ban to cover the whole Russian Federation. Scholar 
Aleksei Malashenko (2007, 34–5) recollects that some “experts from Moscow,” 
including Malashenko himself, managed to convince the ruling elite that the 
ban would be senseless. It should be noted that, while President Putin (who 
probably did not wish to complicate foreign relations with Saudi Arabia) rec-
ommended that the word ‘Wahhābism’ should not be used as a synonym for 
radical or terrorist Islam back in 2006, its usage as such still continues in the 
media and at lower levels of the Russian Government (Fagan 2013: 161).
When I searched the media database Integrum for word combinations like 
‘sect Hizb [ut-Tahrir]’, ‘sect Nurdzhular’, and ‘sect NORM’, the largest number of 
hits came from the combination ‘sect Wahhābism’. For example, an article in 
the newspaper Izvestiya, discussing politics in Saudi Arabia, provides its readers 
with a small amount of background information, which begins: “Wahhābism 
itself (which the other Muslims consider as a sect and its followers as heretics) 
was founded in the eighteenth century” (Yusin 2003). However, the number 
of hits for the word combination decreases over the ten-year period for which 
I performed the search. Correspondingly, in that time, a new topic ‘sect ISIS’, 
has begun to appear more frequently.
4.2 Hizb ut-Tahrir
A decision by the Highest Court of the Russian Federation in 2003 banned Hizb 
ut-Tahrir on the grounds of it being a terrorist organization aiming to elimi-
nate non-Islamic governments, including those in Russia and the CIS coun-
tries.3 The director of the human rights and analytical center SOVA, Alexander 
Verkhovskii (2006), argues that although there were good grounds to ban Hizb 
ut-Tahrir for being extremist—including its incitement of religious and ethnic 
hatred, and its propagation of anti-Semitism in particular—the terrorism ver-
dict was unsubstantiated. He reminds us that the organization does not call 
3 Federal’nyi zakon “O Bor’be s terrorizmom,” No. 130-FZ, 25 July 1998. The verdict. Reshenie 
Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 14 Fevralya 2003 g. No. GKLI 03–116, Natsionanal’nyi antiterroris-
ticheskii Komitet, https://web.archive.org/web/20160108040711/http://nac.gov.ru/content/ 
3934.html.
466 Aitamurto
for terrorist action and that none of its members have been found guilty of 
inciting terrorism in Russia.
After the verdict, the human rights organization Memorial requested an 
analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s publications4 by the Head of the Spiritual Board 
of Muslims of Asiatic Russia, Nafigulla Ashirov. He concluded that the pub-
lications contained no calls for violence or the violent overthrow of the legal 
regime. After the statement was published on Memorial’s website, the organi-
zation received a request from Moscow city prosecution to remove the mate-
rial as it was potentially extremist. After a short legal battle, Memorial was 
forced to comply in 2005 (Fagan 2013: 157).
Human rights organizations have reported that questionable arrests and 
convictions have been made on the basis of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(Fagan 2013: 157). Given that the Hizb ut-Tahrir has been denounced as a terror-
ist organization, its pleas for fair treatment are easy to disregard. In 2011, dem-
onstrations were held against the mass arrest of Muslim activists in Tatarstan. 
The fact that members and symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir were seen at these 
demonstrations led some authorities and Russian Islam specialists to brand 
the events radicals’ attempts to achieve their own extremist goals, backed by 
“naïve human rights activists” (Suleimanov 2012).
Labeling Hizb ut-Tahrir as a sect is an integral part of the public campaigns 
mounted against it. The newspaper Moskovskii Komsomolets quotes the head 
of the DUMRT, Ravil Gainutdin: “For some, it may come as news but, neverthe-
less, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a typical sect. Namely a sect in which all the concepts 
of traditional Islam and the Qurʾān are presented in a distorted form” (“Rab 
Lampy” 2005). The same rhetoric can be found on some Islamic websites, espe-
cially those that are accused of being cover-up projects for anti-Islamic actors. 
For example, on 10 February 2014, Islam Today published the article “Hizb ut-
Tahrir: Islamic Party or a Misguided Sect?” which presented features like “reli-
gious marketing” and “aggressive missionary work and psychological pressure” 
as typical characteristics of a sect—and of Hizb ut-Tahrir in particular.
After the annexation of Crimea, the rights of the Crimean Tatars became an 
issue of concern. In comparison with Russia, religious politics in Ukraine are 
less prescribed. Although Russia promised to grant the Tatars the same privi-
leges as other inhabitants of the area, soon after the annexation, raids began 
on mosques, madrasas, and Muslim homes. Several high-profile Islamic lead-
ers have been forcibly deported or have left Russia of their own accord. The 
current leader of the Crimean Muftiate, Emirali Ablaev has remained silent 
4 These five publications were selected because they have often been referred to in Russian 
court cases as evidence of the extremism of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
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about the oppression of Tatar people and religious activists in the peninsula. 
Instead, he has appealed to Russian authorities in his rivalry with other Islamic 
actors and organizations, accusing these of extremism and sectarianism. These 
accusations are used both as weapons in internal struggles within Crimean 
Muslim community and to show loyalty to Kremlin by vilifying Ukraine. As 
early as 2012, Ablaev, who was already then known of his pro-Russian stance, 
accused the Ukrainian authorities of oppressing the Crimean Tatars: “At the 
same time  … we can see within the Crimean procurator and the Ukrainian 
Secret Service a complete indifference toward the activity of radical, extremist-
terrorist sects: ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’, Wahhābites, [members of] Al-Ahbash, takfirists 
and others. Not one of the appeals of the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of 
Crimea on banning these sectarian organizations have been heard” (Ivzhenko 
2012). It is questionable, how widely Ablaev’s concerns were shared among 
Crimean Tatars in 2012. However, it is clear that the Russian regime has unde-
niably been more efficient in blocking extremism and the activity of ‘sects’, but 
also religious freedom than Ukraine.
4.3 Nurdzhular
In May 2007, the Moscow Koptevo District Court banned as extremist fourteen 
parts of the Russian translation of the Rislae-I Nur by Said Nursi (1876–1960). 
The verdict was based on an expert’s statement, in which it was explained 
that the publication attempted “to influence the psyche of the reader sub-
consciously, using mechanisms of religious belief, i.e. the formation of con-
scious values and convictions with an irrational basis” (quoted in Fagan 2013: 
161). The ban was criticised both in Russia and abroad. Indeed, the court has 
refused to take into account several statements by Russian scholars of religion 
and Muslim organizations. In the years that followed, many more of Nursi’s 
publications were banned. In April 2008, the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation banned the Nurdzhular organization for being extremist. Again, 
the basis for this accusation was widely condemned.
Human rights organizations and Muslim activists have criticised the ban, 
claiming that there is no evidence of the existence of the Nurdzhular organiza-
tion in Russia. Those arrested for being members of Nurdzhular, it is claimed, 
have been detained simply for reading Nursi’s works (Ponomarev 2012; 
Smirnov 2008). Many of these people have denied the accusation, pointing out 
the absurdity of concluding that reading certain publications is the same as 
belonging to an organization run by their author (Fagan 2013: 159–61). However, 
the measures taken against Nurdzhular have met with the approval of experts 
known to support action against Islamic activism in Russia. Silantyev (2007: 
439), for example, suggests that the ban is valid by making the erroneous claim 
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that both Nurdzhular and Nursi’s publications are also banned in Turkey for 
their extremist tendencies. Reporting on such matters by seemingly neutral 
news outlets thus creates an image of the prevalence of radical Islamic activity 
in Russia.
In its denunciation by Muslim leaders and human rights organizations in 
the media, Nurdzhular is often referred to as an extremist sect. In the Izvestiya 
article “Sectarians Spied Russia,” Nurdzhular is accused of spreading pan-
Turkish ideas in Russia and raising “a generation in Turkic areas in Russia, loyal 
to Turkey.” The same article claims that Nurdzhular is a cover organization for 
the CIA’s operations in Russia (Bulavin 2011). Moreover, a connection to ter-
rorism has been made in the official newspaper of the Russian Government, 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (25 April 2007), which stated that “according to the interna-
tional intelligence, the members of Nurdzhular are connected to the terrorist 
organization the Grey Wolfs Bozkurtlar,” as well as claiming that Nurdzhular 
books promote the idea of “overthrowing the secular order and replacing it 
with shariat [sharīʿa].”
4.4 NORM
The National Organization of Russian Muslims (Natsional’naya Organizatsiya 
Russkikh Musul’man, or NORM) was founded in 2004 as an organization aiming 
to represent and defend the rights of ethnic Russian Muslims. NORM argues 
that ethnic Russian Muslims should not reject their national traditions and 
roots upon conversion to Islam. According to Renat Bekkin, the godfather of 
NORM was Geydar Dzhemal, who, in Soviet times, gathered a group of left-wing 
and conservative revolutionary intellectuals around him. Dzhemal, whose 
mother was Russian and father was Azerbaijanian, was a Shīʿite; remarkably, 
NORM members include both Sunnīs and Shīʿites.
From the outset, one of the group’s leading ideologists (who would also 
become its leader) was Vadim Sidorov (Kharun ar-Rusi), who, in addition 
to being a student of Dzhemal, had a background in Russian ultra-rightist 
nationalist circles, as did many of the founding members of the organization. 
Sidorov, along with many other prominent figures within the organization, has 
flirted with Fascism and has openly admitted his interest in the ideas of tra-
ditionalists like Julius Evola and René Guénon. A year after the foundation of 
NORM, Shīʿite members were expelled from the group and Sidorov fell out with 
Dzhemal, criticizing his internationalist tendencies.
Initially, both Sidorov and NORM seemed to subscribe to Salafism. Inspired 
by its contact with the Murabitun World Movement, however, in 2007, NORM 
announced that it bases its activities on the Maliki madhhab and Ṣūfism, 
although it does accept members from other madhhabs (Bekkin 2012: 380–7). 
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Only a small percentage of ethnically Russian Muslims belong to NORM. This 
is either because they do not subscribe to the organization’s ideas or because 
they have never heard about it. After expelling the Shīʿites, the organization 
gained some new prominent members, such as Ali Polosin; when NORM begun 
to take a more critical stand against the state, however, they left. NORM was 
among the few Muslim groups that openly supported the anti-Putin demon-
strations in 2011 and 2012, as well as the Ukrainian Maidan. Sidorov claims that 
before these events, NORM tried to distance itself from active involvement in 
opposing the Government, but the oppression of Muslims (and ethnic Russian 
Muslims in particular) compelled it to abandon its loyalism (“Znachimoe 
Ottsustvie” 2015).
Oppressive measures against NORM began in St Petersburg in 2013, when 
several of its members were arrested. The informal leader of the group, Maksim 
Baidak (Salman Sever), was accused of “justifying terrorism.” The charges were 
based on a blog written by Baidak two years earlier, in which he expressed 
some understanding of the motives of the Primorskie Partizany,5 a criminal 
group which had attacked and killed several police officers in 2010. Arrests 
made for the purpose of questioning spread to other cities as well so that, by 
the end of 2013, the majority of NORM leaders had fled Russia.
NORM has condemned the annexation of Crimea and, in 2014, it founded 
a new organization, Slavyano-Islamskaya Liga (the Slavic-Islamic League), 
together with some groups representing ethnic Ukrainian Muslims. Sidorov 
claims that Russian special services continue to monitor and intimidate people 
whom they suspect of being connected to NORM. It is because of these threats, 
Sidorov argues, that the organization has become more closed since the late 
2000s. After leaving Russia, leading NORM figures advised all the group’s mem-
bers and friends in Russia to disassociate themselves publicly from the organi-
zation (Sila 2015).
NORM has been presented as a sect both in media reports and by rival Muslim 
organizations. The latter tend to base their claims on the doctrinal nature of 
NORM. The organization Darul’-Fikr, which also includes some ethnic Russian 
Muslims, has labeled both the Murabitun World Movement and NORM “mis-
guided sects.” They have also accused them of being overly nationalistic and 
blindly following Western culture, including Western philosophy and dis-
course, which they see as unnecessary or even harmful for Muslims (“Russkie 
5 The Primorskie Partizany had been mistreated by police officers and the case aroused much 
discussion about police brutality in Russia. Originally, the Primorskie Partizany had no con-
nection with Islam; some of the members have been reported to have converted to Islam, 
however, during their time in prison.
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musul’mane” 2010; Bekkin 2012: 385–387). In 2007, NORM published a report in 
response to its accusations of being a sect. Surprisingly, NORM chose to defend 
the word ‘sect’ by drawing on the ḥadīth, in which, NORM stated, Muḥammad 
predicted that Islam would be divided into 73 sects. NORM argued, therefore, 
that all Muslims belong to some sort of ‘sect’. Notably, NORM does draw a dis-
tinction here between the ‘sect’ and the ‘misguided sect’, rejecting the second 
label (Ar-Rusi 2007).
In the media, accusations of sectarianism made against NORM are usu-
ally linked to suspicions about Russian Muslims in general. As in the case of 
Wahhābism, the threat posed by radical ethnic Russian Muslims seems to be 
exaggerated in the press. For example, in an interview with Komsomol’skaya 
Pravda on 6 June 2015, Silantyev argued that if a Slav converted to Islam, there 
was a 90 percent chance that he or she would end up in a ‘radical sect’; he 
also referenced both Wahhābism and NORM. In another interview, he com-
mented on the role of ethnic Russian Muslims in terrorist activity: “If, earlier, 
the most criminal sect in our [country] was considered to be the Satanists, 
which immediately fell into the special category, nowadays, it can be said that 
radical [ethnic] Russian Muslims have surpassed them in their inclination 
towards criminality (kriminogennost)” (Svetlova 2011). Some reports describ-
ing NORM as a sect refer to a change in the organization’s behavior at the end 
of the 2000s. In a 2009 article about ethnic Russian Muslims in the popular 
newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, it was argued that the adoption of the Maliki 
madhhab and the election of Sidorov as leader led NORM to “become alien for 
Russians and for Russian Muslims and turned [it] into a minute pro-Nazi sect” 
(Mal’tsev 2009).
5 The Faizrakhmanisty
5.1 Scholars on the Faizrakhmanisty
Until recently, there was little scholarly literature on the Faizrakhmanisty. Of 
the few publications on this topic, some fall more into the category of theo-
logical contentions, rather than scholarly analyses. The two publications on 
the group that are cited most often are ‘Unofficial Islam in Tatarstan’ (2003)6 
and ‘Anti-Islamic Tendencies’ (2006) by the scholar and Islamic leader Valiulla 
Yakupov. Yakupov knew the organization’s leader, Faizrakhman Sattarov, very 
well. Despite his thorough acquaintance with the Islamic tendencies within 
6 Interestingly, in this booklet, Yakupov seems to use the terms “unofficial Islam,” “non-
traditional Islam,” and “sect” interchangeably.
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Tatarstan and his scholarly competence, Yakupov’s writings on Islam (in par-
ticular, his non-official Islamic tendencies) are indicative of his position as a 
theologian and official in the DUMRT. For example, in his booklet Anti-Islam: 
About the Sectarian Nature of Wahhābī Reformers (2006), he maintains that 
there cannot be any real Islam outside the four (Sunnī) madhāhib. According 
to Yakupov, Wahhābism was created by the British special services in order 
to cause discordance among Muslims (2006: 5–9). Yakupov also criticises 
Nurdzhular and reminds his readers that “during the cold war [Said Nursi] did 
much to discredit our country, factually supporting NATO’s plans against the 
USSR” (2006: 38).
After the Faizrakhmanisty’s rise into public consciousness in 2012, another 
source became widely cited: an online article entitled “Faizrakhmanisty: A 
Sect of Islamic Origin in Tatarstan in the 21st century” and written by a highly 
controversial scholar of Islam, Rais Suleimanov (2011) whose claims about 
the prevalence of radical Islam have been contested by scholars and Muslims 
alike.7 According to Suleimanov, the Faizrakhmanisty represent a “salient 
example of a totalitarian sect with Islamic origins” (2011). The rector of the 
Islamic University in Kazan, Rafik Mukhametshin, has also written about 
the Faizrakhmanisty. Unlike Yakupov (2003) and Suleimanov (2011), who 
both describe the Faizrakhmanisty in terms of the concept of the ‘totalitar-
ian sect’, Mukhametshin does not use even the word ‘sect’; rather, he refers 
to the Faizrakhmanisty as a ‘group’ or ‘movement’. In an interview after the 
raid on the Faizrakhmanisty compound, Mukhametshin explained that, in his 
view, the Faizrakhmanisty could not be considered an Islamic sect because the 
group mixes together various Islamic traditions and elements, and also lacks a 
coherent religious doctrine (Ivanov 2012). The most recent studies of Sattarov 
and Faizrakhmanisty has been conducted by Renat Bekkin (2018, 2020), who 
bases his writings in both diligent study of archives and fieldwork material.
5.2 Faizrakhman Sattarov and His Teachings
Faizrakhman Sattarov was born in Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan, in 1929. 
After compulsory service in the Soviet Army, he had various odd jobs, including 
one as a janitor. In 1955, he entered the Mir-I’Arab Islamic Madrasa at Bukhara 
and the Baraq-Khan Madrasa in Tashkent (in the Soviet Union, these were the 
7 For example, an eminent Russian scholar of nationalism, Valerii Tishkov, called a report 
about the threat of ethno-religious conflicts and radical Islam in Povolz’e, published by 
the Russian Institute for Strategic Research, a provocation. At: http://golosislama.ru/news 
.php?id=17631. Suleimanov is often argued to have close contact with the Russian security 
services (see Dzutsati 2014).
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only two institutions which provided higher Islamic learning (Kemper, Motika 
and Reichmuth 2010: 11). At Tashkent, where Sattarov studied between 1955 
and 1964, he was the first Tatar student. After working in a mosque in Kazan, 
Sattarov was invited by Shamir Khiyaledinov, the leader of the Dukhovnoe 
Upravlenie Musul’man Evropeiskoi Chasti SSSR i Sibiri (DUMECSS), to work at 
his organization. Sattarov’s star in the organization began to rise and he was 
sent to work in mosques in Leningrad, Rostov-on-Donu, and Ufa (Yakupov 
2003; Bekkin 2018).
At the beginning of the 1980s, Sattarov began to gather a group of followers 
and to develop his teachings. According to Yakupov (2003), his alienation from 
the official DUMECSS was his response to being passed over in the DUMECSS 
leadership election in 1980, despite being one of the most suitable applicants 
for the post, in terms of his mastery of the Islamic tradition. Sattarov himself 
claimed that, at that time, he had begun to regret cooperating with the Soviet 
authorities: “The authorities of the state security organizations took me to 
Islamic countries, where I had to say that ‘I do not believe the American slander 
that believers are harassed in the USSR. We have a total freedom of religion!’ 
That is how I came to be a servant of Satan, a traitor. And when I understood 
this, I regretted it and began to travel to cities and to preach” (Varsegov 2008). 
Due to his activities, Sattarov was expelled from the DUMECSS and his follow-
ers thus decreased in number (Yakupov 2003).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Sattarov’s scholarship 
began to be appreciated and the number of people wishing to learn from him 
grew once more. Paradoxically, many of the future Islamic leaders of Tatarstan, 
such as Valiulla Yakupov and Ildus Faizov, who later condemned Sattarov, 
were students of his. Rafik Mukhametshin confirms that “many people came 
to Faizrakhman-khazrat to learn, because he was educated. In the 1980s, it 
was impossible to find anyone more educated” (Zavalishina 2013). Sattarov 
published his religious views in a small publication entitled Iman tamynlary 
(which translates from the Tatar language as ‘The Roots of the Faith’).8
In 1992, Sattarov opened a small madrasa in Naberezhnye Chelny, the sec-
ond largest city in Tatarstan, and also created communities in Ufa and Kazan. 
In 1996, he settled in Kazan on 700 square meters of land, which he called dār 
al-Islām or ‘the house of Allāh’ (gosudarstvo Allakha). This compound, housed 
in a three-story building, became home to Sattarov and his followers. He was 
8 Interestingly, none of the scholars who are discussed in this article refer to this publica-
tion, which was Sattarov’s only publication. Likewise, it is not available in either the Russian 
National Library or the State Library, which, between them, should be in possession of every-
thing published in Russia.
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able to register the land officially as a residence for his community and he also 
obtained land for the construction of a mosque, although the latter was never 
realised. In the 1990s, then, the community was thriving, and functioned in 
a very democratic manner. According to Yakupov (2003), however a schism 
appeared in the community when one of its students begun to gain too much 
influence. When he was expelled from the community, a substantial number 
of people deserted Sattarov.
At the beginning of the 2000s, the community began to become more iso-
lated and to take a more critical stance in relation to the rest of society. The 
Faizrakhmanisty refused to pay taxes or utility charges, so their water, gas, elec-
tricity, and telephone were disconnected by the authorities. The organization’s 
children were kept out of public schools and the members refused to receive 
any medical treatment. In fact, the community went as far as denying the valid-
ity of the Russian state and its laws; the Faizrakhmanisty created their own 
passports and flag. As the 2000s went on, however, the authorities began to 
challenge the organization’s activities more and more. Members were banned 
from a local marketplace where they sold food products, a move which was 
attributed to their inability to compromise with officials. Equally problematic 
was the fact that, given that official Islamic organizations refused to acknowl-
edge the Faizrakhmanisty as Muslims, the organization’s deceased could not 
be buried at Islamic burial grounds. Nonetheless, Sattarov was not afraid of 
presenting his community as being distinct from official Islam in Tatarstan, 
which left it vulnerable to accusations of sectarianism (Bekkin 2020).
The Faizrakhmanisty consider all other Muslims heretics and therefore do 
not allow any outsiders into their mosques. Nevertheless, the community has 
grown slowly; according to the local newspaper Vechernyaya Kazan, in 2002, 
twenty-two people lived in the compound but by 2012, the number of the 
followers had increased to nearly seventy (Yudkevich 2012). Whereas in the 
1980s, the community attracted many middle-class people, several reporters 
argue that by the 2000s, most of Sattarov’s followers were the uneducated and 
underprivileged. Many of Sattarov’s critics claim that money was one of his 
main motives for creating the community, suggesting that some of his support-
ers were pursued for their wealth. However, Sattarov can hardly be accused of 
seeking a lavish lifestyle, given that he shares the ascetic life of his followers. 
Moreover, some interviews with community members have indicated that at 
least some of these people came to the community in order to be saved from 
poverty and hunger (Varsegov 2008). By the end of 2000s, Sattarov’s Parkinson’s 
Disease compelled him to stay in bed and made him unable to continue teach-
ing and preaching. The leadership of the community was entrusted to one of 
his followers, Gumer Ganiev, who gained the title of emir (Arab. amīr).
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It should be noted that the term ‘Faizrakhmanisty’ has been created by 
outsiders as a label for the organization. Members of the community called 
themselves Mu’mins or simply ‘true Muslims’. Sattarov refers to the concept of 
seventy-three branches of Islam, of which only one is the true one. He claims 
that the end of the world is soon to come and the only ones who will be saved 
are his followers. He has stated that he receives direct messages from Allāh 
in his sleep and calls himself a messenger of God. He does not claim to be 
unique in this respect, however; he suggests that there have been, and will be, 
other messengers (including women), all of whom will suffer for their faith. 
In 1976, Sattarov claimed to have received the title narsulla (‘Allāh’s helper’) 
from God. In 1993, he also claimed the title of rasulalla (‘messenger of God’). 
Critics such as Valiulla Yakupov argue that this change amounts to appropria-
tion of the title of the Prophet, as rasulalla can be interpreted as having such a 
meaning.9 Sattarov has always denied considering himself to be a prophet, 
however. Indeed, in an interview with the newspaper NG-Religii, Sattarov 
is careful not to break one of the five commands of Islam by disputing that 
Muḥammad was the last prophet. He explains that while a prophet receives 
instruction directly from Allāh, a messenger’s task is to bring more people to 
faith (Aisin 2007). Apparently, the members of the community also under-
stood this crucial difference; after being raided by the security forces, one 
member stated: “do not call us sectarians. The messenger is not a prophet, 
just a messenger. We are not breaking [any laws of] Islam” (Allenovaya 2012). 
Nevertheless, the Faizrakhmanisty had several ritual practices and hold many 
beliefs that appear very unorthodox. For instance, according to Sattarov, the 
true Kaʿba is located on the premises of his community and all of its members, 
therefore, performing ḥajj daily (Demidova 2009).
For the Faizrakhmanisty, the only authority is the Qurʾān. They deny the 
validity of various madhhabs and any forms of national Islam, including 
Tatarism. However, there are distinct nationalist tendencies in Sattarov’s teach-
ings, including an emphasis on the ‘golden age’ of the earliest Tatar state, Volga 
Bulgaria (c. 700–1238 CE). Sattarov criticises the political and religious elite of 
Tatarstan for cooperating with Russia—for “shaking their hands.” Nevertheless, 
in another interview, he states that he has nothing against Russians, as long 
as they stay in their own areas (Varsegov 2008). During the 2000s, Sattarov’s 
attitude toward the Russian state turned more hostile. In an interview in 1998, 
Sattarov stated that he prefers the state to remain secular, not religious and 
9 According to Il’shad Nurmiev’s (2012: 136) Dictionary of Islamic Terms (in Russian), (ar)
rasulla(‘) means “the Prophet” and rasulullakh means “messenger of God.” The dictionary is 
approved by the Commission of the DUMRF.
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that “citizens should remain loyal and […] participation in politics is permissi-
ble” (Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003: 132). A few years later, the community 
began to disassociate itself from the state and the surrounding society, which is 
when Sattarov denied the legitimacy of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, 
the Faizrakhmanisty have never expressed any inclination toward revolution-
ary activity. In the 2000s, the sect ended proselytism in outside society and 
even Suleimanov (2011) admits that “though not acknowledging the state, they 
have a loyal attitude towards it. Sattarov does not call his followers to engage 
in any kind of war.”
5.3 The Raid of August 2011
Religious control of unofficial Islam tightened up in Tatarstan throughout the 
2000s (see International Federation for Human Rights 2009). However, even 
stricter measures followed the terrorist actions that took place on 19 July 2012: 
the murder of Valiulla Yakupov, the deputy to the Mufti of Tatarstan, and the 
assault on the chief Mufti, Ildus Faizov. Immediately after the attacks, the 
police and special forces began a campaign against Islamic terrorism, within 
which they made raids on various Islamic organizations, confiscated literature 
and computers, and arrested up to 600 people (Mukhetdinov and Khabutdinov 
2012: 215–245).
It was as part of this anti-terrorist campaign and the search for the mur-
derers of Yakupov that the raid on the premises of the Faizrakhmanisty took 
place on 1 August 2012. According to the police, they “received information” 
that guns might be stored at the compound. As expected, no weapons were 
found in the raid; instead, the authorities concluded that the premises were 
unsuitable for habitation and twenty-seven children were taken to a hospi-
tal, where they were found to be healthy and returned to their parents. The 
police confiscated approximately 1,000 books, including some manuscripts by 
Sattarov, in order to check them for signs of extremist activity. At first, Sattarov 
was prosecuted for arbitrariness (samoupravstvo),10 but this was later changed 
to a charge of extremism. Once more, the children were taken from their par-
ents, who were told that they would lose their parental rights unless they left 
the compound and allowed the children to go public schools and have medical 
10  Under the Russian criminal code, this is defined as “the unauthorized commission of 
actions contrary to the order presented by a law or any other normative legal act, actions 
whose lawfulness is contested by an organization or individual, if such actions have 
inflicted substantial harm.” See http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/PartII/SectionX/
Chapter32.html.
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treatment. Most of the parents submitted to these demands and only around 
fifteen members stayed at the compound.
On 25 February 2013, the court of the Sovetskii district of Kazan declared 
the Faizrakhmanisty an extremist group. The verdict was based mainly on 
the rights of the citizens and children, which were argued to have been vio-
lated due to, for example, being forced to live in isolation, not being allowed 
to receive medical treatment, and being coerced into religious group. The 
verdict also referred to the “breaking up of families” on the basis of religious 
conviction. One of the few defenders of the community was the human rights 
organization SOVA Center, which stated: “Despite the fact that the members of 
the community led an isolated way of life and the theology of the community 
differed from the traditional Islam, we do not see any grounds for declaring 
the community extremist and we consider the banning of its activity lawless” 
(“Obshchina faizrakhmanistov” 2014).
In August 2013, all Sattarov’s manuscripts, which were confiscated during the 
raid, were declared extremist and added to the federal list of banned materials. 
The manuscript collection contained a variety of materials: mostly handwrit-
ten books in the Tatar language but also leaflets, single papers, and a personal 
letter. The official list gives very cursory information about the material: “No. 61. 
Grey notebook with writing in Russian and Arabic. No. 77. Papers in format A4, 
joined with a metal clip” (Zaochnoe 2013a). As is customary in such cases, the 
verdict was based on the testimony of the experts, who had assessed the mate-
rial from the viewpoints of linguistics, psychology, and religious studies. These 
unnamed experts (their names were not included in the proceedings) pro-
nounced that the material was “targeted at transforming the personality of the 
reader, to change his worldview, values, conviction, and the manners of behav-
ior. Its effects can be isolation from the surrounding world, the destruction of 
an individual’s spiritual, and physiological harmony, [causing] an individual 
to oppose social structures and norms which have established themselves in 
the society” (Zaochnoe 2013a). The material was also found to create negative 
opinions of other religions and promote aggressive behavior toward followers 
of different faiths. Moreover, the contents of the literature were declared “not 
to correspond the classic concepts of Islam” (Zaochnoe 2013a).
After the raid, some Faizrakhmanisty members remained at the com-
pound. In November 2013, however, the Sovetskii district court ruled that the 
Faizrakhmanisty, including the property owners, had lost their right to live 
in the compound. The verdict stated that: “The religious group represents an 
isolated community, which lives according to its own internal rules and ordi-
nances, which brings clear threat to societal peace. Moreover, [allowing] these 
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citizens to continue living and planning together can create a threat to the 
security of the Russian Federation. Only enforced dissolution of the group 
‘Faizrakhmanisty’ enables us to secure and effectively protect the rights, pre-
scribed by law, and interests of a non-specified group of people” (Zaochnoe 
2013b). In April 2014, the police evicted the last fifteen people from the 
compound.
5.4 Media Coverage of the Case
The story of the raid on the premises of an ‘underground sect’ spread rapidly 
not only through the Russian media, but also internationally, both in print and 
online. The majority of the reports drew a picture of the Faizrakhmanisty as 
a dangerous sect. Often, this was achieved in subtle ways—for example, by 
comparing the Faizrakhmanisty with the Christian sect Penzenskie zatvorniki, 
whose members barricaded themselves underground in 2007 and threatened 
to burn themselves as they were waiting for the end of the world. Despite the 
fact that the Faizrakhmanisty had no suicidal inclinations and lived in a house, 
parallels between the two were drawn (Sokolov 2012). It seems improbable 
that the police ever seriously suspected that the Faizrakhmanisty had anything 
to do with terrorism; the statement that the sect’s whereabouts was discovered 
during the investigation into the murder of Yakupov, however, insinuates just 
that. Moreover, in some newspapers, it was reported that Yakupov had criti-
cised both the Faizrakhmanisty and Sattarov.
The most negative and exaggerated versions of the events and the commu-
nity seem to have been propagated most efficiently. Outright misinformation 
was repeated in the Russian and international media. The raid was portrayed 
as a dramatic finding; many articles used words to the effect that the police 
had ‘discovered’ a sect. However, the community was well known to local 
people—it had been discussed in Russian newspapers before and members 
of the community had given numerous interviews to the press. Indeed, the 
Faizrakhmanisty have been under surveillance for years. A newspaper article 
from 2007 explains that police waiting outside the compound had stated: “They 
live there quietly and peacefully” (Basilaya 2007). As Rafik Mukhametshin 
admits, “There have always been Faizrakhmanists [here], which was known to 
both the law enforcement and social authorities. But, I think, they were afraid 
to ban them [the Faizrakhmanisty], because it would have caused much con-
troversy. After the [terrorist] events in July, it seems, it was decided to solve this 
problem, as well” (Zavalishina 2013).
Many newspapers stated that Sattarov had deprived members of all contact 
with outside world. However, even though such interactions do seem to have 
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been limited, other reports indicate that a complete ban on contact was never 
in force. For example, in 2007, the newspaper Komsomol’skaya Pravda wrote: 
“as it turned out, the underground-dwellers (zatvorniki) still go outside the 
gates and have been chatting with the police and the neighbors with pleasure” 
(Basilya 2007). In 2008, when journalists from Komsomol’skaya Pravda visited 
the compound, some members of the community told them that they read and 
respected the newspaper (Varsegov 2008).
The state-run media in Russia had an important role in spreading the news 
abroad and in forming the dominant image of the community. Perhaps the 
most dramatic misrepresentation was the claim that many of the children 
had never seen the light of day, which had no basis in fact. As CNN stated on 
10 August, “The state-run newspaper Russia Today said some [children] were 
born underground and have never seen daylight.” An article published in the 
Daily Mail on 8 August 2012 claimed: “A cruel religious sect kept twenty-seven 
children locked away in dark and unheated underground cells—some for a 
decade. The youngsters, aged from one to seventeen, have never seen day-
light and have now been rescued from their living hell in Russia.” Even less 
scandal-seeking, more prestigious media offered a similar story. On 9 August, 
The Guardian wrote: “The digging began about a decade ago, and seventy fol-
lowers soon moved into an eight-level subterranean labyrinth of cramped cells 
with no light, heat or ventilation. Children were born. They too lived in the 
underground cells for many years—until authorities raided the compound last 
week and freed the twenty-seven sons and daughters of the sect.” There were 
some more balanced articles. On 14 August, Mansur Mirovalev reported in The 
Huffington Post: “A brief visit inside the compound, which provided shocking 
headlines around the world when police raided it and seized the children, 
revealed none of the elaborate underground design described by prosecutors. 
Nor does a police video showing rooms inside. The father of a cult member, 
who originally disapproved of his daughter joining the group, said he was 
able to visit freely and has no complaints about how members live or treat 
their children.”
Having analysed twenty-seven Russian and ten Western media reports 
on the raid, I have found that members of the community were interviewed 
in very few cases. Moreover, some of these ‘interviews’ consisted of just one 
quoted sentence.11 The most frequently quoted persons were police represen-
tatives, court officials, and medical professionals. The subject expert quoted 
11  The community did not let reporters on to the compound premises, but members did talk 
with reporters at the gate.
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most often was Rais Suleimanov, who, some Russian sources claimed, had con-
ducted an ‘extensive study’ on the Faizrakhmanisty. In the material examined 
for the present chapter, Suleimanov’s comments appeared in four Russian and 
five Western media reports.
A more skeptical attitude toward the authorities can be found in readers’ 
comments on the internet, especially on Islamic websites and Tatarstan media 
sites. Here, people who knew the community rejected media representations 
of the Faizrakhmanisty as a dangerous or ‘totalitarian’ sect. The skeptics tar-
geted both the authorities and the mainstream media. Some commentators 
noted that the living conditions of the Faizrakhmanisty were not that differ-
ent from the ways in which a substantial proportion of the Russian popula-
tion lived in the countryside. In this way, the conservative religious lifestyle of 
the Faizrakhmanisty was depicted by some as mirroring the reality of Russian 
society. On Radio Azattyck’s website, one reader commented: “What did the 
parents do differently? Didn’t they live like everyone else? Not watching the 
Olympic [Games] on TV, not drinking beer, not smoking, not wearing mini-
skirts and so on?” (Andrukhaeva 2012).
On some Islamic sites in particular, the measures taken by the authorities 
and the representations perpetuated by the media were denounced as being 
examples of Islamophobia existing in Russian society. This can be seen in quo-
tations like: “I still do not understand why they are called sectarians? Because 
they look like Muslims, talk like Muslims and behave like Muslims?” (Alishaev 
2012). On a Tatarstani news portal, a reader’s comment revealed the skepti-
cism toward the authorities’ fight against Islamic terrorism: “Something very 
strange here … As soon as there is a terrorist action, our brave ‘internal [surveil-
lance] authorities’ begin to intimidate this half-crazy Faizrakhmanisty. It gives 
an impression that, as the joke goes, they [special services] are not looking for 
the key where they lost it, but in there, where there is more light” (Kazanskie 
sektanty 2013).
6 Conclusion
An examination of labeling phenomena in the Russian media indicates that the 
term ‘sect’ is used in the construction of images of social problems. Moreover, 
it is chosen specifically to refer to social groups of Islamic dissent that are fig-
ured as posing difficulties within society. As we have seen, it is easy to find links 
between the media label ‘sect’ and legislative measures taken against religious 
organizations such as the Wahhābists, Nurdzhular, and the Faizrakhmanisty. 
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When coupled with the broadening of the category of ‘extremism’ in Russian 
court decisions, accusations of sectarianism by the media and depictions 
of various groups’ activities as suspicious can be devastating to religious 
communities.
In the media, the Faizrakhmanisty have been criticised on various grounds: 
for distorting Islam, practicing religious fundamentalism, violating the rights 
of children, brainwashing people, and exploiting people to satisfy the leader’s 
so-called greed and power hunger. These accusations mirror the characteristics 
of the ‘totalitarian sect’ elaborated typically in Russian discussions from the 
1990s onward. The accusations are not completely unfounded but it is evident 
from an analysis of media reports that the Faizrakhmanisty have been con-
structed as a typical ‘totalitarian sect’ through selective reporting. This is symp-
tomatic, in part, of the fact that the person referred to most often as a scholar 
of the topic, Rais Suleimanov, has clear biases, preferences, and political ambi-
tions, which can be detected in his statements about the Faizrakhmanisty. It 
can be concluded that a lack of knowledge about Islam led to many Russian 
and Western media outlets simply repeating the most dramatic claims that 
were made about the case by Suleimanov and others, even though they 
were inaccurate.
The case of the Faizrakhmanisty reflects currents in the flow of ideas not 
just in Russia, but in many Western countries, as well. The increasing ten-
dency toward discussing Islamic minorities within the framework of security 
invites authorities to have dismissive attitudes regarding non-traditional reli-
gions and newer communities. Ironically, this securitization creates pressure 
for uniformity within Muslim organizations, leading to the rejection of reli-
gious pluralism and constraints on the freedom of religion. It is thus that, in 
Russia, depictions of the Faizrakhmanisty, arguments about ‘totalitarian sects’, 
and Islamic extremism have been elided, blurring the definitions of and links 
between all three.
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Chapter 21
Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a 
Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
Emin Poljarevic
1 Introduction
The notion of takfīr (lit. excommunication) was part of pre-modern heresiology 
that revolved around a range of conceptualisations of kufr (rejection of belief) 
and the conditions of belonging to a Muslim community (Al-Shahrastani 
1923).1 This issue of religious and sectarian belonging was directly connected 
to belonging to a Muslim polity. Takfīr, therefore, entailed pronouncing judg-
ment on Muslims for having exited a community of Muslims either through 
what was understood to be their ‘erroneous’ beliefs and/or actions. Such judg-
ments have often had direct political consequences (Khalidi 2005). Those 
who voluntarily had left Islam and, consequently, left a specific Muslim com-
munity, have traditionally been re-classified as murtaddīn (apostates) and/or 
kuffār (non-believers, sing. kāfir) (Chaliand and Blin 2007). For example, in his 
Incoherence of the Incoherence, the seminal philosopher and jurist Ibn Rushd 
(d. 1198) opined that “heretics,” namely, those who violate the agreed upon 
principles of the divine law are apostates, ought to be killed (Khalidi 2005: 167). 
In the classical period of Islam, the issue of excommunication has often been a 
complex legal discussion among Islamic scholars and philosophers.
The earliest systematic form of such theologically based excommuni-
cation appeared in the 660s, when a zealous militant opposition group of 
proto-Khawārij (lit. ‘those who go out’) or Khārijites, called upon Muslims to 
reject and rebel against ʿAlī’s political authority. The series of events within 
which later Khārijite theology started to crystalize is oftentimes described 
1 Funding for the research for this chapter was provided by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond 
[NHS14–1701:1] through the project “Resolving Jihadist Conflicts? Religion, Civil War and 
Prospects for Peace,” led by Isak Svensson, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala 
University. The author wishes to thank all those who have reviewed early drafts of this chap-
ter. A number of people have commented and improved the quality of the text, especially 
Jay Willoughby, Carole Cusack, Muhammad Afzal Upal, and two anonymous reviewers. The 
usual disclaimers apply.
486 Poljarevic
as the first fitna (lit. ordeal). The large-scale civil war between ʿAlī (by Sunnīs 
regarded as the fourth caliph, d. 661) and Muʿāwiya (the governor of Damascus, 
r. 639–680)2 enabled the emergence of a range of more of less theologically 
zealous groups, of whom the most politically significant were the Khawārij. 
During an arbitration attempt, a group within the ʿAlī’s encampment rejected 
any thought of negotiation based on several Qurʾānic passages claiming that 
only God, the true Sovereign, could arbitrate between a legitimate political 
authority (ʿAlī) and the rebels (Muʿāwiya’s Damascene army). This caused a 
serious split between ʿAlī’s supporters and those who rejected his attempt to 
negotiate (Hodgson 1974). Later, a Khārijite assassinated ʿAlī with a poisoned 
sword in 661. A range of violent events and political rifts followed this early 
intra-Muslim schism.
The early Khārijites accused both parties, including each other’s active and 
passive supporters, of heresy and apostasy. Their central axiom was expressed 
by Qurʾān: 12:40, which summarizes the notion of God’s legislative sovereignty: 
lā ḥukm illā lillāh [legislation belongs to God alone]. In addition, their de-
contextual and literal reading of the text frequently pointed to the verses 4:60, 
4:100, 12:14, and similar passages, all of which in various ways express God’s 
supremacy in making (political) judgments.
In effect, Khārijites developed theological arguments that labelled those 
who indirectly deny God’s sovereignty to be apostates. For example, the logic 
of Khārijites’ arguments led them to claim that if and when Muslim political 
leadership try to resolve political disputes by, for instance, negotiating with 
their opponents (that is, ʿAlī’s negotiation with Muʿāwiya), they are consid-
ered breaking their bond with the Qurʾānic principles of God’s sovereignty, 
which makes them deviants and apostates who deserve severe punishment. 
The result has therefore been that Khārijites considered it a religious duty to 
fight all Muslim political leaders and, indeed laymen, who neither joined nor 
swore allegiance to the Khārijites. For instance, the early Khārijites labelled the 
Muʿtazila ‘deviants’ because they chose abstention (iʿtizāl) when confronted 
with the choice between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya (Adang and Ansari 2015).
The early late-seventh century Khārijite movement represents an early vio-
lence oriented and literalist interpretative tradition that justified rebellion as 
the religious tradition’s central tenet. Comprised of relatively small groups of 
ardent rebels scattered across Iraq, Iran, the eastern Arabian Peninsula, and 
the Maghreb region, they sought political power to ‘purify’ Muslim commu-
nities primarily through literalist and selected reading of the Qurʾānic text 
2 Sunnī Muslims consider both as the Prophet’s Companions who led the opposing sides in the 
first Muslim civil war over a legal issue related to the murder of Caliph ‘Uthman ibn al-‘Affan 
in 656. ʿAlī was the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law.
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and prophetic narrations. For instance, to qualify as a political ruler, a Muslim 
must demonstrate extraordinary moral virtue, justice, religious devotion, and 
knowledge, as well as strictly apply the appropriate legal sanctions to those 
who break Islam’s moral code. The entire debate on distinctions between 
major and minor sins, ethics, and moral virtues within the early mainstream 
Sunnī scholarship seems to have evolved in an attempt to counter what was 
considered to be Khārijites’ unreasonableness. The debate evolved in the light 
of the formation of interpretative methodologies and scholastics used by the 
main part of the religious scholars primarily within the Muslim urban centres.
Some of the main concerns articulated by Khārijites is that any violation 
of moral codes unequivocally identifies the political leader and his support-
ers as non-Muslims—which would theologically require all Muslims to rebel 
against such a person’s authority (Kenney 2006). However, it is rather unclear 
who is responsible for making this decision: the majority of male adults, the 
whole community of believers, the religious authorities, or any individual who 
has a ‘legitimate’ cause? This particular question has also been a source of 
intense controversy regarding ISIS’ proclamation of its caliphate on 29 June 
2014 (Gerges 2016).
Nonetheless, insisting upon the ‘correctness’ of a person’s actions also 
indicated that the Khārijites emphasised free will far more than did the early 
Sunnīs, especially the Ḥanbalīs, who were leaning more towards predestina-
tion. This theological distinction became clearer during the tenth century, 
after the great ninth-century rivalry and conflict between Ashʿarī/Ḥanbalī and 
Muʿtazilite scholarship (Makdisi 1981). The later Khārijites’ strict adherence 
to inflexible legal requirements and high moral expectations, particularly for 
political leaders, meant that group cohesion of and within their various groups 
slowly eroded. Simply put, the severity of their socio-political structures and 
codes of conduct was, in the long term, untenable and thus caused an increas-
ing variety of reinterpretations of alternative theological principles to emerge.
The initial severity of differentiation between ‘believers’ (Khārijites them-
selves) and all others (kuffār) was therefore revised. For instance, the out-
right hostile and violent othering and mass killing (istiʿrāḍ) of non-compliant 
Muslim ‘infidels’ (kuffār and murtaddīn) turned into nonviolent labelling, 
wherein general Muslim public were categorised as hypocrites, ‘the ungrate-
ful ones’, heretics, and so on. These and similar reinterpretations caused many 
additional (but smaller) groups to appear, often named after their originators 
such as the Azāriqa, ʿAtāwiyya, Baihāsiyya, Ibāḍiyya, Muḥakkima, Najadāt, 
and Ẓafariyya (Al-Shahrastani 1923). Only a few of these have survived. The 
Ibadis, one theologically and politically reformed Khārijite group, eventu-
ally became the official religious establishment of the Sultanate of Oman 
(Kenney 2006).
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Both Sunnī and Shīʿī groups have used takfīr (excommunication) through-
out Islam’s multivariate history. For example, its theological and jurispruden-
tial application played a significant political role during the Muʿtazilī miḥna 
(ordeal or inquisition) of the 830s and 840s in what is today known as Iraq 
against Ḥanbalī and other rival Islamic scholars. The irrecoverable end of 
Muʿtazilism as a religious and intellectual force came only after the political 
shift of power (Makdisi 1981). Others examples are ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) 
Mardin fatwā against Syria’s Mongol rulers; the Ṣafavid (Shīʿī) Akhbāriyya’s 
takfīr of Muslim philosophers in the 1600s; and most notably, during the 1700s, 
the religious movement of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s en masse excom-
munication of the Sunnī Ottoman and Shīʿī religious leaders. All of these and 
similar historical cases are either concerned with othering their doctrinal and/
or political opponents, who are perceived as violating ‘Islamic doctrine’s fun-
damental principles’ and thus as not belonging to the broader community. 
Again, such theological exclusions often had socio-political consequences that 
largely depended upon the context or the dynamics of pre-existing religious 
polarisations as well as the political authorities’ interest, willingness and/or 
ability to support the ‘orthodox’ position vis-à-vis the perceived heterodoxies 
(El-Rouayheb 2015).
2 Political Theory of Loyalty and Disavowal
The idea of political and religious allegiance was hotly debated among Sunnī 
scholars throughout the classical period (ca. 850s–1400s) (Al-Mawardi 1995). 
Sunnī polemics largely revolved around consistency in a person’s theologi-
cal, jurisprudential ‘belonging’, which in turn determined that person’s social 
and political rights vis-à-vis leadership and other religious communities. Such 
polemics became more contentious in Muslim polities with higher levels of 
theological heterodoxies. For example, the survival of four schools of Sunnī 
jurisprudence (Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī, and Ḥanafī) and the dominant Shīʿī 
school of jurisprudence (Jaʿfarī) is a consequence of complex relationships 
between political and scholarly classes in pre-modernity. One suggestion 
is that the crystallization of these schools and the de facto disappearance of 
the Zahiris and a significant number of other jurisprudential traditions is a 
direct result of political decisions from the early thirteenth century onwards 
(Makdisi 1981). Similar developments occurred later on in the North Africa, 
Levant, Arabian peninsula and in the eastern lands of Islam (Hodgson 1974). 
Nevertheless, the broader Sunnī establishment drifted towards a more prag-
matic compliance and coexistence between the religious scholar-experts class 
and the political leadership (El-Rouayheb 2015).
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For example, the long-term scholarly discourse drifted towards religious 
understandings that the populations were expected to obey a political leader 
who publicly proclaims (shahāda) God’s unity and, at least in theory, admits 
the sovereignty and supremacy of God’s will over his own dominion (Hodgson 
1974). This requirement entailed public announcements of loyalty, during the 
congregational Friday prayers and on other occasions, to a political leader or 
religious establishment (ʿulamāʾ) either as a matter of conviction or coercion. 
It is therefore not surprising that the classical Sunnī scholarly deliberations 
from the tenth century onwards focused primarily on a political ruler’s legiti-
macy and discouraging popular rebellions (aḥkām al-bughāh) against political 
leadership (Abou el-Fadl 2001).
The basis and framework of political commitment and legitimacy (siyāsa 
sharʿiyya) remained at the heart of classical scholarly discussions on politi-
cal theory related to caliphal authority and legitimacy (Hodgson 1974). That 
is different from the idea of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (loyalty and disavowal) within 
the modern discussion concerning political legitimacy brought forth by con-
temporary Salafi interlocutors. Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani (b. 1956) pres-
ents one of the most comprehensive contemporary Salafi-discussions of that 
topic. He, along with other Salafi interlocutors, conceptualizes this idea as a 
primary duty of contemporary Muslims, one that entails a personal commit-
ment to a relationship with God, a social framework that enables the fulfil-
ment of collective duties, and a political dimension that involves prospects 
of violence (Al-Qahtani 2003). Most of the pre-modern conceptualisations 
of political commitment were not necessarily framed in the terminology of 
al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, but the insinuations of allegiance and political compliance 
were nevertheless deeply imbedded in the discourse.
Historically, the scholarly elites (ʿulamāʾ) were forced to respond various 
political circumstances and conflicts with moral, ethical, and political opin-
ions on how socio-political problems ought to be addressed. For instance, the 
early proto-Sunnī scholars proclaimed the Khārijites unbelievers (de facto 
excommunication) because they posed an imminent threat to the existing 
social order. Today, there is a similar situation where mainstream Muslim 
scholars disqualify ISIS’ leadership as de facto apostates (see below). Arguably, 
the general Sunnī opinion held that rebels destabilise ruling structures, which, 
in turn, results in social and material destruction and, subsequently, causes 
violations of both the rights of God (ḥuquq Allāh) and the rights of Muslims 
(ḥuquq al-ʿibād). Shīʿī scholars developed a theological principle tawallā 
(pledging allegiance to the ahl al-Bayt) and tabarrā (displaying enmity towards 
the enemies of God, the Prophet, and his family).
In the classical period, however, the early Ḥanbalīs and similar contempo-
rary proto-Sunnīs expressed predominantly negative opinions regarding the 
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meaning of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ. Their main understanding was that the formu-
lation of loyalty and disavowal is a religious innovation caused by sectarian 
infighting, which many Ḥanbalīs interpreted as religious deviancy. Nonetheless, 
a violation of the principle of (‘correct’) political and/or religious allegiance 
in the subsequent centuries would occasionally result in occasional excom-
munication of a Muslim individual or group (Adang and Ansari 2015). Such 
pre-modern doctrines of othering or identity affirmation and differentiation 
played an important and historically contingent role in othering of thought 
heretics.
Distinctions between the in- and out-group members were often mani-
fested through context-dependent processes of social classification, political 
belonging, and legal status. Similar distinctions acquired new meanings dur-
ing European colonialism and/or nation-state formation (Lewis 1988). During 
the first half of the twentieth century and within the context of unravelling 
colonial control, modern national state formations, growing nationalism, pan-
Arabism, secularism, the declining relevance of religious institutions, and the 
evolution of authoritarian regimes gave takfirism its new form and means of 
expressing it.
The traditional distinction between believers and non-believers was for the 
most part a non-political issue in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
region during the Ottoman political hegemony. There were few political reper-
cussions for apostasy on the local level (Deringil 2000). Nevertheless, a secular-
ized form of takfirism (for example, disqualifying and expelling a person as a 
member of a community) arose and dominated all public and political discus-
sions in determining a person’s legal status vis-à-vis a state or citizenship. Such 
belonging was oftentimes expressed through narratives of more or less intense 
expressions of patriotism, including ancestral and ethnic belonging. Hence, 
we find Sunnī citizens in Iran or Shīʿī citizens in the Gulf monarchies. In the 
case of reformed Khārijites, such as Oman’s Ibāḍī Muslims (or Muḥakkima 
as some prefer to be called today), takfīr has also appropriated a new largely 
abstract meaning of excommunication, that is based on symbolic confined to 
differentiations between the larger body of Muslims (considered by and large 
as hypocrites) and the ‘true’ believers.
3 Belonging between State Sanctioned Nationalism, Ethnocenticity 
and Religious Communitarianism
Some would argue that takfirism during the latter half of the twentieth century 
has evolved into a contentious religious and political issue due to the failure of 
491Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory
pan-Arab nationalist projects across the MENA region (Ibrahim 2007). Within 
this process of conceptual evolution, terminology such as al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ 
came to play an increasingly central role in religio-political othering. For exam-
ple, the early modern interpretation of political loyalty and disavowal within 
the national state framework was largely interpreted as a subordinate issue 
of religion ( furū‘), namely, political allegiance to a nation constructed within 
specific territorial borders. As a range of initially vibrant nationalist projects 
turned into authoritarian military and monarchic systems, a significant part 
of political opposition and intellectual elites turned towards cultural and reli-
gious symbols for inspiration (Hourani 1970). A part of more militant and reli-
giously inspired opposition groups and several regimes in Muslim-majority 
states began interpreting and promoting political loyalty as an essential part 
(uṣūl) of the Islamic creed, thereby merging and equating belief in God with 
loyalty to a particular political order. Such conflation of political and religious 
terminology has been expressed through political narratives by which some 
authoritarian regimes and militant opposition groups seek to delegitimise 
their respective political opponents.
During the last half of the twentieth century seemingly marginal political 
oppositional groups in the MENA region picked up the idea of takfīr. The first gen-
eration of modern-day violence-oriented takfīrī groups operationalised al-walāʾ 
wa-l-barāʾ as an ideological framing by which to establish a range of violent 
action plans against the region’s authoritarian regimes. These groups confronted 
these regimes’ repressive policies and the perceived ungodliness that their politi-
cal systems represented (Kenney 2006) with violent and nonviolent mobilisa-
tion strategies. These early conceptualizations of takfīr integrated the modern 
political idea of a nation state with the pre-modern religious doctrinal claim of 
God’s sovereignty. For instance, divine sovereignty trumps any worldly authority 
claimed by modern nation states, for God’s supreme will, as understood to have 
been recorded in the Qurʾān and the canonical ḥadīth literature, is attempted to 
be realized in the social, political, and broader civilisational spheres. At the same 
time, this political reasoning had dismissed the authority and legitimacy of the 
traditional Islamic religious establishment’s scholarship (Huwaidi 1988).
Sayyid Quṭb, Egyptian intellectual and activist, executed by the Egyptian 
government in 1966 allegedly for conspiring to assassinate Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, is presented as an political voice that provided important arguments 
to the later development of takfīrī political doctrine (Wright 2006). One of 
the most important arguments in his last book, Milestones (1990), is that the 
“Muslim World”—a civilisational category—suffered from the overpowering 
social disorder that he termed “the state of jāhiliyya,” much like the situation in 
pre-Islamic Arabia. One of his suggested prescriptions to resolve this was to 
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establish just governance in Muslim-majority societies based on God’s sover-
eignty (ḥākimiyya) (Quṭb 1990).
Takfīr-oriented political opposition groups adopted this basic set of argu-
ments and regarded ḥākimiyya as a form of operationalised al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ 
within political context of a nation state. This view gave the idea of loyalty and 
disavowal doctrinal content and a more concrete relational link between the 
political and theological. As a central tenet of Islamic doctrine on par with 
God’s unity, names, attributes, and lordship, it provided a theological argu-
ment to advocate rebellion and insurrection against perceived ungodliness 
and apostasy of political leadership in Muslim majority polities (Al-Maqdisi 
1984). Muslim political authority, according to this view, must be based on 
doctrines presented in the Islamic scriptures and historical examples that had 
validated, during brief moments of the first Islamic century, how to govern a 
Muslim community and polity.
This line of theological reasoning lays ground for broadening the concept of 
Islamic worship (ʿubūdiyya), wherein the political is an integral part of human 
compliance with divine purpose. In addition to broadening the role of free will 
by implicitly suggesting that humans are able to act/choose within the range of 
multiple God-given futures, these broadened understandings provided a tacit 
intellectual platform to reactionary theological attitudes that have potential 
to legitimate political violence. This is a major point of difference between 
violence-oriented takfirist groups, traditional Sunnī scholarly discourses and 
democratically inclined Islamist reformist movements.
For example, political and social movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
have denounced and rejected similar takfīrī interpretations of Quṭb’s original 
analysis and proposed reformist solutions by not employing al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ 
or ḥākimiyya in their mobilization discourses and activism (Al-Hudaybi 1977; 
Poljarevic 2012). It is therefore significant to note that disagreements between 
nonviolent and violent, democratic and nondemocratic, including what is 
sometimes considered theologically heterodox and orthodox Muslim political 
and religious groups, are rooted largely in theological interpretations, ideologi-
cal preference, operational disagreements and collective proclivities towards 
political violence or nonviolence (Hamid and Farrala 2015). One important 
theological feature of these disagreements is the role and meaning assigned to 
Islamic eschatology.
4 The Millenarian Component of Modern-day Takfirism
A part of the second generation of violence-oriented takfīrī groups emerged 
during the early 1970s as a direct response to the Egyptian state’s initial 
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permissiveness and latter repression of selected parts of the religiously moti-
vated political opposition. By the mid-1970s, Takfīr wa al-Hijra, initiated by 
Ahmad Shukri Mustafa (executed 1978) and others, had begun a violent cam-
paign against state officials and institutions (Ashour 2011). By the late 1970s 
and early 1980s Islamic Jihād, then led by Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Faraj 
(executed 1982), became the most influential promoter of takfīrī militancy. His 
important The Forgotten Duty (farīḍah al-ghāʾibah) had a significant effect on 
legitimating violence against such leaders as Anwar Sadat, who was assassi-
nated by Faraj’s group in 1981 (Faraj 2000). Another relevant argument was 
anchored in the fatwās of ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, the theological and juris-
prudential council to Faraj and Islamic Jihād (Faraj 1986) which differed con-
siderably from those of al-Azhar’s scholarly elite. ʿAbd al-Rahman died in a US 
maximum security prison in 2017, convicted in 1995 for his leading role in the 
1993 World Trade Center bombings.
One of The Forgotten Duty’s most important doctrinal points is the impor-
tance of waging a physical (as opposed to a spiritual) war against the perceived 
enemies of Islam and Muslims. Some authorities considered this a collective 
duty ( farḍ kifāya), Faraj and others argued that it is an individual duty ( farḍ 
ʿayn) (ʿAzzām 1985). The latter argument added a new sense of urgency, espe-
cially to young predominantly male audiences, for it meant that no permis-
sion was needed from political, religious, or parental authorities to join Islamic 
Jihād and similar groups (Cook 2011).
In the late 1970s, and as a part of the third generation of violence-oriented 
takfīrī activism, on the first day of the Islamic year 1400 (20 November 1979), 
a millenarian group composed largely of university students led by Juhayman 
al-ʿUtaybī (executed in 1980) launched an armed raid and captured the Sacred 
Mosque in Mecca. The rebels proclaimed a new political and spiritual order in 
Saudi Arabia by announcing the arrival of the Mahdī, an eschatological figure 
who, according to most Sunnī theological interpretations, will appear some 
time before the Day of Judgment and lead Muslims in the global struggle for 
justice and salvation. Although not a new phenomenon, this type of ‘mahdism’ 
had a more innovative dimension: the particular Salafist interpretation and 
the nature of its threat to an important segment of the Arab political context 
(Voll 1982). Al-‘Utaybī announced that the kingdom’s clergy or for that mat-
ter any Muslim who defended the ruling system, as well as its policies and 
political authorities, had abandoned their religious obligations and personal 
piety to the extent of actual kufr, or disbelief. These and similar contemporary 
examples of modern-day political rebellion demonstrate both the potency and 
longevity of this form of political othering and its ongoing important doctrinal 
role in mobilising against primarily authoritarian regimes in and beyond the 
MENA region.
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Doctrinally, Islamist, Salafi, and other Muslim activist groups are divided 
along different strategic considerations some of which are outlined above, but, 
more importantly, along interpretations of the role of God’s sovereignty, as 
well as how, where, and to what extent Muslims should be involved in gover-
nance (Meijer 2009). These doctrinally and subsequent jurisprudential differ-
ences in interpretation are contingent on the particularities of the surrounding 
political, social, and cultural contexts. Eschatological urgency is, for example, a 
more pronounced feature of violent groups such as ISIS, wherein the political 
governance of khilāfah is directly related to fulfilling an important theologi-
cally defined precondition of the Judgement Day (Dabiq 1:21–28).
Although takfirism and Salafism share important theological and legal 
principles, among them a literalist approach to the scripture, strict personal 
pietism, and demands on a public obligation-based approach to lived Islam, 
they do differ in significant ways. For example, ISIS’ brand of takfirism stands 
for perpetuating violence based on the unremitting excommunication of its 
opponents and its ambition to establish a state as the primary mean to usher 
in the apocalypse. Arguably, these and other primary objectives can be consid-
ered as significant discrepancies from what has traditionally been viewed as 
Salafism: a diverse set of religious and ideological principles driven by ambi-
tions to purify and authenticate Muslims’ beliefs and practices (Meijer 2009).
Contemporary Salafism, broadly understood, is a wide-ranging, ultracon-
servative, and complicated revivalist/reformist religious methodology that has 
been developing more systematically since the turn of the twentieth century. 
Looking beyond these ‘family resemblances’, ISIS represents anti-systemic 
mobilization and violent forms of othering against all perceived enemies, 
which is more in line with the early Khārijites’ fervent anti-establishment 
militancy and theological hairsplitting. Consider, for instance, its selective 
doctrinal positions, the level and form of repression in the state or region it 
controls, a place’s demographic composition, the dynamic of historical griev-
ances, along with political and religious freedoms, including the availability of 
a charismatic leadership and other socio-political conditions such as foreign 
military occupations.
5 Trajectories of Violence in a Volatile Geopolitical Context
Few violent events, besides wars, so clarify the separation between enemies. 
The 1979–1989 Afghan war of liberation from Soviet occupation, one such event, 
provided an exceptional opportunity for violence-oriented MENA region Salafi 
activists, some of whom already held takfīrī predispositions, to defend fellow 
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Muslims. Doing so enabled them to demonstrate both the theological obliga-
tion to use violence to show solidarity with their perceived religious brothers 
and sisters and their commitment to violent struggle beyond their own socio-
political contexts. Subsequently, the Mujahideen gathered Arab volunteer 
fighters, together with parts of the organised Afghan resistance, partly under 
the leadership of ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām (d. 1989).3 Their guerrilla tactics and tena-
cious insurgency led the Soviet forces to withdraw in 1989 (Kepel 2006). Other 
important components that helped maintain the Mujahideen’s efficiency were 
the financial and logistical support, including the weapons and communica-
tion equipment, provided by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, 
the United States, and others (Roy 1995).
ʿAzzām, one of the rare religious scholars who actually fought there, had 
published a range of writings during the 1980s that advanced Quṭb’s thesis on 
the urgency of action (jihād) against the perceived enemies of God and the 
Muslims. His theory’s central tenet was that all Muslims (collectively) were 
theologically obliged to undertake an armed struggle against immediate injus-
tices to confirm their Islamic commitment (Lawrence 2005). Informed by 
mainstream pre-modern Sunnī religious scholarship, ʿAzzām presented rela-
tively few and largely undeveloped takfīrī positions in relation to the broader 
Muslim populations.
By the end of the 1980s, when the Soviets gradually withdrew, Usāma bin 
Lādin (assassinated in 2011), along with several of his companions includ-
ing ʾAyman al-Ẓawāhirī (b. 1957), sought to maintain the foreign volunteer’s 
momentum of military success by establishing al-Qāʿida (the Base) network 
(Farrall 2011). They had organised a transnational network to connect all of 
the committed, proven, and trustworthy Arabic-speaking militants (Roy 1995). 
At its core, the network would be hierarchically structured and headed by 
bin Lādin. Affiliated subsections were given operational independence but 
had to commit to following the general direction and principles of the cen-
tral leadership and its consultative council of veteran, trusted, and personally 
interconnected violence-oriented activists (Gunaratna 2002). At the same 
time, Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī (b. 1959), ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Rahman, and other 
allied religious scholars who have been either directly or indirectly affiliated 
with al-Qāʿida and have influenced the network’s doctrinal orientation dem-
onstrated stronger tendencies to excommunicate and justify violence against 
political opponents, Muslim and non-Muslim alike (Farrall 2011).
3 The official name of the managing organization for the volunteers was the Service Office for 
(Foreign) Fighters, Maktab al‐Khidmah li al-Mujahidīn.
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At the end of the Cold War and witnessing the MENA region’s unravelling 
geopolitical structure, al-Qāʿida’s leadership adopted new ambitions, one of 
which was to become an independent military force capable of operating 
internationally. Embolden by the network’s military successes in Afghanistan, 
bin Lādin, had offered the group’s military aid to the Saudi monarchy in 1991, 
which felt threatened by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. One of his sup-
porting arguments was that al-Qāʿida had overpowered a far stronger enemy, 
namely, the USSR, just a couple of years earlier. The Saudi leadership, however, 
briskly rejected his offer and turned to the United States for military support, 
all of which was supported by the Wahhābi religious establishment.
President George H. W. Bush responded by establishing military bases, to 
which he sent over half a million US soldiers, in and around the “Land of the 
Two Holy Places” (Mecca and Medina). Bin Lādin, along with al-Qāʿida’s lead-
ership and religious advisors, saw this as doctrinal and political treason of 
what is understood as Islam’s principles (Hamid and Farrall 2016). Their politi-
cal conclusion was similar to that of al-ʿUtaybī: Attack the House of Saud and 
its allies by all available means.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of civil and occupation wars in 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia (Croatia/Serbia), Chechnya (Russia), Iraq (the 
United States), Mindanao (the Philippines), Somalia, Tajikistan, and elsewhere 
prompted the leadership to dispatch several of its affiliates to some of these 
hotspots to assist the indigenous Muslim groups’ war efforts (Ashour 2011). 
During this same period, the increased systematisation of takfirism both as 
a network-based violence-oriented transnational rebel-force and as a self-
referential and theologically autonomous tradition also started to assume a 
more distinctive ideological shape.
Al-Maqdisī, a Jordanian who as a young man knew al-ʿUtaybī, has been 
among the most important intellectuals who formulated the new meanings 
for takfīr (excommunication), al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (loyalty and disavowal), 
the nature of the relationship between belief and political action, and other 
notions that became pivotal concepts for takfīrī militants (al-Maqdisi 1984). 
His contribution has been crucial to extending the meaning of historically con-
tingent terms by weaponising them against apparent socio-political injustice, 
corruption, repression, and perceived godlessness in various Muslim-majority 
contexts. He made a particular effort to explain the meaning of ḥukm Allāh 
(God’s rule), which he related to the political leadership’s responsibility to rule 
in accord with a strict reading of scripture (Wagemakers 2009).
For al-Maqdisī, excommunication was directly reserved for ‘ungodly’ politi-
cal leaders. According to him, any political leader who consciously fails to 
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execute his “godly” responsibility of establishing ḥukm Allāh as the primary 
symbol of recognising God’s sovereignty over all things becomes a ṭāghūt, 
defined as a tyrant similar to the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt. Other prominent 
ideologues, such as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (b. 1950) and Abu Musʿab al-Suri 
(b. 1958), earlier presented similar arguments, but stopped short of excom-
municating entire Muslim populations. This line of reasoning differs from the 
general theological principles of the historical Khārijites as well as those of 
ISIS. In the case of ISIS, the processes of excommunication become the defin-
ing feature of the group’s identity and cornerstone of its organizational theo-
logical principles and eschatology that is wedded with its violence-oriented 
mobilization and political ambitions.
Al-Maqdisī’s religious training, which consisted of the Salafi religious meth-
odology of reasoning and a long record of social activism, for which he had 
been repeatedly jailed by Jordanian authorities and something that had con-
tributed to his scholarly reputation and authority. His writings became par-
ticularly salient among personalities such as al-Zarqawi, who was already 
involved in ongoing violent conflicts in primarily Iraq. Although he is not a 
member of the al-Qāʿida network, Al-Maqdisī had provided important reli-
giously informed arguments and personal integrity—both of which the net-
work has utilised enthusiastically (Hegghammer 2009).
Even though al-Qāʿida and its affiliates are theologically wary of proclaiming 
general Muslim audiences to be non-believers, they have been more inconsid-
erate when it comes to using indiscriminate violence against their perceived 
enemies. For example, they have often justified such campaigns on the grounds 
of revenge, where the collateral damage is acceptable because they are attack-
ing hostile governments or their military forces (Chaliand and Blin 2007). Such 
legitimation is frequently expressed in jurisprudential language, although 
they regularly sidestep mainstream Sunnī legal methodology and jurispru-
dence in favour of the operational circumstances in making strategic choices 
(Maher 2016).
One can reasonably argue that this violence is far closer to the violent 
strategies of the pre-modern Khārijite insurgency than the pre-modern Sunnī 
definitions of jihād as ‘just war’ (Poljarevic 2018). For instance, the al-Qāʿida 
leadership’s decision to violently confront the Saudi monarchy was based 
primarily on the king’s outward and direct hostility towards the network and 
its agenda, and secondarily on theological principles (Gunaratna 2002). The 
leadership legitimised the subsequent violence, including its attacks of non-
military targets, primarily as a matter of ‘personal grudge’ and only later as a 
matter of theology.
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In the mid-1990s, bin Lādin sent a letter to Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior 
Scholars, then under ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz’s (d. 1999) leadership, in which he 
outlined his criticism of the kingdom.
This aggression has reached such a catastrophic and disastrous point as 
to have brought about a calamity unprecedented in the history of our 
umma, namely the invasion by the American and western Crusader 
forces of the Arabian peninsula and Saudi Arabia, the home of the Noble 
Kaʿba, the Sacred House of God, the Muslim’s direction of prayer, the 
Noble Sanctuary of the Prophet, and the city of God’s Messenger, where 
the Prophetic revelation was received.
This momentous event is unprecedented both in pagan and Islamic 
history. For the first time, the Crusaders have managed to achieve their 
historic ambitions and dreams against our Islamic umma, gaining con-
trol over the Islamic holy places and the Holy Sanctuaries, and hegemony 
over the wealth and riches of our umma, turning the Arabian peninsula 
into the biggest air, land, and sea base in the region.
Lawrence 2005: 15–16
This diagnostic analysis of the perceived moral hubris of both the Saudi state 
and the MENA region more generally also reveals the urgency with which the 
revolutionary militants more broadly understand socio-political realities. For 
instance, using “unprecedented,” “aggression,” “invasion,” and “Crusader forces” 
in relation to Islam’s holy places all point to the need for immediate action. 
This and similar passages in his letter and later statements emphasise the for-
eign “control over the Islamic holy places,” which call for launching a total war 
primarily against the monarchy and its supporters (Khatab 2011). The concept 
of umma, therefore, becomes a useful symbol by which to address non-Arab 
audiences. However, if the masses were to support such a call to arms, which is 
apparently important in creating permanent socio-political change, bin Lādin 
also had to emphasise that he had the backing of the region’s senior and influ-
ential Salafi scholars (Ibrahim 2007).
Such a line of argumentation is largely compatible with the thought of ʿAzzām, 
who promoted a form of religious legitimacy anchored in the theological dis-
course of contemporary Salafi and Wahhābi religious scholars. This approach is 
also emblematic of foreign volunteers in the Afghan war of 1979–1989, a process 
of which bin Lādin himself is partly a result of (Bergen 2006). However, both he 
and al-Ẓawāhirī (b. 1951), now the first in command of the al-Qāʿida network, 
widened ʿAzzām’s approach. Bin Lādin’s understanding of violent opposition 
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and warfare was anchored in the militant Salafi activist empowerment dis-
course that engaged in what can be described as a “civilisational struggle for 
survival,” a trend that can be traced to the Muslims’ struggles against colo-
nialism during the twentieth century. On the other hand, he sought theologi-
cal recognition and legitimation from recognised Salafi, Wahhābi and other 
Sunnī scholarship to communicate with the masses in Muslim majority socio-
political contexts (Lawrence 2005).
al-Ẓawāhirī, a founding member of the small Egyptian militant group 
Islamic Jihād and a part of the second generation of violence-oriented takfir-
ism, had a clear ideological and strategic vision that entailed a violent over-
throw of what he and his co-founders considered heretical Arab regimes. His 
vision and leadership has consistently been more takfīrī-oriented than bin 
Lādin’s, who emphasised a more theologically reconciliatory approach to the 
general public, including religious tolerance of Shīʿīs living in Afghanistan and 
the MENA region. This public communication strategy of addressing particular 
religious and political authorities has, at times, been both strategically func-
tional and morally resonant with vast segments of frustrated and politically 
perceptive young men primarily in that region. Al-Qāʿida gained little physical 
support for its efforts, however, and its network eventually became a distinc-
tive transnational symbol of radical resistance against the U.S. interests there, 
and its repressive regional allies (Gerges 2009).
One of the major features of al-Qāʿida’s political theology, as it relates to 
other political opposition groups in Muslim-majority societies, is its insis-
tence on creating a radically different transnational political space. Such an 
approach entails more distinctive features than what is sometimes described 
as ‘jihādi-Salafism’, which is closer to the contingent reading of the neoclas-
sical doctrine of jihād (Maher 2016). One classical understanding dictates a 
broad religious scholarly support for violent action in a particular territory, 
which is, in turn, based on the request of that territory’s political leader-
ship for military aid. Thus, it can be argued that al-Qāʿida gradually devel-
oped a distinct form of ideological and strategic mobilisation that did not 
fully resemble that of ʿAzzām, which was more in line with the neoclassi-
cal doctrine of jihād. This gradual transformation occurred primarily due 
to the recruitment of an increasing number of younger takfīrī-oriented 
activists from Egypt’s Islamic Jihād (led by al-Ẓawāhirī), as well as Algerian 
and Libyan militants who had little interest in discussing theological meth-
odology beyond its violent interpretations. Al-Qāʿida’s political theology 
therefore represents an organisational and doctrinal kernel out of which 
ISIS developed.
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6 Political Opportunities and Theological Activism
The third generation of violence-oriented takfīrī mobilization was born 
after 9/11. This critical event has had irreversible effects on the MENA region 
and indeed on large segments of Muslim-majority societies. The invasion of 
Afghanistan by the US and other forces in late 2001 and dispersal of al-Qāʿida’s 
infrastructure there was one immediate result. A far more substantial one was 
the US invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in early 2003. The occu-
pation’s initial result—the total collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist state 
institutions—created opportunities for al-Qāʿida to enter a new battlefield 
with a renewed sense of self-importance (Gerges 2016).
Abu Bakr Naji (d. 2008), a little-known al-Qāʿida operative who authored 
The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma 
Will Pass (Idārah al-tawāḥush: akhṭar marḥalah satamurru bihā al-ʾummah), 
argues that the ultimate goal of the violence-oriented takfīrī(s’) struggle is to 
create and promote total war against all perceived enemies both locally and 
globally. Naji represents the fourth generation of violence-oriented takfīrī mili-
tancy. In such a situation, the ensuing savagery and destruction would offer 
Muslim populations little choice other than to view joining them as the only 
way to establish security and stability. This influential text recommends ways 
to institutionalize takfirism within the scope of a modern (also global) state. 
Its apocalyptic message focuses on conquering and gaining support from 
‘disillusioned’ Muslim populations. In short, by drawing the US and the EU 
into wars against Muslim-majority states, a large swath of populations would 
‘realise’ who the cosmic enemy is and thereafter join the struggle to establish 
the caliphate (Naji 2004). Naji’s text outlines a grand political strategy without 
extensive theological discussion, an approach that appeals to a new strand of 
violence-oriented takfīrī activists who are arguably less competent in following 
or even interested in complex theological explanations and methodologies.4
Al-Qāʿida gradually adopted the Jordanian takfīrī militant Ahmad 
Al-Khalayla, better known as Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), as its net-
work’s leading member in Iraq. Much like Naji, he can be considered repre-
sentative of the fourth generation of violence-oriented takfīrī militancy. In 
the early 2003, his Group for Monotheism and Jihād (Jamāʿat al-Tawhīd wa 
al-Jihād) was on al-Qāʿida’s probation. However, the group quickly proved to 
be an effective insurgent group that could not be ignored, and thus became a 
primary, although disorderly, al-Qāʿida affiliate. In 2004 it adopted the name 
4 Funding for the translation by W. McCants was provided by the John M. Olin Institute for 
Strategic Studies at Harvard University.
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the al-Qāʿida Organisation for Jihād in the Land of Two Rivers (Tanzīm Qāʿida 
al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rafidayn), or simply al-Qāʿida in Iraq (AQI). Its primary goal 
was to simultaneously target the occupying forces and the Shīʿa-dominated 
government, along with Shīʿa civilians and especially their religious symbols 
and gatherings (Celso 2015). Al-Zarqawi, an earlier student and colleague of 
al-Maqdisī, implemented some of the takfīrī theological teachings after signifi-
cant recalibration of exactly who was ‘the enemy’. According to its subsequent 
widening and weaponising of al-Maqdisī’s scriptural interpretations, any Sunnī 
who opposed AQI and essentially all Shīʿa Muslims were legitimate targets. 
Subsequently, al-Maqdisī sought to distance himself from such indiscriminate 
violence by openly disagreeing with his former student on both theological 
and jurisprudential grounds.
Another theological feature of al-Zarqawi’s militancy was his ardent focus 
on eschatology, particularly on the smaller and larger signs of the Day of 
Judgment (ʿalamāt al-saʿā al-sughrā wa al-kubrā). One of his emblematic state-
ments, uttered sometime between 2003 and 2006, was: “The spark has been lit 
here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—
until it burns the Crusader armies in Dabiq.” This eschatological message, a per-
manent feature of the ISIS’ flagship publication Dabiq, appears on either first or 
second page of each issue of the magazine,5 thereby signalling the importance 
and centrality of al-Zarqawi’s mission, mobilisation narrative, and a subsequent 
feature of ISIS’ takfīrī doctrine (McCants 2015). It is based on a reading of what is 
sometimes described ‘as a minor sign of the Apocalypse’ in Sunnī eschatological 
thought. This is a part of a well-known Prophetic statement recorded in Ṣaḥīḥ 
Muslim’s “Book of Tribulations and Portents of the Last Hour,” it reports that the 
Prophet had said that: “The Last Hour will not come until the Romans land at 
al-A’maq [in present-day Turkey] or in Dabiq [in present-day Syria].” This is an 
important example of invoking prophetic insights and the direct implications 
of representing the divine order. This type of messianic and apocalyptic appeal 
to wider audiences is an important ISIS mobilization strategy.
Al-Zarqawi did not live to see the formation of the Islamic State in Iraq in 
2010, its 2014 declaration of reinstatement of caliphal authority, its violent 
campaigns, institutional development, and temporary revivification of slavery, 
ultimately its military decline and 2019 collapse. Nevertheless, the significance 
5 Fifteen issues of this magazine were published during 2014 and 2016, often distributed via the 
deep web. The featured contents ranged topically from news reports from a range of battle-
fields, interviews with ISIS soldiers and leaders, as well as doctrinal memoranda, including a 
recurring and distinct eschatological message. They have, at present, no stable URL or online 
location.
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of his interpretation of takfīrī doctrines, strategy of indiscriminate violence, 
and emphasis on eschatology can be seen as central to ISIS’ establishment. On 
the other hand, these important components were among the key causes of 
the ISIS—al-Qāʿida split in 2014 (Celso 2015).
For instance, much in line with al-Maqdisī’s (part of the second-generation 
of violence-oriented takfīrī thinkers) critique, al-Qāʿida’s leadership repeated 
attempts to reign in al-Zarqawi by ordering him to stop attacking general pop-
ulations and focus instead on the occupying troops. But he continued and even 
intensified his group’s violent campaign; a clear violation of his earlier pledge 
of obedience and allegiance (bayʿa) to bin Lādin. This violation has oftentimes 
been interpreted as a breach of a fundamental theological commitment and 
therefore equated with apostasy, which in this case did not result in enmity 
and violence. In the case of the ISIS’ interpretation the principles of bayʿa this 
is understood to mean total obedience to the caliph.
Although troubled by al-Zarqawi’s decision, al-Qāʿida’s leadership never sev-
ered contact with him or denied him support, indicating that their theological 
pragmatism was tied to their political and strategic realism. Despite the ensu-
ing criticism, his group’s brutality and rebellious effectiveness attracted large 
numbers of recruits and media notoriety. Some estimates have shown that he 
commanded only a few dozen militants at the beginning of the US invasion in 
2003—a number that had grown to several thousand rebels and tens of thou-
sands of supporters just a few years later (Gerges 2016). It can therefore be 
argued that the nature and brutality of al-Zarqawi’s violent strategy and strict 
takfīrī doctrine became a defining feature of ISIS, as well as an important point 
of (ideological and strategic) contention between it and al-Qāʿida.
The issue of religious and political significance of bayʿa has fiercely been 
debated between al-Qāʿida and ISIS affiliates, especially prior to and dur-
ing the factional infighting since the end of 2013. Sami al-Uraydi, an ear-
lier al-Qāʿida affiliate and the former deputy leader of Organisation for the 
Liberation of Syria (Ḥayāt Taḥrīr al-Shām), defines allegiance as both general 
(bayʿat al-ʿāmma) and specific (bayʿat al-khāṣṣa). The former concerns the 
public, which is obliged to recognise the political authorities in exchange for 
the political leadership’s obligation to protect it. If the political authorities fail 
to do so, the political leadership becomes illegitimate.
The latter expression concerns the obligation to fight the umma’s apparent 
enemy with all that that entails. ʿAzzāms writings make a similar distinction 
between the collective ( farḍ kifāya) and individual ( farḍ ʿayn) duty to fight. 
This type of legal reasoning reduces the general scope of al-Qāʿida’s initial 
understanding of general allegiance to the mere recognition of an individual’s 
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belonging to the ummah, an expression of one’s Muslim identity, as it were 
(ʿAzzām 1985).
The fourth generation of violence-oriented takfīrī activists, in the shape of 
ISIS have a different understanding of belonging to a Muslim community. For 
ISIS, a Muslim’s identity is conditioned upon his or her active theological and 
political allegiance to and recognition of the caliphal authority. This makes 
its notion of takfīr broader than that of al-Qāʿida and its affiliates. More sig-
nificantly, ISIS leadership’s reasoning is premised on a theological methodol-
ogy that likens one’s religious creed (ʿaqīda) with political recognition (bayʿa) 
and unquestionable obedience (saʿah wa ṭāʿah) to the ruler (khalīfa) and what 
is understood as godly political order (khilāfa or imāma). Therefore, ‘correct’ 
political allegiance, bayʿa, much like ʿaqīda, is an essential condition for salva-
tion.6 Subsequently, ISIS’ theological methodology directly implies that each 
believer is expected to actively demonstrate and confirm his or her enmity to 
all other political orders and/or persons, be they branded as ṭaghūt, kāfir, or 
murtad, to be accepted as a muʿmin (believer).
Next, consider the context—the so-called Sunnī Awakening in Iraq (2006–
2010)—within which such a theological methodology gained traction. During 
this period, large swaths of the Sunnī minority rebelled against the sectarian 
Iraqi state institutions occupied almost exclusively by Shīʿīs. Systematic disen-
franchisement of Sunnīs after Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003 contributed directly 
to the domestic growth of takfīrī-oriented militancy. Likewise, the occupying 
forces’ policies had intensified sectarian identity politics to the point of a low-
intensity civil war. For example, the dismantlement of the former regime’s army 
caused many Saddam-era officers to join the fight against both the occupying 
forces and the Shīʿa-dominated government. During this same period, al-Qāʿida 
in Iraq garnered increased material support from part of the disenfranchised 
Sunnīs living in the country’s western provinces (McCants 2015).
The Sunnī tribal leaders’ support for AQI after 2010, and later ISIS in 2014, 
was primarily based on pragmatic calculations concerning their collective 
survival in an increasingly violent sectarian context, and not necessarily the 
population’s theological convictions (Gerges 2016). The effects of this alliance 
of convenience were immediate. The pre-existing road, electricity, water, oil-
producing infrastructures were quickly utilized by experienced ISIS managers 
who had built a self-sustaining bureaucracy that, in turn, enabled the enforce-
ment of strict public morality codes. Moreover, its attempt to establish a new 
order included the theatrical destruction of cultural heritage that did not 
6 See Dabiq 2014, 1: 6–7, also the article on Imāma, July 2014: 20–28.
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conform to its religious interpretations,7 redolent of al-Zarqawi’s targeting of 
Shīʿa places of worship (McCants 2015: 99ff.). Due to the deepening sectarian 
conflict and prolonged war without any prospects of peaceful settlement, the 
evolving violence-oriented takfīrī mobilization allowed no space for any devi-
ance from the strict doctrines of radical differentiation between friends (believ-
ers) and enemies (heretics). In a war situation, one can assume various drastic 
notions of cosmic war, such as the ISIS apocalyptic framework’s disallowance 
of any doctrinal, tactical, or otherwise nuances. A totalizing, black-and-white, 
and unrestrained worldview becomes a realistic dogmatic alternative. In other 
words, the immediacy of survival, wherein the logic of total war mixed with 
questions of survival and even salvation, became the defining feature of politi-
cal discourse (Kalyvas 2006).
7 The Case of ISIS and its Theology of ‘Apocalypse Now’
In a narrow historical sense, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Dawla 
al-Islāmiyya fī al-ʿIraq wa Shām (Daesh), can be considered an outgrowth of 
the theological and organisational evolution of al-Qāʿida’s network in Iraq 
after the US invasion of 2003. ISIS, which briefly controlled large swaths of 
territory in eastern Syria and western Iraq, represents a transnational takfirist 
network that seeks to establish a new theocratic state. Self-identified as a 
caliphate (khilāfa), it is based on the idea of global and perpetual war, a takfīrī 
credo, and an apocalyptic worldview. This also means that ISIS is a tactically, 
ideologically, and religiously violent movement that had operated in several 
Muslim-majority authoritarian and failed states within which it exerted vary-
ing degrees of control over part of their territory.
ISIS represents an early twenty-first century wave of violence-oriented 
takfirism that differs from similar historical groups. Its theological underpin-
ning is rooted in an eschatological conviction that initiating a global con-
flict between Muslims and non-Muslims and “re-establishing” the khilāfa 
marks the beginning of the Day of Judgement. Members urge their audiences 
7 Some of the most reported cases in this regard is the group’s total destruction of ancient 
Palmyra’s Temple of Bel and its Roman amphitheatre, among other things, reminiscent of 
the Taliban’s 2001 destruction of the Buddha statues in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan valley. ISIS 
also destroyed a large number of historical mosques in the Syrian and Iraqi land that it 
controlled, purportedly because they symbolised shirk (polytheism) (Dabiq 2:14–17). ISIS’ 
defiance against the international and national plies to stop destroying the historical monu-
ments attracted the mainstream media’s attention which was arguably the very purpose of 
the material destruction.
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to participate in a cosmic struggle between good and evil. This messianic proj-
ect is oftentimes expressed in a symbolic and tangibly violent rhetoric of reli-
gious and political othering and excommunication, but also in mass-killings 
and destruction of property. This analysis highlights the interchangeably of 
some of the important political and theological elements found among its core 
building blocks. ISIS can therefore be considered to represent an outgrowth 
and ideological creation of combining contextual circumstances dominated 
by authoritarian rule and violent foreign interventions, intra-state con-
flicts, long-running zealous doctrines of sectarian othering, and radical and 
politically motivated groups (Hafez 2003). Over the last fifty years, violence-
oriented takfirism, as previously explained, has undergone evolutionary stages 
represented by a particular generation of militants who responded to unique 
circumstances.
As elaborated above, the first stage (not to be confused with generation), 
characterised by the rise of violence-oriented ideological and religious bellig-
erency, was triggered by the persistence and perceived robustness of repres-
sive and totalitarian states in the post-colonial MENA region. Authoritarianism 
there, especially in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, helped form the first 
takfīr-centred organisation—Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn—in 1969, which the Egyptian 
media labelled Takfīr wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration) sev-
eral years later. This initially nonparticipating and isolationist religious group 
considered the Egyptian state, its society, and the wider Muslim community 
as heretical and fallen in terms of their religious duties. Its leaders therefore 
excommunicated (takfīr) all non-members and those who rejected their views 
and religious understandings. The second stage represents the particular expres-
sions of marginal, yet still important, violent mobilization in that region during 
the 1970s and 1980s, which was (in)directly prompted by the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan. Its leaders produced key takfīrī(-oriented) texts. The third gen-
eration, which arose during the 1990s, represents the internationalization and 
broadening of violence-oriented takfīrī mobilization, which culminated with 
the 9/11 attacks on the US symbols of political and economic power.
The fourth stage was initiated by the US-led invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Afghanistan (2001–2014) and Iraq (2003–2014), which pro-
vided pivotal political opportunities for the evolution of an increasingly reli-
giously and politically independent strand of takfirist militancy. This stage 
started in the beginning of the 2010s, when the so-called Arab Spring desta-
bilised several authoritarian regimes, thereby creating unprecedented oppor-
tunities to establish themselves in previously impervious territories, most 
notably Libya and Syria. ISIS launched a massive recruitment drive that has 
attracted many young, frustrated, and almost exclusively male volunteers from 
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the MENA region, Europe, Asia, and Africa. They, together with parts of the 
deprived and disenfranchised Iraqi and Syrian rebels, made up its core fighting 
force. The leaders framed these important consolidating factors within their 
state-building project, which pivots around apocalyptic interpretations of 
existing takfīrī doctrines, thereby adding a powerful theological spin to its mil-
lenarian worldview.
In the war-torn Iraq and later Syria during the 2010s, the pre-existing and mar-
ginal religious imaginaries and symbols had become weaponised rhetorical tools 
that often demean, dehumanize, and dishonour the perceived enemy. These 
have been tangible in both al-Qāʿida and ISIS narratives, which are replete with 
‘otherising’ terms: kuffār, deviants, hypocrites, innovators, heretics, crusad-
ers, Zionists, and so on.8 The assumed logic of war and enmity, especially in 
civil conflicts, had produced a sense of immediacy wherein the individual is 
obliged to show enmity to anyone who does not subscribe to or share his or 
her (political, ideological, religious and so forth) convictions (Kalyvas 1999). 
Extraordinary displays of enmity and violent forms of theological hair-splitting 
are more common during periods of prolonged and collective existential crises 
(Taylor 2013). Severe forms of existential stress, especially in war situations, 
enable the growth of particularly violence-oriented and anti-systemic groups.
Propaganda materials effectively communicate an alternative reality that 
can perpetuate enmity and encourage violence. For example, Dabiq was a 
major ISIS news outlet for personal interviews of its fighters and command-
ers, as well as expositions of its doctrinal principles. The magazine hurled 
many proclamations of takfīr against ‘non-conformist’ Muslims, “renegades 
whom it’s permissible to fight, and for no reason other than the fact that they 
refuse to give bayʿa” (Dabiq 2014, 1:24). The political and theological notions of 
ḥākimiyya and political allegiance are equated with the correctness of one’s 
religious creed and ‘purity of faith’, which subsequently assumed the central 
theological place in differentiating friend from enemy.
In the eighth issue of its English-language version, an article entitled “Irjāʾ, 
the most dangerous bidʿa:9 and its effects on the jihād in Sham [Syria]” presents 
ISIS’ eighteen-page opposition to considering all Muslims to be believ-
ers as a default position or based on their own words and statements. The 
8 This type of hostile othering and categorizing is similar to that used in the occasionally racist 
labelling of perceived enemies as terrorists, jihadists, extremists, Mohammedans, Islamists, 
hajjis, camel jockeys, and so on.
9 Irjāʾ (postponing, for example, a judgement) describes a specific theological principle: a person 
can either have faith or not. The definition of faith is thereby limited to a religious state (of pres-
ence or non-presence of faith). In other words, only God can assess the quality of an individual’s 
faith and devotion. It is believed that this assessment will take place on the Day of Judgement.
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article presents several prophetic statements that highlight the importance of 
one’s faith and deeds, followed by contemporary examples of how ‘misguided’ 
al-Qāʿida and its allies in Syria are in terms of their military cooperation against 
ISIS and the Assad regime. In other words, any group or faction that does not 
back up its ideological beliefs and religious interpretations with proper action, 
namely, recognising ISIS as the only religiously valid group defending MENA 
and the world’s Muslims, are deviants, heretics, and kuffār—legitimate targets.
ISIS’ doctrinal and mobilisation logic, much of which aligns with the early 
Khārijite theological framework and later takfīrī conceptualizations of the 
political, dictates that it represents the only legitimate solution to the entire 
spectrum of socio-political, moral, and economic problems experienced by 
the global Sunnī population. This logic, therefore, extends to claiming that the 
organization has an exclusive God-given right to establish the eschatologically 
ordained and sole legitimate power structure recognised by God, namely, the 
caliphate (Dabiq 2014: 1). Within the scope of ISIS’ political theology and God’s 
sovereignty, its general framework of religious creed, acts of political loyalty and 
disavowal, including strict adherence to moral piety, are combined with one’s 
obligatory allegiance to the self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-
Badri al-Samariai, or simply Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (assassinated 2019).
A large number of Sunnī scholars and religious movements have heav-
ily criticised the ISIS’ policies and religious standpoints on a range of issues, 
including the legitimation of slavery and its millenarian interpretations.10 
At the same time, the ISIS leadership challenges the validity of any religious 
and political authority outside its own power structure of ideological control. 
In the fourth issue of Dabiq carried “The Revival of Slavery before the Hour,” 
which argued for the systematic enslavement of Yezidi individuals and prison-
ers of war, particularly women, so that the group’s fighters could avoid com-
mitting sexual “sins”:
[T]he Yezidi women and children were then divided according to the 
sharī’a amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in 
the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the 
Islamic State’s authority to be divided as khums.
Dabiq 2014, 4:15
   Some Salafis, including ISIS, regard bidʿa as a negative form of innovation in matters 
of religion. This term therefore describes an attempt to deform Islam’s teachings and thus 
threatens ISIS’ strict understandings of the religious sources.
10  Some criticism is presented at http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/. For more theologically 
based Sunnī criticisms, see al-Yaqoubi (2015).
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This interpretation provides religious justification for the legitimacy of 
slavery as a part of war booty.11 What is more, enslavement seems to be based 
on the Yezidis’ supposed belonging to an ancient “pagan minority” having the 
sole legal status of a subservient class of people. Another consequence of this 
attitude is its genocidal policies justified as a revenge for “genocide [that] is 
committed by the Maliki, Asadi, and Israeli forces against the Muslims via 
systematic massacres, chemical warfare, rape, and starvation by siege, Obama 
watches with euphoria” (Dabiq 2014, 3:35).
Another eschatological passage relates its revival as a precondition of the 
Day of Judgement:
After this discussion and as we approach al-Malhamah al-Kubrā (the 
greatest battle before the Hour [Armageddon])—whenever its time 
comes by Allāh’s decree—it is interesting to note that slavery has been 
mentioned as one of the signs of the Hour as well as one of the causes 
behind al-Malhamah al-Kubrā.
Dabiq 2014, 4:15
Yet another argument regarding slavery is connected to takfīr. Expecting the 
critique from the “weak-minded and weak hearted,” presumably the Muslim 
public and religious establishment, the article justifies the “revival of slavery” 
as a preordained and God-given obligation:
Before Shaytān [Satan] reveals his doubts to the weak-minded and weak 
hearted, one should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffār 
and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect 
of the sharīʿa that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying 
or mocking the verses of the Qur’ān and the narrations of the Prophet 
(sallallāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam), and thereby apostatizing from Islam.
Dabiq 2014, 4:14
11  Many Sunnī scholars have issued fatwās refuting ISIS’ claims of legitimacy for slavery 
and its other religious interpretations (Al-Yaqoubi 2015, www.lettertobaghdadi.org, Dar 
al-Ifta). “Egypt’s Dar al-Iftaa vehemently condemns the heinous murder of the Jordanian 
pilot by the bloodthirsty QSIS.” Al Azhar Fatwā Committee Official Website, at http://eng 
.dar-alifta.org/foreign/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=660&CategoryID=1. Accessed 01/06/2019. 
See also Adam McCoy and Adam Taylor, 2015, “Islamic State says immolation was jus-
tified: experts on Islam say no,” The Washington Post at https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/04/the-chilling-reason-the-islamic-state-burned 
-a-jordanian-pilot-alive/. Accessed 01/06/2019.
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This indicates that the ISIS’ strategy of othering and its theological reason-
ing is extreme in relation to existing Muslim scholarship, from which it radi-
cally diverges in terms of current legal understanding of slavery’s prohibition12 
and its understanding of who is a Muslim.13 This line of theological reasoning 
is similar to that of the pre-modern Khārijites. For instance, the above pas-
sage suggests that anyone who denies the (Islamic) legality of slavery is per 
definition a kāfir. The same article directly suggests that in a literal interpreta-
tion of the scriptures, slavery is “much more plausible” than any other inter-
pretations (see above). This apparent melding together of uṣūlī (the basic 
theological principles) and furūʿ (legal rulings) is another methodological 
similarity with the early Khārijites and dissimilarity with contemporary main-
stream Sunnīsm.14
8 Conclusion
ISIS is the latest evolutionary stage of violence-oriented takfīrī-based mobi-
lization that denotes a religiously inspired socio-political ideology that has 
spawned a militant organisation with a sustained, distinct, and largely unique 
set of millenarian beliefs and violent practices. This set of religious and politi-
cal beliefs has gained traction in the context of existing national and inter-
national violent conflicts and, as such, has been conveyed through a range of 
violent and extraordinary forms of othering. Its particular violence-centred 
religious orientation is takfirist political project that is based on the fusion of 
narrow, Khārijite-like political strategy and selective, Salafi-inspired, principles 
of violent othering. In the end, what emerges from this inimitable set of reli-
gious, ideological, strategic, and contextual fusions is a worldview driven by the 
cosmic struggle between perceived believers (ISIS members) and all others.
12  See for example, “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights,” 21 Dhul Qaidah 
1401/19 September 1981, Preamble, paragraph g), point iii) at http://www.alhewar.com/
ISLAMDECL.html. Accessed 01/06/2019.
13  See for example, “The Amman Message” at http://ammanmessage.com/. Accessed 01/06/ 
2019.
14  Mainstream Sunnīsm is a contested term; nevertheless, it is useful because it illustrates 
numerous points of theological, legal, philosophical, spiritual, and political conflict 
between ISIS and its many Sunnī opponents, arguably the mainstream. Moreover, the 
earlier mentioned religious declarations of opposition to ISIS, its religious and political 
goals and methods, represent just a few English-language examples that outline generally 
held Sunnī position towards contemporary violence-oriented takfirism in general, and 
towards ISIS in particular.
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Part 4
Ṣūfism and Its Influences
∵

Introduction to Part 4
Ṣūfism is the mystic and ascetic aspect of Islam. As such it is unrelated to 
the Shīʿa-Sunnī split. One can be a Shīʿa or Sunnī and still be a Ṣūfi. Ṣūfism is 
about a way of believing and experiencing Islam rather than about a sectar-
ian belief system. John Spencer Tirmingham (1971: 2) called it the way which 
is aimed “at spiritual freedom whereby man’s intrinsic intuitive spiritual 
senses could be allowed full scope.” Despite the accusations of heresy by some 
Sunnī and Shīʿa fundamentalists, Ṣūfi Muslims argue that their beliefs and 
practices are firmly rooted in the same sources of Islamic tradition that all 
Sunnīs and Shīʿas hold as sacred, namely, the Qurʾān and sunna of the Prophet 
Muḥammad. Muḥammad, who Ṣūfis claim was the first Ṣūfi master (murshid). 
While most Ṣūfis believe that Muḥammad’s cousin and the first Shīʿa imām, 
ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, was the second in line after Muḥammad and source of 
divine wisdom, some believe Abū Bakr, the first Sunnī khalīfa to have played 
that role.
Over time Ṣūfism was institutionalized into ṭarīqa, commonly known as 
orders. While many of these orders were regional and short lived, others became 
well established over vast regions and long periods of time. These include: 
Suhrawardiyya, Qādiriyya, Rifāʿiyya, Kubrāwiyya, Chishtiyya, Shādhiliyya, 
Badawiyya (or Aḥmadiyya), Mawlawīyah, and Naqshabandiyya (Tirmingham, 
1971: 14). Distinctive features of institutionalized Ṣūfism outlined by Alexander 
Knysh (2017 60–1) include revelatory knowledge of God, techniques and teach-
ings are transmitted from masters to students, and that a follower (murīd) goes 
through stations (maqām) to gain ecstatic states (ḥāl). Devotional practices 
amongst Ṣūfis range from dhikr, repetition of the names of God and the scrip-
tures, to quiet meditation, to lively dance and music.
This section starts with an overview of Ṣūfism, before moving on to look 
at the Khaniqahi Ṣūfi Order. The remaining three chapters describe regional 
variations in Ṣūfism and the ways in which this mystical tradition has influ-
enced new religious movements and spiritual ideologies. This includes Subud, 
founded by an Indonesian student of Ṣūfism, Muhammad Subuh, the life 
and ideas of René Guénon, a French Shadhili Ṣūfi, and the teachings of the 
Greek-Armenian esotericist G.I. Gurdjieff.
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The chapter offers an overview of Ṣūfism (taṣawwuf), covering Ṣūfi beliefs and 
practices, as well as their historical and social dimensions. First, it provides an 
introduction to the origins of the term ‘Ṣūfism’ and its etymology, with the aim 
of identifying the core of the Ṣūfi ethos, and the ways it is manifested through 
ritual. The historical development of Ṣūfism is explained from its initial oth-
erworldly impetus to its routinisation, first into lodges scattered across the 
world, and later into well-established Ṣūfi Orders (ṭuruq, sing. ṭarīqa). The face 
of Ṣūfism today is then considered, by introducing the reader to today’s most 
relevant ṭuruq, and its location and influences. Finally, the chapter assesses the 
manifold influences Ṣūfism has exerted in religious as well as social and politi-
cal movements across the world.
2 Ṣūfism: Genealogy of a Term
The term Ṣūfism has long been widely used in Western academia. Today, it is 
also of common usage in popular parlance, employed when people want to 
refer to a broad array of phenomena, from some types of music or particular 
kinds of devotional dances, to ritual practices such as trance or religious heal-
ing. But what do we mean when speaking about ‘Ṣūfism’? The association of 
the term with such a diverse range of phenomena has admittedly obscured its 
meaning. This ambiguity, often embedded in a mysterious and exotic tone, is a 
feature that has characterised the term since its inception, and it is related to 
the patchy knowledge Europeans had about Islam.
Up to the end of the eighteenth century, Europeans’ knowledge of taṣawwuf 
was admittedly scant (Chodkiewicz 1994: 12; Schimmel 2011: 7–8). Prior to 
colonialism, some of the beliefs and practices that were to be later associated 
with the Ṣūfis attracted the attention of some European travellers, and they 
provided almost the only knowledge of taṣawwuf that Europe had had up to 
that time. For example, the Italian merchant Giosafat Barbaro (d. 1494), as 
well as the Spanish Ambassador of the Castilian King Ruy González de Clavijo 
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(d. 1412), travelled through Anatolia (De Nicola 2016: 59) and left accounts of 
encounters with Qalandar dervishes, devotees of a mendicant religiosity of an 
antinomian nature in pre-modern Islam (Karamustafa 1994). In the sixteenth 
century, there are also accounts of Europeans who travelled to Istanbul and 
visited a “dervish convent in the city” (Jezernik 2007: 166), and in the sev-
enteenth century of travellers who returned to Europe with descriptions of 
dervish rituals (Schimmel 2013: 179). Yet, none of these explanations provides 
evidence of the authors being good connoisseurs of what they were describing. 
On the contrary, since exploring religious aspects was not the main objective 
of their trips, the superficial acquaintance that characterises their reports is 
only to be expected.
The word ‘Ṣūfism’ came to be coined during the Enlightenment. From 
the eighteenth century onwards, the addition of the suffix ‘-ism’, characteris-
tic of European language and often used to denote ‘ideology’ or ‘worldview’, 
was added to the root ‘ṣuf ’. It is unclear what the root ‘ṣuf ’ actually means. 
Some have connected it to the term ṣafā’ (purity), or to ṣafwā (‘the elected, 
the chosen ones’), or even to ṣuffā (bench, in reference to a supposed group of 
contemporaries of Muhammad who would have gathered on a bench, symbol-
ising a primordial community of paupers) (Ernst 1997). Nonetheless, it is clear 
that the combination of ‘ṣuf ’ with ‘ism’ made the term Ṣūfism an etic attri-
bution, with no single emic translation in the languages spoken in Muslim- 
majority societies.
In addition, the sparse, sometimes inconsistent knowledge Europeans had 
about the religious realities of Muslim-majority societies contributed to a rep-
resentation of Ṣūfism within an atmosphere of ambiguity. One of the results 
of the ambiguity connected to this orientalising gaze is that those aspects of 
Islam that became commonly associated with Ṣūfism were extremely diverse 
in nature. So varied was the miscellany of ideas, personas, and practices that 
were from then on considered Ṣūfi that, one may argue, it would be difficult to 
find, other than Islam, a common denominator to connect them. In the eyes of 
the observer however, they were part of a unique, well-defined world, and they 
were typified accordingly. Most of the religious doings were perceived as prac-
tices that stood ‘at the fringes’ of what was perceived to be ‘normative’ within 
Islam, the dichotomy being in itself a further attribution of its dubious cor-
relation with living religion. The orientalising gaze through which Europeans 
often looked at Muslim-majority societies often meant that Islam was viewed 
quite negatively. It follows that since Ṣūfism was perceived as not exactly part 
of Islam, the ‘foreignness’ attributed to Ṣūfism within its own tradition gave it 
a more positive connotation. That meant that, for Europeans, over time the 
term became useful to designate different Muslim beliefs and practices that 
519Ṣūfism
for whatever reason were met with more interest and congeniality than the 
other Islamic beliefs and practices considered to be less congenial (Ernst 1997).
The religious manifestations that were viewed more favourably included 
certain types of poetry and musical genres, particular traditions of foretell-
ing the future and interpretation of dreams, rituals connected to the practice 
of God’s remembrance (dhikr),1 pilgrim worship at tombs and mausoleums 
(ziyāra),2 and religious healing (shifāʾ) (the latter three being practices that on 
occasion involved practitioners entering states of trance). It was in this context 
that taṣawwuf begun to be located either outside or at the fringes of the Islamic 
tradition. This positioning gave Ṣūfism its current traditional association with 
‘mysticism’ (that is, a human effort to get closer to the divine often beyond or 
at the expense of particular religious traditions). Most notably, the positive 
connotation acquired by Ṣūfism grew in direct contrast to the negative one 
acquired by Islam, to such an extent that, at least for some, the Ṣūfis came to 
be viewed as non-Islamic devotees in Muslim-majority societies. Orientalists 
such as Sir William Jones (d. 1794) or Sir John Malcolm (d. 1833) represent the 
classical view of this approach. Ṣūfism from this perspective was ‘non-Muslim 
within Islam,’ and was defined as an offshoot of Hindu yoga, Greek philosophy, 
and Buddhism (Ernst 1997). By the end of the eighteenth century and begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, the term sometimes also became linked to 
pantheistic beliefs; that is, the creed in which the human is perceived to be 
identical to the divine.
3 Ṣūfism’s ‘Foreignness’ and ‘Impurity’
The tendency to associate Ṣūfism with something other than Islam has contin-
ued until the present day, and Ṣūfism’s foreignness to Islam is an idea that is 
still quite popular in the Western world and among (an ever-increasing num-
ber of) Muslim opponents of taṣawwuf. In the West, the twentieth century saw 
the popularisation of the idea of Ṣūfism as ‘the non-Islamic mysticism’ put into 
practice. As a result, we have witnessed the emergence of groups in Europe 
and North America who describe themselves as Ṣūfis, but do not consider 
1 Dhikr (Arab.) is generally translated into English as ‘remembrance’. It denotes a ritual com-
monly performed by Ṣūfis that consists of mentioning a previously memorized formula. 
Dhikr djāli refers to the performed ritual when the formula is uttered aloud, whereas dhikr 
khāfi refers to the one practiced either in silence or in low tones. Both can be performed 
either individually or collectively.
2 Ziyāra, pl. ziyārāt (Arab.) is a Ṣūfi pious visitation, pilgrimage to a holy place, generally a 
zāwiya, tomb, or shrine.
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themselves to be Muslims. Organisations such as the Ṣūfi Order International, 
for example, consider Ṣūfism to be a ‘universal’ (that is, not bounded to Islam) 
religious tradition, with the current leader, Zia Inayat Khan (b. 1971), express-
ing his views on the non-Islamic nature of Ṣūfism in a famous essay called “The 
Paradox of Universal Ṣūfism” (Inayat Khan 2016). Equally, the International Ṣūfi 
Movement and the Ṣūfi Ruhaniat International, based in San Francisco (Ṣūfi 
Ruhaniat International 2020) are groups that see themselves not as part of the 
Islamic tradition, but of a ‘Universal’ one. Finally, special mention is given to 
Idries Shah (d. 1996), arguably the greatest populariser of the ‘non-Islamic’ ten-
dency within Ṣūfism. The Indian spiritual teacher and prolific author became 
famous for suggesting that Ṣūfism, a ‘universal’ religiosity, predates Islam. 
Although his scholarly credentials have been widely questioned, he is well 
known for ‘guiding’ and being a source of inspiration for famous personalities, 
such as the Nobel Laureate Doris Lessing (d. 2013) and the American psycholo-
gist Robert Evan Ornstein (d. 2018). He was also in close contact with members 
of more recently formed religious groups, including Gerald Gardner, (d. 1964) 
the founder of Wicca, and John Godolphin Bennett, (d. 1974) the British scien-
tist and disciple of G.I. Gurdjeff (d. 1949) (Wellbeloved 2003). Although these 
ideas have contributed to make Ṣūfism known in some non-Muslim milieus 
unfamiliar with Islam, they are certainly not representative of the majority of 
Ṣūfis. In fact, a more ‘mainstream’ identity within contemporary Ṣūfism posi-
tions taṣawwuf right at the core of the Islamic tradition, or as epitomising its 
essence, in Alexander Knysh’s words: “[Ṣūfism is] Islam in miniature [because] 
all the features of the encompassing larger tradition (Islam) are reflected in its 
ascetic-mystical stream (Ṣūfism)” (Knysh 2017: 7).
Also common, however, is the tendency to view Ṣūfism as something that 
has departed from a ‘normative’ understanding of Islam, at least from the 
point of view of orthopraxis. This conceptualisation of Ṣūfism is becoming 
more popular not only in the West, but also in some Muslim-majority societ-
ies. It is clear that the practices that today are perceived as ‘Ṣūfi’ (for example, 
samāʾ,3 shifāʾ, ziyāra, and dhikr) have accepted a wide variety of performative 
styles according to cultural variations to give Ṣūfism a reputation of being syn-
cretic. Clearly, as a living tradition, Islam has largely embodied a multiplicity 
of rhythms, looks, and cadences, generating today’s characteristic stunning 
3 Samāʾ (Arab.): type of music used in Ṣūfi rituals of dhikr. Today it has become a musical style 
in its own right and is performed in non-religious settings. Samāʾ literally refers to the act 
of hearing, but more precisely denotes ‘that which is heard’. In Ṣūfism, samāʾ is often used 
to refer to the hearing of music, the spiritual concert, in a more or less ritualised form. In 
medieval Ṣūfi writings samāʾ is perceived as a means of enriching the soul that often induces 
pronounced emotional states (aḥwāl sing. ḥāl), including episodes of trance.
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diversity, for which Ṣūfism is evidently not solely responsible. It is also true 
that Ṣūfism has historically played (and continues to do so) a significant role in 
Islam reaching new cultural milieus. In fact, it is often claimed that taṣawwuf 
has been a decisive element in the historical spread of Islam, and in the devel-
opment of local Islamic cultures across the globe.4 Therefore, the location of 
Ṣūfism at ‘the fringes’, both in religious terms, and especially in geographical 
terms, makes sense to a certain degree.
Nonetheless, the single most significant reason why Ṣūfism today may be 
considered to be insufficiently Islamic, and as a result viewed in a negative 
light by Muslims, is the often unsympathetic attitude that certain reform 
movements have had towards taṣawwuf since their inception in the late eigh-
teenth century. It should be noted that (although probably the best-known) 
reformists’ attacks against Ṣūfism were not the first or only criticisms faced by 
taṣawwuf. As early as the tenth century, one of the most renowned Ṣūfi per-
sonalities, the medieval mystic Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), was executed for pro-
claiming his mystical union with God in a manner considered extreme by his 
detractors. Literalist and legalist interpreters of Islam have long opposed the 
ideas of the Ṣūfis. They have argued over centuries that Ṣūfi Orders provide 
means for non-Islamic practices and are based in beliefs of idolatry (shirk), 
considered by Islam an unforgivable sin. Yet it was the reform movements that 
made these criticisms widespread from the eighteenth century onwards.
Most famous for its outright opposition to Ṣūfi practices and beliefs was the 
Arabian Wahhābī movement, as well as India’s Ahl-i Ḥadīth (Robinson 1988). 
With their emphasis on correctness in religious performance, these groups 
saw practices such as the veneration at the graves of the awliyāʾ Allāh5 as a 
breach of the belief of tawḥīd (the principle of Oneness of God) fundamental 
articulation of the monotheistic ethos in Islam. These criticisms were present 
in diverse cultural settings within Muslim-majority societies. We find them, 
for example, in the activities and teachings of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Idrīs al-Sanūsī 
(d. 1931) (Vikør 1995) and the 1930s Society of Algerian ʿUlamāʾ in North Africa, 
in the Jadid movement in Central Asia (Khalid 1999; Baldauf 2001), and in the 
4 There are a number of studies devoted to the spread of Islam that support this view: for exam-
ple, Buehler (1998), Le Gall (2010), Cornell (1998), and Vikør (2000). However, an increasing 
number of scholars are questioning this view by arguing that this is a claim made a posteriori 
by Ṣūfis of later periods (DeWeese 1994), or in particular by members of Ṣūfi Orders willing 
to legitimate their institutions.
5 Walī Allāh, pl. awliyāʾ Allāh (Arab.): walī can be translated as manager, guardian, protector, 
and also intimate or, most commonly, friend. Walī Allāh, generally translated as ‘friend of 
God’, is the term used to designate a Muslim saint, one who intercedes for others as Allah’s 
deputy or vice-regent on earth.
522 Domínguez Díaz
Muḥammadiyya in Indonesia (Anwar 2005). In the Arabian Peninsula, as early 
as 1803, the Wahhābī seizure of Mecca and Medina brought about the destruc-
tion of all the tombs that existed in and around the city (Bruinessen 2009). 
Attacks on Ṣūfi shrines in the name of Islam’s ‘purification’ have persisted to 
this day; in Libya, for example, as recently as 2012, there was desecration of at 
least six Ṣūfi shrines and complexes,6 and in Pakistan two bomb attacks—at 
the shrine of Hazrat Data Ganj Baksh Ali Hujweri in Lahore in 2010, and at a 
Ṣūfi Festival in southern Punjab in 2011—killed around a hundred people and 
injured many more. These are just a few of numerous examples. Confrontation 
between ‘Ṣūfis’ and ‘anti-Ṣūfis’ has recently become the norm rather than the 
exception in many Muslim-majority societies (Sirriyeh 1999).
The opposition between Ṣūfism and anti-Ṣūfis is not straightforward, and vari-
ous aspects deserve to be highlighted. First, it has been claimed that ‘fundamen-
talist’ voices within Islamism have been able to elaborate on their religio-political 
identity thanks to and against a backdrop of ‘two others’ (an external other, the 
West, and an internal other, Ṣūfism) (Weismann 2011). As our knowledge of both 
Ṣūfism and Salafism expands, a view in which Ṣūfism is both the antithesis and a 
foundational background to Salafism is gaining ground, at least within academic 
circles (for example, Ridgeon et al 2015). Considering Ṣūfism as merely antitheti-
cal to militant Islam is therefore misleading, in that it purportedly forgets the 
relevant role Ṣūfism has had in Islamic history, in among other things, the cre-
ation of groups and ideologies from which Islamists (Salafis among them) stem. 
Thus, the structure typical of the ṭuruq, if not their core doctrines, has provided 
inspiration for Islamist political organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
(al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, founded 1928), a spin-off of the ṭarīqa Ḥaṣāfīyya 
Shādhilīyya (Johansen 1996). Thus, Salafism can be seen more accurately, or at 
least partly, as a modern result of a religious trend that was at the same time Ṣūfi 
and reformist, rather than the negation of Ṣūfism in itself (Weismann 2011).
Second, the relationship between Ṣūfis and their detractors is also complex 
because some of the verbal attacks pronounced against Ṣūfism have been and 
are vocalised from within the Ṣūfi movement; therefore, these critics should be 
viewed not as opponents of Ṣūfism, but as proponents of change from within 
taṣawwuf. One example of this interesting relationship is Deobandism, a 
6 Attacks on: the al-Maṣrī shrine in Tripoli (October 2011), Sīdī ʿUbaīd’s tombs’ complex 
in Benghazi (January 2012), the tomb of a fifteenth-century scholar ʿAbd al-Salām al-
Asmar (d. 1575) in Zlitan (March 2012), Abdul Salam Al Asmari’s shrine, mosque, and library, 
Hazrat Sheikh Aḥmad Zarrūq’s (d.1493) tomb, and the al-Shaʿab al-Dahmān mosque, which 
lodged a number of Ṣūfi graves, including the tomb of the Ṣūfi scholar ʿAbdullah al-Shaʿab 
(d. sixteenth century) (August 2012). At http://themuslim500.com/2013-2/issues-of-the-day/
destruction-of-Ṣūfi-shrines. Accessed 01/07/2020.
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reformist trend that is often referred to as ‘South Asian Wahhābism’ and which 
shows, at the same time, accommodation and acceptance of Ṣūfism. Yet clearly 
the two seem to differ, as noted by Oliver Roy when speaking about the situa-
tion in Afghanistan, in that:
The Deoband school rejected innovation (bi‘dā), kept to a strict ortho-
doxy and would not permit the cult of the saints; nevertheless, it accepted 
Ṣūfism and many of the teachers were Naqshbandi or Qadiri [these are 
the names, as we shall see later, of two of the most relevant Ṣūfi Orders], 
which, in itself, clearly shows how the fundamentalism of the school is 
distinct from that of the Saudi Wahhabi. Once again, the link between 
fundamentalism and Ṣūfism was to be the hallmark of the orthodoxy of 
the ‘ulama of the subcontinent, Afghanistan included.
Roy 1990: 57
Similar to the situation with Deobandism, many reformers in other parts of the 
world, did not, at least initially, oppose Ṣūfism per se, but some of the practices 
that were more often associated with this type of religiosity (the veneration of 
saints, the visitation of tombs, faith healing, miracle claims, and so forth).
In most cases, they were very critical of Ṣūfism in its organised form, the Ṣūfi 
Orders, being lines of thought inspired, for example, by the Egyptian thinker 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh or Indonesia’s Muḥammadiyya movement. Such objec-
tions attest to the anti-ṭarīqa stance of many nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Islamic trends, rather than a mere anti-Ṣūfi position. These perspec-
tives could also be applied to (both Islamic and secularist) nationalist circles in 
many Muslim-majority societies. The most famous example is the policies of 
the Turkish Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who suppressed Ṣūfi Orders because they 
were seen as a tie to the past and an impediment to the modernisation and 
advancement of the nation. Other countries, such as Egypt, aware of the effec-
tive powers that Ṣūfi leaders and their organisations exerted over vast groups 
of the population, attempted to limit their influence and bring them under 
state control.
A further aspect of the complex confrontation between Salafis and Ṣūfis is 
the inner diversity existing within the two. For example, several attacks on cen-
tres of Ṣūfi piety have been authorised by supporters of the Salafiyya, yet not all 
Salafis support acts of violence against Ṣūfis, even though, in many cases, they 
consider the veneration of Ṣūfi figures as an innovation (bidʿa) with no place 
in Islam. Soon after the desecration of shrines in Egypt on March 2011 by Salafi 
vigilantes, the Salafi leader ʿAbd al-Muna ʿim al-Shahha publicly condemned 
the attacks as criminal acts, declaring they were completely impermissible 
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because, in his view, Salafis oppose the veneration of graves but do not advo-
cate their destruction. This statement proliferated on Salafi websites, and 
attacks on Ṣūfi shrines ceased immediately (Brown 2011: 10).7
4 The Making of a Religious Tradition
But what really is Ṣūfism, and how did it come to be what it is today? Albeit his-
torically not proven, Muslim tradition speaks of the existence of people with 
mystical inclinations that were companions of the Prophet. Somewhat vaguely 
defined, it is difficult to know exactly what bound these people together and 
differentiated them from other Muslims (Knysh 2017: 247).8 Additionally, there 
are references to ascetics as part of the taṣawwuf trend (for example, faqīr, 
ʿārif ) in source material. Despite these few cases, the formative period of what 
we refer to today as Ṣūfism can be more generally identified between the ninth 
and twelfth centuries, a long-lasting period of time in which a wide range of 
diverse religious ideas and practices became a ‘recognised religious tradition’, 
which included a body of religious literature, a set of principles, and a com-
pendium of ritual exercises. Historians have identified a significant number 
of religious trends within ‘Islamdom’ that tried to use the human soul as a 
mechanism and tool to experience reality during the ninth and tenth centuries 
(Karamustafa 2007). At first, these sometimes quite distinct religious move-
ments were not part of a single unified trend, but rather diverse groups based 
across the world.
In this early phase, Baghdad was important in terms of the innovation of 
mystical trends, but it was by no means the only place where they existed. 
Lower Iraq, North-Eastern Iran, and Central Asia, for example, were places with 
a vibrant mystical life, as exemplified by groups such as the Malāmatīs and 
authors such as Sahl ibn ʿAbdulla al-Tustarī (d. 896) or Abū ʿĪsā Muḥammad 
ibn ʿĪsā ibn Sawrah ibn Shaddād al-Tirmidhī (d. 892).9 Some of these renun-
ciant trends, such as the Malāmatiyyā or the Karrāmiyyā, have been identified 
as being too distinct as to be considered ‘Ṣūfi’. They are oftentimes referred 
to as made of ‘the people of the khānaqā’ (a lodge for spiritual retreat), the 
7 This was published on Salafi websites. See: www.salafonline.net/frontend/newsdetails 
.aspx?ftid=11&nid=65. Accessed 19/05/2016.
8 Examples of the early mystics are ‘Abū Ḏarr al-Ghifārī al-Kinānī (d.652), ‘Abū’l-Dardā’ (d.639), 
Hudhayfā ibn al-Yamān (d.656), or, ‘Imrān ibn al-Hussayn al-Khuzā’i (d.672), ‘Abdallah ibn 
‘Amr ibn al-‘As (d.685), see Knysh (2017: 247).
9 For a more detailed analysis of earlier groups and personalities, see Karamustafa (2007).
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khānaqā‘iyyūn (Maqdisi in Melchert 2001: 237).10 In any case, they contributed 
to the consolidation of Ṣūfism.
In time, Baghdad would emerge as a major capital of Ṣūfi ideas, and 
Baghdadi trends were exported to more distant parts of the Islamic world, such 
as the Iberian and Arabian Peninsulas, where they became fused with local 
practices and ideas. As a result, a growing gap emerged between what Ahmet 
Karamustafa (2007: ix) called the “metropolitan” version of Ṣūfism (distinctive 
of Baghdad) and a series of “provincial” counterparts. These flourishing mysti-
cal trends should be viewed within the context of a rapidly evolving intellec-
tual milieu within Islamic thought during this period of consolidation of Islam 
as an established World religion.
However, it is the creation of a distinctively Ṣūfi literary genre during the 
tenth and eleventh centuries that has been seen as the historical landmark 
in the birth of ‘Ṣūfism’, that is, a self-conscious religious tradition. The liter-
ary output produced in this phase—first in Arabic from the eleventh century 
onwards, and later on in Persian—has been viewed as a sum of attempts to 
unify the eclectic ‘metropolitan-versus-provincial’ compendium of mystical 
trends into a single normative corpus. At the same time, Ṣūfism incorporated 
doctrinal corpuses from other traditions (for example, Neoplatonic, Hellenic, 
Gnostic) elaborating on a theosophical system. The contributions of other tra-
ditions are evident in the writings of one of the theosophical Ṣūfis par excel-
lence, the Persian al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), who is said to have incorporated 
Zoroastrian and Hermetic concepts into his thought.11
The process of developing an ‘orthodoxy/orthopraxis’ was meant to define 
the boundaries and somehow assimilate the diversity of mystical approaches 
that existed, with mystical writers of the period disagreeing over matters of 
religious norm, and also in that they positioned themselves and their views 
of Islam in rather different ways. The literary genre introduced the tradition 
to new audiences, contributed to building new solidarity between groups, 
and preserved and evaluated the legacy of earlier paragons (Le Gall 2010: 
676). The process of tradition-building was further consolidated by the emer-
gence of a new type of religious institution, the Ṣūfi lodge (sing. zāwiya, ribāṭ, 
or khānaqā’).
10  A good approximation of these distinct early renouncing movements that appeared 
mostly in Nishapur, see Melchert (2001).
11  A later but very relevant theosophical author was the Murcia-born Ibn al-ʿArabī 
(d. 1240), one of the major exponents of theosophical Ṣūfism and the perhaps most 
important author in the development of the idea of sainthood in Islam. For further refer-
ence, see Renard (2008).
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Ṣūfi lodges housed a new type of congregation comprising a religious leader, 
the shaykh al-tarbiyya, and his followers. A religious ‘method’ emerged as the 
key that brought together the master and his disciples.12 These communi-
ties soon became regulated by manuals of conduct and etiquette (adab) by 
which communal living was organised. The ultimate goal of the Ṣūfi method 
was, the rationale goes, fusing the devotee with God, an objective ultimately 
attained after undertaking a journey through a ‘path’ (ṭarīqa) consisting of 
‘stations’ (sing. maqām) and a series of feelings or ‘states’ (sing. ḥāl) derived 
from the experience of being in those stations. Ṣūfism understands that the 
journey is a way of progressively overcoming the machinations of one’s car-
nal soul or ego-self (nafs) and detaching oneself from those mundane aspects 
that habitually estrange the spirit from its godly source (Ohlander 2015: 61). By 
eliminating these impurities, the devotee is understood to finally return to the 
‘original source’, God. By undertaking the journey, the devotee seeks ultimately 
to attain experiential knowledge (maʿrifa) of God’s unity, distinguishing the 
reality of the Islamic profession of faith ‘There is no god but God’ from the 
physical world.
It was assumed, however, that the sojourner required guidance to navi-
gate the path. The shaykh’s ‘educational’ (tarbiyya) role consisted of training 
and closely supervising the spiritual transformation of the devotee. The link 
between shaykh and disciple was conceptualised as maḥabba (divine love) and 
routinely manifested by personal submission and obedience. Loyalty to those 
masters became more formally established over time by developing the notion 
of ‘initiation’, signalled by the bayʿa13 (oath of allegiance), and thus the exclu-
sive connection that a disciple had with the shaykh became a feature of that 
master-disciple relationship. Each ṭarīqa then became a group of disciples liv-
ing in a lodge with their shaykh and following his particular method to attain 
the Divine.
In most cases, the small communities that were created around particu-
lar masters did not survive more than a few generations. Nevertheless, it was 
not long until a new concept, that of the silsila, became central to Ṣūfism, 
and groups would often consolidate to become more sizeable and stable. The 
notion of the silsila connected particular individuals that had studied with a 
master to him and his unique method/path. The idea of the silsila helped to 
12  A more detailed explanation of this method of spiritual attainment is given by Schimmel 
(2013: 99–148), Knysh (2010: 301–311), Ernst (1997: 98–108), and Hodgson (1974: 232–227).
13  bayʿa (Arab.) is generally used to refer to an ‘oath of allegiance’ pledged to a religious or 
political institution or leader. In Ṣūfism, it signifies a vow of allegiance to a Ṣūfi saint (walī 
Allāh). Sometimes members of Ṣūfi Orders refer to it as ‘the pact’.
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develop webs of individuals and far-flung spiritual families, relating people 
from distant times and places.14 Through the notion of the silsila, particular 
sayings were linked to specific personalities, in a development that resonates 
with the concept of isnād, the authentication mechanism that is characteris-
tic of hadith literature. However, these incipient ‘chains of authority’ found 
in early Ṣūfism soon gave way to veritable Ṣūfi genealogies, by which all the 
awliyāʾ within a given path had to be connected by a shared pedigree. The Ṣūfi 
communities grew not only larger, but also more important.
The role played by the lodges is the key to understanding the evolution of 
Ṣūfism from a dispersed and liminal mystical movement to a consolidated and 
vastly spread religious tradition. Ṣūfism underwent a process of institution-
alisation, by which the small religious communities articulated around spe-
cific lodges came into contact with relevant political and social players. The 
ṭuruq, thence, emerged from a dynamic of routinisation that made the Ṣūfis 
both more famous and more powerful. In a variety of political scenarios, we 
see that by the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh century, rulers 
in highly volatile political contexts began to support with patronage (waqf ) 
ʿulamāʾ, Ṣūfis, and scholars of law, as a way to try to cement their legitimacy 
among local communities.15 In time the groups became more complex: the 
lodges that housed them often turned to sponsorship from wealthy donors in 
the form of charitable endowments, a partnership between religious and eco-
nomic or political personalities that often benefitted both parties.
In addition, these communities soon acquired pivotal roles in their local 
societies, with their leaders frequently becoming significant and well-known 
personalities, not only with a saying about religious matters.16 Nevertheless, 
the ṭuruq of this period showed little resemblance to those we know today, 
with ‘modern’ ṭuruq, or as they are often called “full-grown brotherhoods” 
(Abun-Nasr 2007), emerging from the eighteenth century onwards.
14  The earliest known exponents of such genealogies are Jaʿfar al-Khuldī (d. 959), who 
declared that Junayd had inherited his teachings ultimately from the followers via a chain 
that included Ḥasan Yasār al-Baṣrī (d. 728) and, soon after Khuldi, Abu Ali al-Daqqaq 
(d. 405/1015) who also traced Junayd’s teaching to the followers, but via Dawud 
ibn Nusair al-Tā’ī (d. 781-2) (Karamustafa 2007: 116).
15  This has, for example, been analysed by Erik Ohlander (2008) in his study of tenth-
century Palestine.
16  Multiple instances can be cited for the political influence exerted by Ṣūfis at differ-
ent times and in different regions. A notable example is that of the movement led by 
the Qaramanoghlus, which resulted in the foundation of the Safavid dynasty in Persia, 
a dynasty that traced their origin back to a Ṣūfi personality, the dervish Nura Ṣūfi 
(Trimingham 1973: 239).
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Prior to the twelfth century, the Ṣūfi concept of ‘friendship with God’ 
(walāya), which gives a special ‘saintly status’ to particular Ṣūfi personali-
ties, developed independently from the existing groups that gathered around 
lodges (Karamustafa 2007). However, the mushrooming success of these mys-
tical communities in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has been seen as 
both the cause and the consequence of the integration the walāya cosmogony 
into the routinised structure of the lodges. It is during this period that local 
awliyāʾ began to be adored by wider crowds, becoming the axis of posthumous 
veneration. Thus, the walī’s tomb became a symbol of the vector connecting 
the ordinary with the otherworld. These graves were converted into shrines 
and worshippers developed series of rituals around the walī’s tomb, for it was 
perceived as a point of connection between humans and God.
The awliyāʾ’s descendants used their ancestors’ charisma to convert the 
lodges into centres of increasing economic and social power. More sizeable 
communities of devotees were created around these nuclei, many of which 
were organised along tribal or ethnic lines. The ṭuruq began to ramify, with 
groups in different regions claiming adherence to particular awliyāʾ with com-
mon ancestry. Ṣūfism grew in popularity beyond recognition, attracting audi-
ences of an increasingly diverse social and economic background. Such growth 
promoted its fame and attracted renewed criticisms from both non-Ṣūfis and 
insiders, who sometimes considered that a tendency towards routinisation 
would bring about the loosening of the moral and radical freshness that Ṣūfism 
stood for.
By the fourteenth century, the transformation of Ṣūfism from a minority 
religious trend manifested by a fringe community of wayfarers into one of the 
most widespread traditions within Islam, with a significant impact at social, 
economic, and political levels, was concluded. By then, Ṣūfism was “a religious 
and social presence embedded in a distinct tradition of piety, anchored in 
coherent local associations, and integral to the world of Muslim scholarship 
and the fabric of Muslim societies” (Le Gall 2010: 677).
5 The Ṣūfi Brotherhoods
Scholars still lack a more distinct understanding of the transformation that 
Ṣūfism underwent from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century (Le Gall 
2010). The fourteenth century saw the success and consolidation of the walāya 
concept, connected with the establishment of a ‘culture’ of Ṣūfism. In this 
context a ṭarīqa consisted of a walī, a doctrinal body and a series of distinct 
ritual practices that were often not distinct from those of other ṭuruq. In 
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addition, there was a network of shrines geographically dispersed and con-
nected through a number of Ṣūfi pilgrimage routes. I define this landscape as a 
‘culture of Ṣūfism’, denoting that the travel to various shrines and participation 
of pilgrims in rituals performed in them was a common practice and implied 
devotion to awliyāʾ from different ṭuruq. In other words, a notion of ‘exclusive 
membership’ did not exist within the ṭuruq system. Although Ṣūfism as a ‘cul-
ture’ is still widespread today, over time this loosely organised form of saintly 
veneration has had to learn to coexist with an increasingly structured type of 
Ṣūfism, that of the modern established Orders.
By the eighteenth century, and not entirely historically coincidental with 
the emergence of non-Ṣūfi revivalist trends, a further step in the process of 
institutionalisation of the ṭuruq system had been observed (for example, 
Abun-Nasr 2007). The Ṣūfi Orders of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
are considered to be a major foundation for understanding the recent dynam-
ics of Ṣūfism, as they developed organisations and leadership that are pivotal 
in setting the discourse and defining the issues of Ṣūfism in the modern period 
(Ohtsuka and Voll 2016). Crucially, the ṭuruq of that time, which was more sim-
ilar to today’s Orders, began to exhibit a more restrictive idea of membership, 
the concept of bay‘a, which acquired a renewed relevance because it signifies 
exclusivity in the bond between devotee and walī. As a result, religious author-
ity tended to concentrate more exclusively on the walī, and baraka (Colin 
2016), the force by which God is believed to emanate his/her/its source into the 
ordinary, became increasingly associated with awliyāʾ at the expense of other 
sources of veneration, such as objects and places. Although in many cases the 
‘new’ ṭuruq were just branches of the old ones, they were a totally new breed 
and with awliyāʾ’s renewed claims of genealogical connection to Muḥammad, 
they have to be seen as fully fledged and highly influential distinct sources of 
Islamic revival.
In a development that predates the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
rituals adopted distinctive features and were associated with a formal chain 
of spiritual descent (silsila) which indicated that the person leading the ritual 
(or instructing others in geographically distant places on how to do so) took its 
formula from a walī who took it from another walī and so on, in a line extend-
ing back to the founder, and then often beyond the founder to the Prophet 
Muḥammad (Ohtsuka and Voll 2016). As Orders consolidated, leadership 
would pass from one shaykh to the next, sometimes along blood lines and less 
often on the basis of spiritual seniority/mastery within the ṭarīqa. Sometimes 
branches would disappear over succession disputes, while in others a devotee 
would attain sufficient charisma to establish a recognised ‘sub-branch’ within 
a pre-existing Order or initiate a whole new ṭarīqa (Ohtsuka and Voll 2016). 
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Overall, the structures of Ṣūfi religious authority that we know today were well 
established by the eighteenth century.
6 Ṣūfism and Ṣūfi Religious Organisations
From the eighteenth century onwards, the ṭuruq became “full-grown brother-
hoods” (Abun-Nasr 2007), ‘religious organisations’ that were to a certain extent 
comparable with those developed by other religions. In particular, there are 
parallels in that the concept of membership attained by most Ṣūfi Orders since 
then would easily comply with the definition proposed by sociologists of reli-
gion when referring to religious groups in general. Stolz, for example, defines it 
as the situation in which:
The individual may consider him or herself to be a member of a group, 
giving him or her certain rights to the resources (such as knowledge, ritu-
als, friendship) of the group. Among these resources we normally find 
‘chains’ of salvation means leading to salvation ends. In return, the indi-
vidual normally gives up control over certain actions or resources (for 
example, agrees to follow certain rules, subscribe to certain beliefs, sup-
port the group financially, etc.). Memberships are normally indivisible, 
and not alienable. They are often exclusive; the group thus forbids mem-
bership of other religious groups.
Stolz 2006: 24
This notion of membership is certainly applicable to many Ṣūfi Orders 
today. Nonetheless, some specific points are worth considering in the case of 
taṣawwuf. First, the laxity of the bond between walī and devotee is often still 
significant. For example, in many Ṣūfi organisations, both in Muslim-majority 
societies and in the West, there are a significant number of people at the gather-
ings who are not formal members of the Order, but people just ‘tasting’ Ṣūfism 
(to use the jargon of Ṣūfi Muslims). Although in some cases these individuals 
will in time become fully committed members of the ṭarīqa, others will have a 
noncommittal in-and-out relationship for as long as their association with the 
organisation lasts; this is sometimes a period of time that is much longer than 
the Order would like it to be. In some cases, as is the case with some branches 
of the Qādiriyya, such as the Būdshīshiyya, those ‘tasting’ Ṣūfism are asked for a 
certain degree of commitment and exclusivity, and at least for the time period 
in which they are ‘tasting’ they are prevented from visiting other brotherhoods 
(Dominguez Diaz 2014: 129).
531Ṣūfism
Second, although a number of known organisations conform with this pat-
tern, Ṣūfism displays an entirely parallel dimension that escapes the formal-
ity, exclusivity, and commitment imposed by the idea of membership. On the 
one hand, the aforementioned ‘culture’ of Ṣūfism, with its “routes, circuits and 
networks which pilgrimage and visitation establishes” (Werbner 2015: 299) is 
still vigorous and compelling to millions of Muslims. On many occasions, these 
networks contain shrines whose awliyāʾ do not belong to the same silsila, and 
thus not to the same ṭarīqa either (in fact, these shrines are often not associ-
ated with particular Orders at all). In Central Asia and North Africa, especially, 
there are plenty of local groups that have evolved around particular shrines or 
families. Awliyāʾ with a renowned reputation for their religious excellence and 
walāya might attract crowds during their lifetime, but these followers might 
fall away once they die; thus, Ṣūfi Orders with a stable body of formal disciples 
are not created. Tombs of such pious teachers exist throughout the world and 
are vibrant centres of popular piety and the rituals performed there sometimes 
combine the styles of various Orders. These practices might be indirectly iden-
tified with Ṣūfism in a more general way, and less so with a particular path, 
although the real impact and identity of these manifestations is not general or 
vague, but specific and local. This type of Ṣūfi centre is called “shrine-Ṣūfism” 
by Kazuo Ohtsuka and John Voll (2016), and it is an important aspect of mod-
ern Ṣūfism that does not conform with, and in some cases defies, the rule of 
exclusive membership followed by the largest brotherhoods.
Third, there are other types of Ṣūfi groups that similarly defy the notion of 
exclusive membership. Some groups, often those that stand closer to New Age 
religiosities, evolve around a loosely organised structure, with a lax attitude 
towards affiliation for which they are often very proud. In these groups, partici-
pants are not asked for any form of exclusive affiliation and, in fact, it is often 
the case that attendees discuss and compare the practices of the group with 
those of others at ritual sessions; for example, this is found among members of 
the ṭarīqa Naqshbandiyya in various European countries.
Despite all the aforementioned issues, the majority of Orders have a clearly 
defined notion of membership, or at least one that is more evident than that of 
the pre-modern groups. The orders that developed from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries onwards are, by and large, more stable structures than 
their pre-modern precursors. They represented a new organisational direction 
and were “relatively more centralized and less prone to fission than their pre-
decessors” (O’Fahey 1990: 4). They were also different from the old ṭuruq in a 
number of other ways. The new orders tended to place less attention to the 
joyful aspects of Ṣūfism and became more ‘sober’, and also, typically, became 
more concerned with matters of Islamic law.
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7 Ṣūfism’s Vitality in Modern Times
By the mid-twentieth century some observers thought of the ṭuruq as rem-
nants of the past, with little chance of surviving the rapid changes being expe-
rienced by Muslim societies. They believed that as societies became more 
industrialised and technology was made more widely accessible, the social 
functions once played by the Ṣūfi awliyāʾ and their Orders would be replaced 
by other forms of social participation, such as the labour unions (Gilsenan 
1967). In some parts of the world Ṣūfi activity appears to have decreased, partly 
due to the increasing success of the aforementioned attacks by reformists and 
secularists. In countries such as Tunisia, for example, Ṣūfism has become rel-
egated to almost minimal expression. In other countries, such as Turkey, there 
has been a diminished role of several Orders, and in most other places some 
of the typical characteristics of the ṭuruq have undergone significant changes.
Today, for example, the role played by the internet and mobile phones in the 
reaffirming of Ṣūfi charisma through the sharing of saintly imagery, although 
yet to be formally assessed by the academe, is a key aspect in the religious 
lifestyles of some Muslim youth. Equally, the transnational impetus acquired 
by many Orders via an increasing flow of international migration and cosmo-
politan ties was difficult to predict forty years ago. Nevertheless, the dramatic 
changes that Ṣūfism has undergone, and contrary to the predictions of decline, 
demonstrate quite the opposite, that ṭuruq continue to be a fundamental ele-
ment of Muslim religious life everywhere.
Ṣūfi Orders have also been capable of integrating into the local religious cul-
tures of disparate corners of the globe, becoming effective vehicles of religious 
proselytization. In some cases, Ṣūfi Orders have adopted a laissez-faire attitude 
with regard to legal matters, becoming de facto friendlier to the pre-existing 
religious fabric of the lands in which they arrived. This has contributed to min-
imising the confrontational aspect of inter-religious encounters and facilitated 
the success of Islam in many regions of Africa and South-East Asia. Ṣūfism 
has demonstrated the ability to adapt to local religious laws and cultures, and 
has also brought about, for the new devotee, the opportunity to be incorpo-
rated into a wider religious community, the umma, which has provided a new 
and dynamic identity to the communities it has reached. For example, in West 
Africa, the flexible structure adopted by the Qādiriyya allowed this ṭarīqa to 
engage with local tribal leaders who have played a key role in the function of 
the organisation (Brenner 1988). Similarly, the Neo-Ṣūfism of the Shaṭṭāriyya 
and the adaptable character of the master—disciple relationship, in particu-
lar in West Sumatra, has facilitated expansion of the Order within South-East 
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Asia, especially during the late nineteenth century and beginning of the twen-
tieth century (Fathurahman 2003).
It is worth noting, however, that patterns of change coexist with continuity 
of other aspects, and that of the features that have defined Ṣūfism for many 
centuries are still part of what it is today; in fact, these are essential to under-
standing its modern success. Thus, Ṣūfi Orders continue to facilitate spaces 
of religious devotion that often pervade social class, race, and ethnicity—
nowadays, in some cases, even gender. The culture of saint veneration that 
occurs around shrine and tomb complexes is as vibrant and flourishing as it 
was before the advent of nation states. Moreover, the consolidation of social 
and political structures such as political parties and labour unions have not 
threatened, as predicted earlier, the survival of the Orders; instead ṭuruq have 
become new ways of articulating civil society in many Muslim majority soci-
eties. In some cases, the ṭuruq advocate political quietism, as it is often the 
case among Ṣūfi Orders in countries such as Germany or Holland, yet in others 
they are involved in political matters, as in Afghanistan and Iraq. The politi-
cal involvement of Ṣūfism has sometimes been open, such us in war-torn sce-
narios, yet in other instances it has been more discreet. For example, in several 
countries in the West, Ṣūfi groups of different leanings have been supported 
economically by governments as part of their efforts to combat home-grown 
jihadism (see Muedini 2015).
7.1 Transnational Ṣūfism
Several Orders have thrived to such an extent that they have developed inter-
regional networks of religious followers and personalities. The example of the 
Naqshbandiyya in the Levant, analysed in detail by Itzchak Weismann (2007) 
in his famous monograph, is a good example of the geographical expansion 
that Ṣūfism can achieve. This Order, originally from Central Asia, has extended 
into South Asia and to Ottoman lands via Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1625) and his 
successors on one hand, and by the earlier line of ʿUbaydullāh Aḥrār on the 
other. By the eighteenth century, dignitaries of this Order were well known 
among Istanbul’s most illustrious circles as well as in other major Ottoman 
capitals, such as Damascus. In Syria’s capital, for example, the great Ḥanafī 
muftī Muḥammad Khalīl al-Murādī (d. 1791) was part of a family associated 
with the Naqshbandiyya. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Shaykh 
Khālid al-Baghdādī (d. 1827), part of the Mujaddidī line within the Order, led 
a significant revivalist movement in the lands of the Fertile Crescent, and the 
religious life of Naqshbandī’s Khālidī line has been famously defined as being 
“the paramount order in Turkey” (Algar and Nizami 2016).
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The ṭarīqa has also become well known for developing a stable network of 
commercial and intellectual ties across distant lands, with students, pilgrims, 
and travellers who visit city after city being housed with physical shelter and 
religious instruction in the ṭarīqa’s lodges. Sobieroj (2016) has studied one 
of these devotees, the scholar Ma Mingxin (d. 1781), who left his homeland 
China in order to study in Naqshbandī lodges in Central Asia and the Arabian 
Peninsula, including the important Naqshbandī centres of Mecca and Medina. 
Combined networks of commercial activities and pious instruction can be seen 
in the activities of family-based ṭuruq, as in the South Arabian ʿAydarusiyya, a 
Ṣūfi order of a notable family of the Hadramawt region that has expanded into 
Egypt and the islands of South-East Asia, as well as into India (Ohtsuka and 
Voll 2016).
Furthermore, Ṣūfism’s characteristic adaptability, a feature that stems from 
the fact that it often generates relatively small gatherings and less formal con-
gregations than those in mosques, has facilitated the renovation of Muslim 
piety in situations where Muslims are in the religious minority, and thus have 
less capability to develop the religious infrastructure (such as mosques and 
madrasas) that Ṣūfis can manage without. Likewise, in the highly volatile reli-
gious countries of the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Ṣūfism 
has successfully engaged devotees in endeavours of religious proselytization 
(daʿwa), giving Ṣūfi groups a distinct power in social milieus with a large degree 
of religious pluralism.
The good press that taṣawwuf often gets in the West has allowed Ṣūfi groups 
to continue to thrive and gain converts to Islam in times of somewhat extended 
anti-Muslim sentiment. Thus, the transnational character of some of the 
pre-modern Orders still prevails among various groups today. The Qādiriyya 
Būdshīshiyya is a case in point: it is an order that originated in North-Eastern 
Morocco but in the last thirty years has expanded, through both migrant 
and cosmopolitan connections, to sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe, and 
South and North America. Although most of its followers are Moroccans or 
of Moroccan origin, the ṭarīqa has been successful in attracting former non-
Muslims as well as Muslims from other non-Ṣūfi and/or non-Moroccan reli-
gious backgrounds.17 One of the mechanisms through which the Order has 
been effective in attracting new devotees is through its online presence, with 
sites in various languages.18 Similarly, the ṭarīqa Burhāniyya that originated 
17  For an ethnographic study comparing the diverse branches of this order, looking in par-
ticular at the religious identities of its female members, see Dominguez Diaz (2014).




in the Sudan with Burhāni (d. 1983) has spread to various countries in North 
Africa, the Levant and the Gulf, Western Europe, South Asia, and North 
America.19 A visit to their YouTube channel will acquaint the reader with the 
impressive following of the Order’s gatherings.20
Another often cited example of a transnational Ṣūfi Order is the ṭarīqa led 
by Nazim al-Qubrusī al-Haqqanī (d. 2014). The organisation is connected to 
the worldwide spread of the Naqshbandī trend, although it is an offshoot of 
the mainstream ṭarīqa. Whereas, the original Naqshbandiyya traces its ori-
gins to Central Asia, the Haqqaniyya branch, in contrast, relates its ancestry 
to the Caucasus region through a linkage to the Indian Mujaddidiyya tradi-
tion. Nazim al-Qubrusī al-Haqqanī moved to London in the 1970s to establish 
a European branch of the Order, then led by Abdullah Fa’izi al-Daghestani 
(d. 1973); this was a successful endeavour that today has resulted in the ṭarīqa 
having a significant and active following in places such as North America and 
most of Western Europe, the Middle East, and South and South-East Asia.21 
Although it also exists in various parts of the world, this ṭarīqa in particular 
has had success in attracting non-Muslims to Islam. It also is quite visible on 
the internet.22
Particular mention should also be given to the Chishti Order, an organiza-
tion that originated in Herat. Although most of its followers are in Afghanistan 
and South Asia, it has recently, through migration, been established in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and East and South Africa. 
The Ajmer (Rajasthan) shrine of the Order is the tomb of Moinuddin Chishti 
(d. 1236) and it receives many visitors during Ṣūfi celebrations, particularly 
Urs.23 Finally, it is good to remind the reader that the number of Orders with an 
international outreach is too large for them all to be mentioned individually. 
Moreover, not only that they are too many to mention, but one of the conse-
quences of taṣawwuf’s flexible nature is that new groups of devotees are cre-
ated, whereas others disappear, on a regular basis, complicating the scholarly 
task of accurately mapping the Orders and their transnational outreach.
19  For an interesting study of the German branch of this Order see Lassen (2009).
20  Their channel, at https://www.youtube.com/user/TariqaBurhaniya/videos, at the time of 
writing has 5,930 subscribers, and some videos have garnered over 24,000 views. Accessed 
01/07/2020.
21  The Order was studied in an ESRC project let by Nielsen, Yemelianova and Stringer. See 
http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/wwwroot/nielsen.htm. Accessed 28/09/2018.
22  See http://www.naqshbandi.org/, http://Ṣūfilive.com/. Accessed 28/09/2018.
23  To obtain a more accurate idea of the Order’s following see http://dargahajmer.com/
photo-tour/. Accessed 28/09/2018.
536 Domínguez Díaz
7.2 The Legacy of Ṣūfism in Non-Religious Organisations
Ṣūfism has been and continues to be a fundamental element in the religious 
fabric of Muslim contexts, and it has an impact on all sorts of aspects of Muslim 
culture, from music, to poetry, and even dress. One of the consequences of this 
pervading influence is to be found in civil society and politics where Ṣūfism 
has played a key role in the ways in which a variety of organisations are struc-
tured. For example, in South Asia, Ṣūfi culture has given rise to political par-
ties and platforms. In Pakistan, for instance, the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) 
was formed in 2010 as a coalition of Barelvi Muslims; Barelvism is the largest 
Islamic orientation within Pakistan, and one that has been based mainly on 
Ṣūfism throughout its history (Eppin 2013). The SIC is an alliance of Islamic 
political parties with followers numbering about 160 million people.24
Similarly, various African countries have seen Ṣūfi orders intertwined with 
or transformed into political parties, since the way in which some of the ṭuruq 
have been organised has provided the basis for the creation of political parties. 
The leaders of the Tijaniyya in Senegal have entered politics by becoming part 
of the ranks of the existing Parti de l’Unité et du Rassemblement (PUR). The 
Tijani leadership had initially expressed a desire to found their own party but 
the Senegalese constitution forbids the formation of political parties of reli-
gious nature. Nevertheless, the PUR has been significantly influenced by the 
Ṣūfi background of its leaders (Samson 2000).
Ṣūfism has also exerted its influence on non-political organisations. In 
Senegal, the Murīdīya evolved into an organisation that was key in transform-
ing and modernising agriculture. During Soviet times, various ṭuruq in areas 
of Central Asia created modern organisations tolerated by the state, and so 
Islamic communal life could endure the challenges they faced when the state 
applied severe efforts to suppress religion. In Afghanistan after 1979, the ṭuruq 
system and, notably, the Qādiriyya and Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidīyya Orders 
have been central in recruiting mujahideen, in which traditional Orders turned 
de facto into modern military units. Another example is the Sudanese ṭarīqa 
Khatmiyya, which served as a basis for the emergence of the National Unionist 
Party, later the People’s Democratic Party; by the end of the twentieth century, 
the head of the Order was also the president of the Democratic Unionist Party 
(Ohtsuka and Voll 2016).
7.3 Non-ṭarīqa Religious Organisations
The ethos and the intellectual legacy of Ṣūfism have been equally pivotal in the 
constitution of some of the most widespread religious organisations within 
24  For a more detailed study of the coalition see Khan (2011).
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Islam, groups that are often not Ṣūfi Orders. These groups are not organised 
according to the principle of walāya, and therefore they do not develop a 
master—disciple relationship, or at least not one that is representative of the 
traditional patterns of Ṣūfi religious authority. One example of this type of 
organisation can be seen in the informal networks of women in Istanbul who 
gather to perform Ṣūfi practices but whose groups only present a weak connec-
tion and little resemblance to traditional established Orders (Raudvere 2002).
Another example of a group that does not conform to the patterns of the 
ṭuruq is the Gülen movement, which is a transnational religious movement led 
by the Turkish Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. There are several elements 
that are typical of Orders that do not apply to the Gülen movement. A ṭarīqa 
has a leader, a shaykh, who in turn has a group of devotees. Devotees shall, in 
most cases, formally initiate into the ṭarīqa in order to become disciples of the 
master. Additionally, every ṭarīqa has a chain or lineage (silsila), as we have 
seen, through which it endorses religious legitimacy by establishing a genea-
logical line that connects the current head of the Order to previous ones, and 
from them to one of the founder fathers of Ṣūfism (for example, in the case 
of the Qādiriyya, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, d. 561 AH/1166 CE). The role of the 
shaykh is still educational, even though, in a number of modern ṭuruq, reli-
gious instruction has been diluted or somehow transformed. This education, 
as we have seen before, is generally based on a ritual discipline. The discipline 
is supposed to progress as the disciple ascends in his religious education to 
more complex stages of religious learning. Conversely, the Gülen movement 
does not show any of these features. Fethullah Gülen considers himself an 
intellectual who is not the shaykh of a ṭarīqa. More relevant perhaps is the fact 
that there is no initiation and there is no specific set of ritual practices unique 
to the movement. The Gülen movement is Ṣūfi only to the extent that Ṣūfism, 
as an intellectual and religious legacy, has heavily informed the thinking of the 
founder. It is often noted that Fethullah Gülen was influenced by Said Nursi 
and the Nur movement, another group with relevant Ṣūfi underpinnings but 
no ṭarīqa structure in the traditional sense.
A further example that illustrates the religious influence of Ṣūfism beyond 
the world of Ṣūfi Orders is to be found in the three, perhaps, most famous pros-
elytising Islamic religious groups that exist in South Asia, namely the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat, the Daʿwat-i Islāmī, and the Sunnī Daʿwat-i Islāmī. These movements, 
with an effective missionary outreach, are believed to be comparable in size 
and scope to Christian Pentecostalism (Gugler 2009). To various extents, the 
three represent examples of the legacy that Ṣūfism has contributed to Muslim 
religious life beyond the ṭuruq, as they all are based on what has been called 
‘Sunnization’, a doctrine heavily influenced both by Ṣūfism and the Salafiyya 
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(Gugler 2009). These movements are not obvious heirs of Ṣūfism, as the incor-
poration of the Ṣūfism legacy into their practices is complicated. For exam-
ple, in the case of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, the founder had been initiated in a 
number of ṭuruq (Chishtiyya, Suhrawardiyya, Qādiriyya, and Naqshbandiyya) 
and whereas the structure and aesthetics of this organisation relies heavily on 
Ṣūfism, Tablīghīs support a reformed version of Islam that outwardly rejects 
certain Ṣūfi practices, which they deem to be synchronous with Hinduism. In 
this sense, the group has attracted the criticisms that Ṣūfism had to face from 
Salafi orientations, as discussed previously.
8 Conclusion
The once questioned capacity of Ṣūfism to adapt and overcome the challenges 
of the modern world has been easily overcome. Ṣūfism has demonstrated an 
impressive capacity to maintain its significance in the religious life of millions 
of Muslims across the world. The contemporary face of Ṣūfism has achieved 
an impressive transnational spread, thanks mainly to globalisation, and to the 
interaction and assimilation of peoples and cultural aspects, including reli-
gious ones, although, as we have seen, this is not an entirely new phenomenon. 
On the contrary, historical studies indicate that there is something inherently 
cross-cultural in the conceptualisation of the ṭuruq world. In addition, the rela-
tionship between Ṣūfism and the organisations that have been developed by 
the Ṣūfis is not straightforward. In fact, a recurrent feature within taṣawwuf 
has been the existence of Ṣūfis, masters, and devotees, and of Ṣūfi gatherings 
and networks of pilgrims, that evade the constrictions of the patterns char-
acteristic of ṭuruq, with lodges made up of a substantial following of ‘non-
formal’ devotees of any ṭarīqa. Additionally, the Ṣūfi Orders do not seem to be 
in decline. On the contrary, they are important elements of the Islamic reli-
gious landscape, and our understanding of the ṭuruq world, I would contend, 
is key for obtaining an accurate picture of (at least a significant part) of the 
existing spectrum of Islamic sects, trends, and organisations. The Orders, with 
their often quite traditional ways of approaching religious authority and dis-
cipleship, have been able to gain a substantial following among both Muslims 
and non-Muslims who have converted to Islam to join them, generating net-
works that thrive in very diverse societies. Also, modernity has shown us the 
vibrancy of Ṣūfism outside the ṭuruq system and taṣawwuf, and as an ethos, 
it has become part of organisations of various sorts, from labour unions and 
political coalitions and parties, to non-ṭarīqa religious groups. The importance 
of the study of Ṣūfism and its legacy in social, political, and economic terms is 
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central to acquiring a well-informed picture of the sects, trends, and organisa-
tions that exist in Islam today.
References
Abun-Nasr, J.M. 2007. Muslim Communities of Grace: The Sufi Brotherhoods in Islamic 
Religious Life. New York: Columbia University Press.
Algar, H. and K.A. Nizami. 2016. “Naḳsh̲̲bandiyya.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd ed. 
Brill Online. At http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of 
-islam-2/nakshbandiyya-COM_0843. Accessed 01/07/2020.
Anwar, S. 2005. “Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjīh in 
Muhammadiyah.” Islamic Law and Society. 12:1, 27–44.
Baldauf, I. 2001. “Jadidism in Central Asia within Reformism and Modernism in the 
Muslim World.” Die Welt des Islams. 41:1, 72–88.
Brenner, L. 1988. “Concepts of ṭarīqa in West Africa: The Case of the Qādiriyya.” In 
D.B. Cruise O’Brien and C. Coulon eds, Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 33–52.
Brown, J. 2011. Salafis and Sufis in Egypt. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.
Bruinessen, M. 2009. “Sufism, ‘Popular’ Islam and the Encounter with Modernity.” In 
M.K. Masud, A. Salvatore, and M. Bruinessen eds, Islam and Modernity: Key Issues 
and Debates. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 125–157.
Buehler, A.F. 1998. Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of 
the Mediating Sufi Shaykh. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Chodkiewicz, M. 1994. “La Réception du Soufisme par l’Occident: Conjectures 
et Certitudes.” In C. Butterworth and B. Kessel eds, The Introduction of Arabic 
Philosophy into Europe. Leiden: Brill, 136–149.
Colin, G.S. 2016. “Baraka.” Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd ed. Brill Online. At http://ref 
erenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/baraka-SIM_1216. 
Accessed 01/07/2020.
Cornell, V.J. 1998. Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism. Austin: 
University of Texas Press.
De Nicola, B. 2016. “The Fusṭāṭ al-ʿAdāla: A Unique Manuscript on the Religious 
Landscape of Medieval Anatolia.” In A.C.S. Peacock and S.N. Yildiz eds, Literature 
and Intellectual Life in Fourteenth–Fifteenth Century Anatolia. Würzburg: Ergon 
Verlag, 51–72.
Dominguez Diaz, M. 2015. Women in Sufism Female Religiosities in a Transnational 
Order. London and New York: Routledge.
540 Domínguez Díaz
Epping, E. 2013. “Politics and Pirs: The Nature of Sufi Political Engagement in 20th and 
21st Century Pakistan.” Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies. 5:3, 1–25.
Ernst, C.W. 1997. The Shambhala Guide to Sufism. Boston: Shambhala.
Fathurahman, O. 2003. “Reinforcing Neo-Sufism in the Malay–Indonesian World: 
Shaṭṭārīyah Order in West Sumatra.” Studia Islamika. 10:3, 29–93.
Gilsenan, M.D. 1967. “Some Factors in the Decline of the Sufi Orders in Modern Egypt.” 
The Muslim World. 57:1, 11–18.
Gilsenan, M.D. 1973. Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion. 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Gugler, T.K. 2009. Jihad, Da’wa and Hijra: Islamic Missionary Movements in Europe. 
Heidelberg: Universität Heidelberg.
Hodgson, M.G.S. 1974. The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Inayat Khan, Z. 2016. “The Paradox of Universal Sufism.” At https://shingondharmaza 
zen.wordpress.com/2007/12/24/the-paradox-of-universal-sufism-by-pir-zia-inayat 
-khan/. Accessed 01/07/2020.
Jezernik, B. 2007. Europe and its Other: Notes on the Balkans. Ljubljana: Oddelek za 
Etnologijo in Kulturno Antropologijo.
Johansen, J. 1996. Sufism and Islamic Reform in Egypt: The Battle for Islamic Tradition. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Karamustafa, A.T. 2007. Sufism: The Formative Period. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.
Karamustafa, A.T. 1994. God’s Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle 
Period, 1200–1550. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Khalid, A. 1999. The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Jackson: 
University of California Press.
Khan, A.U. 2011. “Sunni Ittehad Council: The Strengths and Limitations of Barelvi 
Activism Against Terror.” Centre for Research and Security Studies. At http://crss 
.pk/downloads/Reports/Research-Reports/Barelvi-Activism-against-Terrorism.pdf. 
Accessed 01/07/2020.
Knysh, A.D. 2017. Sufism. A New History of Islamic Mysticism. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Knysh, A.D. 2010. Islamic Mysticism a Short History. Leiden: Brill.
Lassen, S.C. 2008. “Strategies for Concord. The Transformation of Tariqa Burhaniya 
in the European Environment.” In C. Raudvere and L. Stenberg eds, Sufism Today: 
Heritage and Tradition in the Global Community. London: IB Tauris, 189–208.
Le Gall, D. 2010. “Recent Thinking on Sufis and Saints in the Lives of Muslim Societies, 
Past and Present.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 42:4, 673–687.
Melchert, C. 2001. “Sufis and competing movements in Nishapur.” Iran. 39:1, 237–247.
541Ṣūfism
Muedini, F. 2015. Sponsoring Sufism: How Governments Promote “Mystical Islam” in their 
Domestic and Foreign Policies. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
O’Fahey, R.S. 1990. Enigmatic Saint: Ahmad ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition. Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press.
Ohlander, E.S. 2015. “Early Sufi Rituals, Beliefs, and Hermeneutics.” In L. Ridgeon ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Sufism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
53–73.
Ohlander, E.S. 2008. Sufism in an Age of Transition ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī and the Rise of 
the Islamic Mystical Brotherhoods. Leiden: Brill.
Ohtsuka, K. and J.O. Voll. “Sufism.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. 
Oxford Islamic Studies Online. At http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/
opr/t236/e0759. Accessed 01/07/2020.
Raudvere, C. 2002. The Book and the Roses: Sufi Women. Visibility, and Zikir in 
Contemporary Istanbul. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute.
Renard, J. 2008. Friends of God: Islamic Images of Piety, Commitment, and Servanthood. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ridgeon, L. ed. 2015. Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age. London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing.
Robinson, F. 1988. Varieties of South Asian Islam. Coventry: Centre for Research in 
Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick.
Roy, O. 1990. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Samson, F. 2000. “Youth, Sufism, and Politics in Senegal.” ISIM Newsletter. At https://
openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17453/ISIM_6_Youth_Sufism 
_and_Politics_in_Senegal.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 01/07/2020.
Schimmel, A. 2013. Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press.
Sirriyeh, E. 1999. Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in 
the Modern World. Richmond: Curzon.
Sobieroj, F. 2016. “The Chinese Sufi Wiqāyatullāh Ma Mingxin and the Construction 
of his Sanctity in Kitāb al-Jahrī.” Asiatische Studien-Études Asiatiques. 70:1, 133–169.
Stolz, J. 2006. “Salvation Goods and Religious Markets: Integrating Rational Choice and 
Weberian Perspectives.” Social Compass. 53:1, 13–32.
Sufi Ruhaniat International. 2020. Sufi Ruhaniat International. At http://www.ruha 
niat.org. Accessed 01/07/2020.
Trimingham, J.S. 1973. The Sufi Orders in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vikør, K.S. 2000. “Sufi Brotherhoods in Africa.” In N. Levtzion and R.L. Pouwels, eds, The 
History of Islam in Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press, 441–476.
Vikør, K.S. 1995. Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Sanū sī and his 
Brotherhood. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
542 Domínguez Díaz
Weismann, I. 2011. “Modernity from Within: Islamic Fundamentalism and Sufism.” Der 
Islam. 86:1, 142–170.
Weismann, I. 2007. The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi 
Tradition. London: Routledge.
Wellbeloved, S. 2003. Gurdjieff: The Key Concepts. London: Routledge.
Werbner, P. 2015. “Transnationalism and Regional Cults.” In L. Ridgeon ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Sufism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 282–30.
© Milad Milani, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004435544_029
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Chapter 23




This chapter addresses the designation of Ṣūfi Master Javād Nūrbakhsh (1926–
2008) and the Niʿmatullāhī ‘Khaniqahi’ Order or Khāniqāh-i-Niʿmat Allāhī as 
sectarian. Within the field of Islamic Studies, or even the broader scope of the 
study of Islam, there is no sufficient term that equates with ‘sect’ or ‘sectar-
ian’. Generally, Islamic history—from early on—is replete with examples of 
divisions between political alliances/parties (for example, shīʿat ʿAlī or shīʿat 
Muʿāwiya) pertaining to leadership (imāma) and schools of thought (madh-
hab) and to methods of reading and practicing the religion. Yet it has to be 
cautioned that none of these are tantamount to the ‘church-sect typology’ 
as set out in the sociology of religion for the Western Christian context. Max 
Weber (1922) and Ernst Troeltsch (1912) used the typology as a heuristic tool. 
In their theorising, the church was equated with the larger bureaucratic state-
sponsored organisation that ministered to the general population, whilst the 
sect was the smaller evangelical group that adopted a radical stance towards 
the state. Bryan R. Wilson (1959, 1992) later modified the typology to define 
sects by the way in which they positioned themselves in opposition to social 
values or demonstrated their indifference to societal norms. In this sense, it 
has been more about a study that assists in the categorisation of dissention 
and along with it claims about the return to true religion. As such, and despite 
my own reservations about the application of ‘sectarian’ to groupings within 
Islam, one point of entry into the debate might very well be the combined 
issue of the interpretation of religion and legitimation of rule that both domi-
nated early debates and forced Muslims to pick sides. Obviously, Muslims 
gradually became aware of partisanship, dissention, apostasy (ridda), and 
secession (khawārij), although more sharply once a sense of orthodoxy had 
begun to take shape.
Historically, the Ṣūfis are no strangers to intrigue and controversy regarding 
their allegiance to orthodoxy. Although Ṣūfism was never collectively viewed 
as heterodox or heretical, certain aspects of its belief system and praxis were 
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held in suspicion by those stalwart defenders of conventional Islam. Early 
Ṣūfism made the attempt to demonstrate itself as part of orthodoxy, and Ṣūfis 
claimed that they were representative of ‘real’ Islam, wanting to avoid being 
branded as different or apart. The entry point, then, into the debate about sects 
in Islam—in particular with a view to Ṣūfism—can be based on the Latin ‘to 
follow’, as in a prescribed view deemed to be authentic and not necessarily as 
a break-away group or movement. It is specifically in this sense of the term 
that I conceptualise Javād Nūrbakhsh and the Niʿmatullāhī ‘Khaniqahi’ Order. 
The way I proceed to define this further is by creating a framework wherein 
Nūrbakhsh is discussed as a sectarian in the generic sense of a nonconformist 
(even revisionist), and the Order as a sect is read as ‘a following’ whose parti-
sanship is defined by its adherence to the figure of Nūrbakhsh.
Javād Nūrbakhsh became the leading pīr (master) of the Niʿmatullāhī 
‘Khaniqahi’ Order from 1956, and remained its figurehead until his death.1 He 
was known by the sobriquet, Nur ʿAlī Shāh, upon succeeding his Master, Mūnis 
ʿAlī Shāh Dhū l-Riyāsatayn, in the line of the Munawwar ʿAlī Shāhi branch of 
the Niʿmatullāhī Order. The Niʿmatullāhī Order with which he was associated 
is by far the most widespread and significant Ṣūfi Order in Iran, since the time 
of its inception in the fourteenth century (Algar 2012). The Order survived 
harsh persecutions and enjoyed periods of patronage, but all in all, it is well-
established with roots deeply embedded in Iranian society. The secret of its 
success is likely related to its dynamic style and transformative nature, but also 
in its peculiar ability to have managed the tension between Sunnī and Shīʿa 
sensibilities in its earlier manifestations.
In its early history, the Order had undergone several transformations: from 
Sunnī to Shīʿa, moving from Iran to the Deccan, and inaugurating a revival of 
passionate Ṣūfism at a time of Shīʿa scholastic ascendancy. The most recent 
transformation, however, was initiated by Javād Nūrbakhsh with the Order’s 
expansion beyond Iran. It has to be said that the role of Javād Nūrbakhsh in 
the history of the Order is of special note, since it was he, in particular, who 
adapted the branch of the Order that came under his directorship to the pres-
ent day conditions of Western society and culture (Lewisohn 2006: 52). Most 
importantly, the Niʿmatullāhī Masters were generally men of erudition and all 
of them were prolific figures (Algar 2012). Nūrbakhsh was no exception.
The legacy of Javād Nūrbakhsh—as a pronounced figure in the recent 
history of the Niʿmatullāhī—is no less controversial. Here, we discuss Javād 
Nūrbakhsh as a tacit sectarian in that the unnoticed effort of his career as a 
1 However, his son, Alireza Nūrbakhsh was being groomed to succeed Javād Nūrbakhsh from 
early on.
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leading Ṣūfi figure had been to demonstrate Ṣūfism as something other than 
Islam. This relates to what I have called “Nūrbakhshian Ṣūfism” (Milani 2018: 
124) propagated through the Niʿmatullāhī brand. In effect, Nūrbakhsh never 
outwardly proclaimed the Order a sect, nor did he reject Islam outright. His 
was a ‘silent’ revolution of an unspoken majority. Whilst the Niʿmatullāhī 
Khaniqahi cannot be labelled sectarian, the philosophy and praxis of Javād 
Nūrbakhsh warrants a rethinking of his outlook on Ṣūfism as a sectarian move-
ment. What we find in the writings of Nūrbakhsh is that the Ṣūfis began as a 
covert group of Iranian converts to Islam who developed Ṣūfism in order to 
protect themselves from persecution and preserve their pre-Islamic identity. 
In this sense, then, Ṣūfism, represented the merger of old Iranian customs and 
the new religion of the Arabs. Specifically, it consisted of a synthesis of the chi-
valric ideal and the religious notions of love and unity. In Nūrbakhsh’s view, as 
time passes, the Ṣūfi identity is developed more indiscriminately with Islamic 
identity, and as such differences became, over time, increasingly more difficult 
to discern.
In this chapter, I will refer to the overall historical context of Nūrbakhsh’s 
rise to a position of influence, taking into consideration his works within the 
nexus of social, political and cultural aspects of his time. I will primarily draw 
on his Ṣūfi writings, which include books, poems, and discourses, as well as a 
final interview with a documentary film maker (Smith 2008a, 2008b).2 I treat 
Nūrbakhsh as a genuinely perceived charismatic figure who wielded signifi-
cant influence over a large nationwide (and eventually global) community 
of initiates.
In the task of studying Nūrbakhsh and his works, I have primarily worked 
within the framework of a multidisciplinary approach, particularly that of 
religious studies, through which I have drawn on history of ideas and Islamic 
history perspectives in working through problems pertaining to historical 
interpretation and the utilisation of key ideas over time. In my own theorisa-
tion of Nūrbakhsh and his works I have taken an approached inspired by both 
Martin Heidegger and Pierre Bourdieu. Heidegger’s hermeneutics is especially 
relevant because we are examining how meaning arises in a given historical 
circumstance based on the retrieval of what is (or might be) still available from 
the past.3 There is a relationality that is central to a study which examines an 
2 My own observations and interviews with group members are not extensively dealt with in 
this chapter, but they do on occasion inform the basis of my assertions, and I will indicate 
this where relevant (whilst preserving the anonymity of interviewees). Some aspects of these 
interviews have, however, been analysed from a sociological perspective and published else-
where (cf. Milani and Possamai 2016).
3 For background see Thomas Sheehan (2015).
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agent of history and historical data for the purpose of examining how mean-
ing arises and is understood in that context. As such, Bourdieu’s theory of field 
and habitus are especially important for appreciating the value of an agent’s 
habitus in relation to the conditions that define a particular field.4
2 Overview and Considerations
The Niʿmatullāhīyya or Niʿmatullāhī Order is representative of a number of 
branches and sub-branches of which the ‘Khaniqahi’ is a recent twentieth cen-
tury development under the leadership of Javād Nūrbakhsh. The Niʿmatullāhī 
take their name from the fourteenth century Sunnī Ṣūfi saint of Syrian descent, 
Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī. (1330–1431), whom they claim as their founder. Shāh 
Niʿmatullāh gained a large following in Timurid Samarqand, where he seems 
to have become the subject of intrigue and forced to resettle in Kerman (Algar 
2012). The Order was later moved to Muslim India in the fifteenth century 
and then returned to Iran in the eighteenth century, during the twilight of the 
Ṣafavid period, to lead a renaissance of its Ṣūfi style. The Order had by now 
showed itself as truly Shīʿa, and its Ṣūfi figureheads preferred the sobriquet 
‘Kings’ (Shāh) after their ‘King’, Niʿmatullāh Walī no doubt, but with particular 
reference to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib , known in Persian popular culture as the ‘King of 
[True] Men’ (Pers. shah-e mardan). The ‘Kings’ of this branch of Ṣūfism, how-
ever, suffered heavy persecution at the hands of extremist Twelver Shīʿa ʿ ulamāʾ 
who had won favour with the Ṣafavid Kings.5 Yet the Order endured, outlasting 
the Ṣafavids to find its own patronage under the Qājār and Pahlavi dynasties. 
The Order once again came under suspicion with the rise of the fundamental-
ist state of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and experience a new period of 
suppression and harassment, but not before finding refuge in the West.
The process of exporting Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism to the West was initiated by 
Nūrbakhsh in the years immediately preceding the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
There, the ‘Khaniqahi’ label became the name of the Order abroad, known in 
English as the ‘House of Ṣūfism’, and that aspect of Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism that 
becomes directly associated with the teachings of Javād Nūrbakhsh. In 1974, he 
visited the United States at the request of American devotees and in 1975 two 
Houses of Ṣūfism were established in San Francisco and New York by his senior 
disciple, Mr Niktab (1918–2003), and also in London by Nūrbakhsh (Lewisohn 
4 For background see Robert Grenfell (2012).
5 For an extended discussion on the heritage and history of the Niʿmatullāhī Kings see 
Pourjavadi and Wilson (1978).
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2006: 51). From 1976–1978, further Houses of Ṣūfism were established in the 
United States (Washington DC and Boston); in 1979 Nūrbakhsh emigrated to 
the United States, and in 1983 he settled in England (Lewisohn 2006: 51). It was 
in the years following the Revolution that the Order was particularly defined 
by Javād Nūrbakhsh in the Western context. This differed, at least outwardly, 
quite significantly from the way it was practiced and defined in Iran, where it 
particularly emphasised the Order’s Persianate roots and the inward aspect of 
religious observance over the external.
In light of this, a cautionary proviso is needed regarding Nūrbakhsh and 
the Niʿmatullāhī Order (broadly speaking, and even the Khaniqahi, more spe-
cifically). That is, the two—Nūrbakhsh and the Niʿmatullāhī—are not synony-
mous, despite typically being treated as such. I would go so far as to differentiate 
between the ‘mission’ of Javād Nūrbakhsh and the Niʿmatullāhī Order and, 
further still, in relation to the Khaniqahi as well. The reason is that the writ-
ten works of Nūrbakhsh—as well as his live discourses, some of which were 
published under the same titles—do not always, or consistently, represent the 
views of the participants of the House of Ṣūfism. As such, a careful distinction 
has to be made in any study of the Niʿmatullāhī Khaniqahi between what I will 
call, for the sake of simplicity, ‘attendees’ and ‘adherents’: a difference between 
those who are initiated, but are not aware of the Nūrbakhshian agenda, and 
those initiates who subscribe to it. Of course, all those initiated into the Order 
were seen as disciples of their Master (Nūrbakhsh), yet they were not all treated 
as equally holding the ‘right’ understanding of the Path. Nūrbakhsh would on 
occasion relay the sentiment, although in more nondescript terms, in what he 
categorised as the difference between ‘Ṣūfi’ and ‘Darvish’ (Nūrbakhsh 2005–6: 
30). The Ṣūfi simply takes the oath of initiation and becomes a seeker (salek), 
while the Darvish arrives at the station of becoming ‘nothing’ (Pers. heech) (see 
Nūrbakhsh 1996: 55). There were indeed concentric circles within the domain 
of the Order that indicated who was in the know, and who was not, so to speak.
The Niʿmatullāhī teachings of Javād Nūrbakhsh gain greater traction through 
its spread in the West (as they are translated into numerous languages) and 
where the Order begins to flourish on democratic soil, primarily in the United 
Kingdom and North America. Niʿmatullāhī teachings in Iran continued to 
maintain a conservative countenance, but in the West, headed by Nūrbakhsh 
during the 1980s and 1990s, it showed itself as a global spiritual phenomenon 
for all humanity, irrespective of religious belonging. Though not quite Inayat 
Khan’s Universal Ṣūfism, Nūrbakhsh was more invested in the Iranian legacy 
of mysticism ( farhang-e irani) and its wisdom tradition (hikmat-e khosravani) 
(Milani 2014: 219–220). This meant that the Order, as mentioned earlier, was 
made up of layers of hidden initiation (in addition to the formal initiatory rite), 
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which seemed more or less reserved for Iranians or those able to penetrate its 
linguistic and cultural barriers. Nūrbakhsh’s chauvinism was pronounced, even 
in his writings, because he based himself squarely and solely on his Iranian Ṣūfi 
protagonists such as Bāyazīd, Ḥallāj, ʿIrāqī, Kharaqānī, Abū Saʿīd, as well as the 
poets Saʿdī and Ḥāfiẓ, whom he considered to have been real Ṣūfis. They all 
portray a sense of antinomianism to which Nūrbakhsh related, and was fond 
of, but also, they were seen as being part of the Malāmatiyya (the seekers of 
blame), a tradition of Ṣūfism that Nūrbakhsh himself followed.6
From 1979 until 9/11 marks the period of the Western transformation of 
Ṣūfism under Nūrbakhsh where he propagated a distinct shift in his attitude 
toward the formal Islamic identity attached to traditional Ṣūfism. What can be 
gleaned from his writings and his final interview is that Nūrbakhsh distances 
himself further still from an identifiable Islamic identity. Moreover, from this 
time onward, the obligatory prayers ceased to be performed at the Khaniqah 
abroad (though not prohibited), and the terms ‘Ṣūfi’ and ‘Darvish’ (the latter 
being the preferred among Persian speaking members) came to represent mys-
tical morality rather than religiosity.
2.1 Ṣūfism in the Shīʿa Context
One detail that needs to be underlined in the study of the Niʿmatullāhī Order, 
even in the case of Javād Nūrbakhsh, is that it is a Ṣūfi tradition steeped in 
the Shīʿa context. Of the traditional Ṣūfi orders, the Niʿmatullāhī Order is a 
cardinal Ṣūfi order in Shīʿa history. It is a Shīʿa form of Ṣūfism and one that 
thrives in its historical heartlands. This is important to note because Ṣūfism 
is historically a Sunnī phenomenon. It was in many ways a reaction to the 
exteriority of dynastic religion in an effort to derive the true meaning of Islam 
as preserved in the Revelation of Muḥammad and passed down to his clos-
est Companions. Today, its mysticism is rooted in the exercise of austerities 
by which the movement earned its name Ṣūfi (that is, from the Arabic noun 
suf, referring to those who practiced the wearing of wool). The Ṣūfi were also 
defined by their devotion to the contemplative life (for example, as per the 
6 The outlook of Javād Nūrbakhsh on Ṣūfi history has been analysed by Leonard Lewisohn 
(2006: 56–61) who explained (away) their value in connection to Orientalist influenced 
Iranian scholars. For instance, the Niʿmatullāhī publications of Parviz Nawruziyan who uti-
lised the well-known works of Abdul-Hussain Zarrinkoub were the product of nationalist 
chauvinism and a revival of later shunned theories of Orientalists such as F.R.D. Tholuck, 
E.H. Palmer, Reinhart Dozy, and Richard Hartmann. Such reductionism, however, fails to take 
into account the phenomenological value of Javād Nūrbakhsh’s challenge to the status quo. 
For discussion on this see Milani (2014: 219–221).
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systematic methodology of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī who died in 857), developing 
extensive techniques and terminology to explain their manner of aspiring to 
intimacy with the divine.7 In this, they read the Qurʾān for its inner meaning 
and made effort to imitate Muḥammad—though not for the sake of exteriority 
of his habits—but because he was the recipient par excellence of Revelation. 
It is impossible to determine the precise relationship between the Shīʿa imāms 
and the Ṣūfi movement, but we do know that the imāms, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in par-
ticular (as well as all the imāms of the Twelver tradition up until the eighth 
imām, ʿAlī al-Riḍā), were commonly mentioned as figures of significance for 
the Ṣūfis (see, for example, Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār’s Tadhkirat al-awliya where Jaʿfar 
is listed as a principal figure in a list of mystic saints). What becomes clear is 
that the developing Shīʿa tradition possessed its own school of ma’rifa (sacred 
knowledge) and thus had no need of the Sunnī developed taṣawwuf tradition, 
although the Shīʿa did more than their fair share of appropriating mystical 
teachings of grand masters such ibn Sīnā, ibn al-ʿArabī, and Rūmī (all of whom 
were in fact Sunnī) when it was suitable.8
In the Shīʿa context, Ṣūfi identity is demarcated by its own specific termi-
nology and technical methodology. The Shīʿa generally played down the Sunnī 
tradition of taṣawwuf as meaning ‘Ṣūfism’ and instead replaced it with ʿirfān. 
The distinction for the Shīʿa was based on their take on Ṣūfism: a mysticism as 
opposed to Sunnī asceticism. Ṣūfism as ʿirfān, understood in the Shīʿa context, 
was determined by an elevated form of knowledge, since ʿirfān was indica-
tive of someone who was an ʿarif (possessor of sacred knowledge), but also 
someone instinctively attuned to the sacred, able to perceive the inner most 
secrets (bāṭin) of divine communication. For the Shīʿa, Ṣūfism was not only a 
kind of spiritual athleticism but also, and especially, an exercise of the active 
intellect (ʿaql). Ṣūfism in the Shīʿa context, therefore, represents a keen balance 
between Sunnī mysticism and Shīʿa gnoseology, and it becomes a form of eso-
tericism that is different to the Ṣūfism found in the Sunnī context as taṣawwuf 
(mysticism).
7 Several manuals were produced to this effect, which include the Ṣūfi manuals of instruction 
of Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (Kitab al-luma or ‘Book of Light Flashes’), Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (Qutb 
al-qulub or ‘Nourishment of Hearts’), and ʿAlī al-Hujwīrī (Kashf al-mahjoub or ‘Revelation 
of Secrets’).
8 See for instance the work of Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201–1274); for background, refer Black (2001: 
145–53).
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3 New Directions in Ṣūfism: Khaniqahi Ṣūfism Under Nūrbakhsh
Javād Nūrbakhsh took Ṣūfism in a new direction. His radical approach to the 
religio-political hegemony in Iran produced the kind of Ṣūfism that can be 
arguably perceived as being free of Islam. This is not original to Nūrbakhsh; 
Inayat Khan and Meher Baba had accomplished the same end in their exploits 
with Ṣūfism in the West.9 What is unique about Nūrbakhsh is how, despite the 
apparent rift, he nevertheless maintained the synaptic link to tradition, albeit, 
reinterpreted in the light of Iranian historicising. It is Irano-Islamic tradition 
(and not the Islamic per se) that is represented as tradition in the Khaniqahi 
Niʿmatullāhī context. In the narrative, Iranians are the champions of chivalry 
and morality that are the basis of spirituality, mysticism and, of course, the 
core of religion. This is a view akin to the influence of the position of philoso-
phia perennis (or Traditionalist School) that was advocated in Iran by the tow-
ering figure of Hussein Nasr.10
The perennialists believed all religious traditions shared a single metaphysi-
cal truth, which produced the esoteric and exoteric knowledge and doctrine. 
Nūrbakhsh, however, had a greater appetite for modernisation and change. 
A liberal, Nūrbakhsh took this reading further in interpreting religion as the 
meaningless outer garb of what it all means internally, whereby, religion must 
in end be dispensed with. It sounds radical, yet it is a view—albeit loosely 
construed—not far removed from the traditional Ṣūfi schema of certain medi-
eval authors. For instance, authors of early manuals such as Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj 
(d. 988) and Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 996) wanted to portray that Ṣūfism was the 
‘real’ Islam as practiced by the tābi’ūn (successors) in perfect accordance with 
sharīʿa and kalām, and not conceived as its mystical dimension. To be truly 
Muslim and abide by the sunna of Muḥammad was to be a Ṣūfi. They imag-
ined the path of Islam as one of literally travelling (seyr), in which the wayfarer 
(salek) would go from the outer toward the inner heart of faith: from sharīʿa 
(the religious prescriptions) to ṭarīqa (the path) to ḥaqīqa (ultimate truth). 
Al-Makkī himself had two manuals of Ṣūfism: one for the lay (‘Nourishment 
of the Hearts’) and one for the initiated (‘Knowledge of the Hearts’) (Knysh 
2000: 122–123).
It might seem reasonable to think of Nūrbakhsh in the light of New Age 
philosophy, as has been suggested elsewhere (Lewisohn 2006: 59, n. 73), but 
9  The creed of the Universal Ṣūfism (Inayat Khan) and Ṣūfism Reoriented (Meher Baba) are 
highly pluralistic systems without a central Islamic identity (Milani 2012: 670).
10  Nasr and Nūrbakhsh were acquaintances in the known circles of Tehran society. They also 
appear together on publications relating to Ṣūfism. See, for example, Lewisohn (1999).
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I would argue that urge is best resisted. Nūrbakhsh did not invent tradition, but 
rather redirected it from alternate readings of the past. This is an important 
distinction in that a new direction must draw and build on the past in order to 
move forward. Also, there is an important tension for Nūrbakhsh between the 
past and the present whereas this tension does not exist for Inayat Khan and 
Meher Baba, who liberated Ṣūfism from historical traditional baggage to the 
point where it is actually difficult to tell whether it is still Ṣūfism being referred 
to. The ‘invention of tradition’ is not the same as the activity of retrieving pos-
sibilities for interpreting tradition by reading the past for new understandings, 
of which Nūrbakhsh was instructive. Such a tension does not exist in Nasr or 
the Traditionalists either, since they too had taken the failings of modernity as 
a foregone conclusion.11 Nūrbakhsh’s conceptual categorisation is defined by 
his adaptation of classic Ṣūfism as a modern, and what he provides is a distinct 
identity that both breaks with traditional understandings and hauls Ṣūfism 
into the present, giving it a modern form. In this we can make a case to speak 
about his approach as, mutatis mutandis, sectarian.
Other problems abound regarding the categorisation of Nūrbakhsh with the 
neo-Ṣūfism label, which has been typically defined as ‘reform’ and/or ‘renewal’, 
meaning that there is something ‘new’ that has occurred (as though this is to be 
indicative of something separate to the past). This is problematic because the 
modern context of Nūrbakhsh’s thinking is predicated on elements from the 
Ṣūfi past; and the visible change in his thinking is a necessary part of growth 
through tradition (and not separation from it). Can we imagine at all a time in 
which Ṣūfism did not ‘change’? How has Ṣūfism continued to the present age? 
If we observe the early (proto-)Ṣūfi as frontier warriors (for example, Ḥasan 
al-Baṣrī [d. 728] Ibrāhīm ibn Adham [d. 782]), they actively engaged enemy 
forces in the holy wars ( jihād) on the fringes of the Muslim world. This had the 
dual effect of both affecting and being affected. To be sure, the Ṣūfi tradition 
is one that shaped the Islamic, in unprecedented ways, through interreligious 
exchange with ‘the other’ outside Islam. Yet, and at the same time, medieval 
Ṣūfism had developed systems of practice and belief that pushed the boundar-
ies of normative religious understanding, whilst some even flirted with heresy 
in their reformulation of creed and the poetic rendering of mystical experi-
ence. Indeed, Ṣūfism served as both the safety net for those losing their faith 
in Islam as well as a net cast wide to attract new converts. Ṣūfis freely asso-
ciated with Christians, Hindus, Zoroastrians, and Buddhists. In other words, 
that which differentiates the classic Ṣūfi identity from the modern are simply 
notions of historicity.
11  See for example, Hahn et al (2001: chapter 6).
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Nūrbakhsh is no exception to this rule, because what he had fulfilled 
throughout his tenure was to both establish a connection to the West and man-
age the lifeline of traditionalism in relation to it. His open resistance to a tra-
ditional religious framework and its conventional theological underpinnings 
was the key to transforming Ṣūfism, making it palpable for the present time. 
Notwithstanding, classic and modern Ṣūfism have in common the project of 
mysticism that started in the medieval Islamic.
Nūrbakhsh indeed problematised the interpretation of Ṣūfism (and as most 
do), citing a medieval Ṣūfi by the name of Būshanjī who is made famous for his 
saying: “taṣawwuf [Ṣūfism] was a reality without a name and now a name with-
out a reality.”12 By this example, Nūrbakhsh clearly demonstrates a break with 
the past whilst maintaining its importance. Aptly, the definition of Ṣūfism is 
kept by the paradox. There are three distinctive qualities which articulate the 
activity of mysticism: subversion, creativity, and connection with the times. 
From the time he became the head of a traditional Ṣūfi order, Nūrbakhsh 
worked to break the monopoly of traditionalists over Ṣūfi identity. He focused 
on praxis as the fulcrum for change. In this, Nūrbakhsh found inspiration from 
masters of the past and ideas latent in classic Ṣūfi sources such as Farīd al-Dīn 
ʿAṭṭār’s Manṭiq al-ṭayr and Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī’s Mathnawī. In these 
works, conventional Islamic practice is overshadowed by subtle, nuanced, and 
intuitive forms of exercise.
In his endeavour, Nūrbakhsh is by all accounts to be seen as a a sincere Ṣūfi 
who maintained his roots in one of the oldest and traditional Ṣūfi orders dat-
ing back to the fourteenth century. The Niʿmatullāhī style generally favoured a 
non-partisan (that is, Shīʿa/Sunnī) approach to religion and followed the habit 
of its founder, Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī, in advocating the Akbari principle of 
Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd) over historical partisanship. Nūrbakhsh gave 
this a modern twist in his Khaniqahi Ṣūfism. It is ironically this very classical 
root of the idea that underpins the ‘modernity’ of Nūrbakhsh in positioning 
Ṣūfism in the face of contemporary political discord and sponsorship politics. 
Not bowing to the pressures of choosing sides (that is, Islamic or apostate), he 
extemporaneously became the sectarian, that is, he chose to stand apart by 
not partaking in partisanship as other traditionalists had done. In contrast, the 
Gonabadi branch of the Niʿmatullāhī, for instance, had reverted to the original 
position of Shīʿa quietism during the rise of the Islamic Republic, and as such 
12  This saying of Būshanjī (my translation) is oft quoted in many books and articles on 
Ṣūfism, and is paradoxically as much a cliché as it is key to unlocking medieval Ṣūfi 
thought as Ḥallāj’s theophanic locution: ana al-ḥaqq (“I am the truth!”).
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they had fallen back into a traditionalist position as historically practiced by 
the marjaʿ (model scholars).
Nūrbakhsh primarily drew upon the full repertoire of the Iranian cultural 
heritage and the legacy of notable Ṣūfi ecstatics and seekers of blame (mala-
mat) to make the point that Ṣūfism was always the Islamic façade of Persian 
mystical antiquity, and that it is squarely based on the principles of chiv-
alry ( javanmardi) and etiquette (adab), embodied by antinomian attitudes 
(Milani 2013). Now, this was not like the Chishti—another ancient traditional 
Ṣūfi order—which renovated Islam from within by way of Ṣūfism (Milani and 
Adrahtas 2018); what Nūrbakhsh achieved through Khaniqahi Ṣūfism was to 
go further still. He undermined Ṣūfism by Ṣūfism, leaving very little to be said 
that could be described as Ṣūfism: “whatever comes into words is not Ṣūfism” 
(aanche dar gofteh aayad dar taṣawwuf neest) (Smith 2008), he had said. For 
‘Ṣūfism’ was synonymous with ‘Truth’, and drawing on ʿAṭṭār’s metaphysic, he 
concluded that there is nothing that can be said that would capture the Truth 
(ḥaqq). As such, the way to be ‘Ṣūfi’ is to become nothing because “Ṣūfism is to 
become and not something to hear about” (darvishi shodanist na shaneedani) 
(Smith 2008).
The case study of Khaniqahi Ṣūfism is demonstrative of Nūrbakhsh’s inten-
tions to build on what he saw as the ecstatics’ representation of Ṣūfism as the 
other within Islam, and to go further still in revealing a mysticism radically 
uncontained by Ṣūfism and without Islam. Yet it was the general tenor of the 
Khaniqahi Ṣūfi style—as an authentic traditional Ṣūfis—that was best known 
to its followers and it is what attracted hundreds, especially those abroad, 
to its doors. People were drawn by the idea of a real traditional mystical teach-
ing that was rooted in the distant past that liberated individuals from formal-
istic religion.
3.1 Nūrbakhsh and the Traditional Islamic Identity of Ṣūfism
The Khaniqahi branch of the Niʿmatullāhī order is a globally established 
Ṣūfi network due to the efforts of Javād Nūrbakhsh. It is the only branch of 
the Niʿmatullāhī Order that has had the greatest success in expansion and 
development outside Iran, and Nūrbakhsh is the principal force behind the 
Niʿmatullāhī initiative to adapt, expand, and grow in light of challenges faced 
in the twentieth as well as those in twenty-first century. The twentieth century, 
from the time of his ascension to the role of Master (pīr) and on to the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, was largely about sidestepping political tensions. The 
twenty-first century involved strategic decisions in circumventing the stigma 
of being Islamic in an age of Islamophobia. These were significant factors 
in what ultimately defines Nūrbakhsh’s positioning as one distinct from the 
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other traditional Niʿmatullāhī branches (not to mention, other traditional Ṣūfi 
orders) that retained a clear connection with Islamic identity. For Nūrbakhsh, 
Islamic identity was defined through the tradition of interpretation that had 
been dominated by the ʿ ulamāʾ class over the centuries. The battle between the 
Ṣūfi and ʿulamāʾ was an old one and it became epitomised in Ṣafavid Iran with 
the return of the Niʿmatullāhī to their native country as the battle between 
“Mullahs and Kings” (Pourjavadi and Wilson 1978: 136).
As such, Nūrbakhsh’s active promotion of Ṣūfism for a Western audience 
requires careful attention. Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism is historical, culturally rich, 
and guided by a genealogy of spiritual leaders that have been at the heart of 
Persianate society since the fourteenth century. On the one hand, Nūrbakhsh’s 
positionality was demonstrative of a clear break with both Islamic identity and 
traditional Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism. Yet, on the other hand, it was not in defiance 
of Niʿmatullāhī identity. Nūrbakhsh was ever in tune with the Niʿmatullāhī 
identity as a historical phenomenon that was defined by the challenges that 
it had faced. Upon their return to Ṣafavid Persia, the Niʿmatullāhī faced their 
oppressors with what was, in the words of Antonio Gramsci, a passive revolu-
tion. The new Niʿmatullāhī of the Ṣafavid era were Shīʿa, where they embod-
ied a fusion of Ṣūfism and Imāmi expectations that had a protreptic function: 
a Shīʿa-messianic-Ṣūfi formula about the return of justice against despotism, 
social tyranny, and religious fanaticism. This same spirit was once again 
conjured by Nūrbakhsh for the moderns and with a modern sensibility in 
his writings.
The sectarianism of Javād Nūrbakhsh is, therefore, a product of the overt 
manoeuvrability of what it means to be Ṣūfi across a minefield of histori-
cally laden religio-political challenges. Nūrbakhsh navigated the dangerous 
waters of religious institutions and government politics, while retaining both 
the order’s strong cultural ties to the Iranian homeland and demonstrating 
an acute awareness of the importance of being present in the contemporary 
setting. Thus Nūrbakhsh helped to properly situate the Niʿmatullāhī Order in 
modern society and to keep in touch with the modern lifestyle of its initiates. 
Abroad, Khaniqahi Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism was especially accommodating of the 
needs of its non-Muslim, non-Iranian converts. For instance, the weekly ‘ser-
mons’ of Nūrbakhsh, delivered in Persian, were always translated immediately 
into English by his son, Alireza Nūrbakhsh. This would be the case whether 
delivered live or if recorded for production.13
13  Javād Nūrbakhsh always and primarily communicated his message in Persian, which 
was his way of keeping the mainstay of the Order’s ancestral roots, but he permitted and 
encouraged translations into languages other than Persian. Indeed, the bulk of his books 
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Nūrbakhsh’s ambitions for the Niʿmatullāhī Order to be a modern Ṣūfi order, 
combined with keeping a distance from both Iranian politics and the West’s 
politics of Islam, gave it a distinct sectarian feel. But this was couched in an 
esoteric demeanour. Whatever Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism entailed, it did not self-
identify with the ‘theology’ (or ideology) of Islamic regimes, yet it never overtly 
disavowed its Islamicness. The notion that the order was Islamic was never 
withdrawn, nor denied, but what it meant to be Ṣūfi was certainly based on a 
(Niʿmatullāhī) version of Islam, at the very least, which was prominent among 
the few Ṣūfis that were seen to have been apostles to the ‘true’ message of his-
torical Ṣūfism as the real Islam. For Nūrbakhsh, these were the heroes of the 
past such as Bāyazīd and Ḥallāj. By the time of the Republic, Iranians gener-
ally perceived Islam as being synonymous with the newly risen Islamist state; 
and by the time of 9/11, Nūrbakhsh wished to avoid having Ṣūfism confused 
with the negative image of Islam embedded in the West’s War on Terror.14 
The events that played out in Iran as field, and the West as field, resulted in 
Nūrbakhsh showing that the habitus of Ṣūfism was something not at all tied 
to Islam, irrespective of how that was defined. One thing for certain was that 
he had to bypass the geopolitics of both the Middle East and the West in their 
formulations of Islam (as either a force championing justice against foreign 
corruption or undermining the peace of liberal society).
Comparatively speaking, Nūrbakhsh is presented as reflecting the Order’s 
fourteenth century founder, Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī, as an ‘enlightened’ fig-
ure during what has been portrayed as a dark and despotic time when most 
Ṣūfis, apart from the protagonist and his following, had reverted to narrow-
minded religious dogmatism (Graham 1999a; cf. Calder et al 2003: 262–268). 
Accordingly, Shāh Niʿmatullāh’s character was not the kind that would flee 
from danger, nor was he someone able to be coerced; rather he made the 
choice to leave Transoxiana on account of a point that he wanted to make: that 
he, unlike his rivals, did not cling to possessions or status; he left town to give 
way to the worldly pretenders (implicating the rival Naqshbandī Ṣūfi order) 
who were jealous of Shāh Niʿmatullāh’s reputation and following (Calder et al 
2003: 262). Shāh Niʿmatullāh travelled for some time before finally settling in 
Mahan, just outside Kerman. Admired by the Bahmanid sultan, Ahmad Shāh, 
Shāh Niʿmatullāh was invited to the Deccan. Yet it was his son and successor 
who took up the offer of invitation to relocate and remain there for two and 
a half centuries. The return to their native Persia by the end of the eighteenth 
have been translated into English (as well as other European languages where the Houses 
of Ṣūfism are located) to ensure wider access.
14  This was confirmed by an anonymous source well connected to the Order.
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century is what Terry Graham has noted as a renaissance of Niʿmatullāhī 
Ṣūfism (Graham 1999b: 167–168). The intensity of the Niʿmatullāhī revival was 
defined both by state persecution as well as internal fractures. The order grad-
ually divided into three distinct sub-branches: the Ṣafī ʿAlī Shāhī, Sulṭān ʿAlī 
Shāhī (or Gonabadi), and the Munawwar ʿAlī Shāhī , the third branch being the 
one inherited by Javād Nūrbakhsh.
Shāh Niʿmatullāh was a prolific author of prose and poetic works. As men-
tioned, he followed the doctrine of unity of being as espoused by the ibn 
al-ʿArabī school of thought in Iran, but did so in combination with the theme 
of intense divine love as found in Rūmī’s poetry. More importantly, Shāh 
Niʿmatullāh considered sharīʿa as secondary to ṭarīqa. These are comparable 
facets that underline Nūrbakhsh’s approach. We can see that Nūrbakhsh insti-
gated his own Niʿmatullāhī revival in the Iran of the Shāh through a process of 
modernisation and liberalisation of Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism for an educated popu-
lace previously disillusioned with the stagnating traditions of bygone Ṣūfism. 
A psychiatrist by profession, he was well known among influential circles in 
Tehran, which enabled him to leave his mark through the Ṣūfism he espoused. 
He envisaged Ṣūfism as a ‘progressive spirituality’, which both attracted and 
detracted followers. In truth, his innovations had greater success abroad. 
Despite the regime change in Iran, Nūrbakhsh demonstrated his commitment 
to modernisation and what would be indelibly the Niʿmatullāhī renaissance of 
the age (Milani 2018: 120f).
Like its founder, and other Niʿmatullāhī masters, Nūrbakhsh too was pro-
lific. He produced a vast amount of publications (assisted by having his own 
press: Khaniqahi Niʿmatullāhī Publishing) launching his Ṣūfi modernising 
project. Simultaneously weaved into these works was the message about dis-
tancing Ṣūfism from traditional Islamic identity. As noted, he championed the 
view that Ṣūfism was innately Iranian and evolved out of native Persian mysti-
cism. He advocated for the humanitarian principles of Ṣūfism that he believed 
were a “quintessentially Iranian cultural phenomenon” (Lewisohn 2006: 56). 
Nūrbakhsh’s initial strategy was to nationalise Ṣūfism (in Iran) in order to coun-
ter the influence of the mullās by producing a picture of the past that showed 
Ṣūfism having pre-Islamic and Iranian roots. This invoked the spirit of nation-
alism as represented by the eleventh century literary masterpiece of Firdausi, 
the Shāh nameh or Book of Kings.15 In his writings, Nūrbakhsh described the 
history of Ṣūfism as a process of making Islamic the native Iranian mysticism 
of Persia. He made the point that the designation ‘Ṣūfi’ only mattered when 
Iranian mystics accepted Islam in the years following the conquest of their 
15  For further discussion on the Niʿmatullāhī creed, see Milani (2014: 219).
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lands (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13). The particular focus was the province of Khurasan, 
home of ‘true’ Ṣūfism, which only wore the garb of ‘Islam’:
Nūrbakhsh understood the non-Iranian elements of Ṣūfism, such as the 
doctrine of ‘trust in God’ (tavakkol) and asceticism (zuhd), as linked to 
Egyptian and Syrian Christianity, and explained the ‘doctrine of activ-
ity’ and ‘social exertion’ (kasb, amal) as sourced in the pre-Islamic 
Khurasanian experience.
Milani 2018: 12216
It is important to note that Nūrbakhsh’s national chauvinism in favouring 
Iranian heritage as the key to Ṣūfism was never collectively a Niʿmatullāhī con-
cern (Lewisohn 2006: 59). His non-Iranian disciples were largely unaware of 
the Persian agenda, and most of them even now do not bother with what was 
Nūrbakhsh’s propaganda. Whilst the Niʿmatullāhī abroad are generally aware 
of, and share in the concerns about, the tensions between Ṣūfi and mullā, 
for them Ṣūfism is essentially a universal spirituality open to all humanity 
(Milani 2014).
4 Nūrbakhsh’s Reading of Khurasanian Ṣūfi Identity
Nūrbakhsh made apparent his preference for Khurasan as the historic ‘home’ 
of original Ṣūfism. Khurasan was furthest from the capital in Baghdad. 
Historically, Khurasan had been a political red-zone from whence the ʿAbbāsid 
revolt emerged to topple the Umayyads. Khurasan also represented a place 
with a history of hybrid asceticism that was based on local communities who 
had converted to Islam. They were a people steeped in old customs and fiercely 
proud. These groups, of which the most notable are the Karrāmiyya (ninth 
century) and the Malāmatiyya (tenth century), were ascetics that were eventu-
ally swallowed up by the expansion of Sunnī endorsed orthodox Ṣūfism that 
came out of Baghdad in the late tenth century (Green 2012: 36f). From about 
the tenth century, Muslim piety was taking shape in different ways, and it was 
a time that the hard-defined boundaries that exist today had not yet formed 
(Melchert 2015). Ṣūfism itself was still in the process of being defined through 
competing ascetical and mystical strands, all of which were coming together 
under the newly evolving umbrella term ‘Ṣūfi’. Baghdad and Khurasan, at that 
16  On the explanation of Nūrbakhsh’s narrative on Ṣūfism see Nawruziyan (1997a, 1997b, 
2000).
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time, represented two distinctly different schools of thought with two unique 
outlooks: the ‘sober’ and the ‘intoxicated’ method. As Ṣūfism became more 
prominent, the Karrāmiyya and Malāmatiyya gradually fell into obscurity.
The Karrāmiyya were known for their rigorous asceticism and literalism and 
were nicknamed ‘mortifiers’ based on their strict austerities. Their monastic 
communities were both influential and important for conversion of the local 
community of dhimmis or those who paid the religious tax to be allowed their 
prayers (Green 2012: 46, 48). The Malāmatiyya developed in reaction to the 
Karamiyya. They were known as ‘the seekers of blame’ as per their distinc-
tive practice. It was the latter group that was particularly opposed to the Ṣūfis 
from Baghdad. Their main rivalry was, however, with the local Karrāmiyya. 
The Malāmatiyya criticised the Karamiyya for putting their piety on public 
display, which for the former group was an obstacle to true piety (Green 2012: 
46). Nūrbakhsh was not only fond of the Malāmatiyya, but he saw himself as 
a modern day malamati, a seeker of blame. For the Malāmatiyya, the greatest 
obstacle on the path to God was the public display of piety, because it charac-
terised a hypocritical religiosity. Someone who practiced the malamati philos-
ophy would, for instance, deliberately expose themselves to self-humiliating 
instances that attracted the blame of others. The Ṣūfis of Baghdad—as insti-
gated by Junayd (d. 910)—also held a disdain for public displays of piety, as 
the aim of Ṣūfism was to control the nafs and not make a spectacle of oneself 
for sake of diverting others from their pious obligations. Yet unlike them, the 
Malāmatiyya believed that the nafs could not be destroyed and they argued 
that saying so was evidence of the victory of nafs (Green 2012: 46).
Nūrbakhsh, of course, underlined the charade of ‘the religious’ in their proc-
lamations and displays of piety and induced the Niʿmatullāhī Ṣūfism with the 
force of malamati attitude. Similar to the Malāmatiyya who were opposed to 
Karrāmiyya pietism and Ṣūfi moralising in public, Nūrbakhsh held a disdain 
for those who would impose their pious status over others. In line with this 
philosophy, Nūrbakhsh was obstinate in exposing the hypocrisy of religion.
Nūrbakhsh in fact had never openly declared his malamati approach—
known only to those closest to him—until when it was made public in a 
final recorded interview (Smith 2008a, 2008b). As mentioned, many of 
the Niʿmatullāhī followers remained unaware of (and thus unaffected by) 
Nūrbakhsh’s more intimate praxis, especially if they did not read or under-
stand Persian (see Lewisohn 2006). Nevertheless, another distinctive aspect of 
his sectarianism is defined through his espousal of malamati philosophy. One 
could say that Nūrbakhsh had decisively undermined both Islam and Ṣūfism 
by employing malamati piety. This gave him the spiritual mechanism with 
which to divorce his mysticism from mainstream religion, but also from the 
formal and traditional Ṣūfism that was historically associated with orthodoxy.
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5 ‘Nūrbakhshian Ṣūfism’: The Inner Circle of Iranian Mysticism
In their book, Kings of Love (1978), Nasrollah Pourjavadi and Peter Lamborn 
Wilson celebrate the “Ṣūfism of Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī” as the distinguished 
methodology of a significant historical figure. He is described as having inau-
gurated a new era of Ṣūfism, confirmed by the lending of his name to the Order 
that it formed and which continues to the present day. In this segment, I make 
the point that the ‘Ṣūfism of Javād Nūrbakhsh’ is in a similar vein, something 
equally distinct. Indeed, it might be said of Nūrbakhsh that he was the ‘Shāh 
Niʿmatullāh ’ of the age; that he was the Quṭb and Imām of his time—as was 
implied of the Shāh Niʿmatullāh (Pourjavadi and Wilson 1978: 40)—though 
Nūrbakhsh would have undoubtedly denied it about himself (Pourjavadi and 
Wilson 1978: 242).
Javād Nūrbakhsh was a charismatic figure and interviews with his followers 
indicate that his views had great appeal.17 Up to this point, we have attempted 
to locate Javād Nūrbakhsh in his historical context. Now, we turn our atten-
tion to the content of his Ṣūfi thought and his picturing of Ṣūfism as a sectar-
ian movement. This takes us beyond the Khaniqahi Ṣūfism identity, which is 
really an outer layer to what is ‘Nūrbakhshian Ṣūfism’, that is, that aspect of 
Nūrbakhsh’s thought that reveals something authentic about Nūrbakhsh’s Ṣūfi 
identity. This is a deeper level of the Khaniqahi Ṣūfism that rightly belonged 
to only the closest circle of Javād Nūrbakhsh, and it was certainly not some-
thing that was ordinarily or openly shared with the wider audience of the 
Niʿmatullāhī Khaniqahi initiates. Interestingly, the section of this chapter on 
historical contextualisation was about the clues to seeing Nūrbakhsh as a sec-
tarian, yet the content of his work (as will be seen) reveals the inverse, that 
Ṣūfism was seen by him as a sectarian movement.
The best place to start is with how Nūrbakhsh defined Ṣūfism. A careful 
reading of his works will show that he squarely placed the emphasis on moral 
conduct and service to others. Throughout all his writings (including both his 
discourses and poetry) this is the central aspect of his message and it is con-
sistently repeated countless times: Spiritual morality always takes precedence 
over religious duty and the obligation to religious law. This he would occasion-
ally make explicit, but typically enveloped in historical quotes taken and inter-
preted from Abu Sa’id, Sa’di, or Hafiz. These he would interpret (albeit, without 
much difficulty) in making his point. For Nūrbakhsh, these regular reference 
points were not only demonstrative of the antinomian attitude of certain 
historical Ṣūfis whom he admired greatly, but also, and more importantly, of 
the kind of Ṣūfism that he espoused. Two distinct quotes to this effect were a 
17  For more details see Milani and Possamai (2016).
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saying of Abu Sa’id: “If you walk on water, you’re no more than a water-bug; if 
you fly through the air, you’re no more than a fly; gain a heart and become a 
human being” (Nūrbakhsh 2000: 44); and another of Sa’di: “Devotional practice 
is nothing more than serving others; it has nothing to do with rosary, prayer rug 
or robe” (Nūrbakhsh 2004: 36).
Nūrbakhsh’s attitude toward religion, God, and the Ṣūfi path is about 
gradual layers of understanding, and so an important aspect of his method-
ology was underpinned by what he termed as “Sufism and Psychoanalysis” 
(Nūrbakhsh 1990). These Jungian style layers of consciousness are representa-
tive of Nūrbakhsh’s overall depiction of the Ṣūfi path (Nūrbakhsh 1992). Driven 
by the apprehension of the ‘real’, the Ṣūfi was to traverse beyond the outward 
description of terms and arrive at inner meaning. Similarly, what it meant to 
be Ṣūfi was not about the outward definitions or even the practices, because 
ultimately it was about the experience. Nūrbakhsh thus made the distinction 
between mystical understandings of God from theological readings, stating on 
several occasions that Ṣūfism has nothing to do with religion (Smith 2008a), 
and by extension the ‘God’ of the Ṣūfi similarly has nothing to do with the God 
of biblical tradition (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 32–34). Notwithstanding, he consistently 
refers to God or a sense of God’s presence behind the symbolic language he 
utilises. At the crux of his writings is a delineation between Ṣūfism and Islam. 
His narrative tells the story that Ṣūfism was never really part of the Islamic 
religion (Smith 2008a; Forum 2007) and in fact existed before the arrival of 
Islam, and it is since then that Iranian mystics developed Ṣūfism as their way 
of accepting Islam while being able to secretly continue their practice of the 
ancient spiritual traditions. Secret, not because these ancient traditions were 
innately profane, but because they were sacredly humane customs of the old 
world needing to be preserved.
The published Discourses of Nūrbakhsh (1996) are heavily laden with the 
ideal of chivalry or what he refers to in Persian as javanmardi. Chivalry is a 
Persian institution and is the hallmark of the heroes of Persia’s past. While 
the actual heroes of the past, such that they appear in the Shāh nameh of 
Firdausi, are Muslims implicitly and they are those who are primarily obser-
vant of ancient Iranian customs, Nūrbakhsh promotes the virtues of altruism 
(through them) at the expense of religion. Such a degree of altruism is predi-
cated upon an unrelenting decree of having faith in the ‘master’, and so goes 
the infamous quote from Hafez: be mey sajjadeh rangin kon garat pir-e moghan 
gooyad (“stain the prayer rug with wine should the master command you”). 
Moreover, and taking extracts from numerous poems of Nūrbakhsh such as: 
“Feigning Negligence,” “Love’s Bazaar,” “Love’s Treasure,” and many others, we 
see the view reinforced that religion is nothing but a barrier to God, and that 
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God is not what is conventionally disclosed by the religious (Nūrbakhsh 1980). 
Most telling is that in his The Psychology of Ṣūfism (1992), a dense and technical 
book, Nūrbakhsh expounds on his psychological theory of the process of spiri-
tual transformation from a state of ego-centeredness to spirit-consciousness, 
all the while without recourse to religion. So it would seem, though difficult 
to ascertain for certain, that Nūrbakhsh’s ‘theology’ does not advocate a tran-
scendent God, but rather the divine presence through humane virtues. For 
certain, the point conveyed in his exegesis is that Ṣūfism is about the power of 
self-realisation through the utter devastation of the ego. The method, as visible 
throughout all his works, is by way of observing personal etiquette (adab) and 
the practice of service to others (khedmat) (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 51).
However, a full appreciation of Nūrbakhsh’s view of Ṣūfism as a sectarian 
movement requires careful deliberation, because Nūrbakhsh never explicitly 
denounced Islam but stated that Islam was taken up by Iranians and then made 
synonymous with their sense of spirituality: “Ṣūfism is the culture of ancient 
Iran […] With the coming of Islam to Iran, Ṣūfism gradually took its place in 
the Iranian culture and gave rise to the mysticism of Islam” (Nūrbakhsh 2006: 
4). His historical understanding of Ṣūfism is connected to his definitional 
understanding of Ṣūfism. What Ṣūfism is in practice is what it is historically: 
“Before Islam appeared, the tradition of chivalry ( javanmardi) in the Middle 
East was maintained through the training of men to be chevaliers ( javanmar-
dan)” (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13). He described javanmardi as involving several key 
practices that define the substance of a particular kind of person whose very 
substance as a human being is quintessentially good:
Consideration for others (morowwat), self-sacrifice (ithar), devotion 
( fada-kari), the helping of the unfortunate and unprotected, kindness 
towards all created beings, keeping one’s word and self-effacement—all 
qualities that were later to emerge as the noble attributes of the perfect 
human being from the point of view of Ṣūfism.
Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13
The chevalier was in effect an exemplar person, what Nūrbakhsh calls “a 
true human being” who abided by a “code of etiquette and conventions” that 
defined javanmardi. Ṣūfism was therefore an accidental occurrence due to the 
adaptation of chivalry to Islam upon its arrival to Iran. He says:
With the appearance of Islam, these chevaliers embraced the religion 
of Islam while retaining the conventions of chivalry, thereby founding 
the creed of Ṣūfism on the basis of both Islam and chivalry. Thus, the 
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etiquette of the chevaliers became the part of the practice of the kha-
niqah and of the Ṣūfis.
Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13
In the course of time, Nūrbakhsh explains, the Ṣūfi masters of this tradition 
placed emphasis on developing ideas such as Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd) 
and divine love (ʿishq), which they defined as the central tenets of Islam, and 
they combined these with their code of chivalry to define Ṣūfism. Therefore, 
the definitional practice of Ṣūfism “consisted of focusing one’s gaze in one 
direction (towards God) through the power of love, and its method was to cul-
tivate a humane code of ethics, which was equated with that of the chevaliers” 
(Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13).
Nūrbakhsh’s opening chapter in Discourses is a direct appeal to his initiates 
to realise that they are “the standard-bearers of the school of humanity and 
of the tradition of chivalry” (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13). Furthermore, these “noble 
human qualities” that defined Ṣūfism are what differentiated those that would 
call themselves Ṣūfis from others in the world today, but which were expected 
of all fellow humans. In effect, Ṣūfism, as a practice of the ‘true’ human being 
was the key to establishing a ‘spiritual paradise’ discovered here and now 
within and through the Ṣūfi path as opposed to the “material paradise” of those 
who worshiped externalities (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 13).
6 Ṣūfism as a Sectarian Movement and the Inner Revolution
If Nūrbakhsh portrayed Ṣūfism as he saw it, the mainstay of his thought, in 
my analysis of his works, was the need for a modern re-interpretation of Ṣūfi 
history. One does wonder whether and to what extent Nūrbakhsh’s reading of 
Ṣūfism for the modern age was due to the contemporary circumstance of his 
time. In any case, it is his reframing of Ṣūfism for the present time that in my 
opinion reified the sectarian attitude of Nūrbakhsh about Ṣūfism.
Nūrbakhsh received explicit patronage during the modernising reign of 
the Shāh , because Ṣūfism was shown to be something attuned to the mod-
ern liberal values of a westernising society. However, after the Revolution that 
brought to power the Islamic Republic, such a notion could not at all be tol-
erated, not even by moderates. As such, Nūrbakhsh felt it necessary to leave 
Iran altogether in order to maintain the sense of freedom of religion that was 
enjoyed prior to the Islamist regime’s takeover. Nūrbakhsh’s circumstances 
were, of course, reminiscent the ordeals faced by Shāh Niʿmatullāh , and in a 
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way Nūrbakhsh must have seen himself in the light of the grandmaster, who 
also practiced self-exile (Graham 1999b). In the Discourses Nūrbakhsh makes 
the point about frustrations with religious authorities, doing so on many occa-
sions, but one in particular is worth noting: “The Ṣūfis celebrate two festivals 
each breath; spiders celebrate by making feasts of flies” (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 
14). The use of ‘spider’ and ‘fly’ was a common trope for the ‘mullā’ and the 
‘believer’. What was fast disappearing in the aftermath of the Revolution was 
what was always most precious to Nūrbakhsh: the means to offer individuals 
a degree of flexibility and accountability of conscience. It was not that people 
needed to have religion forced upon them but that they needed to understand 
the moral imperative to be found in religion. Once discovered, whether religion 
was needed or not remained a personal choice. Nūrbakhsh never condemned 
the following of religious laws or the practice of Islamic rituals; this was left up 
to the individual to decide, but he made sure to remind people of what the real 
expectation of a ‘religious’ person was. For example, Nūrbakhsh says (mind 
you, echoing the saying attributed to Rabea the female saint of Basra): “The 
Ṣūfi’s love of God involves no expectation of reward or fear of punishment, for 
the Ṣūfi does not have any wishes and demands” (Nūrbakhsh 1996: 21). Again, 
he says, “Righteous action refers to acting with no thought of merit of reward” 
(Nūrbakhsh 1996: 16).
Nūrbakhsh’s progressive attitude was the stamp of Ṣūfism for the modern 
individual. Moreover, that Ṣūfism’s originality was sourced in Persian antiquity 
fit perfectly with the paradox of Iranian identity in balancing the old and the 
new. Nūrbakhsh understood that Iran was a land of many contradictions and 
the place of many tensions brought about by centuries of religious revolution. 
As such, he provided the framework for an inner revolution that was pow-
ered by the historicity of Ṣūfism as effectively an arcane sectarian movement. 
Rather than outwardly divorce religion, the Ṣūfi travelled within to shed the 
layers of outward piety. Even quoting Junayd, the founder of Baghdad School 
of Ṣūfism, Nūrbakhsh shows just how this mystic of Persian descent was forced 
to preserve the vibrancy of mysticism in the face of outward jurists and their 
religious tradition: “For twenty years I have been discoursing only on marginal 
aspects of Ṣūfism, but of what concerns its profoundest depths I have not 
breathed a word, for tongues have been forbidden to utter that and hearts not 
permitted to apprehend it” (Nūrbakhsh 1997: 10).
In a sense, it is clear that Nūrbakhsh had distinctly made the case for Ṣūfism 
as a sectarian movement which had consistently defied the outward extremi-
ties of the religious class. In the course of its inner revolution, sometimes Ṣūfis 
had to remain silent, and sometimes vocal. On the whole, anonymity was 
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preferred to outward conflict for the majority of Ṣūfis, and Nūrbakhsh was no 
exception. What makes Nūrbakhsh different to other traditional Ṣūfi figure-
heads is that his approach reminds one of the spirit of the antinomianism of 
classical Ṣūfism, in that Ṣūfism (for them and, I surmise, for Nūrbakhsh) was 
not about acquiescing to tradition, nor was it about foregoing goodness for the 
sake of observing outward religion.
7 Conclusion
It is never easy to define a person or their ideas in a way that does justice to 
their intention and purpose. This chapter has attempted to engage with sig-
nificant aspects of Nūrbakhsh’s thinking on the topic of Ṣūfism within Iran 
and the West generally as made available through his writings (in Persian and 
English) and later made public in a final interview (Smith 2008a, 2008b). In 
such an undertaking there is no claim to having pinpointed either the histori-
cal or any ontological sense of the person. Rather, this chapter captures, with 
due caution, a reading of Nūrbakhsh’s outlook—as he reveals it—on Ṣūfism as 
a sectarian movement, from as much as can be discerned about his perspec-
tive, and a consideration of Nūrbakhsh as an undisclosed sectarian based on 
the geopolitical conditions of his circumstance. It is of course my own inter-
pretation, in fleshing out from his writings, something about his own view on 
Ṣūfism as a sectarian movement historically, and in discerning the Niʿmatullāhī 
Khaniqahi teachings of Nūrbakhsh as sectarian in nature, implicitly.
In this endeavour it would seem that the Niʿmatullāhī Khaniqahi Ṣūfism of 
Javād Nūrbakhsh presents those who engage with its belief system with some-
thing different to what is ordinarily encountered in traditional Ṣūfi circles. 
Ṣūfism of the Niʿmatullāhī brand is not Islamic mysticism, but rather in the 
words of Annemarie Schimmel (1975) the “mystical dimension” of it tout court. 
Javād Nūrbakhsh is certainly seen as a facilitator of such a space/dimension 
of habitation for those practitioners of mysticism with principal concern for 
divine mystery and for its own sake. In this way he presented a new direction 
for Ṣūfism based on a forgotten past.
O Nūrbakhsh, the debate over Truth
 And illusion,
Which began long ago,
 Now no longer remains.
…
565Javād Nūrbakhsh and the Niʿmatullāhī ‘Khaniqahi’ Order
 Our intent was to explain the story
  Of the heart
 And its condition in the grief
  Of burning and boiling.
 From a kingdom beyond
  All thoughts of the world
 The sovereign of the soul was captured
  By the beauty of the Beloved.
 I said that for me it went pleasantly,
  But the heart heard and replied,
 ‘Do not conceal it—
  Our story burned the soul’
Nūrbakhsh 1980: 110–111
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Chapter 24
Subud: An Indonesian Interpretation of Ṣūfism
Antoon Geels
1 Introduction
Subud is one of hundreds of mystical movements (aliran kebatinan) that have 
grown significantly in post-war Indonesia. Along with other movements like 
Sumarah and Pangestu, Subud has attracted people from the West and has now 
spread to 83 countries, divided into nine zones. The total number of members 
is estimated at close to twelve thousand. Despite the fact that Subud leaders 
deny any relation to the Javanese mystical tradition, it can easily be shown that 
the greater part of Subud’s conceptual apparatus is firmly rooted in the cul-
tural history of Java. Under the banner of change and renewal, Subud presents 
a message that, fundamentally, is one of continuity in a society in transition. 
Subud’s ideas and practices underline not only the variety within Islamic sects 
and movements, but also the adaptability to local traditions, as the present 
chapter will try to show.
Subud is an acronym for Susila Budhi Dharma, words of Sanskrit origin. 
According to Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo, the founder of Subud, the 
meaning of these three words is “to follow the will of God with the help of the 
Divine Power that works both within and without, by way of surrendering one-
self to the will of Almighty God.” As such Subud “may be attached to the whole 
of mankind in every religion.” This means that Subud also can be presented as 
an example of ‘glocal’ spirituality. Subud attaches to local spiritual traditions, 
including Hinduism, while simultaneously having the ambition to reach out 
globally. The focus in this chapter will be on a short biographical presenta-
tion of the founder, the basic concepts of Subud, its specific spiritual exercise 
(latihan kejiwaan), and, finally, the Javanese background of Subud, especially 
focused on the nineteenth century renaissance period and the rise of mystical 
movements in post-war Java.
2 The Life of Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo (1901–1987)
Raden Mas Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo, the founder of Subud, usu-
ally called Bapak (a conventional honorific term, meaning ‘father’; here referred 
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to as Subuh), was born on 22 June 1901, in a small village near Semarang, the 
capital of the province Central Java. The name Muhammad does not neces-
sarily mean that Subuh was an orthodox Muslim (santri), but like millions 
of other Indonesians Muhammad Subuh would regard himself as a Muslim 
though he did not observe all five pillars of Islam. He did not perform regu-
lar Friday prayers at the mosque, and despite extensive travelling around the 
world, the founder of Subud did not make the pilgrimage to Mecca (Sitompul 
1974: 61–62).
Although Muhammad Subuh always claimed to be an ‘ordinary’ person, his 
life, as told by himself, provides proof that he was a remarkable man. At his 
birth volcanoes erupted, as is common in Javanese folklore when an important 
person is born. At the age of six or seven Subuh went to a private Dutch school. 
The young Subuh turned out to be a very sensitive boy. He did not like to see 
boys fighting and was unable to read degrading or false information about 
Indonesia in Dutch schoolbooks. He also displayed a clairvoyant faculty and 
was teased for it by other children, who did not like the fact that Subuh could 
clearly see things that they could not see in the ordinary world. It is also impor-
tant to note that the family of Subuh held in high esteem traditional Javanese 
values, like the practice of self-denial, values that Subuh retained all his life 
(Longcroft 1993: Chapter 4).
When Subuh was fifteen or sixteen years old he had a decisive experience. 
One night an old man, dressed in black and carrying a staff, awakened him. 
Later Subuh understood that this man must have been Sunan Kalijaga, an 
ancestor saint who returned to this world in order to look after Subuh when 
he could not take care of himself (Sumohadiwidjojo 1991: 23–24). The man 
approached the astonished boy and uttered this prophecy: “Remember. When 
you are thirty-two years old, you will be called by Almighty God.” For Subuh 
this could only have one single meaning: he was going to die at thirty-two 
(Longcroft 1993: 30). Muhammad Subuh mentions that this experience came 
to him shortly after he received the message that his grandfather had died. 
“I was very shocked by the news,” he writes many years later in his autobiog-
raphy, and adds that he no longer had the will to study and rather wanted to 
start work.
In the years to come Subuh became the breadwinner for his family. He 
worked as a bookkeeper at the Semarang City Hall. During these years he also 
felt an intense spiritual quest related to the prophecy he had received some 
years earlier. If he was going to die at thirty-two, he surmised, it was better to 
search for higher values. His spiritual journey took him to a number of teach-
ers. The most important spiritual teacher of Subuh during these years was 
Shaykh Abdurachman. He was also the last one to whom Subuh went to receive 
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spiritual guidance. Abdurachman was a well-known shaykh of the Naqshbandī 
order of dervishes. Like most other spiritual teachers he immediately noticed 
‘the spiritual potential’ of the young Muhammad Subuh (Longcroft 1993: 46).
Muhammad Subuh received the latihan kejiwaan, the spiritual exercise of 
Subud, in 1925 when he was twenty-four years of age. This unexpected experi-
ence concluded his search for spiritual teachers. As he tells the story, one night, 
around midnight, after hours of studies, Subuh put his books aside and went 
for a walk. Suddenly, and surprisingly, he noticed “a light shining from above a 
ball of radiant white light,” falling onto his head. Then it happened:
My body started shaking; my chest was heaving. I feared I would collapse 
in the street. I quickened my pace to get home as quickly as possible. 
But on reaching the house, the shaking stopped and my chest was calm. 
I knocked on the door, which was immediately opened by my mother, 
who asked, ‘Why do you look so pale?’ to which I responded, briefly, 
‘It’s nothing!’
I went directly to my room and stretched out on my bed. I folded my 
arms over my chest and surrendered to Almighty God. Amazing: I saw 
my whole being filled with light. This lasted for just half a minute. Then 
I arose, but not from my own will, and went to the room that I used for 
prayer and study. There I stood and performed two raka’ats of prayer. 
After finishing the prayer, I returned and lay down again on my bed and 
fell asleep.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1990a: 24
This was Muhammad Subuh’s first experience of the Subud latihan, character-
ised by a total surrender to Almighty God. In Subuh’s biography it is added that 
he was reminded of the words uttered by the old man in black, who prophesied 
that God would call him, interpreted by Subuh that he would die young. If this 
was the time, then he should surrender completely, which is why Subuh lay 
down on his bed with his arms crossed on his chest (Longcroft 1993: 49).
Subuh felt troubled by this kind of experience. At that time, he did not really 
understand its deeper meaning. Apparently, Sheikh Abdurachman could not 
explain them either. A number of similar experiences came to him shortly 
afterwards. Only a few months later, when performing the dhikr ritual, reciting 
the prayer lā ilāha illa ʾllāh, (“There is no god but God”), spontaneously during 
latihan, he saw and felt a large book falling into his lap. On the first page he 
saw the picture of an Arab in a long robe and wearing a turban. Subuh tried to 
read the Arabic script, which suddenly changed into Roman characters and in 
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Dutch translation. He read: “The Prophet Muhammad Rasulu’llah.” Strangely 
enough the picture smiled and nodded, confirming the interpretation. Then 
Subuh turned the page and saw Javanese people; on other pages there were 
people representing many different races. All of them were moving, praying, 
crying, shouting, and asking God for forgiveness. Then the book vanished into 
his chest (Longcroft 1993: 52ff; see also Sumohadiwidjojo 1990a: 29–30).
During this period Subuh met his future wife, Rara Ruminda. They married 
in October 1926. Ruminda gave birth to four children. Siti Rahayu was born 
in 1928, followed by Haryono two years later, and eighteen months later by 
Haryadi. Their youngest child, Siti Hardiyati, was born in 1935.
The first group around Subuh was formed among the followers of Shaykh 
Abdurachman. Subuh still considered himself to belong to that group. Soon 
a small group of Abdurachman’s pupils started to visit Subuh’s house regu-
larly. In 1932–33 some of these friends received the latihan. Slowly, the latihan 
spread to a group in Semarang and elsewhere in Java.
During these years Subuh had his most important spiritual experience, 
referred to as his ascension. According to his biographer it is most likely that 
this experience came to Subuh in the middle of 1933, around the time that he 
decided to give up his worldly work. This must have been a worrying time for 
his wife Ruminda, who at the time was only twenty-one years of age. After all, 
Subuh was the main financial provider for her and her small children, as well 
as for other members of his family.
No doubt, this must have been a confusing time for Subuh as well. One eve-
ning, when at home, he felt his body growing weak, his mind emptied. Suddenly 
he was aware of the prophecy of the old man in black, who told the schoolboy 
Subuh that at thirty-two years of age he would be called by Almighty God. 
Subuh stretched out on his bed and “surrendering to the Power of Almighty 
God” he suddenly felt his body “lengthen, widen and expand” and he moved at 
great speed across “a huge expanse.” In his own words:
Before me I could see mountain-like cones of light, seven of them, stacked 
one above the other, and each connected by a cord of brilliant white light. 
I approached the first cone and entered it. Within could be seen a vast 
panorama, much greater than that I had seen before.
There I saw Almighty God’s creatures clad in white and praising the 
majesty and greatness of Almighty God … It seems I was not permitted 
to stay too long as I was transported again and found myself entering the 
second mountain from below, then I went up until I reached the sixth 
mountain where I felt completely powerless.
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In this state of utter weakness I felt myself saying, ‘Allahu Akbar, Allahu 
Akbar, Allahu Akbar.’ Only then did I enter the seventh cone. There I had 
no direction and no purpose other than to say, ‘Allah, Allah, Allah.’ But 
from there I could see anything and everything that was very distant, 
including the world that I had left.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1990a: 34–35
It was only after his ascension that Subuh started to ‘open’ other people, that is, 
initiate them into the Subud latihan. Slowly the latihan began to spread, first 
in Java and then, more than two decades later, all over the world (Longcroft 
1993: 67ff).
While Subuh and his family were still living in Semarang, a small group in 
Yogyakarta, ‘opened’ and guided by Subuh, started an organisation called Ilmu 
Kasunyatan (ilmu means ‘esoteric spiritual knowledge’; kasunyatan means 
‘emptiness’) (Longcroft 1993: 73–74). During the next twelve years after the 
ascension Subuh and his family lived a life of hardship. He had no work and was 
financially dependent on others for support. When their sixteen-month-old 
boy Suharyo died in August 1934, young Ruminda became severely depressed. 
In 1936 she fell ill and passed away.
In November 1941 Subuh remarried to Ibu Siti Sumari who was thirty-four 
years old and the mother of two children. This second marriage was of tre-
mendous importance for Subud. Ibu Sumari made the Subud latihan available 
for women. In his autobiography Subuh writes: “My family life was complete 
again. We lived simply but always felt at peace and calm, so I was able to be dili-
gent in the latihan kejiwaan that I had received through the grace of Almighty 
God” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990a: 32; see also Longcroft 1993: 95ff).
Like many other families they lived through a time of hardship during World 
War II and the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch sur-
rendered the country to the Japanese in March 1942. Subuh tried to survive by 
starting a small contracting business together with eight other persons. After 
the war, in February 1946, Subuh and his family moved to Yogyakarta.
Towards the end of 1946 membership increased from about twenty to two or 
three hundred. A few months later, on 1 February 1947, journalists, government 
officials, and others were invited to an inaugural meeting in a reception room 
at the City Hall of Yogyakarta. On that occasion Subuh proclaimed the name 
chosen for the new organisation: Subud, an acronym for Susila Budhi Dharma.
The words ‘Susila Budhi Dharma’ are of Sanskrit origin. According to the 
interpretation of Subuh, susila means ‘to be able to live according to the will 
of God as really true human beings’. Budhi, usually translated as ‘endeavour’, 
‘power of the intellect’, or ‘consciousness’ in the Indonesian vocabulary, refers 
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to a divine power within man and all creation, according to Subuh. Dharma, 
usually translated as ‘religion’, ‘righteousness’, or ‘duty’, is translated by Subuh 
as “the possibility for every creature, including man, to surrender completely 
to the will of God” (quoted in Sitompul 1974: 80). The combination of the three 
words thus means “to follow the will of God with the help of the Divine Power 
that works both within and without, by way of surrendering oneself to the 
will of Almighty God” (Sitompul 1974: 80). As such Subud “may be attached to 
the whole of mankind in every religion” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b [1961]: 245; 
Longcroft 1993: 121).
In his speech to the invited people Subuh emphasised that Subud “had 
no holy book, no teaching, no sacred formulas, no methods of meditation … 
In Subud the members only surrender with patience, trust, and sincerity to 
Almighty God.” In addition to all this Subuh also explained that Subud is not a 
political party and that its members will obey the laws of the state (Longcroft 
1993: 122–123).
After independence on 17 August 1945 membership was rapidly increasing. 
In May 1957 Subuh and his wife Ibu left Jakarta for England. There they met 
important people, including Dr John G. Bennett a leading follower of the mys-
tic G.I. Gurdjieff, who had died some years earlier. The followers of Gurdjieff, 
about 1200 in number, were looking for a new master. When Muhammad 
Subuh came to England, invited by Bennett and his Gurdjieff group, he was 
welcomed by a great number of people.
Since 1959 Subud has arranged World Conferences, held every fourth year. 
Muhammad Subuh became known to the world of Subud as Bapak or ‘father’. 
In 1970 the American scholar Jacob Needleman, in his book The New Religions, 
could write that Subud is the most widespread of all the new teachings, 
being spread in more than sixty countries throughout the world (Needleman 
1970: 104). Today this number has increased to 83 countries. After 1955 the 
Headquarters of Subud moved to Jakarta. In the early 1960s Subuh managed 
to buy some land on the outskirts of the capital. In time it became known as 
Wisma Subud, situated in a village called Cilandak, and Subud members from 
overseas donated considerable sums of money for construction projects.
3 Basic Concepts in Subud
24.3.1 God and Creation
Although the idea of God is implicitly included in Subuh’s talks, there are rela-
tively few lengthy statements about God. The simple reason for this is that God 
cannot be known by the human mind. Like other mystics Subuh sometimes 
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uses negative descriptions of God. Allāh, he says, “has no form, no colour, no 
time, no place, no nationality, no country” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1967: 80). “Do 
not try to understand the impossible,” Subuh exhorts his followers. But in order 
to be able to communicate about God, Subuh usually refers to “the Great[est] 
Life” (hidup yang maha besar) (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990c [1957]: 119). This Great 
Life permeates the whole universe; it is “within all that is within, and outside 
all that is outside, and God goes before all that is before and comes after all that 
is after” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 113; 1988a: 18).
This concept is similar to the most basic idea of God in mystical theology: 
a combination of immanence and transcendence. In relation to man, God is 
near and simultaneously far away, Subuh says, reminding us of a few words 
from the Qurʾān, often quoted by the Ṣūfis: “God is nearer to you than your 
jugular vein” (Sura 50:16). “The power of God is within man,” says Subuh: “God 
is closer to a human being than if he sees with his own eyes, God is closer to a 
human being than when he thinks his own thoughts. God is closer to a human 
being than when he feels his own feelings” (Sumohadiwidjojo: 1993: 84). “But if 
a man wishes to go toward God,” he also says, “then, o dear, He is far, far away; 
that is to say, the distance cannot be measured” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1969: 112). 
Despite the utter unknowability of God for the human mind, it is possible for 
man to be guided by His power, which is within every human being. “God is 
within you, God is there all the time, God accompanies you in everything that 
you do” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1988a: 5; 1981: 11). “Your inner self … keeps you con-
stantly in touch with the Great Life” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 17).
Although most references to God are of an abstract kind, like in epithets such 
as “the Great Life” or “the Life Force,” being “the light and the guide within the 
individuality of each of you” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b: 153), Subuh occasionally 
uses personal terms like “the One who watches over you” (Sumohadiwidjojo 
1990c: 183). Expressions such as the aforementioned are certainly of a second 
order in relation to abstract references to God. Sometimes Subuh says that it 
does not matter how we designate God. God is Almighty, All-Powerful, and 
All-Knowing. It is impossible for man to picture God, because God has no 
form. But man can reach a certain understanding of God since he has been 
given the capacity of understanding. Being immanent in His creation God 
encompasses the whole universe. Nothing is lifeless, as modern physics has 
proven (Sumohadiwidjojo 1989: 12–13).
Subuh does not talk often about creation. In the beginning there was empti-
ness, silence, and the first vibration (qadr ilham, sometimes spelled as hadir 
ilham) that issues from the will of God (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990b: 13). “Such 
utter isolation,” Subuh says in a talk from 1982, “is referred to in Javanese as 
samun suwung, a total void.” Then, he continues,
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there arose for the first time the so-called nur ghaib, the light of Life, the 
source of everything, and its vibration and radiance, as it spread every-
where, created the light and heat of the sun, fire, air, water and earth. 
It is said that with the creation of these four elements there also arose 
the forms of life, starting from the material, to the vegetable, the animal, 
the human and others beyond. All these arose spontaneously, growing 
together. Such is the story of life as received by the prophets and the mes-
sengers of God.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1983b: 18–19
So, in the beginning there was emptiness and vibration, the same basic vibra-
tion that can be felt in the Subud spiritual exercise, the life within a life. 
Then there was light, which explains why important messengers like Jesus 
are always depicted as surrounded with light or with a halo, “as if his body is 
bathed in light that comes down from above” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990b: 13). 
After the manifestation of light, the four elements were created, and the four 
basic forms of life.
Subuh, through his compiler, describes creation as an emanation process: 
God “decided to test His Own Power” by making “something out of nothing” 
(quoted in McKingley 1992: 1). The world as we know it is materialised spiri-
tuality, passing through the four elements, successively condensed into gross 
matter. The first human beings were Adam and Eve, existing first in a state of 
original unity when there was just light. This was a state of perfection, a state 
of bliss. Everything needed was provided for, just like the unborn baby in the 
mother’s womb. God created a physical body for Adam, a body with senses, 
a heart and mind, and he gave it all kinds of forces, intended to be useful in 
this world: vegetable, animal, human, and ‘other forces’. Equipped with all this, 
Adam was able to live in the world and although he was sad to leave his state 
of original unity, he soon adopted to this new world, forgetting about eternal 
bliss. But by giving Adam the Holy spirit (Roh Ilofi) and the power of the angels 
(Roh Kudus) God made it possible for Adam and his children to remember the 
state of original unity. To take us back to this state is the most profound task of 
the latihan kejiwaan (McKingley 1992: 3ff). This means that we have to study 
another two aspects of the Subud doctrine: the view of man and the essence 
of the spiritual exercise.
3.2 The Concept of Humanity
It is obvious from Subuh’s explanation of the biblical story of Adam and Eve 
that they and their descendants are equipped with all kinds of forces, powers, 
and capacities that enable man both to live in the world and to transcend it. 
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We will now go deeper into the human and divine capacities of humankind. 
This brings us to the following doctrines: the seven universal life forces; the 
four types of nafsu (will, desire); the four bodies of man; and the concept of 
jiwa (soul).
Life as it really should be, Subuh says, “is a chain of being that is harmo-
nious” (McKingley 1992: 44). The concept of ‘harmony’, often used by Subuh, 
is important and used in different contexts. Here it primarily means altru-
ism, to live and show respect to fellow human beings, independent of race or 
nationality (Sumohadiwidjojo 1988a: 2, 1979: 26). Mankind is truly one, “and 
if this can become general then it is the way whereby the world can achieve 
a state of peace, a state of harmony, and can become different from what it is 
today.” This state of being, Subuh adds, is an ideal and realised only by the few 
(Sumohadiwidjojo 1989: 3–4).
The most ordinary state of being is not harmonious. Humans are constantly 
being influenced by lower forces, originating not only from oneself, but also 
from one’s parents and generations of ancestors (Sumohadiwidjojo 1969: 104). 
These lower forces are four in number. The lowest is the material or satanic 
force (daya rewani) (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990c: 135). The next level is the veg-
etable force (daya nabati), more powerful in influence. Like the material force, 
and the other lower forces, the essence of the vegetable force is already pres-
ent in the human body. There is a mutual influence between plants and other 
lower forces and human beings.
As well as rice and vegetables people also eat meat. We now reach the third 
lower force, the animal force (daya hewani), even stronger in influencing the 
feelings of humans and thereby impeding progress (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990b: 
247ff). The fourth of the lower forces are related to the ordinary human being 
(daya jasmani) and acts in sexual union. It is an even “mightier” influence 
(Sumohadiwidjojo 1990b: 263ff). These four forces should be our inner ser-
vants, not our masters.
In addition to the lower forces there are three higher forces. The roh 
rohani is the finer human soul (McKingley 1992: 10). Subuh also refers to this 
level with the expression “the force of the true human being” (daya insani) 
(Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 33–34). Being above the ordinary human level, the 
higher forces are difficult to describe. Subuh says that there is a dividing line 
between the lower forces, the realm of the nafsu, and the three higher levels 
(Sumohadiwidjojo 1985: 51). The true human being is free from self-interest 
(Sumohadiwidjojo 1969: 67); “the perfect human soul … goes straight to God 
and worships Him” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b: 66). Beyond this level Subuh 
mentions the rahmani and rabbani levels (Sumohadiwidjojo 1969: 90).
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The presentation and discussion of the seven forces, especially the lower 
four of them, is a favourite theme in Subuh’s talks. Another frequent topic is 
the struggle with the different desires or passions of man. We touch upon the 
important concept of nafsu, usually translated as passion, of which there are 
four. The first one is called nafsu amarah, red in colour. It is connected with 
will, desire, and anger. This nafsu is also closely related to the material life 
force, which we cannot get rid of. The reason for this is that man “while in this 
world, is composed of the elements earth, water, air and fire,” the four material 
elements (Sumohadiwidjojo 1973: 161).
The second type is called the nafsu aluamah, black in nature and colour. Its 
characteristic is greed, and it is related to the vegetable life force. “Trees and 
plants provide food. By nature they are competitive, greedy” (Sumohadiwidjojo 
1973: 163). This nafsu is an obstacle to the worship of God. Then comes the nafsu 
Ṣūfiyah or supiyah, yellow in colour, the colour of spirituality. It has to do with 
attraction between men and women, and it is related to the animal life-force. It 
is needed in order to develop “the passion of love and unite with the opposite 
sex.” When this has been achieved, the nafsu appropriate to man, connected to 
the human life force, can be developed. This is the nafsu mutmainah, white in 
colour. This nafsu “is an especially good one, a holy one. It is the nafsu of the 
human level” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1965: 165). Thus, the relation between the dif-
ferent nafsu and the lower forces is that they are usually intermingled, causing 
a negative or positive spiritual development.
A third important doctrine, necessary for a proper understanding of the 
Subud view on spiritual development, is the teaching about the four bodies of 
man. In one of his early talks, Subuh uses a diagram consisting of four circles. 
The outer one is man’s physical body; the second circle represents the body 
of feeling and emotions; the third circle is the body of understanding, while 
the last one represents “inner peace or the consciousness of the inner feeling” 
(rasa diri) (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 12ff).
We cannot leave the Subud view of man without touching upon the concept 
of jiwa, one of the Hindu influences on Subuh’s thoughts. In the earliest pub-
lished book of Subuh, a book which is not composed of talks, but consists of a 
systematic survey of his ideas, it is stated that man should not neglect “training 
in the realm of the jiwa.” In its context, this statement obviously means spiri-
tual development. Through the influence of the lower forces and the nafsu, 
people can lose their human jiwa. That is why they need to develop “the inner 
nature of mankind—the kejiwaan” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990b: 221). This means 
that the concept of jiwa is related to different levels of spiritual development. 
In his Cilandak talks Subuh explains about this developmental aspect when 
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commenting upon the concept of kejiwaan (Sumohadiwidjojo 1973: 36–37, see 
also 1983a: 4):
The kejiwaan, however, does not depend on the power of thought, but 
rather on the glory, the greatness of God, Whose Power envelops all, from 
the jiwa of matter to the jiwa Rabani (Spirit of the Almighty), to the jiwa 
Ilofi (the Great Life Force) and up to the jiwa Roh Kudus (the Holy Spirit).
Thus, the jiwa is spiritual, it is the sum total of human capacities and possibili-
ties, entangling the whole hierarchy of the physico-spiritual universe. In the 
same talk Subuh describes the jiwa as an atmosphere: “The jiwa is an atmo-
sphere surrounding you, enveloping you, just as you are enveloped by bright 
light when you stand in the sunshine at midday, or by darkness in the middle 
of the night when there is no sun” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1973: 35). In this atmo-
sphere there is a dimension that is eternal. “The jiwa God gives can never be 
destroyed” (McKingley 1992: 7).
3.3 The Return to Original Unity
In Subud, the world is materialised spirit, reaching an ever-increasing level of 
density. The whole of creation aspires to return to the original state of unity, 
symbolised by the story of Adam and Eve. The universal pulse consists of a 
double movement: emanation and ascension. Although we live in a world of 
multiplicity, there is unity in plurality; the Great Life Force is eternally imma-
nent in its creation. It is the privilege of man to ‘taste’ this unity, to be in touch 
with the Omnipresent, supporting Life Force.
In the following quotation from the texts of Subuh we encounter this funda-
mental idea, so common in the mystical theology of world religion, in Arabic 
Ṣūfi terminology:
[E]verything originates from God. This cannot be denied; no. Inna illahi 
wa inna ilaihi rojiun (from God we come and to God we return). It is not 
only words when we say that we come from God and return to God. No. 
Everything is from God, and everything will return again into the power 
of God. No more and no less.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1981: 18
Subud emphasises personal, non-mediated experience of God’s presence. But 
due to the influence of the lower forces, the nafsu, and the four bodies of man, 
the more common situation of man is at best to be aware of God’s absence. The 
longing for divine presence and guidance is the first step on a long and arduous 
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road, described by Subuh in different ways. It is absolutely necessary, however, 
to undertake this journey with a pack containing some indispensable tools: 
to be able to surrender, to have patience (sabar), to trust in God (tawakal), to 
display an attitude of submission, and to be sincere (ikhlas). In addition to 
these fundamental capacities, Subuh also mentions the importance of losing 
self-interest and of being quiet: “You can yet come to understand all that is 
necessary just by being patient and quiet” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990c: 183).
One of the most important concepts is surrender. In connection with the 
spiritual exercise (latihan kejiwaan) Subuh has already indicated what this 
means. We have to surrender everything in our feeling and thinking:
If you let go of all your thoughts, and let go of all that you feel in your 
inner feeling, and you really believe in God … If, in the training [latihan], 
you think of something, even a little, it stops. Clearly, the training you 
receive—that is, your receiving in the training—cannot be mixed with 
your desires and thoughts.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 101
Before going deeper into the spiritual exercise and elaborating on its require-
ments, it is necessary to present the different stages in spiritual development, 
according to Subuh. Occasionally, Subuh refers to the four traditional stages 
within mystical Islam or Ṣūfism. In a talk from 1959 he criticises other interpre-
tations of the spiritual life for consisting of words only, a theoretical approach 
existing in the mind. All these approaches can be grouped under the headline 
tarikat, spiritual ways. But there are stages beyond tarikat (sometimes tarekat). 
Subuh divides all four of them in two groups:
The first two forms are called Shariat [Arab. sharīʿa, ‘law’] and Tarikat 
[Arab. ṭarīqa, ‘path’]. Shariat does not imply any search for the way to 
God, for all that is required is simply faith; that is to say, if a man already 
has faith in the counsel of those who have received in the past, it is held 
that such a faith will bring him straight to God, and that God will look 
after the faithful. The second form is Tarikat, which means the way to find 
the inner meaning of faith.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b: 122–123
The first two stages are usually related to the religiosity of ordinary man. But 
deeper spiritual development can only be obtained when man reaches the sec-
ond group of two stages: Hakekat [Arab. ḥaqīqa ‘truth’] and Makrifat (Arab. 
maʿrifa, ‘knowledge’). The third stage can only be reached when all efforts 
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have ceased: “This Hakekat only exists when a man comes to see that all his 
efforts are useless and that in truth this can only come to man by the Will of 
God.” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b: 123). The meaning of Makrifat, Subuh explains, 
is “that a man has received the contact with and is filled by the Will of God, 
and is following that divine Will which exists within His being.” The difference 
between the first and the final two stages is described in the following way:
Hakekat and Makrifat are qualities of a man who has received the contact 
with the Power of God to such an extent that he lives according to this 
power and becomes, in very truth, its instrument, whereas in the first two 
ways he is still the instrument of his own self-will; that is, of his thoughts, 
desires and feelings. This is the difference between Shariat and Tarekat 
on the one hand and Hakekat and Makrifat on the other.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b: 123
Subuh adds that the two higher ways are received in the Subud latihan. In rare 
cases, spiritual development leads to the state of ‘perfect man’ (insan kamil), 
a person who has integrated all forces. Perfect man, Subuh says, “is equipped 
with the entire framework, the hierarchy of life-instruments or forces; and 
these exist within him to make his life in this world complete.” Perfect man, 
Subuh continues, is not somebody who turns away from the world, somebody 
who isolates himself in a cave or in the jungle in order to meditate. Perfect man 
does not turn his back to society, he is socially-minded (Sumohadiwidjojo 1975: 
67). A perfect human being or a perfect human soul (the soul called insani) “is 
one with the nature of a creature that knows the true life and knows, too, the 
life of other natures, and which always feels love, and loves and assists anyone 
in need, or those who are ill or in need of care” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 44).
4 Latihan Kejiwaan: The Subud Spiritual Exercise
From what has been said above it is obvious that a purification process is 
needed in order to reach the state of perfect man. From an overall point of view 
the latihan kejiwaan is a purification process. This process proceeds at several 
levels of the psycho-physiological human being, starting with the body and our 
feelings. The purification process includes past sins committed by ancestors. 
Sometimes Subuh refers to the Hindu-Buddhist concept of karma. The influ-
ence from ancestors is firmly rooted in the Wayang stories (Rieu 1985: 26). In 
the words of Subuh: “inside the mistakes which you committed in your own 
life are the mistakes committed by your parents. And inside those mistakes are 
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the mistakes of your grandparents” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1981a: 29; see also 1983b: 
3, 1986: 2, 1993: 28).
It is obvious that the higher levels of latihan are just as rare as similar mys-
tical states of consciousness in other traditions. In a booklet entitled This Is 
What I Have Been Hoping For Subuh mentions that during the twenty-five years 
that he first set foot in Europe only about fifty Subud members have received 
something “beyond their ordinary knowledge” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1983a: 12). 
The most important psychological prerequisites for reaching these higher lev-
els can be summarised as letting go, that is, complete surrender to the will 
of God. A mystical way of expressing this important part of the exercise is to 
reach “death in life” (Mati sakjeroning urip) (Sumohadiwidjojo 1985: 36). The 
same idea is expressed in one of Subuh’s New York talks:
Those men who received Grace in the days of old  … have repeatedly 
declared that in order to know and to realise the true, the real, life, which 
it is both necessary and possible for man to know, he is required to die 
before he really does die; that is to say, he should experience death before 
he really dies. This is symbolised in the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, which represents the return of Life from death.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1975: 12
The psychological description of this requirement is to “stop thinking and 
imagining” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990c: 111). Subuh’s advice to Subud members 
is to put aside all speculations, all thought. In a way it is like “re-entering 
the state  … as a small child free from the influence of the external world” 
(Sumohadiwidjojo 1984b: 28).
Subuh not only demands the inhibition of thought, but also “the cessation 
of your personal self” during latihan (Sumohadiwidjojo 1984a: 45). In addition 
to all this one should be free from desire: “If your thinking and desires interfere, 
your latihan stops by itself.” In the next sentence Subuh says that it is necessary 
to surrender “body and soul to the One God” with trust, patience, and sincer-
ity (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 67). The practice of latihan is not limited to the 
latihan hall, twice a week. Subuh advises experienced practitioners to do the 
latihan at home (Sumohadiwidjojo 1984a: 176). The experience of latihan is an 
on-going process leading, finally, to a permanent state in which Subuh claimed 
to be (Rieu 1985: 76).
From what has been mentioned above it is obvious that Subud is embedded 
in mysticism, in the sense of experiencing the immediate presence of God, 
leading to far-reaching consequences in the individual’s life. One of the most 
common verbal expressions of this experience is to feel “a vibration of energy 
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felt within the self,” or “to make contact with the Great Life, or with the Power 
of God” (mendapatkan kontak dengan hidup-besar atau dengan kekuasaan 
Tuhan) (Sumohadiwidjojo 1990: 110–111).
What we receive in the latihan can be described as a vibration of life, 
called in Islam the hadir ilham. This vibration arises within our being the 
moment the nafsu ceases to act. Gradually it spreads to our whole body, 
eventually manifesting in the form of movements.
Sumohadiwidjojo 1981a: 53
In one of his early talks in Coombe Springs, England, Subuh again mentioned 
that a person who has an immediate relation to the “Great Life” is called, in the 
language of Islam, a perfected human being (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 12; see 
also 1983b: 58).
In summary, then, Subuh asks Subud members to stop thinking and desir-
ing, to inhibit impressions from the external world, as well as to inhibit con-
sciousness of the self. In short, to empty yourself: “When you are free from your 
thoughts, mind and desires in your exercises, and really become empty, only 
then will you be able to receive and be aware of blissful and light movements 
and other such actions within yourselves” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1975: 23).
With this last quotation we touch upon certain experiences that can be felt 
during latihan. Subuh mentions involuntary bodily movements, expressions 
of joy and sorrow, all coming from the soul ( jiwa), not from the heart. Even if 
people only utter sounds like “Er, er, er, eh, eh, eh, ah, ah, ah” it is regarded as 
receiving, as coming “from the human soul … and not from the other forces 
which suppress it” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 77; see also 1988b: 9, 1979: 18ff). The 
latihan, Subuh explains, begins with “the coarse physical body, and later goes 
deeper to the inner feeling,” cleansing as it goes. The result of this purification 
is that it brings to life “the real power of the soul or jiwa” (Sumohadiwidjojo 
1993: 79).
The purpose of the latihan, then, is to purify the four bodies, that is, the 
physical body, the body of feelings and emotions, the body of understanding, 
and the inner feeling, as well as to calm the passions (nafsu). The necessary 
requirements are an attitude of “patience, faith, submission and sincerity 
towards the greatness of God” (Sumohadiwidjojo 1993: 56). Only then can 
we receive “guidance from the Great Life” during latihan (Sumohadiwidjojo 
1993: 58).
From a societal point of view the latihan is beneficial for all mankind in our 
present, troublesome situation. One of the fruits of the latihan is “to bring our 
lives to a state of happiness and usefulness in this world” (Sumohadiwidjojo 
583Subud
1986: 2; 1988a: 14). The latihan kejiwaan of Subud is a method or a way to re-
establish original unity, a way of unifying all humankind, a method given to us 
through Muhammad Subuh, and adapted to the situation of humanity in the 
present age (Sumohadiwidjojo 1986: 21–22; 1989: 9).
5 Subud as Javanese Mysticism
As stated in the introduction, Subud leaders usually deny any relation to the 
Javanese mystical tradition. In this chapter, however, I have tried do show 
that the greater part of the conceptual apparatus of Subud is firmly rooted 
in Javanese mysticism. The latihan kejiwaan is the axis mundi of Subud. Due 
to this experiential basis of Subud, the concept of God and the view of cre-
ation receive a limited space in the talks of Subuh. God is described in terms 
very common in kebatinan circles: as unity, the Great Life, immanent in the 
universe. God is utterly unknowable, but simultaneously man’s inner guid-
ance, in other words both far and near. This description can be characterised 
as a combination of transcendence and immanence, one of the main features 
of panentheism.
The mystical movements (aliran kebatinan) are firmly rooted in Javanese 
culture. It certainly is no easy task to present an overall picture of Javanese 
culture. Clifford Geertz, a well-known authority on the subject, expresses the 
diversified cultural situation on Java in the following way:
Java—which has been civilised longer than England; which over a period 
of more than fifteen hundred years has seen Indians, Arabs, Chinese, 
Portuguese, and Dutch come and go; and which has today one of the 
world’s densest populations, highest development of the arts, and most 
intensive agricultures—is not easily characterised under a single label or 
easily pictured in terms of a dominant theme.
Geertz 1960: 7
In a chapter like this we will have to limit ourselves to some of the main ele-
ments of Javanese religion, especially the themes as presented above: God and 
creation, the concept of man, and the return to original unity.
The Indonesian anthropologist K.P. H. Koentjaraningrat distinguishes 
between Agami Jawi (‘Javanese Religion’) and Agami Islam Santri (‘Islam of 
the Religious People’). “The Agami Jawi manifestation of Islam,” according 
to Koentjaraningrat, “represents an extensive complex of mystically inclined 
Hindu-Buddhistic beliefs and concepts, syncretistically integrated in an 
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Islamic frame of reference” (Koentjaraningrat 1985: 317). We will now turn to a 
few aspects of this worldview called ‘Javanese Religion’.
From a cosmological point of view, life on earth is regarded as part of an 
all-encompassing unity. This unity (yang Suksma) is also called ‘life’ (urip), 
since all existence emanates from and will eventually return to this principle. 
Existence is hierarchical, extending from condensed matter to more subtle lev-
els that are closer to the origin. Man is somewhere in the middle of this great 
chain of being. With his outer manifestation (lahir) man belongs to the world 
and its material aspects; the inner nature of man (batin), on the other hand, 
has connections upwards in the hierarchy. With the aid of his ‘intuitive inner 
feeling’ (rasa), man has access to knowledge and experiences inaccessible to 
those who are bound to the outer, material manifestation of the unity of exis-
tence (Mulder 1992b: 5ff). Considering this premise, it is easier to understand 
the attitude of the Javanese towards the Koran, the Bible, or a formalised, insti-
tutionalised view of God. There is no need for a ‘mediator’ as God is immanent 
in the human heart, God is Life of which every human being is a part (Mulder 
1992b: 8).
The Javanese concept of God is non-personal, immanent in all creation. 
There are, however, also more personal features in the Javanese view of God, 
features that can be summarised in the following way:
God is the totality of nature, manifested as a small divine being, so tiny 
that it can enter any human being’s heart at any moment, yet he is in real-
ity as wide as the oceans, as endless as space, and he is manifested in the 
colours which make up and symbolize everything that exists on earth.
Koentjaraningrat 1985: 327. See also Zoetmulder 1935 and Mulder 1992b: 18
There is hardly any doubt that Subuh is in agreement with the general pat-
tern in Javanese mystical literature: the necessary descent of the One into the 
many, of unity into plurality, and the equally necessary return to original unity. 
In this basic pattern is also included the view of man in his unique position in 
this cosmic chain of being, that is, somewhere in the middle, which gives him 
a possibility to become aware of his original state. The human is a microcosm, 
and as such they are the sum total of the universe. This doctrine is not limited 
to Ṣūfism and Javanese literature from the renaissance period; it is also funda-
mental in the Javanese Shaiva interpretation of Hinduism.
Subuh’s syncretistic presentation of the emanation process is based, I think, 
on two sources: the Javanese mystical tradition, and Subuh’s own experience. 
Concerning the latter, this explains why the founder of Subud chooses to con-
nect the original state of Unity to “the first vibration” and to describe the “first 
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manifestation” as “Light.” Both aspects are intimately related to his own experi-
ence, which is now linked to the Subud conceptual apparatus. These concepts, 
in turn, enable a Subud member to interpret his or her experience of vibration 
as a direct contact with God.
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the story of Adam and Eve is 
influenced by court literature like the Paramajoga and similar texts from 
the nineteenth century renaissance period. I am referring especially to the 
Serat Wirid, where it is stated that Adam is created out of the four elements 
and that God inserted spiritual elements in him (Hadiwijono 1967: 106ff). In 
order to survive in the world Adam was equipped with senses and a heart 
and mind, all useful in a world consisting of vegetable, animal, human, and 
other forces.
As far as the concept of humanity is concerned, the doctrines discussed 
above comprise the seven forces inside and outside the human, the four types 
of nafsu, the four bodies of humankind, and the concept of jiwa. The first two 
doctrines are related to each other in such a way that the four so-called lower 
forces have their counterparts in the four types of passions. This fourfold divi-
sion of passions occurs first and foremost in Ṣūfism, which in turn influenced 
renaissance mystical literature.
Finally, the thoughts pertaining to humanity’s return to original unity are 
also firmly rooted in Ṣūfi sources. Subuh repeats again and again that the true 
servant of God should cultivate the following qualities: complete surrender, 
patience (sabra, Arab. ṣabr), trust in God (tawakal, Arab. tawakkul), and sincer-
ity (ikhlas, Arab. ikhlāṣ). These concepts belong, of course, to classical Ṣūfism. 
In her general description of the Ṣūfi spiritual path Annemarie Schimmel 
depicts ikhlas as “absolute sincerity,” as a giving up of “selfish thoughts in the 
service of God.” Sincerity is a prerequisite before entering the mystical path 
proper, one of the stages of which is tawakal, ‘trust in God’. A total trust in God 
implies self-surrender to Him, amounting finally in nothing less than union 
with God (Schimmel 1975: 108, 117ff).
Another important station on this path is patience, sabar. “Perfect patience,” 
Schimmel writes, “is to accept whatever comes from God, even the hardest 
blow of fate.” Ṣūfi mystics in all times and places never tired of inventing new 
parables for this station. In the words of Schimmel:
Only through patience does the fruit become sweet; only through 
patience can the seed survive the long winter and develop into grain, 
which, in turn, brings strength to the people, who patiently wait for it to 
be turned into flour and bread.
Schimmel 1975: 124
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There is a general consensus among Ṣūfi authors on these issues and that 
they are in line with the thinking of Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo. In 
conclusion, then, the basic concepts of Subud can be regarded as doctrinal 
fragments originating predominantly from Hindu inspired and Ṣūfi mystical 
sources, as elaborated during the Javanese renaissance period.
6 Conclusion
Subud is amongst other Indonesian “thriving sects” such as Pangestu and 
Sumarah that draw on Javanese mysticism (Mulder 2005: 28) but Subud consid-
ers itself not so much a religion as an organisation centred on the spiritual tech-
niques of latihan as revealed by Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo (Subud 
2013). This chapter started by briefly detailing the life of Sumohadiwidjojo, 
fondly known as Bapak, and his founding of Subud after experiencing mysti-
cal revelations. Drawing on the primary data generated by his many talks and 
autobiographical writings over the years, the basic concepts of Subud were 
outlined, including the concepts of God, creation, humanity, and returning 
to the state of original unity. The essential spiritual exercise of Subud, lati-
han kejiwaan, was elaborated upon as a means of experiencing the divine and 
knowing the self. Finally, although the analysis presented in this chapter is not 
exhaustive, it can nevertheless be stated that the doctrinal profile of Subud is 
primarily derived from the Javanese interpretation of Islamic mysticism and 
to a lesser degree from Hindu-Javanese systems of thought. Thus, Subud rep-
resents an Indonesian interpretation of Ṣūfism in a comparatively new revela-
tory tradition that exists today on a global scale.
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Chapter 25
René Guénon and Traditionalism
William Rory Dickson
1 Introduction
René Guénon’s (1886–1951) Traditionalist school of thought has played a sig-
nificant role in the transmission of Islam within Europe and North America. 
Like Guénon, most of his followers became Muslim and pursued the practice 
of Ṣūfism within several Traditionalist Ṣūfi orders, making Traditionalism a 
largely Islamic movement. Several of Guénon’s followers were accomplished 
academics whose writings on Islam have shaped its reception in the West 
more broadly, particularly among intellectuals and Ṣūfis. This chapter will 
first of all outline Guénon’s life and thought, before considering the broader 
Traditionalist movement and its role in the development of Islam in the West 
in the twentieth century.
Initiated into a Ṣūfi order in 1910, Guénon sought to recover humanity’s 
‘Primordial Tradition’ (la Tradition Primordiale), whose metaphysical truths he 
believed were still preserved within Eastern religions. Although Guénon held 
that Hinduism’s non-dual Advaita Vedanta school was the most authoritative 
expression of the Primordial Tradition, he did not think Hinduism suitable for 
Westerners, and saw in Islam a more recent and accessible expression of the 
Primordial Tradition. Guénon’s emphasis on orthodox religion as the neces-
sary container of esoteric truth, alongside his trenchant critique of modernity, 
led to his school of thought being referred to as Traditionalism.
His initiation into Ṣūfism, and later devout practice of Islam, would prove to 
have historical significance for Islam in the West, as several of his followers and 
associates would become Muslims, establish their own branches of Ṣūfi orders 
in Europe and North America, and further write influential interpretations of 
Islam for Westerners. Most notably Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998) would pub-
lish numerous books expanding upon Guénon’s thought and initiate several 
European and North American intellectuals into his Ṣūfi order, the Maryamiyya. 
Together, Schuon and Guénon’s writings would form the core works of the 
Traditionalist school of thought. Traditionalism has been particularly influen-
tial among Western scholars of Islam, including Titus Burckhardt (1908–1984), 
Michel Chodkiewicz (b. 1929), Martin Lings (1909–2005), and Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr (b. 1933), many of whose students have become established scholars in 
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their own right. The many works by Traditionalist scholars published in the 
last century have helped shape Western discourse on Islam more broadly, but 
especially in regards to Ṣūfism.
2 The Life and Thought of René Guénon
René-Jean-Marie-Joseph Guénon was born in Blois, France in 1886, to a bour-
geois Catholic family. Despite a delicate constitution and recurrent health 
issues he excelled as a student, obtaining baccalaureates in philosophy and 
mathematics (Borella 1992: 330). In 1904 he began a mathematics program 
at the Collège Rollin in Paris, hoping to eventually enter the prestigious 
École Polytechnique. Guénon struggled with his studies, however, and with-
drew from college in 1906, leaving the Latin Quarter for the more placid Ile 
Saint-Louis. His interests were increasingly drawn towards the thriving occult 
scene offered by fin de siècle Paris, a scene he would immerse himself in over 
the next six years.
Guénon’s occult pursuits were mediated through Gérard Encausse (1865–
1916) or Papus as he was also known. A physician interested in alternative 
medicine, Encausse became a pillar of Paris’s occult milieu. He established 
several esoteric organisations that Guénon would become affiliated with, 
including the École Hermétique and Ordre Martiniste. Encausse’s interests 
overlapped with Theosophy, and he had been a member of the Paris branch 
of the Theosophical Society since 1887. Emerging out of nineteenth century 
Spiritualism, Theosophy offered a synthesis of Western and Eastern esoteric 
traditions. Established in 1875 in New York, by 1890 the Theosophical Society 
had over 200 branches, with publishing houses in America, Britain, France, 
India, and Sweden (Dickson 2015: 68).
For Theosophy’s founders, Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907) and Helena 
Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891), a unitary truth lay at the core of the various 
religions and philosophies of human history, perennially present though 
expressed in different forms. Their perennialism was based on the prisca theo-
logica of the Renaissance, an idea that can be traced to the Council of Ferrera 
(1438–1439) in Florence, Italy. Here, Georgios Gemistos Plethon (1355–1452), 
a Neoplatonist scholar of the Byzantine delegation, suggested to Catholic 
Florentines that a deep understanding of Plato could lead to the harmonisa-
tion of divergent philosophical and religious views, with outward differences 
resolved in a transcendent unity. Plethon drew Cosimo de’ Medici’s (1389–1464) 
attention. A wealthy Florentine noble, de’ Medici would become a patron of 
Neoplatonic and Hermetic thought during the Renaissance, funding Marsilio 
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Ficino’s (1433–1499) revived Platonic Academy. Ficino was an influential propo-
nent of the prisca theologica, arguing that all true religion and philosophy were 
diverse manifestations of a single truth, just as all visible forms shared a deeper 
ontological unity. The phrase philosophia perennis itself was later coined by the 
Italian humanist Agostino Steuco (1497–1548), who built upon Ficino’s peren-
nialism in his De perenni philosophia (1540) (Schmitt 1966: 505–506).
Perennialism found renewed cachet during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, as Europeans began to encounter non-Western languages, phi-
losophies, and religions in much greater depth, with the access afforded by 
Western imperial and colonial expansion. Exemplary here is the founding 
father of British Orientalism, Sir William Jones (1746–1794), an accomplished 
philologist, translator, and jurist, who was appointed as a judge in the British 
supreme court in India in 1783.1 In his study of Hindu and Ṣūfi philosophy, 
Jones saw shared patterns with Plato in the West, all of which he believed to 
be derived from an ancient, primordial “metaphysical theology” (Dickson 2015: 
37). Jones’s version of the prisca theologica included the Vedanta (Hinduism’s 
most influential philosophical school)2 as particularly profound representa-
tive of the Primordial Tradition. According to Jones, “It is impossible to read 
the Vedanta, or the many fine compositions in illustration of it, without believ-
ing that Pythagoras and Plato derived their sublime theories from the same 
fountain with the sages of India” (Benoit 2010: 92).
Jones is further credited with discovering the Indo-European language fam-
ily. In his famous address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1786, he outlined the 
connections between Sanskrit, Persian, Latin, and Greek. This Indo-European 
or ‘Aryan’ language family would be increasingly conceived of in racial terms 
in the century that followed, with an imagined superiority over its Semitic 
counterpart (Masuzawa 2005: 150–151). As Gregory A. Lipton observes, “The 
idea of the metaphysical superiority of the so-called Aryan spirit in rela-
tion to Hinduism—or more esoterically conceived as ‘the Vedanta’—formed 
a large part of the Romantic fascination with India” (Lipton 2018: 128). This 
1 Jones played a paramount role in introducing Westerners to “Oriental” philosophies and reli-
gions, creating the first society and journal devoted to the study of the Orient in 1784. For 
more on his life and work, see Franklin (2011).
2 Vedanta is considered to be one of six Darshanas or philosophical schools within Hinduism, 
that had largely crystalised by the twelfth century. It has developed through commentaries on 
the Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita, and on the Vedanta-Sutras (Doniger 2009: 505). Orientalist 
understandings of Vedanta were largely based upon Shankara’s (c. 788–820) Advaita (non-
dual) school, which asserted that the self (atman) or subjectivity is ontologically identical 
with the absolute (brahman), and that spiritual liberation (moksha) is attained through 
knowledge of this identity.
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Vedanta-oriented perennialism, in part based upon a notion of Aryan philo-
sophical superiority, would be further elaborated upon by Theosophists in the 
nineteenth century and Traditionalists in the twentieth.
In her major works Isis Unveiled (1877) and The Secret Doctrine (1888), 
Blavatsky suggested that the “Secret Doctrine” was an ancient system of eso-
teric knowledge, synthesising both the truths of religion and science, with the 
potential of uniting people across boundaries of religion, race, and culture. 
This perennial wisdom was best preserved in the East with Vedanta and in 
the West with the Hermetic texts. Despite sharing this version of perennial-
ism with Theosophists, Encausse was drawn to Masonic rites, something most 
Theosophists were not. In 1890 he founded the Ordre Martiniste as a sort of 
neo-Masonic movement, with a focus on esoteric symbolism and initiation. 
Perceiving a threat to her authority, Blavatsky published critiques of Encausse 
in her new journal La Revue Théosophique. In response Encausse established 
his own journal, Le Voile d’Isis, publishing articles critical of Blavatsky and 
Theosophy (Sedgwick 2004: 46–47).
Alongside a Vedanta-oriented perennialism,3 Guénon would inherit 
Encausse’s concern with symbolism and initiation, as well as his disdain for 
Theosophy. However, Guénon’s quest for an authentic initiatory tradition 
would also draw him away from Encausse. During a séance in 1908, Guénon 
believed that Jacques de Molay (1243–1314), the Knights Templar’s last Grand 
Master, contacted him with instructions to re-establish the Order of the 
Temple, providing him with a direct source of initiation (Sedgwick 2004: 49). 
Several Martinists joined Guénon’s Ordre du Temple Renové. Encausse saw 
this as a threat and consequently expelled Guénon from his order. Guénon’s 
search for spiritual authenticity would continue.
In 1909 he joined the Église Gnostique, established by Jules Benoit Doinel 
(1842–1903) in 1888. After joining, Guénon established La Gnose, a journal 
affiliated with the church. The Gnostic Church is where Guénon would meet 
Count Albert de Pouvourville (1861–1939), a French solider, writer, and journal-
ist who claimed to receive a ‘Taoist initiation’ from Vietnamese Triads after 
his desertion from the French military in Vietnam. Guénon would credit de 
Pouvourville as his source for the idea that the Primordial Tradition is one, 
and, with a dig at the Catholic Church, that “parasitic vegetation must not be 
3 Harry Oldmeadow summarises the centrality of perennialism to Guénon’s thought as fol-
lows: “The existence of a Primordial Tradition embodying a set of immutable metaphysical 
and cosmological principles from which derive a succession of traditions each expressing 
these principles in forms determined by a given Revelation and by the exigencies of the par-
ticular situation, is axiomatic in Guénon’s work” (Oldmeadow 1995: 5).
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confused with the very Tree of Tradition” (Sedgwick 2004: 57–58). Although 
Guénon later hoped to recover access to the Primordial Tradition within 
Catholicism, he would eventually conclude that the Church had been too 
tainted by the modern spirit, and that authentic initiations into the Primordial 
Tradition could only be found in the East.
His Gnostic affiliation would further lead him to Ivan Aguéli (1869–1917), 
who would ultimately have a pivotal influence on Guénon’s life and path. 
Aguéli was a Swedish-born convert to Islam, Ṣūfi, and artist, who also joined 
the Gnostic Church and began writing articles on Ṣūfism for La Gnose. Also 
known as Shaykh ʿAbd al-Hādī al-ʿAqīlī, Aguéli was a representative (muqad-
dam) of Shaykh ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿIllaysh (1845–1921), leader of the Shadhiliyya 
ʿArabiyya Ṣūfi order in Cairo. Through Aguéli, Guénon was initiated into the 
Shadhiliyya ʿArabiyya in 1910, and began to correspond with ʿIllaysh, becom-
ing a Muslim and taking the name ʿAbd al-Wahid Yahya. Guénon soon dis-
solved his Ordre du Temple, though there is little evidence to suggest that he 
adopted the practice of Islam until decades later, despite his perhaps perfunc-
tory conversion.
It is important to note here that, while living in Damascus, ʿIllaysh had been 
an associate of the famous Algerian philosopher, Ṣūfi, and military leader, amīr 
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazā’irī (1808–1883). Like al-Jazā’irī, ʿIllaysh was a proponent 
of the thought of the medieval Ṣūfi philosopher Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī 
(1165–1240) (Chodkiewicz 1995). Traced from al-Jazā’irī, through ʿIllaysh, and 
then from Aguéli to Guénon, the thought of Ibn al-ʿArabī would come to 
have a prominent role in Traditionalist circles, being seen as something like 
a Muslim equivalent to Hindu Vedanta. This embrace of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s school 
of thought was not merely coincidental however. Considered by many Ṣūfis 
to be the shaykh al-akbar or ‘greatest master’ of the Ṣūfi tradition, as well as 
the most influential expounder of the ‘oneness of being’ (waḥdat al-wujūd),4 
Ibn al-ʿArabī’s non-dual philosophy was another example for Traditionalists of 
what they took to be the core doctrine of the Primordial Tradition: the inher-
ent oneness or non-duality of existence.
During this period Guénon began to believe that the ancient wisdom of the 
Primordial Tradition could only be authentically found within orthodox reli-
gious forms, something that would distinguish his perennialism from that of 
Martinists and Theosophists. This turn towards tradition would coincide with 
4 Although Ibn al-ʿArabī and his students certainly held that wujūd or ‘being’ is one, the use 
of the term waḥdat al-wujūd in a polemical context frequently led to misunderstandings of 
the term. Hence, its appropriateness as an accurate representative of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s school of 
thought remains a subject of debate. For more see Chittick (2004).
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his marriage to a devout Catholic woman, Berthe Loury (d. 1927) in 1912. In 1915 
Guénon began attending lectures at the Institut Catholique, where his emerg-
ing orientation towards tradition fit well with the Institute’s conservative 
Catholicism. Guénon’s experience of Paris’s occult underground convinced 
him that authentic initiation was not to be found there, and his increasingly 
critical view of Spiritualist and Theosophical groups was lauded by many in 
Catholic circles (Dickson 2015: 71).
Despite his initiation into Ṣūfism, and mutual sympathy with tradition-
oriented Catholics, Guénon considered Hinduism’s Vedanta to be the most 
explicit articulation of the Primordial Tradition. This did not mean that he 
understood Vedanta to have a categorical superiority over other traditions, but 
merely that he thought it offered the most incisive expression of the truths 
shared by them all. Regarding this essential unity of traditions, Guénon writes:
The real traditional outlook is always and everywhere essentially the 
same, whatever outward form it may take; the various forms that are spe-
cially suited to different mental conditions and different circumstances of 
time and place are merely expressions of one and the same truth; but this 
fundamental unity beneath apparent multiplicity can be grasped only by 
those who are able to take up a point of view that is truly intellectual.
Guénon 2004 [1927]: 30
By “intellectual,” Guénon here means a point of view based on objective 
intellection, or pure gnosis, which he considers to be of a “supra-individual 
order,” in contrast with the inherently individual, subjective nature of rational 
human thought (2004 [1945]: 90). Schuon would consider this to be one of 
the great contributions of Guénonian thought, “to have recalled what mod-
ern thought … has forgotten or sought to forget, namely the essential distinc-
tion between intellectual intuition and mental operation, or, in other words, 
between the Intellect, which is universal, and the reason, which is individual” 
(Schuon 2004 [1984]: 1).
Guénon wrote a dissertation on Vedanta in 1920 that was rejected by French 
Indologist Sylvain Levi (1863–1935). Levi discounted Guénon’s assertion of a 
perennial tradition traced back to earliest humanity, and further disagreed 
with situating Vedanta as representative of Hinduism more broadly (Sedgwick 
2004: 22–23). The French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) 
liked the book however, and recommended it for publication. It would become 
Guénon’s first book, L’introdution générale à l’étude des doctrines hindoues, pub-
lished in 1921. That same year he also published a series of polemical articles in 
the Institut Catholique’s journal Revue de philosophie, denouncing Theosophy 
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as a “pseudo-religion.”5 In a similar vein, he published L’erreur spirite in 1923 
as a refutation of the errors of modern Spiritualism. Guénon’s critique of 
Theosophy and Spiritualism was informed by his growing concern to distin-
guish authentic forms of initiation from inauthentic ones, which he termed 
“counter-initiation.”
His concern to exclude heretical traditions could be taken too far even for 
some of his Traditionalist associates. For example, Guénon initially believed 
that Buddhism was not an inherently orthodox expression of the Primordial 
Tradition, but rather a heretical deviation from Hinduism. It was only after 
extensive correspondence with fellow Traditionalists Marco Pallis (1895–1989), 
who himself was a practitioner of and writer on Tibetan Buddhism, Ananda 
K. Coomaraswamy (1877–1947), a Tamil philosopher with a far deeper under-
standing of Buddhism, and Schuon, who had also read more extensively on 
Buddhism, that Guénon would eventually revise his opinion and consider it an 
authentic tradition (Waterfield 2002: 47; Fitzgerald 2010: 54).
Guénon’s persistent interest in ‘Oriental metaphysics’ eventually dried up 
his support in Catholic circles, including that of Maritain. In his fourth work, 
Orient et Occident (1924), Guénon proposed that the forthcoming collapse of 
Western civilisation could only be averted with the help of Eastern traditions. 
For Guénon, the modern world was starkly contrasted with its Eastern pre-
decessors: Western modernity was a materialistic deviation from the tradi-
tional norm, as represented by the classical civilisations, of India, China, and 
the Middle East. In his La crise du monde moderne (1927), he suggested that, 
“Easterners are justified in reproaching modern Western civilisation for being 
exclusively material,” as Western materialism is “a complete state of mind … 
one that consists in more or less consciously putting material things, and the 
preoccupations arising out of them, in the first place” (Guénon 2004 [1927]: 
81–82). Less geographical entities, for Guénon the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ were 
first and foremost mentalities, one grounded in tradition, the other deviating 
from it.
In contrast to the modern West, Eastern civilisations were exemplary as 
their art, law, religion (and most importantly esoteric teachings), preserved 
the sacred, metaphysical knowledge of the Primordial Tradition. As a result, 
the East maintained contact with divine truth, and hence experienced a civili-
sational balance and health as a result. Although the modern West appeared 
5 On the Theosophical appropriation of Hindu terminology, Guénon suggests “the self-styled 
Theosophists  … are almost completely ignorant of Hindu doctrines, and have derived 
nothing from them but a terminology which they use entirely at random” (Guénon 2001 
[1925]: 18).
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to offer moral, scientific, and technological progress, this appearance was an 
inversion of the stark reality: modernity represented a movement away from 
traditional principles, and even a diabolical inversion of traditional truths, 
leading to the atrophying of genuine knowledge, social fragmentation, con-
flict, and the eventual dissolution of human civilisation (Dickson 2015: 71).
Guénon critiqued “the profane sciences of which the modern world is so 
proud” as “really and truly only the degenerate ‘residues’ of the ancient tradi-
tional sciences,” just as “quantity itself, to which they strive to reduce every-
thing” is “no more than the ‘residue’ of an existence emptied of everything that 
constituted its essence” (Guénon 2004 [1945]: 5). In general, he described the 
conditions of the contemporary period as those of the Kali Yuga or Dark Age of 
the Hindu cosmic cycle. Elaborating upon this notion, Guénon suggested that 
over time, cosmic manifestation moved further from its metaphysical source 
and unified principle (Brahman) thereby experiencing greater materialism, 
quantification, fragmentation, and spiritual-moral decline. As Mark Sedgwick 
notes, Guénon’s perennialism is distinguished from its Theosophical counter-
part with this pessimistic understanding of the modern world (Sedgwick 2004: 
50–51).
In the 1920s, Guénon seemed to find a certain equilibrium. He was work-
ing as a schoolteacher, married and raising his niece, with his Traditionalism 
gaining ground as a respectable philosophy. His life would take a quite dif-
ferent turn beginning in 1927, however, when his wife died during an opera-
tion, his niece was taken from his care, and he lost his job as a teacher. By this 
time, he had also soured on the possibility of finding a convivial home for his 
Traditionalism within the Catholic Church. In 1930 Guénon traveled to Egypt 
in the hopes of finding Ṣūfi texts for translation and publication (Borella 1992: 
334). Although initially struggling to get by, alone and penniless in Cairo, he 
increasingly integrated into Cairo life, and eventually decided against return-
ing to France. In 1934 he married Fatima Muhammad Ibrahim, a devout Muslim 
Egyptian woman, with whom he would have four children.
In marked contrast to many urban Egyptians, who were adopting Western 
clothing, Guénon wore the traditional jalabiyya, and maintained the life of a 
committed Muslim: praying, fasting, and following the dictates of the sharīʿa 
in his personal life. He also joined the Hamdiyya branch of the Shadhili order, 
as ʿIllaysh’s ʿArabiyya had largely dissolved (Sedgwick 2004: 75–76). Guénon 
maintained some link to traditional Egyptian elites through Shaykh ʿAbd 
al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd (1910–1978), an accomplished scholar of law and Ṣūfism, 
who would later become the head of al-Azhar Mosque. Maḥmūd wrote a 
book about Guénon in 1954, al-Faylasuf al-Muslim: René Guénon ‘Abd al-Wahid 
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Yahya, in which honorifically referred to him as an ‘arif bi-llah or ‘knower 
of God’ (Laude 2010: 9). Guénon’s wholesale embrace of life in Egypt is in 
part indicated by his formally becoming an Egyptian citizen in 1949 (Borella 
1992: 334).
During his years in Egypt Guénon’s sense of the importance of having an 
orthodox religious form within which to practice the esoteric path crystalised. 
He would eventually conclude that authentic initiation is always an integral 
part of a complete religious tradition, with its doctrines, rituals and rules all 
collectively forming a living, organic whole. To isolate one aspect of a reli-
gious tradition from others, or to mix elements of different traditions, was to 
destroy this organic coherence and the providential power it transmitted. This 
was precisely what he accused Theosophy of, and why he considered it to be 
a counter-initiatory tradition. In his Initiation et réalisation spirituelle (1952), 
Guénon concisely articulates the Traditionalist position on the necessity of 
following a particular religious form: “Whoever makes himself out to be a 
spiritual teacher without attaching himself to a specific traditional form, or 
without conforming to the rules established by the latter, cannot truly possess 
the qualifications he appropriates to himself” (Guénon 2004 [1952]: 110). Very 
much in line with classical Muslim understandings of Ṣūfism, that suggested 
the spiritual path (ṭarīqa) could only legitimately occur within the confines of 
Islamic law and ritual life (sharīʿa), Guénon held that authentic Ṣūfism always 
coincided with a devout Muslim life.
Despite living a life that, to all outward appearances, indicated a deep con-
version to Islam, Guénon did not consider himself to have converted. He was 
careful to specify that his practice of Islam did not imply “the attribution of 
the superiority of one traditional form over another,” but was rather a ques-
tion of “spiritual expediency,” as an understanding of “the essential unity of 
all traditions” rendered the possibility of conversion “meaningless and truly 
inconceivable” (Guénon 2004 [1952]: 63). Schuon notes that at the time of his 
embrace of Islam, Guénon did not believe that Buddhism was an authentic 
tradition, nor did he think that Christianity retained any genuine esotericism. 
Further, believing that an orthodox Hindu need be born into the caste sys-
tem, Islam appeared to be his only option to access the Primordial Tradition 
through an initiatory esotericism within an orthodox religion (Schuon 2004 
[1984]: 6). Although a committed Muslim in practice, Guénon continued to 
use Hindu terminology in his metaphysical expositions, with the belief that 
“Hinduism serves as the standard and central tradition for present humanity” 
(Borella 1992: 332). However, for the reasons mentioned above, Guénon did not 
see the practice of Hinduism as a viable way for Westerners, and instead saw 
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in Islam the most recent and final manifestation of the Primordial Tradition 
in this cosmic cycle, one particularly suitable for moderns looking to recover 
universal truths in a traditional context.
This synthesis of primarily Vedanta-based expositions of metaphysics with 
Islamic path and practice would leave a lasting imprint on Traditionalism. 
Indeed, Guénon published seventeen works during his life, with eight vol-
umes produced following his death, collectively constituting the doctrinal 
base for Traditionalism. Harry Oldmeadow concisely summarises Guenon’s 
writings, noting that they cover “a vast terrain—Vedanta, the Chinese tradi-
tion, Christianity, Ṣūfism, folklore and mythology form all over the world, the 
secret traditions of gnosticism, alchemy, the Kabbalah,” regardless of subject 
however, “always intent on excavating their underlying principles and showing 
them to be formal manifestations of one Primordial Tradition” (Oldmeadow 
1995: 275). The main themes of Guénon’s body of work include: 1) a concern 
with articulating a universal metaphysics underlying diverse religious expres-
sions, or perennialism; 2) defining the relationship between the esoteric and 
exoteric aspects of tradition; 3) analyzing various religious symbols, drawing 
out their universal implications, and; 4) a trenchant critique of inauthentic 
forms of initiation, and of the modern world more broadly (Laude 2010: 14). 
These themes would continue to shape Traditionalism following Guénon’s 
death, largely under the leadership of Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998).
3 Guénon’s Influence and Successors
As a result of his extensive writings and correspondence, Guénon would have 
significant influence, and yet until recently there was little academic atten-
tion paid to him. In the 1980s Joyce O. Lowrie observed that, “despite Guénon’s 
having written twenty-six books and hundreds of articles in his lifetime, and 
despite the fact that at least seven books have been written about him, he is 
still virtually unknown” (1985: 392). Sedgwick suggests Guénon’s absence from 
academic discussion is rooted in the general scholarly skepticism and even 
hostility towards writings based on esoteric principles, and further resulting 
from Guénon’s unique style of French writing, which includes his own ter-
minology developed independently of contemporary academic approaches 
(Sedgwick 2008: xvii–xviii).
Recently however, Wael Hallaq, scholar of Islamic law and intellectual his-
tory, has argued in Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge 
(2018) that Guénon’s deep critique of modernity “is gaining enough appeal 
that it has become recently relevant for many intellectual concerns,” including 
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postcolonial studies and environmental ethics (2018: 144). Hallaq suggests 
that Guénon offers a more thorough and effective critique of Western moder-
nity than Edward Said (1935–2003) does in Orientalism (1978), arguing that 
“Guénon begins where Said ends” (2018: 145). Besides noting that Guénon was 
not discussed by Said, and in fact complicates Said’s concept of Orientalism, 
Hallaq valorises Guénon as being ‘ahead of his time’ with a prescient diagno-
sis of Western modernity’s destructive deviation from traditional metaphys-
ics, social norms, and structures. He suggests that Guénon’s work “captures 
much of the best in recent social theory, Critical Theory, and cultural criticism, 
but without admitting the legitimacy of the system on which these critical 
theories insist” (2018: 145). As Sedgwick notes, Hallaq’s “use of Guénon repre-
sents a Traditionalist breakthrough into the Western intellectual mainstream” 
(Sedgwick 2019).
Despite his (until quite recently) marginal presence in mainstream aca-
demic discourse, Guénon was critically important for the development of 
Ṣūfism in the West. Though Guénon never recommended in print that his 
readers convert to Islam or practice Ṣūfism, “most of those who were influ-
enced by him did become Sufis” (Rawlinson 1997: 280). Hence the majority 
of Guénon’s intellectual heirs followed Guénon’s own example of becoming 
Muslim and were likely influenced by his understanding of Islam as the final 
manifestation of the primordial tradition in this cosmic cycle.
The spread of Traditionalism and Traditionalist Ṣūfism in the later twen-
tieth century however was largely the result of the writings and teachings of 
Guénon’s successor of sorts, Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998) or Shaykh ‘Isa Nur 
al-Din, as his followers referred to him. Schuon’s father was a concert violinist, 
and perhaps growing up with a musician had some influence on Schuon’s later 
emphases on aesthetics and beauty, as well as his own poetry and painting. 
Schuon grew up a Lutheran, but at his father’s request converted to Catholicism 
at the age of fourteen. During his school years he became friends with Titus 
Burckhardt, who would become a prominent Traditionalist author in his own 
right (see, for example, Burckhardt 1992, 2008, 2010).
After his father’s death, while he was still a teenager, Schuon became a textile-
designer to support himself. He was also an avid reader of books on religion 
and philosophy, and became particularly entranced with Hinduism (Fitzgerald 
2010: 13). When he was sixteen, Schuon read Guénon’s Orient et Occident, and 
was profoundly affected. As a result he corresponded with Guénon, who, in 
1931, advised him to look to Islam and Ṣūfism. Although he was an avid student 
of Advaita Vedanta, Schuon agreed with Guénon that it was not a valid path 
to spiritual realisation for Europeans, as one could not technically convert to 
Hinduism. So, despite some reservations, in 1932 Schuon spent four months at 
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the ʿAlawi Ṣūfi center in Mostaganem, Algeria, under the tutelage of the famous 
Shadhili master Ahmad al-ʿAlawi (1869–1934), where he would embrace Islam 
and enter the Ṣūfi path. He returned to Europe and established a branch of the 
ʿAlawiyya, with mostly fellow Guénonians joining. Burckhardt was impressed 
with Schuon’s change and wanted to go to Mostaganem himself. However, 
with al-ʿAlawi’s health in decline, Burckhardt decided to pursue Ṣūfism in Fez, 
Morocco, where he would study Arabic, convert to Islam and become a mem-
ber of the Darqawi Ṣūfi order. Despite his own extensive initiatory experience 
with Ṣūfism, Burckhardt continued to acknowledge Schuon as the leader of 
their burgeoning Ṣūfi circle (Sedgwick 2004: 87).
In 1934 Schuon described mystically receiving the highest ʿAlawi spiritual 
practice, the use of the Supreme Name in recitation (Allah), while reading 
the Bhagavad Gita in Paris (Sedgwick 2004: 88). In 1935 Schuon returned to 
Mostaganem where he was authorised as a representative (muqaddam) of the 
ʿAlawi order. This authorisation has led to some debate as the Arabic certifi-
cate he was given appears to authorise Schuon as one who can call people to 
the Islamic faith, without specifying any initiatory authority beyond that. But 
for his followers, this authorisation was taken to include a broader spiritual 
authority. Regardless, in 1937 Schuon experienced a vision that he believed 
authorised him as a Ṣūfi master (shaykh) in his own right, and dreams reported 
by his followers were taken as confirmation. Guénon would continue to send 
interested seekers to Schuon, and his order would grow during the 1930s until, 
at the end of the decade, he had established centers in Paris, Amiens, and Basel 
(Sedgwick 2017).
Notable for his later influence as a scholar of Islam, Martin Lings would 
join the ʿAlawiyya in 1938 after reading Guénon. He became an associate of 
Guenon’s while teaching in Cairo during the Second World War (Sedgwick 
2004: 119). Lings is perhaps most broadly known for his highly-regarded English 
version of the Prophet Muhammad’s biography (Lings 2006). Lings would 
later go on to establish himself as a respected scholar and member of Britain’s 
Muslim community. His A Sufi Saint of the Twentieth Century: Shaykh Ahmad 
al-ʿAlawi (1993) remains a popular study of al-ʿAlawi and Ṣūfism more broadly. 
Lings also quietly led Maryamiyya circles in Jordan and the United Kingdom, 
both connected to the royal families of those countries, with Prince El Hassan 
Bin Talal and Prince Charles both having notable interest in Traditionalism, 
and personal connections with Lings (Sedgwick 2011: 177).
Schuon maintained the style of dhikr (remembrance of God, usually chant-
ing) practiced by the ʿAlawiyya. He taught his students salat (the five daily 
prayers), and suggested they follow the basic moral and ritual guidelines pro-
vided by the sharīʿa. However, in contrast to broader ʿAlawi practice, Schuon 
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emphasised the primacy of the dhikr practice, downplaying other devotional 
forms usually associated with Ṣūfi practice. This was part and parcel of Schuon’s 
concern to avoid the limitations of “average Sufism,” which for Schuon was 
based on a simplistic pietism and sentimentality that failed to produce genu-
ine spiritual realisation or gnosis.
Distinguishing his own path from what he saw as the limitations of con-
ventional Ṣūfism, Schuon noted that, “our point of departure is the Advaita 
Vedanta and not a moralist, individualist and voluntarist anthropology with 
which ordinary Sufism is undeniably identified” (Sedgwick 2004: 170). Like 
Guénon, Schuon held that Vedanta “stands out as one of the most direct for-
mulations possible of what constitutes the very essence of our spiritual reality” 
(Schuon 2003 [1959]: 19). Although for Schuon the “Vedantic perspective finds 
its equivalents in the great religions which regulate humanity,” non-Vedantic 
formulations “may be dependent on dogmatic perspectives which restrict 
their immediate intelligibility,” making them less accessible (Schuon 2003 
[1959]: 19). Hence for Schuon, Vedanta was something like a key unlocking the 
very same truths found at the heart of Ṣūfism, truths only obscured by the limi-
tations of Islamic theology. On this point he elaborated, “we take our stand on 
Shankaracharya [the founder of Advaita Vedanta], not on an Ibn ʿArabī; the lat-
ter we accept only insofar as we find in him something of the Vedanta” (Lipton 
2018: 138). To the extent that Traditionalists have embraced Ibn al-ʿArabī, 
some of their interpretations have been critiqued for downplaying “exclusiv-
ist notions of religious supersessionism and [Islamic] socio-politcal author-
ity” in Ibn al-ʿArabī’s thought, in effect reframing his work along the lines of 
Tradtionalist perennialism (Lipton 2018: 9).
In line with nineteenth cenutry Orientalist and German Romanticist under-
standings of language family and race, Schuon believed that Ṣūfism suffered 
from a Semitic “subjectivism,” and hence it lacked the objectivity to “consis-
tently discern the transcendent formlessness of essential truth from religious 
particularism,” while holding that the “Aryan metaphysics of Vedanta and 
Platonism” retained this objectivity (Lipton 2018: 122). In his work Le Soufisme: 
voile et quintessence (1980) Schuon summarises his perspective on this issue 
describing Aryans (Indians, Persians, and Europeans) as “above all metaphysi-
cians and therfore logicians,” while characterising Semites (Jews and Arabs) as 
“a priori mystics and moralists,” and “subjectivists” (Schuon 2006 [1980]: 21).6 
6 Although the concepts of “Aryan” and “Semitic” are integral to Schuon’s analysis of vari-
ous traditions, he limits their importance in affirming that, “it is only too obvious that the 
great question that arises for man is not to know whether he is Semitic or Aryan, Oriental or 
Western, but to know whether he loves God” (Schuon 2006 [1980]: 26).
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In contrast to Schuon’s self-described Aryanism, Guénon dismissed the notion 
of the ‘Aryan race’ as an Orientalist fiction devoid of substance (Lipton 2018: 243).
Schuon’s streamlining of devotional practice combined with a doctrinal 
focus on Vedanta clearly set his Ṣūfism apart from the phenomenon as it tended 
to function in Muslim-majority contexts, though his Ṣūfism still remained 
largely within the parameters of Guénon’s thought. The coming decades how-
ever would see Schuon take his thought and his Ṣūfi order in directions dis-
approved of by Guénon. Notably, Schuon’s thought diverged from Guenon’s 
in terms of Christianity and the West. Whereas Guénon eventually concluded 
that authentic inititation could no longer be found within the Catholic Church, 
and that the West was largely devoid of genuine traditional knowledge, Schuon 
believed that not only Catholicism but also the Lutheranism of his youth 
retained some esoteric efficacy, and that the West still maintained some ele-
ments of traditional doctrine. On this, Schuon wrote, “Guénon is magisterial in 
his defense of the traditional East and his condmenation of the anti-traditional 
West, but he overestimates Eastern man as such and underestimates Western 
man as such” (Schuon 2004 [1984]: 20).
Further, whereas Guénon emphasised the incontrivertible necessity of 
adhering to an exoteric form if the integrity of esoteric truth was to be main-
tained, Schuon leaned more towards embracing a universal metaphysics that 
transcended religious forms. Schuon went so far as to suggest that religions 
are like heresies in comparison to the perennial philosophy on which they are 
based. Thus Schuon relaxed or simplified the obligations of Islam for his fol-
lowers, including permission for some not to fast during Ramadan, and the 
allowance of practicing the prayers at irregular times to avoid difficulties. He 
further allowed his students to drink alcohol with European family and friends, 
so as not to create social controversy. On the primacy of the perennial or uni-
versal truth over religious form, Schuon wrote, “the goal of the work is not the 
Islamic form as such, but precisely esoterism as such … This is Islam, not as the 
daily universe of Arab sentiments and passions, but as the manifestation at 
the end of time of the primordial religion” (Fitzgerald 2010: 40).
This concern with the primordial religion manifested in Schuon’s growing 
interest in Indigenous religion and spirituality, especially after reading John 
Neihardt’s Black Elk Speaks (1932). He would later visit members of the Sioux 
tribe, and in 1959 would be adopted into the family of Chief James Red Cloud 
(1879–1960), leader of the Oglala Lakota on the Pine Ridge reservation in South 
Dakota (Fitzgerald 2010: 89). In the late 1940s, Guénon was getting reports from 
associates that Schuon was relaxing sharīʿa requirements, allowing Christians 
to participate in Ṣūfi practices, and including themes for meditation from 
other traditions. Guénon saw this as a kind of “syncretism” that deviated from 
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a genuinely Traditional approach, and encouraged his students to separate 
themselves from Schuon’s ʿAlawiyya, writing that Schuon was transforming 
the organisation into a “vague ‘universalist’ organisation” (Sedgwick 2004: 129).
During this period two associates of Guénon and Schuon’s would go on 
to establish their own branches of Ṣūfi orders, both with a more explicitly 
Guénonian orientation. Schuon had refused to admit a French associate of 
Guénon’s, Roger Maridort (1903–1977), into the ʿAlawiyya, as Maridort was liv-
ing with a woman who was separated but still married to her husband. Guénon 
encouraged Maridort to go to Morocco, where he was initiated into the Darqawi 
branch of the Shadhili order, for which he would later receive an ijaza (authori-
sation) to establish his own group. With the majority of his followers in Italy, 
in 1961 Maridort relocated from France to Turin, establishing his branch of the 
Darqawiyya there. He further created the Rivista di Studi tradizionali, an italian 
journal publishing translations of Guénon’s works as well as works by Ṣūfi fig-
ures like Ibn al-ʿArabī. Maridorth’s group would hold most closely to Guénon’s 
Traditionalism, breaking markedly with Schuon and other Traditionalist Ṣūfis 
(Sedgwick 2004: 131–133).
Michel Valsan (1907–1974) was a Romanian Traditionalist and diplomat 
who joined Schuon’s ʿAlawiyya, and helped establish a branch of the order 
in Bucharest in the 1930s. Beginning in 1940 Valsan led the ʿAlawiyya in Paris, 
before separating from Schuon in 1951, after sharing Guénon’s perspective that 
Schuon was taking the order in directions that deviated from Traditionalism- 
proper. Valsan would then shift the Paris ʿAlawiyya towards a more main-
stream Islamic orientation. Valsan regularly attended Friday prayers in Paris 
and raised his family strictly in accord with the sharīʿa. His intellectual work 
was focused on publishing French translations of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s works. By his 
death in 1974 he had gathered around one hundred followers. Notable here is 
Michel Chodkiewicz (b. 1929), a convert to Islam who would also go on to pub-
lish respected translations and interpretations of Ibn al-ʿArabī (Chodkiewicz 
1993a; Chodkiewicz 1993b). Chodkiewicz worked as a publisher and profes-
sor at the Sorbonne, earning some renown within French Islamic studies. 
Sedgwick credits Valsan and his followers with helping to establish Ṣūfism as a 
recognised and accessible expression of Islam in France (Sedgwick 2004: 133–
135). Unlike Guénon and Schuon, Valsan and Chodkiewicz were not beholden 
to Vedanta as the necessary barometer for authentic metaphysics, and more 
deeply enmeshed themselves in the study of the Ṣūfi-philosophical tradition, 
with their intensive focus on Muslim metaphysicians like Ibn al-ʿArabī and his 
intellectual heirs.
Although he experienced periodic defections, Schuon’s Maryamiyya would 
remain the most prominent Traditionalist organisation in the twentieth 
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century. In 1965 Schuon had a vision of the Virgin Mary. Schuon understood 
the Virgin as an incarnation of both mercy and the perennial philosophy: 
his new relationship with her marked a turning point in his branch of the 
ʿAlawiyya towards an even more universal orientation. For Schuon, the Virgin 
Mary represented the spiritual domain where different religions “lose much of 
their importance and where by way of compensation the essential elements 
they have in common are affirmed” (Lipton 2018: 136). Sedgwick summarises 
Schuon’s spiritual lineage thus: “He was a Muslim with a Sufi initiation from the 
ʿAlawiyya, appointed shaykh of a Sufi order in a vision, but he was also a uni-
versalist with a primordial initiation from the Sioux, appointed to a universal 
mission by the Virgin Mary in another vision” (Sedgwick 2004: 151). Although 
Schuon did not immediately change the name of his ʿAlawiyya order following 
this vision, by the 1980s the order was described by Schuon and his followers as 
the Maryamiyya, after the Virgin Mary.
In 1967 Victor Danner (1926–1990), a professor of religious studies in 
Bloomington, Indiana, established a Maryamiyya branch there. It would 
become the most important center of Schuon’s order, and the site of the 
Maryamiyya’s development toward a more universal orientation. Schuon 
moved to Bloomington in the Fall of 1980, establishing a community at 
Inverness Farms of about sixty or seventy Maryamiyyas. This new community 
at Bloomington focused more on Schuon’s role as a primordial sage, at times 
somewhat critical of older Maryamiyyas more grounded in the outward prac-
tices of Islam (Dickson 2015: 115). Schuon wrote at this time, characterising this 
new phase of his life and teaching, that “the Holy Virgin is the living and heav-
enly link between Islam and Christianity, and that she also links us to Judaism 
and even to all religions” (Fitzgerald 2010: 119).
By the 1980s Schuon had also established himself as an author with a grow-
ing following.7 In many cases he proved able to elaborate upon Guenon’s core 
ideas in ways that may have been more broadly accessible, at least to those 
with some philosophical inclination. His illustration of the perennialist per-
spective in his first book, De L’Unité transcendante des religions (1948) is exem-
plary in this regard:
7 Relevant works of Schuon’s in English include The Transcendent Unity of Religions (1993 
[1948], Understanding Islam (1998 [1963]), Sufism: Veil and Quintessence (2006 [1980]), and 
for some of Schuon’s writings on Hinduism, Buddhism, and Indigenous traditions, see 
Language of the Self: Essays on the Perennial Philosophy (2003 [1959]). For a summary of 
Schuon’s thought, see The Essential Frithjof Schuon, edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (2005).
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If an example may be drawn from the sensory sphere to illustrate the 
difference between metaphysical and theological knowledge, it may be 
said that the former, which can be called ‘esoteric’ when it is manifested 
through a religious symbolism, is conscious of the colorless essence of 
light and of its character of pure luminosity; a given religious belief, 
on the other hand, will assert that light is red and not green, whereas 
another belief will assert the opposite; both will be right insofar as they 
distinguish light from darkness but not insofar as they identify it with a 
particular color.
Schuon 1993 [1948]: xxx
Within the Maryamiyya, Indigenous traditions were incorporated into ritual 
practice and ritual dances that included sacred nudity were practiced by 
Schuon and his close students. Schuon himself articulated these practices 
in terms of the symbolism of nudity, representing the naked, esoteric truth 
that religious forms veil or cover. In an interview he affirmed that “In an alto-
gether general way, nudity expresses—and virtually actualises—a return to 
the essence, the origin, the archetype, thus to the celestial state (Lipton 2018: 
137). However, this symbolic practice eventually broke out into controversy 
when, in 1991, a disaffected former student of Schuon’s brought charges against 
him of inappropriate contact with minors, involving ritual nudity. The charges 
were dropped due to insufficient evidence, though the controversey likely only 
increased the somewhat secretive nature of the group. Following Schuon’s 
death in 1998, Seyyed Hossein Nasr would take over leadership of the largest 
branch of the Maryamiyya.
Nasr, a Professor of Islamic studies at George Washington University, is one 
of the most well-known North American scholars of Islam, having contributed 
to the development of the academic study of Islam, authoring over fifty books 
and around five hundred articles since he began publishing in the 1960s, and 
training several accomplished scholars of Islam (Chittick 2007: xiv). He is also 
the most influential living Traditionalist, playing an important role in articu-
lating the Islamic legitimacy of Schuon and the Maryamiyya.
Nasr was born in 1933 to an elite Iranian family tied to the late shah, Reza 
Pahlavi (1919–1980), and with connections to Iranian Ṣūfi orders (Dickson 2015: 
116). He pursued secondary and post-secondary studies in America and dis-
covered Traditionalism during his time as an undergraduate in science at MIT, 
when he found himself in an intellectual crisis. Following a transformative 
encounter with Guénon’s works, Nasr describes how he then discovered the 
writings of Guénon’s associates Coomaraswamy and Schuon:
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That step led me to the writings of [Ananda] Coomaraswamy and Frithjof 
Schuon, and finally my meeting with Schuon in Europe and my going to 
North Africa. I became directly involved in the Shadhili order, emanat-
ing from Shaykh al-ʿAlawi, an Algerian shaykh. I was only 24 years old, 
in Morocco and Europe. I have been associated with Sufism since then.
Dickson 2015: 117
Nasr first met Schuon in 1957 in Lausanne (2006 [1980]: viii). He became a mem-
ber of Schuon’s order and eventually established a branch of the Maryamiyya 
in Tehran. He was better known however for his Imperial Iranian Academy of 
Philosophy, which, during its time, was the most prominent educational insti-
tution based on Traditionalist principles. Established in 1974, Nasr’s Academy 
hosted world-renowned scholars of Islam like Henry Corbin (1903–1978) and 
Toshihiko Izutsu (1914–1993), and trained William Chittick, who is now the 
foremost English-language scholar and translator of Ibn al-ʿArabī (Chittick 
1989, 1998). Nasr’s connections with the Pahlavi regime made his place in Iran 
untenable after the revolution in 1979, and he left for America where he has 
lived since.
Following Schuon’s death in 1998, Nasr would become the leader of the larg-
est branch of the Maryamiyya. Due to his own Muslim background and scholar-
ship, and perhaps to counter claims that the Maryamiyya are not authentically 
Ṣūfi or Muslim, Nasr has emphazied the order’s Islamic nature, and affirmed 
Schuon’s function as a Muslim Ṣūfi shaykh. In an article for the Traditionalist 
journal Sophia, “Frithjof Schuon and the Islamic Tradition” (1999), Nasr notes 
Schuon’s role as a messenger of “universal and perennial wisdom,” but main-
tains that “his function to speak of pure esoterism should not, however, detract 
anyone one moment from thinking that he is anything other than a Muslim in 
the deepest sense of the term and that he practiced the tenets of the Islamic 
tradition, on both the levels of the law and the way.” Nasr further suggests that 
Schuon’s integration of Christian and Indigenous elements into the spiritual 
life of the Maryamiyya “can be explained in the light of Sufism” (Nasr 1999: 
30–31). Nasr’s article reflects one of the two competing visions of Schuon’s life 
and thought that have developed among Maryamiyyas. Whereas Nasr empha-
sises the Islamic nature of Schuon and his teachings, other students of Schuon 
have focused on his almost divine role as the messenger of pure esoterism 
beyond any single tradition.
In contrast to Schuon’s notable criticism of Ṣūfism for its “Semitic” sub-
jectivism and dogmatic moralism, Nasr’s writings focus almost exclusively 
on the positive aspects of the Islamic tradition. This difference results from 
Schuon’s strong prioritisation of the esoteric over the exoteric, a prioritisation 
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that Nasr does not share to the same degree. For Schuon, the esoteric nucleus 
of a religion “is not in any sense a part, even an inner part, of the exoterism, 
but represents, on the contrary, a quasi-independent ‘dimension’ in relation 
to the latter” (Schuon 1993 [1948]: 9–10). This qualified distinction between a 
religion’s esoteric and exoteric elements contrasts with Nasr’s perspective on 
Ṣūfism as the crystallisation of Islam’s inner dimension, a perspective in which 
Islam’s exoteric and esoteric elements are organically joined. Patrick Laude 
concisely notes this difference, suggesting that, “Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s intel-
lectual and spiritual path is different from Schuon’s, since the latter starts from 
esoterism to go toward Islam while the former has its starting point is Islam 
while its ultimate destination is esoterism or gnosis” (Laude 2003).
Unlike Schuon, a European who embraced Islam as an expedient part of 
his search for esoteric knowledge, Nasr was born into a Muslim family in Iran, 
one deeply connected to the historic Islamic tradition there. With his scholarly 
career, Nasr has written on many of the varied facets of the Islamic tradition 
as a whole, ranging from philosophy, art, and spirituality, to law and theology. 
This depth of engagement with Islam’s intellectuality is not paralleled by any 
other Traditionalist writer. Nasr’s focus on the Islamic nature of Ṣūfism and 
the Maryamiyya coincides with his lifelong association with and study of the 
Islamic tradition.
Non-Traditionalist Muslims have had various takes on the legitimacy of 
Traditionalism and the Maryamiyya. Hamza Yusuf, an American convert 
who has become one of the most prominent Muslim leaders in the West, and 
founder of Zaytuna College (the first accredited Muslim undergraduate college 
in America), was deeply influenced by Martin Lings’ works. Yusuf met with 
him several times and had a great respect for his piety and scholarship. In his 
lengthy 2005 obituary for Lings, Yusuf suggests he and other Muslim authori-
ties who knew him, including the well-known Yemeni scholar Habib ‘Ali al-
Jifri, felt that:
Dr. Lings was most certainly a devout and pious Muslim, fully committed 
to the teaching of the Prophet and one who rooted his thought and prac-
tice in the Quran despite our clear differences with him on the subject of 
perennialism. I believe that his spiritual presence was a cogent argument 
for his practice and commitment.
Yusuf 2005: 55
Both Yusuf and al-Jifri fall within a broader movement to revive the classical 
Sunnī synthesis of Islamic law ( fiqh), theology (kalām), and Ṣūfism (taṣawwuf ), 
what Jonathan Brown calls “late Sunni traditionalism” (Brown 2014: 29). Many 
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of their concerns overlap with those of Traditionalists and so it is not neces-
sarily surprising that there would be a great deal of sympathy between them 
despite their difference on the issue of perennialism. In contrast to Yusuf and 
al-Jifri’s understanding of Traditionalism as something that deviates from 
mainstream Islamic theology, but not in a way that fundamentally compro-
mises one’s Muslim faith and practice, Nuh Ha Mim Keller, another American 
convert who is also a Ṣūfi leader and scholar of Islamic law, has condemned 
the belief in the universal validity of non-Islamic religions as kufr or unbelief 
(Keller 1996).
4 Conclusion
Emerging out of the occult milieu of fin de siècle Paris, Guénon inherited from 
his varied experience of esoteric movements a Vedanta-oriented perennialism 
alongside a concern for authentic initiation. In addition, Guénon developed 
a critique of modernity and valorised traditional religion as the carrier of the 
metaphysical truths of the Primordial Tradition. Guénon would further come 
to see Islam and its esoteric tradition, Ṣūfism, as offering the most expedient 
means for Westerners to access this Primordial Tradition, which he believed 
the West had long ago lost connection to. As a sort of successor, Schuon then 
elaborated upon Guénonian themes in his prolific writings during the latter 
half of the twentieth century, and further became a Ṣūfi shaykh in his own right, 
establishing the Maryamiyya as the predominant expression of Traditionalism 
in practice.
Although both Guénon and Schuon believed that adherence to a reli-
gion’s exoteric morals and laws was a requirement to practice its esoteric 
path, and hence believed that genuine Ṣūfis should be committed Muslims, 
they tended to interpret Islamic thought through the lens of Hinduism’s 
Advaita Vedanta philosophy, which continued for them to be the hallmark 
of explicit metaphysical truth. Schuon in particular criticised conventional 
Islamic theology and devotion as overly moralistic in nature, in some cases 
inhibiting the realisation of pure metaphysics, and was comfortable inte-
grating Christian and Indigenous religious symbols and practices into his 
order. However, both Guénon and Schuon held Ṣūfism and its Islamic form 
to be one of the most accessible means of Traditional initiation, and their 
writings on Ṣūfism and personal practice of Islam were paradigmatic for 
most Traditionalists who followed them, leading to the establishment of a 
Traditionalist Islam in Europe and North America. In his scholarship, Nasr 
would further ground Traditionalism within Islam, as would Burkhardt, Lings, 
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Valsan, and Chodkiewicz in Europe. Taken as a whole, the body of literature 
on Islam and Ṣūfism produced by Traditionalists, academic and otherwise, 
has had a profound influence on Western understandings of Islam, and led 
to its adoption as a spiritual path by several Western intellectuals, and count-
less others influenced by their work. Traditionalism then, forms an important 
element of Islam’s establishment as an intellectual orientation and religious 
practice in Europe and North America.
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Chapter 26




The origins of ‘the Work’, the system taught by the Greek-Armenian esoteric 
spiritual teacher, George Ivanovich Gurdjieff (c. 1866–1949) remain obscure, 
and its sources have been sought in a range of religious traditions, most com-
monly Buddhism, Christianity, and Ṣūfism.1 This chapter interrogates the claim 
that Gurdjieff ’s teaching is broadly derived from Islamic sources, in particular 
central Asian Ṣūfism. Gurdjieff spoke of his system as “esoteric Christianity,” 
and his cosmology owes a debt to neo-Platonism, in particular the works of 
Iamblichus (Azize 2010). However, his pupil John Godolphin Bennett (1897–
1974) believed that Ṣūfism was the ultimate source of Gurdjieff ’s teaching. In 
this chapter Ṣūfi influence is identified in four areas of the Work.
First, Gurdjieff ’s travels in search of wisdom, chronicled in a fictionalised 
form in Meetings with Remarkable Men (1963), seemingly led him to Ṣūfi 
monasteries in Central Asia, where he learned the meditative techniques of 
“self-remembering” and the “Movements” (Hunt 2003). Gurdjieff ’s magnum 
opus, Beelzebub’s Tales To His Grandson (1950) also features Ṣūfi characters 
and teaching stories. Second, the sacred dances or Movements that Gurdjieff 
taught have been presumed to originate in dervish dances (Barber 1986). Third, 
his pupil John Godolphin Bennett (1897–1974) identified Gurdjieff ’s distinctive 
persona and teaching method, involving insults and “shocks,” as deriving from 
the Ṣūfi malamatiyyah or “way of blame” (Bennett 1973). Bennett’s involve-
ment with soi-disant Ṣūfi master Idries Shah (1924–1996) and with Indonesian 
new religion Subud (founded by Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo, 
1901–1987), itself influenced by (Javanese) Ṣūfism, is discussed (Geels 1997), 
as is the Bennett lineage’s links with contemporary Ṣūfism. Fourth and finally, 
1 I am grateful to my research assistants Drs Johanna Petsche and Venetia Robertson, and 
Mr Ray Radford, who all worked on this project. Thanks are due to Professor Mark Sedgwick 
(Aarhus University), who has generously shared his research on Gurdjieff and Ṣūfism 
with me.
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Gurdjieff ’s famous nine-sided figure, the Enneagram, has been dubiously 
connected to Ṣūfism and used by post-Gurdjieffians and neo-Ṣūfis, including 
psychologist and spiritual teacher A. Hameed Ali (b. 1944), better known as 
A.H. Almaas (Almaas 1998) and Oscar Ichazo (Lilly and Hart 1975: 331).
It is concluded that it is valid to identify Ṣūfi influences within the Gurdjieff 
‘Work,’ with varying degrees of prominence depending on the teaching lineage. 
However, it is inaccurate to state that Gurdjieff was a Ṣūfi teacher, or to claim 
that the Work is a modern Western form of Ṣūfism (and thus an ‘Islamic’ new 
religious movement). In the twenty-first century the Fourth Way and Ṣūfism 
are associated through processes of spiritual eclecticism and bricolage, and 
internet and popular cultural media.
2 Ṣūfism in Gurdjieff ’s Life and Writings
George Ivanovich Gurdjieff was born c. 1866 “in Alexandropol [now Gyumri, 
Armenia], on the Russian side of the Russo-Turkish frontier, his father a 
Cappadocian Greek carpenter and bardic poet (ashokh), and his mother an 
illiterate Armenian” (Moore 1994a: 190). When Gurdjieff was a child the fam-
ily moved to Kars, where he became a chorister at the Kars Military Cathedral 
school. He emerged as a spiritual teacher in 1912 in Moscow, married Julia 
Ostrowska in St Petersburg in the same year, and attracted pupils, the most 
important of whom was mathematician and esotericist Pyotr Demianovich 
Ouspensky (1878–1947). In 1917 Gurdjieff and his pupils left Russia, escaping 
the Revolution. From 1917–1922 they were based chronologically at Essentuki, 
Tblisi, Constantinople, Berlin, and finally Paris, where Gurdjieff founded the 
Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man at the Prieuré des Basses 
Loges at Fontainebleau-Avon for a second time (Rawlinson 1997). In 1924 he 
had a near-fatal car crash, disbanded the Institute, and moved to a flat in cen-
tral Paris. Gurdjieff then focused on writing his three major works, assisted 
by his secretary Olga de Hartmann and translator Alfred R. Orage. From 1922 
until his death in 1949, apart from some travels, Gurdjieff remained in France 
(Rawlinson 1997: 283).
Until P.D. Ouspensky met Gurdjieff and began to document his teach-
ings there was no external testimony concerning Gurdjieff ’s life. Ouspensky 
separated from Gurdjieff in 1924, by which time the journalistic chronicling 
of Gurdjieff ’s life had become established. Ouspensky taught the Gurdjieff 
system until his death in 1947 and published the earliest and most systematic 
version of the teaching, In Search of the Miraculous (1949). Mark Sedgwick 
has argued he made a greater contribution to the Work than is generally 
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acknowledged, and that “much of what is known as the Gurdjieff teaching 
is actually Ouspensky’s teaching” (Sedgwick 2019: 132). Gurdjieff ’s writings, 
Beelzebub’s Tales to his Grandson (1950), Meetings with Remarkable Men (1963), 
and Life is Real Only Then, When ‘I Am’  (1974), were published posthumously 
(Moore 1991). Gurdjieff ’s quasi-autobiographical Meetings presents him as 
a seeker of wisdom, one desirous to unite religious, esoteric and scientific 
knowledge. Meetings records the quest by Gurdjieff and his friends, a group 
calling themselves the ‘Seekers of Truth’. They included: Abram Yelov, an 
Assyrian Christian; trainee Orthodox priest turned engineer Sarkis Pogossian; 
the pasha’s son Ekim Bey; archaeologist Professor Skridlov; one ‘remarkable 
woman’ Vitvitskaia; and Prince Yuri Lubovedsky, the principal spiritual guide 
in Gurdjieff ’s book. The Seekers of Truth allegedly travelled in search of ancient 
wisdom in the 1880s and 1890s. They went on an expedition to the Gobi Desert, 
visited Egypt (which Gurdjieff linked to Atlantis), experimented with music 
and vibrations, met wandering holy men in Central Asia, and Gurdjieff himself 
finally found the monastery of the fabled Sarmoung Brotherhood, where he 
reunited with Prince Lubovedsky and learned the sacred dances, or Movements 
(Moore 1991: 31–32).
There has been much speculation about the sources of Gurdjieff ’s teach-
ings, and how reliable the account of his early years given in Meetings is. The 
Fourth Way or ‘Work’, as Gurdjieff ’s teaching is called, has been described as an 
amalgam of esoteric Christianity, Ṣūfism, Tibetan Buddhism, Western occult 
traditions, and Hindu ideas. Gurdjieff himself never acknowledged a mas-
ter. Certain Gurdjieff pupils, like J.G. Bennett, thought that Gurdjieff ’s travels 
were based in reality. He believed that Gurdjieff had lived with Essenes and at 
the Christian monastery of Mount Athos, and had visited Ethiopia where he 
acquired knowledge of Coptic Christianity. Bennett also accepted that Gurdjieff 
spent time in Egypt, Babylon, Afghanistan, and Tibet, and was initiated into a 
Ṣūfi order in Central Asia. From the early 1950s he travelled extensively in the 
Islamic world and “clearly sought out the sources of Gurdjieff ’s teachings from 
the Muslims that he met” (Pittman 2012: 123). Yet during Gurdjieff ’s life the 
orientation to Ṣūfism was not apparent to many of his key pupils, the most 
prominent of whom was Jeanne de Salzmann (1889–1990), his nominated suc-
cessor. She established the Gurdjieff Foundation (with branches in London, 
New York, Paris, London, and Caracas), the official teaching and institutional 
lineage of the Work. The changes which de Salzmann made late in her life were 
criticized sharply by James Moore; he charged that she introduced Hindu- 
style meditation aimed at awakening the Kundalini, when Gurdjieff dismissed 
“Indian religiosity in general (‘a bordel for Truth’) and Kundalini in particular” 
(Moore 1994b: 13).
615Ṣūfism and the Gurdjieff ‘Work’
The first account of Gurdjieff ’s teaching to be published was Ouspensky’s 
Search, and when the two met in 1915 Ouspensky was known as the author 
of Tertium Organum (1912), in which he spoke of Ṣūfism as “a philosophical 
school of a very high idealistic character, which struggled against material-
ism as well as against narrow fanaticism and the literal understanding of the 
Koran” (Ouspensky 1981 [1912]: 250). In Search Ouspensky wrote of his years 
as Gurdjieff ’s pupil (he left Gurdjieff in 1924 though he continued to teach 
Gurdjieff ’s ideas to his students). He noted Gurdjieff ’s vagueness regarding the 
sources of his teachings:
[a]bout schools and where he had found the knowledge he undoubtedly 
possessed he spoke very little and always superficially. He mentioned 
Tibetan monasteries, the Chitral, Mount Athos, Sufi schools in Persia, 
in Bokhara, and eastern Turkestan; he mentioned dervishes of various 
orders; but all of them in a very indefinite way.
Ouspensky 2001 [1949]: 36
When in Istanbul en route to Europe, Ouspensky, Bennett and others visited 
the Mevlevi tekke with Gurdjieff, and drew parallels between Ṣūfi exercises 
and what he had taught them. Ouspensky recalled Gurdjieff saying that “the 
whirling of the Mehlevi [sic] dervishes was an exercise for the brain based 
upon counting, like the exercises he had shown us in Essentuki” (Ouspensky 
2001: 383). Bennett was convinced that the Ṣūfi practice of zikr or dhikr, 
remembrance of the names of God (Allāh) was the same as Gurdjieff ’s self-
remembering, despite the obvious distinction that one practice was focused 
on God and the other on the self (Brenner 1972: 646). Bennett also argued 
that the distinction between (false) personality and (true) essence was of 
Ṣūfi origin, and the Study House at the Prieuré reminded him “of the Sema 
Hanes of the Dervish communities outside the walls of Constantinople” 
(Bennett 1973: 152).
It is certainly true that Gurdjieff crafted an image that was ‘Eastern’; the 
Study House (an aircraft hangar that was used for Movements) was hung 
with Persian carpets, and the Turkish bath in which Gurdjieff joked with 
the men of the Prieuré was also exotic in 1920s Paris. Bennett also saw the 
“Stop Exercise,” in which pupils at Gurdjieff ’s command ceased moving and 
froze, as a Ṣūfi practice (Bennett 1973: 227). His conviction that Gurdjieff 
had studied with the Naqshbandī Ṣūfi order in Bukhara was supported by 
the fact that the Ṣūfi characters in Meetings (Bogga Eddin) and Beelzebub’s 
Tales (Hadji-Asvatz-Troov), were both associated with Bukhara. He said of 
Gurdjieff:
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He put on a mask that would tend to put people off, rather than draw 
them towards him. Now this method  … the Way of Malamat, or the 
method of blame—was highly esteemed in old times among the Sufis, 
who regarded the sheikhs … who went by the Way of Blame, as particu-
larly eminent in spirituality.
quoted in Pittman 2012: 139
Other evidence for Gurdjieff ’s identification with Ṣūfism is found in the 
‘sacred dances’ or Movements, and the music he composed with Thomas de 
Hartmann, both that to accompany the Movements, and piano music that is 
of three types, “Asian and Eastern Folk Music, Sayyid and Dervish Music, and 
Hymns” (Petsche 2015: 112). It is to these two teaching tools, dance and music, 
that we now turn.
3 The Movements and the Piano Music: Ṣūfi Themes
The Movements were unveiled by Gurdjieff in 1919 in Tiflis (Tblisi), the site of 
the first foundation of the Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man, 
and of the first public Movements demonstration. Yet sacred dances were a 
teaching method from the start. In “Glimpses of The Truth” (1914), a text that 
was likely designed to attract students, a seeker asked Gurdjieff about The 
Struggle of the Magicians, a ballet that he had advertised in 1914. He responded:
in the rhythm of certain dances, in the precise movements and com-
binations of the dancers, certain laws are vividly recalled. Such dances 
are called sacred. During my journeys in the East, I often saw dances of 
this kind executed during the performance of sacred rotes in some of 
the ancient temples. These ceremonies are inaccessible and unknown 
to Europeans. Some of these dances are reproduced in The Struggle of 
the Magicians.
Gurdjieff 1984 [1973]: 31
The ballet was never performed but is evidence for Gurdjieff ’s use of dance as 
a teaching method very early on. Ouspensky notes exercises that were done 
on a large drawing of the Enneagram (discussed below) on the floor, with stu-
dents on the numbers from 1 to 9 and moving “in the direction of the numbers 
of the period in a very interesting movement, turning around one another at 
the points of meeting” (Ouspensky 2001: 294–295). Ouspensky did not link 
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the symbol to Ṣūfism as later commentators have but considered it particular 
to Gurdjieff.
The origin of the Movements has been speculated to be the monastery of the 
obscure ‘Sarmoung Brotherhood’, although, as Sedgwick has noted, there is no 
evidence that the Sarmoung Brotherhood existed, and in the Work tradition it 
functions as a source of authority, like “[Madame Helena Petrovna] Blavatsky’s 
mythical Mahatmas” (Sedgwick 2010: 176). More probably, the Movements 
reflect a blend of Eastern and Western dance forms, including Ṣūfi dervish 
dances, Anthroposophical Eurythmy, and Dalcroze Eurhythmics (Wellbeloved 
2005 [1003]: 45). Jeanne de Salzmann’s Dalcroze class were the first Movements 
students, and it is probably significant that Gurdjieff did not teach Movements 
prior to Jeanne and her husband Alexandre becoming his pupils. Yet he taught 
Movements in an expert, rather than an amateur or spontaneous, fashion, 
which suggests that body-based disciplines were of long-standing interest to 
him (Cusack 2017). It was at the Sarmoung monastery that Gurdjieff allegedly 
saw the doll-like machine consisting “of a vertical column fitted with seven 
movable arms, each attached by seven universal joints. Like a written alphabet, 
the machine was capable of transmitting an infinite number of sign combina-
tions” (Gordon 1978: 38). This is supposed to have demonstrated the particular 
postures of the Movements, which often involve complicated and counter-
intuitive actions of different body parts, such as the head, arms, and legs. This 
exotic source has never been substantiated, and it seems more likely that, as 
Gurdjieff noted, when he was young he had “practised mostly Yoga and the 
gymnastics of the ‘Swede Mueller’” (van Dullemen 2014: 215).
Gurdjieff taught that humans are “three-brained beings,” who must align 
their intellectual, emotional and sensory selves into a single self via the devel-
opment of a finer (or kesdjan), body. His teachings are called the ‘Fourth Way’, 
because of the three ways that he connects to the three centres of being. The 
way of the faḳīr (Ṣūfi ascetic) Gurdjieff connects to the body and the sensory 
centre; the way of the monk (Christian ascetic) he links to the emotional centre; 
and the way of the yogi (Hindu ascetic) he aligns with the intellectual centre 
(Cusack 2017: 104). All these paths are fragmentary, as they “are all imbalanced 
because each centre is only aware of part of what we are … So in effect, there 
are two kinds of imbalance … individual neurosis (derived from the fact that 
centres try to do the work that is proper to one of the others) and ‘spiritual lop-
sidedness’ (derived from the fact that no centre can reveal the whole nature of 
man)” (Rawlinson 1997: 288).
For Gurdjieff the purpose of life is the development of a kesdjan body 
through work and “conscious suffering.” Humans, for Gurdjieff, are essentially 
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machines who pass through life asleep. There are four states of consciousness; 
sleep, waking consciousness (nearly the same as sleep), self-remembering, and 
objective consciousness, the attainment of which is linked to the development 
of the kesdjan (astral or higher-being) body. This is a type of soul or immor-
tal element that survives physical death; those without souls become food 
for the Moon when they die. The Movements are the most important bodily 
activity undertaken in the Work, and cultivate the physical centre, while the 
piano music “cultivate(s) the emotional centre,” and Beelzebub’s Tales culti-
vates the intellectual centre (Petsche 2015: 182). The transformative nature of 
the Movements is recognized by Joseph Azize, who notes “there are inner atti-
tudes, which at a certain stage become even more crucial than the corporeal 
dimension” (Azize 2012: 297).
The script of The Struggle of the Magicians tells of dances taught by the 
White Magician to his students, including the heroine, the beautiful and mod-
est Zeinab. The description is clearly of a Movements class:
[i]mmediately the pupils leave their work and place themselves in rows, 
and at a sign from the Magician they go through various movements 
resembling dances. The Magician’s assistant moves up and down and 
corrects their postures and movements. These ‘sacred dances’ are consid-
ered to be one of the principal subjects of study in all esoteric school of 
the East, both in ancient times and at the present day. The movements of 
which these dances consist have a double purpose; they express and con-
tain a certain knowledge and, at the same time, they serve as a method of 
attaining a harmonious state of being.
Gurdjieff n.d.: 19
The Struggle of the Magicians reinforces this sense that the source of the teach-
ing is “Islamic”; the heroine Zeinab, described as “of an Indo-Persian type,” is 
the daughter of a wealthy khan and becomes crucial to a struggle between the 
White Magician and the Black Magician; at the ballet’s conclusion, the White 
Magician is victorious and Zeinab and her suitor Gafar are united (Gurdjieff 
n.d., 8–9). The costume and set drawings have a strong “Arabian Nights” aes-
thetic, adding to the impression of an Islamic, or more properly Ṣūfi, origin to 
Gurdjieff ’s teachings.
Yet it is surprisingly difficult to connect any of the music that Gurdjieff com-
posed or Movements that he choreographed with particular ethnic or religious 
groups; Gert-Jan Blom claims to have identified the source of one tune, “Kurd 
Melody for Two Flutes” (Petsche 2015: 120). Similarly, there is one Movement 
where the words “Sharsche Varsche” are recited. Wim van Dullemen identified 
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the source for this as a “ritual procession to honour the Holy Hussein, who fell 
at the battle of Kerbala, one of the twelve imams” referencing the death of 
Ḥusayn, grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad (van Dullemen 2014: 184).2 In 
Beelzebub’s Tales Gurdjieff calls ‘Saint Muhammad’ “a genuine messenger of 
our Endlessness [God]” (Gurdjieff 1999 [1950]: 1091); Gurdjieff ’s books abound 
with comic tales of the Ṣūfi Mullah Nassr Eddin. Some Movements include 
2 “In the distance, the muffled beat of a large drum could be heard, threatening as a warning 
from the Invisible. The dusty street glowed in the sun that shone directly above Schimran 
(the city in Persia where the author was located). The drum beat edged slowly closer and 
incessantly the cries ‘Sha-ssé … Wah-ssé’ rang out: Shah Hussein … Woe Hussein. The proces-
sion became visible and above the mass of people three large flags flapped. One on of the 
flag’s Ali’s name was written in large golden letters against a black velvet background. On the 
second, a large hand could be seen, the hand of the Prophet’s daughter, Fatima, both blessing 
and threatening. On the third, so large that it almost obscured the view of the heavens above, 
just ‘Hussein’, the grandson of the prophet. The crowd proceeded slowly through the street 
with the penitents leading, dressed in black mourning attire but with bare backs and holding 
heavy chains in their hands that were whipped across their bleeding shoulders to the beat of 
the drum. Behind them walked a large semi-circle of broad-shouldered men, who took two 
rhythmic steps forward and one back. At each step, their chant ‘Sha-ssé … Wah-ssé’ rose up 
and they hit their balled-up fists against their bare hairy chests. They were followed by—in 
white robes, like those of the dead, with deeply bowed heads—Martyrs, with shaven heads 
and long daggers in their hands, their faces closed off and dark as though they were looking 
into another world. ‘Sha-ssé … Wah-ssé’. At each cry, the daggers flashed in the sunlight and 
fell across their shaven skulls, blood running over their (185) white robes. One of them fell to 
the ground and was quickly transported away by the crowd. I saw a beatific smile on his face” 
(van Dullemen 2014: 184–185).
Figure 26.1  Enneagram Movement, Sherborne House, 1974
Image courtesy of Anthony Blake
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whirling, but there is evidence that Gurdjieff introduced this only after living 
in Istanbul in 1920.
4 John G. Bennett, Subud, and Idries Shah
Bennett met Gurdjieff and Ouspensky in Istanbul during his employment with 
British military intelligence in 1920–1921, and spent time at the Prieuré in 1923. 
He then was a pupil of Ouspensky and his wife, Sophia Grigorievna for many 
years. In 1946 Bennett established an Institute for the Comparative Study of 
History, Philosophy and the Sciences, which acquired Coombe Springs, a large 
house at Kingston-Upon-Thames, Surrey (Coates 2013: 182). In 1948 Bennett 
returned to Paris and Gurdjieff, and was with Gurdjieff when he died in 1949. 
Sitting by Gurdjieff ’s body before the funeral, Bennett felt that Gurdjieff ’s 
“power remained and … his work would continue” (Bennett 1973: 272). Bennett 
is unique among the early pupils in that he was interested both in locating 
the sources of Gurdjieff ’s teaching, and in the possibilities of other religions 
and spiritualities. In 1957 he became intrigued by Subud, an Indonesian spiri-
tual group led by Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo (known as Bapak—
“elder or father”—or Pak Subuh), who taught an exercise, the latihan kejiwaan 
(training of the soul), which Bennett introduced to Work students at Coombe 
Springs (Rawlinson 1997: 185).
Fascinatingly, Bennett’s involvement with Subud was the earliest transmis-
sion of Pak Subuh’s ideas to Europe. The name Subud is formed from three 
Indonesian words derived from Sanskrit; Susila (good-tempered), Budhi 
(enlightenment) and Dharma (law). Stephen Urlich describes the latihan, dur-
ing which men and women are segregated, as “uninhibited and unrestrained 
emotional expression, in which ‘contact’ with Subud’s deity is made” (Urlich 
2005: 163). Given that Indonesia is a primarily Islamic country it is unsurpris-
ing that Pak Subuh denied that Subud was a new religion:
[i]t is also necessary to explain that Subud is neither a kind of religion nor 
a teaching, but is a spiritual experience awakened by the Power of God 
leading to spiritual reality free from the influence of the passions, desires 
and thinking. That is why in the spiritual training of Subud one really 
feels that one’s inner self is no longer influenced by the passions, heart 
and mind, which means that in the latihan kejiwaan of Subud the inner 
feeling has truly been separated from their influence.
Sumohadiwidjojo n.d.
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Bennett then converted to Catholicism in 1961, the year that he went to India to 
consult “an Indian sage, Shivapuri Baba” (Rawlinson 1997:185). A break with Pak 
Subuh ensued in 1962. Thus, Bennett was a quintessential seeker and at various 
times had been a pupil of Ouspensky, Gurdjieff, Jeanne de Salzmann, Henriette 
Lannes, all in the Work tradition, and Pak Subuh, Abdullah Daghestani, Emin 
Chikou, the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, and Shivapuri Baba outside the Work.
At Coombe Springs Bennett and his pupils built the Djameechoonatra, a 
structure based on the Enneagram. Its purpose was as a venue for performances 
of the Movements, and it evoked the Study House at the Prieuré (Coates 2013: 
182). This was completed in 1965, but was destroyed the next year, after Bennett 
gave Coombe Springs to the soi-disant Ṣūfi teacher Idries Shah who sold it to 
property developers (Pittman 2012: 107). James Moore is scathing in his assess-
ment of the relationship between Bennett and Shah. Bennett
became persuaded that Shah had come direct from Gurdjieff ’s ‘Sarmoung 
Monastery’ with a ‘Declaration of the People of The Tradition’; how 
Shah pressed Bennett (‘The caravan is about to set out’) to give him 
Coombe Springs outright; how Bennett agonized, and in January 1966 
complied; how Shah promptly repudiated Bennett, and sold the estab-
lishment for 100,000 [British pounds]; how Coombe Springs with its 
sub-Goetheanum Djamichunatra passed under the bulldozers; how Shah 
with the proceeds founded the Society for Organising Unified Research 
in Cultural Education (SOURCE) and the Society for the Understanding 
of the Foundation of Ideas (SUFI) and established himself at Langton 
House, Langton Green, near Tunbridge Wells—all this defies both précis 
and belief, but is … recorded in Bennett’s autobiography Witness.
Moore 1986: 4–6
Bennett had broken with de Salzmann in 1953, and he became one of the most 
creative and productive teachers of Gurdjieff ’s ideas. After the loss of Coombe 
Springs, Bennett began the International Academy for Continuous Education, 
at Sherborne House in Gloucestershire, in 1971 (Blake 2017: 168–170).
He designed a “year-long course  … utilizing Gurdjieffian techniques and 
ideas alongside material from other sources” (Coates 2013: 183). He was con-
vinced that whirling dervishes practicing zikr at the Ṣūfi samāʿ (spiritual 
concert) was identical to the self-remembering exercise of Gurdjieff, and he 
had made the acquaintance of Shaykh Abdullah Daghestani, the leader of 
the Naqshbandī Order in 1955 (Pittman 2012: 125). Later at Sherborne and at 
Claymont Court, Ṣūfism became core, with regular zikr and teaching sessions by 
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Ṣūfi leaders. Bennett bought Claymont Court in West Virginia in October 1974, 
just before his death in December. He wanted Claymont to host the Claymont 
Society for Continuous Education. Claymont Court was meant to house peo-
ple living together in a self-sustaining agricultural community. Sedgwick notes 
that under Pierre Elliot (1914–2005), a teacher in the Bennett tradition, Ṣūfis 
including Reshad Feild (1938–2016), Muzaffer Ozak (1916–1985), and Süleyman 
Loras (1904–1985), who initiated Elliot as a Mevlevi shaykh (Sedgwick 2019: 
133), taught at Claymont. The courses at Claymont Court ended in the 1980s, 
but it continues to be a site of “significant exchanges with a number of teach-
ers and groups representing a wide variety of spiritual traditions and practices” 
(Pittman 2012: 211).
The involvement that Bennett had with various Ṣūfi groups and especially 
with Shah and his pupils had some long-term results that have proved prob-
lematic with regard to the academic study of Gurdjieff and his teachings. In 
1966 a writer using the name ‘Rafael Lefort’ published a short book entitled 
The Teachers of Gurdjieff, which clearly emanated from the circle of Idries Shah 
and his elder brother Omar Ali-Shah, also a popular leader of Naqshbandī Ṣūfi 
groups in the West. This purported to be a series of interviews with ‘authentic’ 
Ṣūfi masters in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and a range of other countries, presented 
as those from whom Gurdjieff ’s ideas were derived, or (less diplomatically) 
Figure 26.2  The Djameechoonatra, Coombe Springs, c. 1965
Image courtesy of Anthony Blake
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stolen.3 Lefort claimed that Hakim Abdul Qader in Adana taught Jurjizada 
(Gurdjieff) weaving, at which he was “an attentive pupil” (Lefort 2008 [1966]: 
12). Controversially, he alleged that Sheik Daud Yusuf in Kerbala (and sundry 
other figures he posited taught Gurdjieff) firmly dismissed Gurdjieff ’s teach-
ing, saying “Gurdjieff is dead  … Gurdjieff passed his authority to none. His 
message died with him” (Lefort 2008: 28).4 While such criticism was unlikely 
to trouble Work members, it is clear that an attack on Gurdjieff ’s authority to 
teach was being mounted on the grounds of “tradition.” Thus, the polemical 
tone of Ali-Shah is unmistakable:
Gurdjieff … had been passed from Master to Master and he had most cer-
tainly assimilated various techniques, terms of reference, music, move-
ment and other things; but he was not mandated to teach, and this is a 
very fundamental, important and crucial factor … The amount of … dam-
age which was caused and is still being caused by Gurdjieff and his fol-
lowers can be measured only in terms of human suffering and pain. All 
the more reprehensible from our point of view is that, after the death of 
Gurdjieff, Madame de Salzmann took over, to be subsequently followed 
by her son and one of the other dancing bears, and they knew what they 
were teaching was not real.
Ali-Shah 1994: 223–226
It is interesting that Ṣūfis in the Shah lineage make such concerted attempts to 
attack Gurdjieff, when the Work itself (apart from Bennett’s lineage) has not 
claimed Ṣūfism as its root tradition or emphasised Ṣūfi influences at all.
The scholarly literature on Gurdjieff, which is relatively limited, contains 
efforts like Anna T. Challenger’s Philosophy and Art in Gurdjieff ’s Beelzebub: 
A Modern Sufi Odyssey, an interesting book which nevertheless uncritically 
accepts the Bennett view that “‘the Sufi origins of his [Gurdjieff ’s] teach-
ings were unmistakable for anyone who had studied both’, consequently we 
may move back and forth with ease between Ṣūfism and Gurdjieff without 
3 It is interesting that Lefort (1966) was taken seriously by many authors, including Theosophist 
Paul Johnson, whose Madame Blavatsky: ‘The Veiled Years’. Light from Gurdjieff or Sufism? 
(1987), argued that “Since modern Sufis are claiming that Gurdjieff was trained in Sufic 
schools for a mission to the West, an examination of the possibility that H.P.B. was also 
indebted to Sufis is in order” (1987: 8).
4 This attitude was shared by Gary Chicoine (b. 1942) who, as “Rishi Dada Narayana” sent a 
letter to Bennett’s Institute at Sherborne in August 1977 (Rawlinson 1997: 203). He presented 
himself as a teacher of Gurdjieff ’s original source and asserted, “The entire Gurdjieff Path as 
away in itself is truly defunct” (Thompson 1995: 549).
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a need for re-orientation” (Challenger 2002: 12). Harry T. Hunt’s admirable 
attempt to situate Gurdjieff in the context of modern secular mysticism also 
states confidently,
What is clear is that Gurdjieff ’s final system contains a set of practices 
largely derived from Sufism, with a more Western psychology of the mul-
tiplicity of ordinary personality, all synthesized within an original version 
of Gnosticism and an attendant highly technical alchemy of alchemy of 
inner experience.
Hunt 2003: 227
Sedgwick, in studies of modern Ṣūfism in the West, has drawn attention to the 
fact that in the 1930s, in addition to Gurdjieff, there were other teachers of 
‘Sufism’ (variously defined) in the West, including Hazrat Inayat Khan, Frithjof 
Schuon, Rudolf von Sebottendorff, Meher Baba, and René Guénon (Sedgwick 
2016: 413). Michael Pittman, the most insightful and scrupulous chronicler of 
the discourse of Ṣūfism within and without the Gurdjieff tradition, offers a 
more cautious and nuanced account of mutual influence in the Bennett leg-
acy, with due restraint about Gurdjieff ’s relations with and/or debt to Ṣūfis and 
Ṣūfism (Pittman 2012, 2013).
5 The Enneagram and Ṣūfism
The Enneagram, a term that combines the Greek ennea (nine) and grammos 
(drawn or written), is a nine-sided figure, usually shown as a triangle inside 
a circle (connecting points 9, 3, and 6), that features in the esoteric system 
of Gurdjieff and was first described by Ouspenky. Gurdjieff said that the 
Enneagram was “completely self-supporting and independent of other lines 
and it has been completely unknown up to the present time” (Ouspensky 2001: 
286), but many different origins have been traced for the symbol (including 
Christian, Ṣūfi, and Kabbalistic) (Webb 1980: 505–519). The numbers around 
the circle show the Law of Seven (this for Gurdjieff was the musical octave of 
seven fundamental notes and two “semitone” intervals, so nine points). The 
points representing the seven fundamental notes are therefore labelled do, 
re, mi and so on. The Law of Seven determines all processes in the universe, 
according to a pattern of seven unequal steps. Gurdjieff used the “seven-tone 
scale,” consisting of two sets of larger intervals—do re mi and fa sol la ti—and 
two smaller intervals, between mi and fa, and si and the do of the next octave 
(Ouspensky 2001: 124–126; Gurdjieff 1984: 187–189). Gurdjieff taught that in 
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all processes resistance is met at the smaller intervals, and a ‘shock’ is needed 
for processes to continue. The nine digits on the Enneagram do not show the 
Law of Seven with seven fundamental steps and two semitone or ‘shock’ steps 
exactly, as the distance between points is equal around the circumference of 
the circle, where intervals between tones and semitones vary.5 The unusual 
six-pointed shape inside the Enneagram is made by joining by straight lines 
the six numbers on the edge that make up the sequence of numbers that occur 
and repeat when 1 is divided by 7 (0.142857 repeated). The other points—9, 3, 
and 6—form an equilateral triangle symbolising the Law of Three, and points 
3 and 6 correspond to the two shock intervals of the octave (Ouspensky 2001: 
290–291).
Gurdjieff claimed the Enneagram was a symbol of universal significance 
and enormous power:
the enneagram is a universal symbol. All knowledge can be included in 
the enneagram and with the help of the enneagram it can be interpreted. 
And in this connection only what a man is able to put into the enneagram 
does he actually know, that is, understand. What he cannot put into the 
enneagram he does not understand. For the man who is able to make 
use of it, the enneagram makes books and libraries entirely unnecessary. 
5 Johanna Petsche, personal communication, 7 May 2013.
Figure 26.3  
The Enneagram
Image courtesy of 
Sebastiaan van Oyen
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Everything can be included and read in the enneagram. A man may be 
quite alone in the desert and he can trace the enneagram in the sand and 
in it read the eternal laws of the universe. And every time he can learn 
something new, something he did not know before. If two men who have 
been in different schools meet, they will draw the enneagram and with 
its help they will be able at once to establish which of them knows more 
and which, consequently, stands upon which step, that is to say, which 
is the elder, which is the teacher and which the pupil. The enneagram is 
the fundamental hieroglyph of a universal language which has as many 
different meanings as there are levels of men.
Ouspensky 2001: 294
This passage makes comprehensible the stern criticisms that ‘orthodox’ 
Gurdjieff groups make of unorthodox (but Gurdjieff-inspired) applications of 
the Enneagram, and those uses by non-initiated teachers who have never been 
part of the Work. The power claimed for the Enneagram by Gurdjieff explains 
why faithful followers believe that its misuse is dangerous. The Enneagram is 
a tool for analysing an individual’s psychological condition (from the Greek 
psyche, soul) and his/her resultant spiritual status.
Gurdjieff also claimed that the Enneagram embodied “objective knowl-
edge,” a significant claim in the Work context:
[t]he symbols that were used to transmit ideas belonging to objective 
knowledge included diagrams of the fundamental laws of the universe 
and they not only transmitted the knowledge itself but showed also the 
way to it … The fundamental laws of triads and octaves penetrate every-
thing and should be studied simultaneously both in the world and in 
man. But in relation to himself man is a nearer and a more accessible 
object of study … in striving towards a knowledge of the universe, man 
should begin with the study of himself and with the realization of the 
fundamental laws within him … The transmission of the meaning of sym-
bols to a man who has not reached an understanding of them in himself 
is impossible.
Ouspensky 2001: 280–281
Thus the Enneagram is a truly esoteric symbol; uninitiated humans without 
the necessary preparation to understand its meaning cannot apprehend its 
significance. This statement also links the diagnostic Enneagram which can 
identify a person’s spiritual level with the developmental Enneagram that plots 
the course of spiritual progress that a person might go on to make. Further, the 
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Enneagram is also a map of the microcosm-macrocosm relationship between 
the human and the universe.
James Webb, a non-Gurdjieffian, argued that the genealogy of the Enneagram 
lay in the Kabbalistic Sephiroth, by way of the Ars Magna (“The Great Art,” 
c. 1305–1308) of Ramon Lull (c. 1232–1315), and the Arithmologia (1665) of 
Athanasius Kircher (1601–1680) (Webb 1980: 505–519). Biographer and Work 
member Moore rejects this, claiming the Enneagram “was intrinsic and pecu-
liar to Gurdjieff ’s system, and unpromulgated before him” (Moore 2004 [1987]: 
2). Sophia Wellbeloved has observed that that the turning nature of Gurdjieff ’s 
“Enneagram” Movements may suggest Dervish and Ṣūfi origins for the symbol 
(2003: 66), but offers no evidence to demonstrate this possible affinity. The 
Bolivian Oscar Ichazo, founder of the Arica School, rejected the alleged Ṣūfi 
origins of the Enneagram: “I know Ṣūfism extensively—I’ve practiced tradi-
tional zikr, prayer, meditation—and I know realized Ṣūfi sheiks. It is not part 
of their theoretical framework. They couldn’t care less about the Enneagon 
[Enneagram]” (Patterson 1998: 24). Helen Palmer and Don Richard Riso (1946–
2012), among other contemporary popularisers of the Enneagram of per-
sonality, continue to trumpet its ‘Ṣūfi’ origins. The neo-Ṣūfi A.H. Almaas has 
developed a method called the “Diamond Approach,” in which “ancient wis-
dom” is integrated with depth psychology, and which uses the Enneagram, in 
a version derived from the Chilean Claudio Naranjo, who had been a pupil of 
Ichazo (Almaas 1998). Sedgwick has noted that in what he calls the “Enneagram 
movement” now largely ignores Ṣūfism, with the exception of Iranian-American 
Laleh (b. Mary, 1938) Baktiar, who has affinities with both Frithjof Schuon’s 
Traditionalist Ṣūfi order, the Maryamiyya and the Niʿmatullāhī order of 
Javād Nūrbaksh (Sedgwick 2019: 141–142), and sundry other groups.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that, while there are Ṣūfi motifs and ideas that 
feature in the teachings of Gurdjieff, it is manifestly the case that Gurdjieff 
was not a Ṣūfi and did not teach Ṣūfism. The discourse of Gurdjieff and Ṣūfism 
largely was the result of John Bennett’s quest for the origins of Gurdjieff ’s 
system, which was complicated (and perhaps compromised) by his identifi-
cation of Gurdjieff ’s “self-remembering” with zikr, the remembrance of the 
names of Allāh (Bennett 1973: 219). Bennett’s problematic relationship with 
both Muhammad Subuh Sumohadiwidjojo and Subud, and Idries Shah and 
the particular Western form of Naqshbandī Ṣūfism he was associated with, 
add further layers of complexity to the story. However, other teachers in the 
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Gurdjieff tradition have interpreted his teaching according to other templates 
(Christianity in the case of Maurice Nicoll, and with Hindu overtones in the 
later years of Jeanne de Salzmann, for example).
Scholars including Michael Pittman and Mark Sedgwick have traced the 
links that Ṣūfism had with Gurdjieff himself and that his followers, loosely 
defined, have developed. The time in Constantinople in 1920–1921, when 
Gurdjieff and Ouspensky were both teaching and John Bennett made their 
acquaintance, is of particular importance, and the memories of time spent in 
the tekkes watching whirling dervishes have influenced the presentation of the 
Work as Ṣūfi-inspired (Pittman 2016: 41). Pittman has researched figures includ-
ing Ahmet Kayhan (1898–1988) and Jelaluddin Loras, who founded the Mevlevi 
Order of America in 1980 and taught at Claymont Court from 1978 (Pittman 
2016: 46). These links involve mutual influence between the United States and 
Turkey, the Work and Ṣūfism, and friendships between Loras and Fourth Way 
teacher Pierre Elliot, for example, and also Reshad Feild (b. Richard Timothy, 
1934–2016) (Sorgenfrei 2013: 114–117). Sedgwick has chronicled interactions 
between the Work and Ṣūfism in Latin America, covering figures including 
Rodney Collin (1909–1956), a pupil of Ouspensky who brought the Fourth Way 
to Mexico, Ichazo and Naranjo (discussed above), and also “[a] similar group 
in the Dominican Republic, the Gurdjieff Dominican Group directed by by 
José Reyes (born 1942) … [which] retains on occasional emphasis on Ṣūfism” 
(Sedgwick 2018: 15). Reyes and Elliot were friends; Reyes went to Claymont and 
Elliot to the Dominican Republic, which explains the group’s Ṣūfi features.
Those elements of Gurdjieff ’s teaching that have been claimed to be Ṣūfi, 
such as the Stop Exercise, the Movements, and the Enneagram, when carefully 
examined are found to be not specifically Ṣūfi at all.6 Gurdjieff was a teacher 
who wore masks and played roles, and these masks and roles varied from pupil 
to pupil. Yet one continuous and never-repudiated thread in the Work was its 
pretension to unite the wisdom of the East and the West. In 1923, when he was 
becoming established in Paris, Gurdjieff spoke with Professor Denis Saurat, 
Director of the French Institute in London. He said:
6 There is another important project to be undertaken, to chronicle and analyse the difficult, 
one could say hostile, relationship between Gurdjieff and his pupils, and his younger contem-
porary, the Traditionalist and Ṣūfi René Guénon (1886–1951) and his pupils. Traditionalists 
have a very negative view of Gurdjieff; Whitall N. Perry, for example, says of the Stop Exercise 
that it “is a far remove from the ritual cessation of movement practised in dances like those 
of the Mevlevi Dervishes and the American Indians, where the flutes, the singing, and the 
drums unexpectedly stop on an explosion of sound between two instants, and the dance 
evaporates into the Void. It is the moment of death, the close of the cosmic cycle” (Perry 1978: 
55). Perry’s attitude to Gurdjieff is unambiguous; he is a “black magician” (Perry 1978: 74–75).
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I want to add the mystical spirit of the East to the scientific spirit of the 
West. The Oriental spirit is right, but only in its trends and general ideas. 
The Western spirit is right in its methods and techniques. Western meth-
ods alone are effective in history. I want to create a type of sage who will 
unite the spirit of the East with Western techniques.
Seymour-Smith 1998: 451
The fictional memoir Meetings shows a young Gurdjieff who is fascinated by 
machinery and modern science, as much as Gurdjieff the seeker of truth was 
attached to ancient and perennial sources of wisdom. It remains to observe 
that if the Work is not Christian, not Ṣūfi, not Buddhist, not Hindu, not 
Kabbalistic, it does not mean that it is sui generis, or that it sprang fully-formed 
from Gurdjieff ’s intellect as Athena did from the head of Zeus. Recently Steven 
J. Sutcliffe made a case for Gurdjieff as a bricoleur, an indubitably inventive 
thinker, but one who was limited by the materials to hand, and not above 
“making it up” as he went along (Sutcliffe 2015: 117–137). Bricolage and inven-
tion are the next models to apply to Gurdjieff ’s teaching, to identify progress 
and change in the “system” and to map the historical development of one of 
the most innovative and interesting new religious groups (and new esoteric 
orders) in the modern West.
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In Between and on the Fringes of Islam
∵

Introduction to Part 5
It is hard to package any tradition as large and diverse as Islam neatly into a 
small fixed number of packets. Not all Islamic traditions can be easily catego-
rized as Shīʿa, Sunnī, Ṣūfi and fundamentalist/extremist as we (and indeed most 
other anthologies, encyclopedias, and handbooks of Islam) have attempted to 
do. Any attempt to force them into such categories is bound to fail and leave 
too many fascinating movements out. The choice then is to either leave such 
movements out of a collection or create a catch-all category. We have chosen 
to include them here in this section of the handbook because we believe that 
including such movements provides our readers a better view of the full diver-
sity of the world of Islam.
Deciding what to do with heretical movements that are deemed less than 
fully Islamic by traditional Sunnī and Shīʿa clerics presents an even more 
daunting challenge for editors of anthologies, encyclopedias, and handbooks 
of Islam. While most traditional collections have excluded such movements, 
our volume casts a broader net. Our goal is to present an overview of the wide 
variety of religious movements present in the Islamic world so that scholars 
and those interested in Islamic history can grasp the full extent of the diverse 
thoughts that exists (or existed) under the name of Islam. This section also 
includes movements that were born of the Islamic world but no longer con-
sider themselves part of the Islamic community, such as the Bahāʾī, Druze, 
and Yezidis. It also traces the development and influences of movements that 
consider themselves Islamic but are rejected as such by many Sunnī and Shīʿa 
Muslims as heretical for one reason or another such as the Aḥmadiyya Muslim 
Jamāʿat, the Nation of Islam, the Moorish Science Temple, and the Ansaaru 
Allah Community.
In addition to a shared Islamic past, these movement are also marginalized 
and minoritized within the world of Islam (and the larger world). As such their 
members also share experiences of discrimination, persecution, and suffering 
at the hands of the larger societies they are a part of. Black Muslim movements 
in America suffered slavery and continue to suffer racism (Mauleon, 2018). 
Aḥmadis, Bahāʾī and Yezidis who live in Muslim majority societies often suffer 
various forms of oppression by the state (Zabihi-Moghaddam, 2016; Ahmed et 
al., 2019). Thus a shared experience of suffering and otherness is also common 
to the movements discussed in this section, especially in the mirror of ‘norma-
tive’ Islam variously framed by moderates, extremists, governments, and those 
outside of Islam.
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Aḥmadiyya Muslim Jamāʿat was founded as a movement to reform Islam by 
Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad (1839–1908) in Qāḍiān, Punjab, India in 1889. Following 
Aḥmad’s death, the movement was led by one of his most senior disciples 
Hakim Nūr al-Dīn (1841–1914). Nūr al-Dīn called himself the khalīfa. After his 
death, the movement split into two factions. The larger faction stayed in Qāḍiān 
and was led by Aḥmad’s son Mirzā Bashiruddin Mahmud Aḥmad (1889–1965), 
who was considered the second Khalifa by his followers. The smaller faction 
moved to Lahore and disbanded the office of Khalifa altogether. Following the 
partition of British India, the second Khalifa moved the Jamāʿat headquarter to 
Rabwah, Pakistan in 1948. After Mahmud Aḥmad’s death, his eldest son, Mirzā 
Nasir Aḥmad (1909–1982) took the reins of the main faction as Jamāʿat’s third 
Khalifa. In 1974, the parliament amended Pakistan’s constitution to declare that 
anyone who believes in Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad as a divinely appointed Messiah 
is not a Muslim. Nasir Aḥmad’s younger brother, Mirzā Tahir Aḥmad (1928–
2003), became the fourth Khalifa on his passing in 1982. In April 1984, the mili-
tary dictator Zia-ul-Haq issued Ordinance XX to make it illegal for Aḥmadis to 
preach their faith “or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings 
of Muslims.” Days later, Tahir Aḥmad escaped to London in a cloak and dag-
ger style. After Tahir Aḥmad’s passing in 2003, Mirzā Masrur Aḥmad, a great 
grandson of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad became Jamāʿat’s fifth Khalifa. He contin-
ues to live in UK and guide millions of his followers all around the world.
Since its inception, the movement has attracted attention from schol-
ars (Walter 1918; Friedman 1992; Khan 2015; Lavan 1974) as well as Muslim, 
Christian and the Hindu faithful because of the messianic claims of its 
founder. Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad claimed that he was a prophet of God and 
both the Islamic mahdī and the messiah of various religious traditions. Such 
claims drew immediate rebuke from Muslim ʿulamāʾ across India who accused 
Aḥmad of kufr—ungratefulness to God. Scholars of South Asian Islam have 
been at a loss to explain what led Aḥmad to make such extra-ordinary claims. 
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In his seminal article delineating boundaries between sects, denominations, 
and minority, Mark Sedgwick (2000) discusses the case of Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat 
extensively pointing out its various “peculiarities” that make it harder to fit it 
neatly into any of those categories. Recently, Upal (2017) explored various con-
nections between Aḥmad and the Ahl-e-ḥadīth ʿulamāʾ, namely, Abū Sayyid 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Baṭālvī and his teacher Syed Nazir Hussain Dehlavi. In 
From Ṣūfism to Aḥmadiyya (2015) Adil Hussein Khan traces various modern 
reformist, as well as traditional Ṣūfi, influences on Aḥmad’s thought. In partic-
ular, he suggests that Ahl-e-Ḥadīth alim or scholar the Ṣūfi Abdullah Ghaznavi, 
as well as writings of the Ṣūfi greats such as Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindi, may have 
had significant influence on Aḥmad’s thinking. Yohanan Friedman (1992) also 
explored similarities between Aḥmad’s spiritual claims and those of Ṣūfi mas-
ters such as Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindi. In this chapter, I will add a third source of 
influence that has not been fully explored yet, namely, that of the rationalist 
South Asian Muslim reformer Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898).
2 South Asian Islam in the Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century was a time of great tumult for South Asian Muslims, 
and therefore a time of great opportunity for Muslim reformers (or “social 
identity entrepreneurs” as I have referred to them elsewhere (Upal 2017) to 
emphasize the role they play in creating and marketing social identity beliefs) 
to remove what they perceived as non-Muslim influences from the thinking of 
the Muslim masses. The most influential among them were the descendants of 
the eighteenth century reformer Ṣūfi Shāh Walī Allāh (or Waliullah) of Delhi 
and his students at the Delhi-based Madrasa Raḥīmiyya which was founded by 
Walī Allāh’s father.
Although a sanad-holding Ṣūfi himself, Shāh Walī Allāh came to believe that 
some Ṣūfi practices had become un-Islamic. He particularly objected to overly 
exuberant Ṣūfi practices such as urs celebrations of the anniversaries of dead 
Ṣūfis, revering the tombs of Ṣūfi masters, and asking Ṣūfis for amulets to cure 
various illnesses. Shāh Walī Allāh’s also railed against taqlīd, that is, the tradi-
tional Sunnī Muslim practice of choosing one of the four school of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) and exclusively following fatwās issued by scholars from that 
school. For most South Asian Muslims, this was the school founded by Imām 
Abū Ḥanīfa, the eighth century Sunnī theologian, whose followers are known 
as Ḥanafīs. The remaining three schools are Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī.
Shāh Walī Allāh argued that following all fatwās of one’s chosen school was 
not mandatory on Muslims. Instead, he suggested that Muslims could pick and 
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choose from fatwās of various schools and various scholars. They could even 
use their own reasoning faculties to carry out ijtihād (independent reason-
ing) in situations where no previous fatwās existed to create solutions to novel 
problems. Thus he argued that a Ḥanafī woman may disregard the edict by Abū 
Ḥanīfa (who ruled that a woman whose husband goes to war and goes missing 
may not marry until he’s confirmed dead) and remarry after waiting for four 
years (as Imām Mālik, founder of the Mālikī school, ruled).
Shāh Walī Allāh’s sons and grandsons helped spread Shāh Walī Allāh’s mes-
sages to the Madrasa Raḥīmiyya students and beyond. The movement they 
helped create came to include a broad class of Muslims. By the nineteenth 
century, it included much of the Muslims elite of North India who were wor-
ried about the loss of royal patronage after the demise of the Mughal power in 
Delhi. The Indian Muslims were divided about the best way to respond to the 
British occupation of India. Some declared that India had become a dar al-
Harb (a ‘land of war’), while others insisted that it continued to be the land of 
peace (dar al-Islam). The proponents of the dar al-Harb enacted their beliefs 
and engaged in hijra (migration) to Islamic areas (including Afghanistan and 
Arabia). They called on their followers and other Muslims to wage jihād against 
the British.
Shāh Walī Allāh’s grandson Shāh Muḥammad Ishaq (1783–1846), the head 
of Madrasa Raḥīmiyya, moved to Mecca because he believed that India had 
become the land of war. Another group led by Syed Ahmad Barelwī (1786–1831) 
moved to the tribal areas on India’s north-western frontier with Afghanistan. 
Barelwī labeled his movement Ṭarīqa-e-Muḥammadi, while others labelled 
them as Wahhābīs because of the similarity of their worldview to that of ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb of Arabia. The Wahhābīs were considered violent extremists by 
the British government and they came to be persecuted both in Arabia and 
India (Allen 2006). Barelwī’s group included the younger grandson of Shāh 
Walī Allāh named Shāh Ismail. Both Barelwī and Ismail died in a fight with the 
Sikhs in 1831.
Those followers of Shāh Walī Allāh who remained in India either became 
completely apolitical (such as Muḥammad Qasīm Nānotawī, who moved away 
from the limelight of Delhi to the village of Deoband, where he founded the 
Deobandī Movement in 1867) or they became fully supportive of British rule 
(Metcalfe 1982). Among the latter were Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), Syed 
Nazir Hussain (1805–1902), and Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan (1832–1890). They 
called themselves variously as Muwahideen (that is, unitarians, the term pre-
ferred by Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan), and Ahl-e-Ḥadīth (that is, the Followers 
of the Prophet’s Words, the term preferred by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Syed 
Nazir Hussain). Syed Nazir Hussain, a graduate of Madrasa Raḥīmiyya, came to 
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be known as the premier scholar and teacher of ḥadīth in India after the depar-
ture of Shāh Muḥammad Ishaq (Robinson 2000). One of Hussain’s prominent 
students, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Baṭālvī (1840–1920), was so worried about being 
associated with Syed Ahmad Barelwī’s Wahhābī followers that he lobbied the 
British officials to stop referring to them as Wahhābīs. After completing his 
ḥadīth studies, Baṭālvī moved back to his hometown of Batala in Punjab. In 
1876, he started an Urdu magazine called Ishat-us-Sunnah to propagate the 
message of the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth movement to the wider world (Robinson 1988).
Another nineteenth century group of Muslims objected to some of the 
teachings of the followers of the Shāh Walī Allāh movement. The Barelwīs 
(named after their founder Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareli [1856–1921]) defended 
traditional Ṣūfi practices. While others referred to them as Barelwīs, they called 
themselves ‘party of the sunna’ to assert that they are the true Sunnīs and 
inheritors of the millennia and a half of the Ḥanafī Sunnī tradition. Barelwīs 
regarded Deobandīs and Ahl-e-Ḥadīth as innovators who disrespect tradi-
tional imams by not following all of their edicts.
3 Syed Ahmad Khan’s Rationalist Islam
The Ahl-e-Ḥadīth viewpoint was very influential among Delhi Muslims in the 
nineteenth century, including Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the son of a noble Delhi 
family who became one of the most prominent Muslim reformers of the nine-
teenth century. Khan received a traditional training in Qurʾān and ḥadīth in 
Delhi (some under Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz). The Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shāh 
Zafar, who ruled Delhi with British support, confirmed Khan’s status as a noble 
by awarding him titles of Javad-ud Daulah and Arif Jang in 1842 (Faruqi 2017). 
He helped his older brother set up Delhi’s first printing press and launch the 
first Urdu journal. Khan claimed that Ahl-e-Ḥadīth had been the original faith 
of Muslims from the very early days, but it had become corrupted after the 
reign of the four Sunnī Caliphs:
Mahomedanism was at first for many long years a pure and simple 
Theism; but in the second century of the Higra, when the ideas of the 
learned men as to its principle were reduced to writing, it was divided 
into four churches-Ḥanafī, Shfai, Malki, and Humbali. For some time it 
remained optional for Mahomedans to choose and follow any doctrine 
of any of these four Churches. When, however, Bani Umaiya and Bani 
Abbas became kings an edict was issued directing all Mahomedans to 
embrace the whole doctrine of any one church of the above four. Those 
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who disobeyed were punished  … There were still, however, many who 
clung the true faith in its primitive simplicity, but who dared not breathe 
their opinion except to a trusted few. Their name was then Ahal-i-Hadis 
i.e., believers in the sayings of the Prophet, who were not bound down 
by the doctrines of the four churches … In India, during the Mahomedan 
rule, the Turk and Pathan kings who were of the Ḥanafī sect were strictly 
averse to religious toleration, and the same state of affairs prevailed dur-
ing the sovereignty of the Mogul Emperors … On the establishment of 
the British rule, however, owing to the English principle of strict religious 
toleration, the followers of Ahal-i-Hadis again came to the front and 
preached openly and fearlessly.
Khan 1872: 10–11
Thus Khan argued the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth view point that Indian Muslims needed 
to be grateful to the British for allowing them to follow their faith in freedom. 
Ahl-e-Ḥadīth also came to adopt distinct practices such as rafa-yadain—
repeatedly lifting hands up to one’s shoulders and dropping them to one’s navel 
during the five daily ritual prayers—that allowed them to stand out from their 
fellow traditional Ḥanafī Muslims who made up the vast majority of Indian 
Muslims. Rafa-yadain, in particular, became a key marker of the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth. 
In a letter Khan claimed that he had been practicing rafa-yadain long before 
his friend Nazir Hussain:
I am the one who turned Syed Nazir Hussain into a puritan Wahhābī. He 
didn’t use to perform rafa-yadain during namaz [ritual Islamic prayer] 
even though he considered it to be the practice of those who were rightly 
guided. I said, this is sad that you do not practice what you consider to be 
a virtuous deed because of what others will think of it. He got up to offer 
the asar [afternoon] prayer and started practicing rafa-yadain.
Khan 1959
Since most scholars regard Hussain to be the founder of Ahl-e-Ḥadīth in India, 
this is a remarkable statement. Khan is not only claiming to be an Ahl-e-Ḥadīth 
but he is also claiming that he was an Ahl-e-Ḥadīth even before Hussain was 
one. In essence he is claiming to be the real founder of the movement because 
he argues that he persuaded Hussain to become an Ahl-e-Ḥadīth and adopt 
the practice of rafa-yadain.
Khan’s early writings mostly expressed traditional views. In his book Qaul- 
e-Matin dar ibtal-e-harkat-e-zamin (literally ‘firm assertion about the false 
assertion of the earth’s motion’), he defended the traditional Ptolemaic view 
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that Sun rotated around the earth−the view that was universally accepted by 
early nineteenth century Indian Muslims (Powell 1993: 209). At some point 
early in his career, however, Khan experienced a dramatic change in his world-
view. This may have been a result of deeper interactions with the increasing 
number of Westerners in Delhi that resulted from his decision to join the 
British East India Company and study at the East India Company College. 
Although his initial appointment was as a clerk, his talents ensured that he 
was quickly promoted to the rank of a jurist. Whatever caused it, Khan came 
to wholeheartedly adopt modern scientific views in the second half of his life. 
This social identity entrepreneur seems to have convinced himself that the 
biggest problem faced by Indian Muslims was the lack of scientific education 
caused by the belief that Islam was opposed to Western science. He became 
a forceful advocate of integration of Western science with Islamic worldview 
through a complete reinterpretation of over a millennium of Islamic tradition. 
Francis Robinson (1988) argues that Khan used the religious interpretation 
techniques he had learned from his Ahl-e-Ḥadīth friends Syed Nazir Hussain 
and Nawab Sidiq Hasan Khan to reconcile Western science with Islam to create 
a distinct doctrine that is best described as a rationalist Islam.
Like the Ahl-i Ḥadīth he circumvented the medieval law schools and 
went straight to the Qurʾān and ḥadīth as guidance for Muslims. The basis 
of his exegetical principles was that the laws of Creation were the Work 
of God and the Qurʾān was the Word of God and they just could not be 
contradictory—and if they seemed to be so it was because man failed 
to understand them correctly. So, for instance, he explained apparently 
miraculous events in the Qurʾān, as Christian apologists might have done 
similar events in the Bible, as metaphors.
Robinson 1988: 9
Khan has come to be so closely identified with his educational endeavours that 
he pursued in the second half of his life to open schools to educate Indian 
Muslims that his considerable intellectual efforts to reform Islam are often 
overlooked. Khan was in fact an alim first and foremost. He wrote a tafsīr (exe-
gesis) of the Qurʾān as well as several books on the topic of Islamic reform. 
He argued that Shāh Walī Allāh’s project of ridding Islam of external influ-
ences remained unfinished because so many Muslims still held onto their 
superstitious beliefs. He argued that Islam was revealed as a rational religion 
to Prophet Muḥammad and that in the intervening years, people had added 
irrational beliefs into Islam. He argued that Muslims had imported miracle 
stories from Christian and Jewish sources and also added some of their own to 
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counter Christian claim that while Jesus showed miracles Muḥammad did not. 
Extending the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth polemic against taqlīd, he labeled the practice of 
using Christian and Jewish miracle stories to interpret Qurʾān as taqlīd.
Khan developed a unique interpretation of the nature of God and His rela-
tionship with the universe (Derajat et al 2019). He argued that God created the 
universe and put the laws of nature (Qanun-e-Qudrat) in place. Just as God 
is unchanging so are his laws argued Khan (Bettani and Shaw 2016: 49). To 
imply that God changes his laws is to imply that God Himself changes which is 
impossible. He presented the Qurʾān’s verse 48:23—“It is the law of Allāh which 
hath taken course aforetime. Thou wilt not find for the law of Allāh aught of 
power to change” (Pickthall 1938)—as proof for his interpretation. For Khan, 
sunnatullah (literally ‘the way of Allāh’ meaning ‘law of nature’) is as important 
a divine attribute as tawḥīd (unity of God) is for traditional Muslims. God’s 
desire to maintain his law of nature trumps his desire to support his prophets 
and destroy their enemies through supernatural miracles. Thus, while an event 
may appear to be supernatural to some observers, it is in fact just an ordinary 
event when seen in a different light. Those who suggest that God broke his law 
to support His prophets do not understand the nature of God, said Khan. What 
these believers see as miracles that violate law of nature are really something 
else entirely. He wrote:
This is true that we do not completely know all the laws of nature and 
the ones we do know are very few and even for those we do not possess 
a complete knowledge. Instead our knowledge is faulty. The result is that 
when some strange event happens and there is plenty of evidence for its 
having happened and its occurrence is possibly not in accordance with 
known laws of nature and if we assume that there was no cheating or 
fraud and that it actually happened, even then we’d have to admit that 
there is no doubt there is a natural law that explains its occurrence that 
we do not yet know … To say that the law of nature is that things hap-
pen in accordance with prayer or intention of a prophet or a holy per-
son is not acceptable because a proof for such assertion would require 
that every single time that holy person prayed for something, it happens 
accordingly … Shāh Waliullah has written in Hujjat-ul-Balagha Chapter 
Haqiqat-ul-Nabuwah wa Khwasa that miracles and acceptance of prayers 
are outside of prophethood.
Khan 1885: 28–29
Khan further argued that God did not break his law of nature even to support 
the greatest of all prophets, namely, the prophet Muḥammad. So, if God did 
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not show any miracles to support Muḥammad, it was unimaginable that God 
would have done so to support his lesser prophets. Thus, the Qurʾān could not 
be speaking of any supernatural miracles even if traditionally Muslims have 
understood them as such. He wrote:
Shāh Waliullah Sahib, in his book Tafhimat-e-Ilahia clearly states that 
there is no mention of any miracles in Qurʾān. And About the split-
ting of the moon, he says that it was not a miracle. Thus he says that 
splitting-of-the-moon is not a miracle in our view. Instead, it is a sign of 
the Armageddon as God says that the time for the splitting of the moon 
comes near and Holy Prophet has informed us about it beforehand.
Khan 1885: 7–25
The fact that Khan only turns to Shāh Walī Allāh (rather than for instance 
imām Abū Ḥanīfa-the founder of the Ḥanafī School) as he seeks authorita-
tive voices from the past to support him shows the regard that he had for 
the eighteenth-century reformer. The above quoted passages also demon-
strate the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth tendency to skip over most of the medieval scholars 
and go to the original sources of Qurʾān and ḥadīth (sayings of the Prophet 
Muḥammad) to bolster their arguments. Khan also invoked events from the 
life of Prophet Muḥammad to support his argument that God does not show 
supernatural miracles:
The infidels demanded miracles from the Holy Prophet peace be upon 
him and said clearly that we will absolutely not going to believe you until 
you rip up the earth and draw fountains, or if you can produce flowing 
canals among orchards of dates and grapes, or if you drop pieces of the 
sky on us, or bring God and angels with you, or if you can produce a deco-
rated house, or if you can ascend to heaven … but despite such insistence 
God told his messenger, ‘say to them that my Lord is pure and I’m noth-
ing but a human being who is sent as a messenger’ … The fact that the 
Holy Prophet, who was the most superior of all prophets and messengers, 
did not have any miracles, proves that the previous prophets peace be on 
them also did not have any miracles.
Khan 1885: 23–24
In a remarkable follow-up passage, Khan seems to anticipate the modern cog-
nitive science of religion (Boyer 1994) approach to explaining the spread of 
religious ideas:
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If an ordinary person imprecates someone saying that ‘lightning may fall 
on you’ and coincidentally that person dies because of lightning. Then no 
one will think much of that but if that prayer were uttered by a person 
whose holiness fills people’s hearts then it becomes associated with his 
miraculous powers  … Many strange rumors that have no basis in real-
ity become popular about holy people. People are so impressed by the 
notion of holiness of such people that they do not research the truth and 
believe them without any research.
Khan 1885: 22
It is not God or His prophets who carry out supernatural acts according to 
Khan, it is ordinary people engaged in ordinary processes of cognition and 
communication that end up creating the supernatural religious concepts.
It is not just the physical miracles such as splitting of the moon by the Prophet 
Muḥammad that ordinary Muslims have misunderstood, argued Khan: most 
Muslims also misunderstand the very nature of prophethood, divine revela-
tion, and humanity’s status among the animal kingdom. Countering the tra-
ditional Sunnī belief that only prophets of God can receive God’s revelation, 
Khan argued that ordinary human beings are not only capable of revelation 
but routinely receive it. Revelation is not restricted to humans either: animals 
can, and do, receive God’s wisdom as well, claimed Khan. In his view, divine 
revelation is nothing but an instinctive call from one’s nature:
All creation whether it be humans or animals or plants, God has put a 
nature into everything. Things happen according to that nature without 
any teacher’s teachings. This blessing of nature has been labeled by some 
ʿulamāʾ of Islam as ilhamat (revelations). But the High Lord has called it 
wahi … This wahi was not delivered to the honeybee by Gabriel or another 
angel of God but God himself put it into it …
According to the ranks of their nature there will be people who will 
be born from among them whom Shāh Waliullah Sahib has labeled as 
perfects, hakims, khalifas, aided by the Holy Spirit (ruh-ul-qudus) guides, 
imams, munazir (warners), nabī (prophets). Today’s faithless people 
call them reformers … A guide who has a perfect nature of guidance is a 
prophet (nabī)
Khan 1885: 16–17
Thus divine revelation is nothing but an animal’s natural instincts and proph-
ets are nothing but reformers in Khan’s worldview.
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Belief in prophets is one of the six articles of faith in Islam. Traditional Sunnī 
Muslim doctrine not only specifies the status of prophets to be higher than that 
of ordinary human beings, but it also carefully delineates boundaries between 
different levels of prophethood and revelation. Theologians have debated 
differences between anbia (prophets), paighambars (messengers), and rusul 
(apostles), and argued in depth about what distinguishes the wahi form of rev-
elation from those of the ilham and kashaf kind (Bisati 2001; MacGregor 2002). 
Khan may have been forgiven by the traditional ʿulamāʾ had he simply argued 
against these fine distinctions and insisted that all prophets were prophets and 
all revelation is of the same degree, but because of his wholescale reinterpreta-
tion of Islamic doctrine, he was condemned by traditional Ḥanafī ʿulamāʾ (for 
example, Barelwīs) as a heretic. They accused him of denying the physical exis-
tence of angels, denying supernatural miracles of prophets, and even limiting 
God’s powers. They labeled him as outside the pale of Islam and pejoratively 
called him a naturie (Urdu for a ‘naturalist’).
Given Khan’s open disregard for traditional understanding of Islamic doc-
trine, opposition from traditional Ḥanafīs (such as the Barelwīs) was expected. 
However, even those who fully embraced Shāh Walī Allāh’s reforms (includ-
ing the Deobandīs and the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth) also felt that Khan had gone too far 
in applying his rationalism to Islamic doctrine. Both Deobandīs and Barelwīs 
accused Khan of being an Ahl-e-Ḥadīth. Ahl-e-Ḥadīth leaders not only denied 
the allegations but, as they were keen to establish themselves as genuine 
defenders of the faith in competition with Deobandīs and Barelwīs, they felt 
the need to be even harsher in their criticism of Khan. Ahl-e-Ḥadīth lead-
ers wanted to be seen as distant from Khan as possible. Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Baṭālvī said that Khan’s dangerous innovations (bidʿa) were so severe that he 
was a kāfir (that is, an infidel). None of this perturbed Khan who replied that 
the ʿulamāʾ of his time had deemed Shāh Walī Allāh as well as other reformers 
kāfir as well. Khan continued to publish and deliver public lectures all over 
India. He founded the Scientific Society and Muḥammadan Anglo Oriental 
College in Aligarh to pursue the mission of redefining Muslim social identity 
as that of harmony between science and Islam.
4 Syed Ahmad Khan’s Influence on Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad
As Khan (2015) points out, Aḥmad’s Aḥmadi biographers are loath to admit 
of any external influence on his religious worldview because they regard his 
ideas to have been divinely inspired. Since Aḥmad was repeatedly accused of 
plagiarizing Khan’s ideas by his contemporaries early in his career (see Batalavi 
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1891 for such claims made by over a dozen ʿulamāʾ), Aḥmadis had reasons to 
be extra careful to minimize any mention of Khan’s influence on Aḥmad. 
Thus it is not surprising that there are only a few scattered hints of contact 
between Khan and Aḥmad documented in the Aḥmadiyya literature. During 
his stay in Sialkot (1864–1868), Ahmed seemed to have written a letter to Khan 
on hearing about Khan’s plans to write an exegesis of the Bible (a first for a 
Muslim). It is not clear as to whether Khan responded to the young man in 
his twenties and if he did what he wrote. Since we also do not have access to 
Aḥmad’s letter to Khan, it is hard to see whether Khan used any of Aḥmad’s 
ideas in his exegesis. Given the status differences between the two men and 
the fact that Aḥmad did not start proclaiming any heretical ideas till 1891 
when Khan’s writing career was coming to an end, it seems unlikely that any 
of Aḥmad’s writings had any impact on Khan. In the 1880s when Aḥmad pub-
lished his first book Braheen-e-Aḥmadiyya (Volume 1 was published in 1880 and 
Volume 4 was published in 1884), he expressed orthodox Sunnī Ahl-e-Ḥadīth 
views on most issues. Given that Khan started publishing in 1840s, and he was 
better known than Aḥmad, we are better off searching for Khan’s influence on 
Aḥmad. We will do this by comparing Aḥmad’s publications published in a 
given year with Khan’s publications published prior to that year. Such a com-
parison yields a number of possible instances of Khan’s potential influence on 
Aḥmad, although we have no way of knowing for sure whether Khan was the 
source of any of Aḥmad’s ideas.
4.1 The Nature of Revelation, Angels, and Prophecy
Syed Ahmad Khan started publishing his rationalist ideas in 1880 through the 
first volume of his Qurʾānic exegesis (S.S. A. Khan, 1880). In it, argued against 
the notion of supernatural angels that act as mediums between God and 
humans (Khan 1880: 29–30, 33–34, 53–57). Instead, he said that God commu-
nicates with all human beings (and animals) at the time of their conception 
when he decides their nature (he probably would have used the word DNA 
instead of nature, had DNA been discovered by 1880). He endows some of his 
creation with stronger capabilities to receive his knowledge than others. The 
capabilities latent at birth become stronger as a person gets older and exercises 
them and they reach their full potential in God’s prophets. He said, “I believe 
nabuwwat (that is, prophethood) to be a natural thing. A nabī (prophet) is a 
nabī even when he is in his mother’s womb” (Khan 1880: 31). Those endowed 
with the knowledge to overcome their cultural norms and given the cour-
age to seek reform are called “paighambar (messengers) in the Sharia lingo 
and reformers in the cultural expression” (Khan 1880: 25). The capabilities to 
receive divine wisdom are metaphorically referred to as the angel Gabriel in 
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the Qurʾān. He wrote: “This proves that that the prophetic capability that God 
produced in prophets (anbia) is named Gabriel” (Khan 1880: 33), adding,
The angels that Qurʾān mentions cannot physically exist but the mani-
festations of God’s infinite powers and those capabilities that God cre-
ated his creation with are called angel (malak) and angels (malaika). One 
of them is Satan or Iblis. The rise of the mountains, water’s flow, power 
of the trees to grow, electricity’s powers of attraction and repulsion etc., 
all capabilities that are present in the creation are the very angels men-
tioned in the Qurʾān.
Khan 1880: 56
Before publishing Braheen-e-Ahmdiyya, Aḥmad shared his drafts with his friend 
and the Ahl-e-Ḥadīth alim Muḥammad Ḥusayn Baṭālvī, who prominently 
advertised upcoming volumes of Braheen in his Ishat-us-Sunnah magazine and 
devoted over 150 pages to reviewing the Braheen. In his review, Baṭālvī declared 
that it was the best defense of Islam published since the time of the Prophet 
Muḥammad. He defended Aḥmad as a good Muslim who meant well, even if 
he was rural and a bit over-exuberant. One of the biggest issues of contention 
was Aḥmad’s claims to be in receipt of constant communication from God in 
the form of dreams and ilham and wahi (revelations). While Aḥmad’s critics 
decried that Aḥmad was claiming a higher status for himself by claiming to be 
a mulhim (receiver of divine revelations), Baṭālvī defended him by saying that 
Aḥmad was describing these experiences to impress non-Muslims by showing 
them that Islam’s God was alive who still communicated with Muslims.
In Braheen, Aḥmad expressed traditional Sunnī views about prophets, Jesus, 
and nature of divine revelation. However, something changed between 1884 
to 1891 when Aḥmad published three books in rapid succession: Fath-e-Islam, 
Tauzi-e-Maram, and Azala-e-Auham. In these books, Aḥmad said that he no 
longer believed in traditional Sunnī doctrine of Jesus’ ascension to heaven 
or the physical nature of angels. He said that the reason for this change was 
that Christian missionaries were duping simple Punjabi Muslims through 
their claims that Islamic teachings also awarded Jesus a higher status than 
Muḥammad by allowing for Jesus’ ascent to heaven while admitting a human 
death for Muḥammad. To blunt these arguments and to restore Muḥammad’s 
superiority over Jesus, he argued that Jesus also had to die a mortal death. In 
order to sell others on this interpretation, Aḥmad argued that many of these 
supernatural beliefs were, in fact, irrational and made little sense in the nine-
teenth century.
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Muslim researchers do not believe that angels descend on earth with 
their feet like humans. This idea is a false innovation because if it was 
necessary for angels to descend to earth with their true bodies in the ser-
vice of their duties then it was impossible for any task to be completed by 
them. For instance, the angel of death who takes the lives of thousands 
of such people who are in different countries and live thousands of miles 
apart from each other. If he was dependent on his feet for travel to the 
country, city, and house of each person and then struggle to take their 
lives then even months are not enough for carrying out such a task.
Aḥmad 1891c: 30–31
We do not know whether Aḥmad would have included Khan among the 
Muslim researchers. Perhaps, because of Khan’s poor reputation among 
Aḥmad’s Ahl-e-Ḥadīth target audience, Aḥmad never cites Khan in any of 
his writings (except when he is criticising Khan). Similar to Khan, however, 
Aḥmad argued that instead of being physical creatures with human-like bod-
ies, angels are natural forces:
In some places in the Holy Qurʾān, every particle of the body has been 
given the name of angels because all those particles listen to their Dear 
Lord’s voice and do what they are ordered to do. For example, whatever 
changes happen in the human body with respect to sickness or health, 
each particle from these materials moves back and forth according to 
God’s will … Without believing this organization, God’s omniscience can-
not be proved nor can his creation function. If every particle does not 
obey him as an angel how can this whole machine work according to 
his will.
Aḥmad 1891c: 44
Not unlike Khan’s forces of nature, Aḥmad’s angels are “particles” of a human 
body. They are no longer supernatural agents of traditional Muslim theology 
who travel from heaven to earth to convey God’s message to human beings. 
This is established, for example, in his explanation of the various roles of the 
archangel Gabriel which he explains by appealing to various natural processes:
Regarding revelation (wahi) Gabriel has three jobs. First, when semen 
falls in a womb for such a person whose nature the all-powerful God 
because of his kindness, that has nothing to do with human actions, has 
decided to make revelatory (mulhimana) then he puts the shadow of 
650 Upal
Gabrielic light (nur) on that sperm. Then that person’s nature develops a 
revelatory nature from God and he gets revelatory organs.
Aḥmad 1891c: 84
4.2 The Nature of the Miracles of Past Prophets
The Qurʾān’s prophets include Biblical figures such as Adam, Abraham, Moses, 
Jacob, Joseph, as well as Jesus and Islamic tradition associates all of them 
with various supernatural events, such as miracles which Allāh granted them 
in order to support their missions (Alumujali 2014). The Qurʾān describes a 
number of such miracles in detail while hinting at many others. Early exegeses 
of the Qurʾān (for example, by Ibn Kathir, Yaqubi, Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Ishaq) 
expanded on these stories. Brannon Wheeler (2002) argues that stories of pro-
phetic miracles played a critical role in the development of a coherent, “more 
accessible and less piecemeal interpretation of the Qurʾān” (Wheeler 2002: 7).
Given Khan’s insistence on God’s unchanging law of nature, as mentioned 
above, he explained all miracles mentioned in the Qurʾān in naturalistic terms. 
As discussed earlier, he denied that Prophet Muḥammad split the moon into 
two and then rejoined the moonlets back together again. Khan argued that 
the Qurʾānic verse suggesting the splitting of the moon was a prophecy about 
the end of times and not description of an event that had actually taken 
place. He also explained away miracles Muslims had traditionally associated 
with Jesus such as Jesus making clay birds come alive and switching the body 
with another person just before his crucifixion (Reynolds 2009). Although in 
Braheen (published 1880–1884), Aḥmad had proclaimed his adherence to the 
traditional Ahl-e-Ḥadīth views about Jesus’ miracles and ascension to heaven, 
in 1891, he also downplayed these miracles.
4.3 Jesus’ Miracles
In Volume 2 of Tafsīr published in 1885, Khan comprehensively went through 
the list of various miracles traditional Muslims had attributed to Jesus and 
argued that none of them could be proven to have occurred super-naturally 
from Qurʾān. When interpreting Qurʾān 5:110, which Muslims had tradition-
ally interpreted to mean that Jesus created birds out of clay and made them 
come alive and fly away. Khan argued that this was not the correct interpreta-
tion of the Qurʾānic verse. He claimed that Muslim exegetes had been engaged 
in blind following (taqlīd) of “incorrect Christian traditions” (Khan 1885: 151). 
Khan argued that events Qurʾān only describes Jesus’ desire to have the clay-
birds fly but there is no mention in Qurʾān of God accepting Jesus’ request 
and the birds ever actually having flown much less having become alive (Khan 
1885: 151). If we believe Khan’s claim of being the first Muslim to deny Jesus’ 
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miracle of making clay-birds alive, then Aḥmad must have been the second 
Muslim to do so. In his book Azala-e-Auham published six years after Khan’s 
publication, Aḥmad also denied Jesus miraculous powers, but his explanation 
was a lot more fanciful:
It is not surprising if the High Lord could have told Jesus about a clay toy 
that flew like the birds or walked by pressing a key or as a result of blow-
ing on it. Since Jesus, son of Mary, worked with as a carpenter with his 
father for twenty-two years, and it is clear that carpentry is one of those 
jobs that increase one’s smarts for inventing mechanisms and artifacts … 
Even in today’s age it is seen that some designers create such birds that 
talk and travel and move their tails. I’ve also heard that some birds fly 
through mechanics. Many such toys are made in Bombay and Calcutta 
and Europe and America. And new ones are invented every year. Since 
the Holy Qurʾān is full of metaphors, these verses can also be interpreted 
spiritually that clay birds refer those illiterate and ignorant people that 
Jesus befriended … and blew the soul of guidance into them that made 
them take flight.
In addition, it is also possible that such miracles could have taken 
place through amal-al-tarab i.e., mesmerism in a frivolous way and not 
for real. Because amal-al-tarab that in the present age is called mesmer-
ism is full of such wonders that those who are fully practiced in it can 
seemingly bring things to life by pouring the energy of their soul onto 
those things … It should be remembered that this practice is not as wor-
thy as commoners think that it is. If this humble servant did not think of 
this practice as despicable and contemptible then I am strongly hopeful 
that because of God’s blessings I would not have been any inferior than 
Jesus, son of Mary, in showing such wonders.
Aḥmad 1891a: 309–312
Thus, similar to Khan, Aḥmad also claims that Qurʾān does not say that the clay 
birds ever flew much less became alive. He also presents explanations designed 
to show that what appears to be a violation of law of nature was not as such. 
However, unlike Khan who offered a single explanation, Aḥmad offers mul-
tiple ones. Furthermore, while unlike Khan’s rationalization Aḥmad’s rational-
izations cast aspersions on Jesus’s spiritual status. Aḥmad claimed that Jesus’s 
other miracles of healing the sick and bringing the dead back to life were also 
done in a ‘frivolous way’ through the use of mesmerism (Aḥmad 1891a: 311). A 
downside of practicing mesmerism, argued Aḥmad, is that one loses one’s pro-
phetic power to reform society of its spiritual ills. This he said explained why 
652 Upal
Jesus had “almost failed” to guide people to “God’s oneness (tawḥīd)” (Aḥmad 
1891b: 311).
Khan and Aḥmad were both motivated by a desire to improve Islam’s status 
with respect to its competitors in South Asia, namely, Evangelical Christianity 
ushered in by the British colonials and resurgent Hindu movements including 
the Arya Samaj and the Shuddhi Movement (Jaffrelot 2007). However, they 
chose two different methods to achieve that end. Khan chose to give Islam a 
rational makeover to make it appear more at home in the modern scientific 
world. Aḥmad, on the other hand, focussed his primary efforts at critiquing 
Hinduism and Christianity. This is reflected in how the two employed their 
rationalizations of Jesus’ miracles. While Khan’s rationalization is intended 
to make Islam and the Qurʾān sound more rational, the primary purpose of 
Aḥmad’s rationalizations is to diminish Jesus’ prophetic status (who he rele-
gates to a magician, using cheap tricks rather than true spiritual insight) relative 
to the prophets of Islam (including Aḥmad himself, alongside Muḥammad).
Unlike Khan, Aḥmad also claimed that Muḥammad had the power to show 
supernatural miracles because he did not practice mesmerism and there-
fore had greater spiritual powers. This enabled the Prophet Muḥammad to 
show ‘real’ miracles such as “splitting of the moon” into two (Aḥmad 1891a: 
302). Contrary to Khan who denied miracles in principle, whether they were 
attributed to Muḥammad or to Jesus, Aḥmad denied Jesus miraculous pow-
ers while confirming them for Muḥammad. The only exception to this rule is 
Muḥammad’s miracle of miʿrāj, that is, physical ascension to heaven and flight 
to visit Jerusalem and to heavens to meet with past prophets such as Jesus. 
Aḥmad denied Muḥammad this miracle, the reason for this exception being 
that admitting Muḥammad’s physical ascension would have required admit-
ting the possibility of Jesus’ miracle of having survived crucifixion by his own 
physical ascension to heaven, both ascensions being described using the same 
terms (rafa) in the Islamic scriptures.
Through his 1880 publication of the first volume of his Tafsīr, Khan may 
have also become the first Muslim to deny the claim that Jesus survived cru-
cifixion by ascending to heaven. As the excellent review by Gabriel Reynolds 
(2009) shows, all previous Muslim scholars who had written on the subject 
had unanimously agreed that God had lifted Jesus to heaven alive to save him 
from the disgrace of being hanged. Given Khan’s stand against all supernatural 
events, he disagreed with all his predecessors. But instead of simply adopt-
ing the position that Jesus had been crucified and had died on the cross, he 
came up with a novel theory. He argued that because Jesus was hanged on 
a Friday afternoon, he was only up on the cross for a few hours before being 
taken down on account of the Sabbath (Khan 1880: 39–40). Even though the 
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“Jews requested that his leg bones be broken” the Romans did not do so (Khan 
1880: 39). Joseph, who received his body, chose not to bury him. Instead, he 
covered Jesus in a shroud and hid him in a cave. Khan wrote:
Jesus was taken down from the cross after three or four hours and it is 
completely possible to believe that he was still alive. At night, he was 
taken out of the shroud and he secretly stayed under the protection of his 
disciples. The disciples saw him and met him. And he died later at some 
unknown location. Undoubtedly, because of the Jewish enmity, he was 
secretly buried at an unknown location that is unknown to this day. And 
they popularized the idea that he has been lifted to the heavens.
Khan 1880: 41
Ten years after the publication of Khan’s Tafsīr, in January 1891, Aḥmad, who 
had previously professed standard Muslim beliefs about Jesus in Braheen, 
claimed that God had recently given him divine knowledge about Jesus’ 
survival from the cross. He said, that it had been revealed to him that “they 
thought that they had killed him on the cross but because they hadn’t broken 
his bones. Thus he was saved because of the support of a faithful and a good 
man and he passed away after spending the rest of his days” (Aḥmad 1891b: 
25). A few months later, Aḥmad added more details to this account in his book 
Azala-e-Auham (Aḥmad 1891a: 378–386). These details (and even the language 
used to describe them) sound remarkably similar to those published by Khan 
a decade earlier, though Aḥmad does add a few embellishments of his own. In 
Aḥmad’s account Jewish leaders play a critical role. He calls them maulvis, the 
term used to refer to Muslim clerics in South Asia and argues that they were 
the ones who asked a reluctant Pontius Pilate for Jesus’s crucifixion. He also 
adds the notion of a dust-storm that resulted in darkness earlier than usual 
to explain why Jesus was taken down so early and why his leg bones were not 
broken (Aḥmad 1891a: 385). In another point of departure from Khan’s ver-
sion, and similar to his explanation of clay birds, Aḥmad claimed that God 
had revealed the knowledge of Jesus’ survival on crucifixion to him through 
ilham and kashaf (revelations): “I swear to He who holds my life in His hands 
that that right now and at this instant, in a divine vision (kashaf ) the truth has 
been revealed to me. What I have just written is from the teachings of that True 
Teacher” (Aḥmad 1891a: 376).
Aḥmad’s use of the term maulvis to refer to Jewish priests seems intentional. 
It was a part of his argument that he was a Messiah similar to Jesus (misl-e-
maseeh) and was also being opposed by maulvis of his time just as the original 
Messiah had been. He argued that because of these the similarities between 
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him and Jesus, his coming had fulfilled Prophet Muḥammad’s prophecy about 
the second coming of Jesus at the end of times. Jesus had come 1400 years after 
Moses, and Aḥmad had come 1400 years after Muḥammad. Muslim ʿulamāʾ 
had gone astray similar to Jewish priests and thus Islam needed a reformer. The 
British government in India was benevolent similar to the Roman government 
in Israel in the time of Jesus.
5 Prayers
Khan believed that Islam was more a rational and logical religion than 
Christianity and Hinduism-Islam’s primary competitors in nineteenth cen-
tury South Asia. The irrational elements (such as supernatural miracle stories) 
had crept into Islam from other religions. Ridding Islam of the supernatural 
elements to make it more logical and rational is the best way to demonstrate 
its superiority. Aḥmad’s diagnosis of Islam’s ills (as he laid it out in Braheen) 
was very different from that of Khan’s. Aḥmad believed that Islam’s primary 
distinction from other religions was that it brought humans into a relation-
ship with a living God who listened to their prayers and responded to them. 
Aḥmad claimed that God regularly talked to him and told him of future 
events. In Braheen, he challenged non-Muslims to visit Qāḍiān and spend a 
few months in his company to witness these miraculous events, even promis-
ing them a payment of 10,000 rupees if they had no supernatural experiences 
(Aḥmad 1880).
Aḥmad criticized Khan for denying miracles shown by Muslims, in particular 
the Prophet Muḥammad. He joined his friend and Ahl-e-Ḥadīth leader Baṭālvī 
in arguing that Khan was engaged in dangerous bidʿa by doing so and mocked 
him as a ‘naturie’ who uncritically followed the Western Orientalists in malign-
ing Islam. Aḥmad accused Khan of “leading astray a large number of Muslims” 
and bringing “them to the brink of heresy and atheism by undermining the 
sanctity of the revelation of prophethood” (Aḥmad 1893: 33). Given Aḥmad’s 
attempt to establish prayer as a point of distinction for Islam, it is understand-
able that he was not delighted at Khan’s assertions that prayers (Christian or 
Muslim) do not have any impact on the outcome of an event. In 1893, Aḥmad 
penned Barakat-ud-dua (Blessings of Prayer) in “refutation of the concepts of 
Sayed Aḥmad Khan Sahib.” Aḥmad’s basic argument in Barakat was to present 
incidents from his personal life where he believed that his prayers had been 
answered by God. He also reissued his challenge from Braheen, inviting those 
who were skeptical of the power of prayer to come to Qāḍiān and see it for 
themselves. He added a personal invitation to Khan:
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stay in my company for a few months. Having been appointed by God 
and being the bearer of glad tidings, I promise that I will concentrate (in 
prayer) so that Sayyid Sahib may be satisfied. I do hope that God Almighty 
will manifest such a sign that Sayyid Sahib’s proposed law of nature will 
be brought to naught in no time.
Aḥmad 1893: 22
Khan never acknowledged the existence of Aḥmad’s ‘refutation’ much less 
responded to it. Such was their relationship. The fact that Aḥmad acknowl-
edged having read Khan’s books prior to 1893 through his refutation leaves 
the possibility open that he may have read them prior to 1891 when he first 
published his own rationalistic interpretations of Jesus’s crucifixion. Given 
the unequal power between the two men in 1893, Aḥmad was probably able 
to anticipate Khan’s non-response. So he decided to pray for Khan and his 
followers even without Khan’s acceptance of Aḥmad’s challenge or a visit to 
Qāḍiān: “God Almighty may wash away this cursed naturalism from the hearts 
of Muslims, so that no stain of it may be left” (Aḥmad 1893: 34). Khan passed 
away in 1898, and ten years later, Aḥmad followed.
The religious movement founded by Aḥmad, known as Jamāʿat-e-Aḥmadiyya 
has been led by a Khalifa since Aḥmad’s demise. The movement claims millions 
of adherents in India, Pakistan, East Asia, Western Africa, Europe and North 
America. Khan today is primarily remembered as an educationalist rather than 
as a religious reformer. While few people read his Qurʾānic exegesis, the college 
he founded in Aligarh continues to educate thousands of Muslim students in 
Western sciences as do an uncountable number of other schools, colleges, and 
universities across South Asia. Far fewer Muslims today see Islam and Western 
science as polar opposites than in the nineteenth century. Thus, both social 
identity entrepreneurs can be said to have achieved some success in achieving 
their goals.
6 Conclusion
The Aḥmadiyya Muslim Jamāʿat with its belief in prophethood for its founder 
Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad, has long been considered an enigma by scholars of 
South Asian Islam. This chapter complements recent attempts to understand 
various influences on Aḥmad’s thoughts. It explores the influence of rational-
istic reform movement led by Khan. I perform a careful comparison of their 
writings to explore the similarities and differences and analyse why Aḥmad 
employed rationalistic techniques sometimes but not at other times and why. 
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Taken in conjunction with recent work, such as that of Friedman (1992) and 
Khan (2015) that explains that Aḥmad’s claims about a high spiritual status 
were not entirely out of line with those made by Ṣūfis such as Shaykh Aḥmad 
Sirhindi, and that Aḥmad’s anti-taqlīd beliefs were not entirely out of line 
with those of Ahl-e-Ḥadīth (Upal 2016), I argue here that Aḥmad’s rationalist 
beliefs were not entirely out of line with those of Khan’s naturalism. Aḥmad 
was certainly unique in his combination of these strands and Aḥmadiyya 
Jamāʿat is certainly in a unique position among Islam inspired movements as 
fiercely clinging to their identity as Muslims while believing in a prophet after 
Muḥammad. Despite these claims or perhaps because of them, Aḥmadiyya 
Muslims are persecuted in many Muslim majority countries around the world. 
This is especially true in Pakistan where the movement was based until 1984 
(it has been based out of London, UK since 1984). Pakistan’s constitution 
was modified twice (in 1974 and 1984) to make propagation and practice of 
Aḥmadiyya beliefs a punishable offense. The anti-Aḥmadiyya hostility is not 
limited to the government but is widespread among Pakistani public. This 
means that they also face widespread discrimination in the private job market, 
admissions to educational institutions, as well as in public service.
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Chapter 28
The Nation of Islam
Edward E. Curtis IV
1 Introduction
Established in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan, by W.D. Fard Muhammad (1893–?), 
the Nation of Islam (henceforth NOI) grew after World War II to be the most 
important and controversial Islamic new religious movement in the United 
States and the Anglophobe Black world. Tens of thousands, perhaps over 
one hundred thousand African Americans joined the movement, but it gar-
nered the sympathy and tacit support of many more African Americans for its 
emphasis on Black pride and self-determination. By the 1970s, the number of 
NOI religious congregations numbered seventy, and its businesses generated 
tens of millions of dollars in revenue (Curtis 2006: 2–4).
The NOI taught that Islam was the original religion of Black people stolen 
from them during the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and beckoned them 
to abandon Christianity, which the movement said had bound them in both 
physical and mental chains. Introducing an original form of Islamic religion 
that interpreted historically Islamic traditions through the prophecies of its 
charismatic leader, Elijah Muhammad, the NOI advocated separate Black busi-
nesses, schools, neighborhoods, and a state. Though it used revolutionary theo-
logical rhetoric, it eschewed both war and violence. Instead, the NOI focused 
on achieving its goals through the reformation of Black American minds and 
bodies. Membership in the NOI required careful study and practice of Elijah 
Muhammad’s teachings, which combined Islamic themes with twentieth-
century metaphysical religion, including a belief in UFOs, to produce a ver-
sion of Islam that included novel theological, cosmological, and eschatological 
doctrines as well devotion to a strict code of middle-class, socially conservative 
ethics (Curtis 2016). From an historically Islamic perspective, one of the most 
controversial of these teachings was the belief that W.D. Fard was God in the 
flesh, and that Elijah Muhammad was the Messenger of God—a claim that 
contradicted both Sunnī and Shīʿa Islamic traditions (Curtis 2006: 10–14).
Though representing a tiny sliver of the global Muslim community, the 
men and women of the NOI played an outsized role in US politics as they 
voiced some of the fiercest and most effective opposition to US imperialism, 
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especially the Vietnam War, in the twentieth century. This chapter will detail 
the NOI’s origins and development, paying attention to important charismatic 
figures such as Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali. It will then outline its religious 
teachings and practices. Finally, it will detail the split of the movement into 
two main branches after the death of leader Elijah Muhammad in 1975; one led 
by W.D. Mohammed and the other led by Louis Farrakhan.
2 NOI Origins and Development
Scholars continue to debate the background of the NOI’s mysterious founder, 
W.D. Fard or Farad Muhammad (Evanzz 2001; Turner 2003). An itinerant sales-
man who went door-to-door in Black Detroit, Fard peddled Oriental silks and 
shared secrets with his clients about their origins. He told them that they were 
originally from the Holy City of Mecca in Arabia, and their original language 
was Arabic. Echoing the claims of Black intellectuals such as Edward W. Blyden 
and many African American religious and cultural leaders of the 1920s, Fard 
linked the history of Black people to Islamic civilisation. He established a tem-
ple devoted to this teaching in Detroit, where Elijah Poole Muhammad (1897–
1975) of Sandersville, Georgia, became his student and an important aide. But 
by 1934, Fard had permanently left Detroit, and after some struggle for the lead-
ership of the group, Elijah Muhammad emerged as its leader (Clegg 1997).
Even though Elijah Muhammad gave credit for all of his teachings to W.D. 
Fard, claiming that his prophecies came directly from God Himself, it seems 
clear from historical records that many of the Messenger’s teachings were 
passed on to organisation members long after Fard had left. One of these doc-
trines, for example, may have been the claim that Fard was Allāh, or God, in 
person. It is more likely that Fard believed he was the Christian Messiah and 
the Islamic Mahdī, figures who, according to Islamic tradition, will appear near 
the time when the world will end. This idea has been circulating among vari-
ous African American new religious movements of the 1920s, and members 
of the Aḥmadiyya movement had been making such claims about their own 
founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, for decades (Curtis 2002: 63–84).
More than any other person, Elijah Muhammad was responsible for the 
unique teachings of the NOI. Raised during the Jim Crow era of racial segre-
gation in the Deep South, Elijah Muhammad traveled north during the Great 
Migration of over one million and half people between World Wars I and II. 
He worked alongside African Americans and immigrants alike at the Chevy 
Axle Company but became unemployed during the Great Depression, when 
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he met Fard. After Fard left in 1934, Elijah Muhammad not only faced competi-
tion for the leadership of the movement but also ran afoul of federal authori-
ties (Curtis 2002: 63–84).
Like many African American leaders of both traditional and new religious 
movements, Elijah Muhammad was investigated by the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) for sedition. For FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, almost any 
agitation for equal rights was seen as potentially seditious. But Hoover was 
especially concerned about the advocacy of many new religious movement 
leaders such as Mittie Maud Lena Gordon on behalf of the Empire of Japan. 
Elijah Muhammad was also implicated as a possible ally of the Japanese, 
whom he considered to be fellow people of color. But the government man-
aged to convict him only of draft evasion, not sedition (Curtis 2013).
As he served time in a federal penitentiary from 1943 to 1946, his spouse, 
Clara Muhammad, is credited with keeping the movement’s members con-
nected to its leader and to keeping the movement alive. It was after Elijah 
Muhammad emerged from prison that the movement distinguished itself 
from the dozens of Islamic groups and new religious movements seeking the 
patronage of African Americans. As the United States emerged as a predom-
inant global power that advocated freedom of religion and speech and eco-
nomic opportunity in its Cold War with the Soviet Union, the NOI attempted 
to expose the white supremacist social system that used both legal and extra-
legal means to insure the second-class citizenship of Black people in the United 
States. Elijah Muhammad criticised African American civil rights leaders say-
ing that their advocacy of racial integration would not correct the problem, 
and he advocated instead religious and political separatism. He instructed his 
followers to avoid service in the US military and he told them not to vote in 
elections. As one of the chief US critics the civil rights movement in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, Elijah Muhammad did not share Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
dream of racial brotherhood with the people whom he called “blue-eyed dev-
ils.” Instead, Elijah Muhammad dreamed of racial justice, which he said would 
come when God would send fire and brimstone to destroy white America in 
an imminent racial apocalypse. Since God would eventually see justice done, 
Elijah Muhammad taught, it was not the job of his followers to stage a violent 
revolution against white America. He told them to obey US laws unless they 
conflicted with their freedom to practice their religion. Though the NOI advo-
cated self-defense, the movement did not advocate aggressive violence and it 
did utilise the US courts to defend its religious liberty, especially the rights of 
Muslim prisoners to practice Islam (Curtis 2002: 63–84).
This lack of a direct challenge to the US political system and white neoco-
lonialism more generally was a frustration for Malcolm X (1922–1965), Elijah 
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Muhammad’s chief lieutenant. Born Malcolm Little in Omaha, Nebraska, 
Malcolm X converted to the NOI while in prison, and became the movement’s 
most effective organiser and spokesperson during the 1950s. Serving as an NOI 
minister at Temple No. 7 in Harlem, New York, Malcolm X helped to link the 
movement to the burgeoning Afro-Asian solidarity and non-aligned move-
ments of developing countries that opposed both US and Soviet interference 
in their internal affairs. Malcolm X articulated the dreams of many Black 
Americans for pan-Africanism, the movement to create cultural and politi-
cal unity among all people of African descent. He was also a strong supporter 
of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom he later saw as a model 
Muslim political leader (Curtis 2015). As a result of his fiery rhetoric and his 
intellectual creativity, Malcolm X became a media fascination, especially after 
Mike Wallace of CBS News featured him as part of a 1959 television special 
on the movement entitled The Hate that Hate Produced. Like other liberals, 
including the Rev. Dr King, Mike Wallace explained the popularity of the NOI 
as the product of poor race relations or what sociologist of religion C. Eric 
Lincoln would analyze in The Black Muslims in America (1961) as a form of psy-
chological and social compensation and the expression of black resentment 
(Lincoln 1961).
In 1963, Elijah Muhammad suspended Malcolm X for disobeying an order 
not to comment on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Malcolm X 
formerly separated from the NOI in 1964, when he converted to Sunnī Islam 
and went on the ḥajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca. He took a new name, El-Hajj 
Malik El-Shabazz. Shabazz also toured several sub-Saharan African countries 
but devoted even more time to studying Islamic religion in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. Freed from the constraints of the NOI, he founded the Organization 
of Afro-American Unity and articulated the need for revolution and the use of 
violence if necessary to free Black and other oppressed people from oppres-
sion, racism, and neocolonialism. At the same time, Malik Shabazz sought 
to develop his New York-based Muslim Mosque, Inc., into a viable African 
American Sunnī Muslim organisation. But before either organisation could 
develop further, Shabazz was assassinated in February 1965 (Curtis 2015).
As significant as Malcolm X’s assassination was, it did not impede the 
growth of the NOI in the second half of the 1960s. The NOI’s most famous con-
vert, world heavyweight-boxing champion Muhammad Ali, remained loyal to 
Elijah Muhammad and when, in 1967, at the height of the Vietnam War, he 
refused to be inducted into the US Army, the NOI gained stature among people 
of color around the world as a space of radical protest against US foreign policy 
and especially military occupation in the developing world. Ali claimed that 
it went against his religious principles to fight in Vietnam and he decried the 
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hypocrisy of a US government trying to protect freedom abroad when it had 
not achieved freedom at home for Black people. Ali’s boxing license was taken 
away, and like his leader Elijah Muhammad, he prepared to face prison time 
rather than serving in the US military. Even as the NOI continued to avoid any 
direct challenge to the state, the symbolic protest of Ali’s refusal to fight and 
his reasons for not doing so were viewed by supporters and detractors alike as 
a form of radical politics (Curtis 2006: 1–14).
3 NOI as a Religious Organisation
Public figures such as Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali helped to produce popu-
lar, scholarly, media, and governmental images of the NOI as a radical political 
group. And NOI made a significant political impact in postwar US history. But 
such images often cloud or even overshadow the strongly religious character 
of a movement that rested on clearly articulated religious doctrines, a charis-
matic prophet, religious ethics, a system of rituals, and a vibrant material reli-
gious culture. Examining these religious elements and how they intersected 
with or were coterminous with the movement’s politics are essential to under-
standing why the NOI worked as a mass movement. The NOI offered its follow-
ers meaning and purpose and a clear path toward religious liberation.
The first step toward this liberation, Elijah Muhammad taught, was knowl-
edge of self; the real history of Black man that white people had suppressed. 
Many members who converted to the NOI said and wrote that they found 
Islam to be a more rational and scientific religion than Christianity. Even if 
many of the theological claims of the NOI were no more based on modern sci-
ence than those of many Christian groups, NOI members presented their reli-
gion as grounded in material reality. They criticised the doctrine of the Trinity 
(the Christian belief that God is three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) as 
irrational. Their belief that God was a human being, not some “spook in space,” 
exemplified the NOI belief that their religion was grounded in fact rather than 
fiction. The same was true for their belief that heaven and heaven were not 
actual places, but states of mind—a belief shared by many other metaphysical 
religions in the twentieth century (Curtis 2006: 16–24).
NOI catechisms entitled ‘Actual Facts’, the ‘Rules of Islam’, and ‘Student 
Enrollment’, memorised by both male and female followers, offered both astro-
nomical fact and cosmological theory. For example, ‘Actual Facts’ detailed the 
various distances between planets in the solar system and the Sun as well as 
the total square mileage of land on the Earth. In explaining the separation of 
the Moon from the Earth, this catechism credited a scientist with creating an 
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explosion sixty-six trillion years ago. Indeed, the belief that scientists’ mas-
tery of technology was behind most cosmological events was central to Elijah 
Muhammad’s thought. Like Christian fundamentalists, he agreed with the 
idea that the current historical dispensation, or the reign of white civilisation, 
began 6,000 years ago, but he argued that the actual origins of humanity—that 
is, Black humanity—could be dated to trillions of years ago (Curtis 2016).
No matter how esoteric Elijah Muhammad’s teachings may have seemed to 
those outside the movement, these lessons attempted to give concrete reasons 
for the relative lack of social, cultural, and political power among Black peo-
ple, and offer the means to Black empowerment. The fullest published expres-
sion of his theology was in his 1965 opus, Message to the Blackman in America. 
In explaining the origins of slavery and racism, Elijah Muhammad offered a 
unique myth, sometimes called ‘the Myth of Yacub’. Referring to archeological 
and anthropological discoveries on the African continent, Elijah Muhammad 
said that the original man—the first human species—was Black. These Black 
people, who followed the religion of Islam, lived in Mecca, he said, where they 
existed in an Edenic state. But a mad scientist named Yacub began the pro-
cess of genetically engineering the white man, who was naturally brutish and 
rapacious. White people eventually conquered the Black people, and Black/
Muslims forgot their language, Arabic, and their true religion. They adopted 
the religion of their slave masters. These enslaved Black people gave up their 
dignified, respectable behaviors, the Messenger taught. They ate poorly, 
became sexually promiscuous, became lazy, and accepted their lot in life. But 
God would not abandon God’s people. The appearance of W.D. Fard to Elijah 
Muhammad promised to change this history. Commissioned by Fard to “men-
tally resurrect” Black people, Elijah Muhammad would bring Black people back 
to Islam. They would separate from their slave masters and live righteously 
again. They could again live in a state of heavenly contentment if they would 
follow the Messenger’s strict program of self-improvement (Muhammad 1972; 
Curtis 2006: 68–93).
Much of this ethical program of uplift focused on strengthening, purifying, 
and disciplining the Black body, which was tied to the fate of the entire Black 
race. For example, members of the NOI devoted a great deal of energy to their 
diet. According to Elijah Muhammad, NOI Muslims should avoid all pork and 
liquor—like other Muslims—but also the foods that came to be associated 
with the shameful legacy of slavery such as “lima beans, butter beans, black-
eyed peas, green cabbage collard greens, pinto beans, kidney beans, brown 
field beans, cornbread, carp, catfish, crustaceans, mollusks, rabbit, possum, 
squirrel, [and] coon” (Curtis 2006: 98). Other beans were fine, and indeed the 
movement became known for selling bean pies, which were often made from 
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navy beans. Red meat should be limited, and the Messenger exhorted followers 
to give up refined sugar, which, he said, was increasing diabetes among African 
Americans. He also asked followers to limit their overall caloric in-take and 
eat only one meal a day. Ramadan was practiced in the movement, but during 
Advent rather than during the actual Islamic (lunar) month of Ramadan. Elijah 
Muhammad explained that a Yuletide practice of Ramadan would help focus 
his followers’ attention on Islam rather than Christianity during the holiday 
season. Eventually, all of the Messenger’s teachings on diet were compiled into 
a monograph entitled How to Eat to Live (1972). Various columns and letters 
in the movement newspaper, Muhammad Speaks, outlined the health advan-
tages of following this diet, and many believers testified to how following a 
strict diet could cure various bodily ailments (Curtis 2006: 98–109).
In addition to providing guidelines on how to eat, the movement became 
an incubator of food businesses that focused on providing healthy and whole-
some food to the Black community overall. Elijah Muhammad himself owned 
several farms, a dairy, a meat processing plant, and by the 1970s, a multi-million 
dollar fish import business called Whiting H & G. NOI followers were not only 
employed in these businesses but also established their own restaurants, bak-
eries, and groceries. Women in the NOI became known for selling homemade 
goods, especially the bean pie, around NOI places of worship, during NOI 
events, and in their homes and neighborhoods (Curtis 2006: 98–109).
Dress, fashion, and adornment were also essential to the NOI’s focus on the 
ethics of the Black body. Unlike the teachings on food, many of these teachings 
emphasised the movement’s central focus on properly gendered nature of male 
and female Black bodies. In the case of both men and women, Black Muslims 
were to dress in a respectable, dignified, and modest manner. But much of 
the discussion of dress in the movement centered on women’s bodies. Many 
female writers in the Muhammad Speaks beckoned women to stop imitating 
what they regarded as white fashions. They proclaimed that wearing cosmetics 
and short skirts, bleaching skin, and dying hair obscured the natural beauty of 
Black women. Eschewing conventional fashion was a religious issue, as Sister 
Beverly 3X wrote in a poem: “Years ago, hemlines were not too short, but the 
clothes fit tight / I thought I was really all right. / A stone fox? No! An ignorant 
fool, following the devil’s evil rule” (Curtis 2006: 114). Elijah Muhammad went 
even further when African American women in the 1970s began to wear afros. 
He banned them from the movement, and one of his female columnists said 
that African people did not actually wear their hair in this manner. To be natu-
rally Black, it was said, was to be more civilised than wearing ‘savage’ styles like 
the afro.
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As much as dress and fashion focused on the female Black body, the NOI’s 
program of moral reform concerning sexuality and reproduction did so even 
more. The official teaching of the movement was that men and women were 
equally responsible for sexual morality, which was defined as heterosexual 
married monogamy. Men in the movement were shamed and punished for 
sex outside wedlock and for adultery, especially with white women. But it was 
once again women’s bodies that were often the focus of the NOI’s official teach-
ings about sexuality. Muhammad Speaks discussed women’s bodies as the field 
in which the seeds of the Black nation must be planted. Elijah Muhammad 
talked about birth control as a form of Black genocide. Women were told to 
have large families in order to repopulate the race. Not all women in the move-
ment followed the teachings about birth control, but it is also clear that patri-
archy of the NOI was attractive to many of its female members. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, African American women remained extremely vulnerable to sexual 
violence from both white and African American men. The promise of physical 
protection, which sometimes included escorts from the home to the mosque, 
made some NOI women feel safe. Moreover, Black women’s safety was under 
threat from the state. One primary example of state violence against African 
American women was forced sterilisation, especially of poor African American 
women. This is one of the key contexts in which to understand why, even as 
second-wave feminism and the movement for the Equal Rights Amendment 
gained ground, tens of thousands of African American women would choose to 
support a sexually conservative movement like the NOI (Curtis 2006: 118–130).
Men and women also often operated inside the movement in separate 
spheres. Men participated in the Fruit of Islam, a fraternal organisation that 
insured movement discipline, provided security for NOI events, and arranged 
for the selling of movement newspapers. The Fruit of Islam was organised in 
military fashion: men inside the group possessed various military ranks and 
they were taught military salutes and protocols. The Fruit, as they were some-
times called, were much more than a self-defense force. It provided a male 
space for the teaching of NOI religious texts and catechisms as well as activi-
ties such as woodworking. In the 1960s and 1970s, members were told to sell a 
certain number of copies of Muhammad Speaks newspapers each week, and 
sometimes developed entertaining, even aggressive sales techniques to hawk 
their newspapers on the streets of Black America. NOI women were enrolled 
in Muslim Girls Training-General Civilization, which taught cooking, sewing, 
spelling, penmanship, hygiene, child-rearing, and other subjects thought to be 
essential to being a wife and mother. Women sometimes learned to march in 
military fashion and maintained various military ranks. Like the Fruit, Muslim 
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Girls Training enforced the ethical commandments of Elijah Muhammad, pun-
ishing those who wore the wrong clothes or had sex out of wedlock. Indeed, 
Sister Captains, as they were called, could be known to be harsh toward those 
under their authority. But there is also ample evidence that women often 
resisted their authority or simply ignored them (Curtis 2006: 132–153).
In addition to establishing its own businesses and groups such as the Fruit of 
Islam, the NOI created what was in the 1960s was the largest Muslim parochial 
system in the United States. Called the ‘University of Islam’, dozens of private 
schools offered a regular school curriculum in addition to classes on Arabic 
language and the religious teachings of Elijah Muhammad. The leaders of this 
school system were women, many of whom had professional experience in the 
public-school system. Though the schools enforced the socially conservative 
gender norms of the movement, they also encouraged both male and female 
achievement. Various issues of Muhammad Speaks featured the achievements 
of girls not only in subjects such as English and home economics, but also in 
math and science. The prominence of female educational leaders and award-
winning female students in University of Islam system are important indica-
tors of the schools’ commitment to the public presence of Muslim women and 
girls within the community itself (Curtis 2006: 153–160).
Bodily discipline, Black knowledge, punctuality, modesty, patriarchy—and 
pageantry—were also featured in the public-facing ritual gatherings of the 
NOI. The ritual highlight of the year was Saviour’s Day, the annual celebration 
of W.D. Fard on 26 February. Thousands of NOI members would come from 
across the country, joined by visitors, to celebrate the day in Chicago. In 1965, 
for example, attendees were able to observe an exhibition by boxer Muhammad 
Ali, testimonies from members of the Fruit of Islam and Muslim Girls Training, 
jazz music from Osman Karriem, and addresses by the Messenger himself. In 
addition to attending the Saviour’s Day celebration, thousands of Muslims 
traveled long distances to see their leader in various rallies across the country. 
These carefully choreographed rallies treated Elijah Muhammad like a head 
of state as the Fruit of Islam carefully escorted him to the podium and main-
tained their posts with great discipline throughout the leader’s long lectures 
(Curtis 2006: 160–167).
Unlike African American Christian preachers who use what has been called 
the ‘chanted sermon’, Elijah Muhammad possessed a plain-speaking style, 
sometimes even stuttering as explained his teachings. His charisma did not 
come from his own personal style, but rather from the sobriety and truth that 
his words illustrated. Elijah Muhammad embodied his own critique of what he 
regarded as Black Christianity’s emotionalism. To many outsiders, Muhammad 
was regarded as a boring, often rambling speaker. His charisma came instead 
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from the respect and devotion of tens of thousands to his prophetic utterances 
and his person. They regarded him a genuine prophet, and if his teachings did 
not make sense on an initial hearing, this was the result of their lack of under-
standing, not his lack of explanatory skill (Curtis 2006: 160–167).
Toward the end of his life, Elijah Muhammad began to make plain or per-
haps reinterpret the meanings of some of his prophecies. This was especially 
true for his prophecy that the world would be destroyed by a Mother Plane, 
which he compared to Ezekiel’s wheel (Ezekiel 1:16). Like his teachings about 
the origins of the Earth and of humankind, his proclamations about the end 
of white America were heavily invested in technological explanations of sal-
vation history. In 1972, during a television interview, he revealed that the end 
of white supremacy would not equate into the end of white people. “I must 
tell the truth,” he explained. “there will be no such thing as the elimination 
of all white people from the earth.” In his other works, including The Supreme 
Wisdom (1957) and The Fall of America (1973), the Messenger explained or at 
the least implied that what would be eliminated was not white people, but the 
whiteness in people—the genetic or moral poison that created racism and vio-
lence. The appearance of the Mother Ship would be like medicine. The Mother 
Ship would reign down fire upon humanity, but such fire was a spiritual tech-
nology of righteousness. If people were willing to take this spiritual medicine, 
humankind could rediscover its Blackness, that is, its original goodness, and 
live in peace and harmony. Though the NOI did much to further a dark and 
angry religious vision of the racial apocalypse, Elijah Muhammad’s religious 
teaching was in the end a utopian vision of human solidarity (Curtis 2016).
4 NOI Sects after the Death of the Messenger
In February 1975, Elijah Muhammad died, and though he never publicly named 
a successor, it was son, Wallace D. Muhammad (also spelled W.D. Mohammed, 
1933–2008) who emerged as the NOI leader at that year’s Saviour’s Day con-
vention. In just a few short years, Imam Mohammed, as he would eventually 
be known, radically altered key characteristics of the movement. In short, he 
transformed the NOI from a new religious movement into an African American 
Sunnī Muslim religious denomination. Mohammed abandoned the NOI pro-
fession of belief in W.D. Fard as God and his father as a prophet. In its place, the 
leader asked his follower to recite the shahada, or the profession of belief that 
there is no god but God and Muḥammad (of Arabia) is the Messenger of God. 
He instructed his followers to pray five times a day, to observe the holy month 
of fast during the Islamic month of Ramadan, and to go on ḥajj. Mohammed 
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also eventually disbanded the Fruit of Islam and Muslim Girls Training, partly 
because he no longer wanted to use these groups to enforce the strict moral 
rules of the movement. From this point on, believers would answer to God and 
their own conscience for their behavior (Curtis 2002: 107–127).
Mohammed’s approach to US politics and society was just as radical. Like 
his father before him, Mohammed had refused to serve in the US military and 
spent time in prison rather than take even a non-combat role. But as a leader, 
Imam Mohammed encouraged his followers to volunteer for military service. 
Over the next few decades, many of his followers would become the most 
highly ranked Muslim members of the US military and Imam Mohammed 
himself would be honored at the Pentagon, the Department of Defense head-
quarters, for his commitment to the US military after the first Gulf War. The 
Imam even introduced US flags in NOI mosques (Curtis 2002: 107–127).
Instead of encouraging racial separatism, Imam Mohammed invited white 
people to join the NOI, and participated in various interfaith cooperation 
efforts, most prominently in the Roman Catholic Focolare movement. To sym-
bolise the new stance of the NOI, Imam Mohammed changed the name of the 
group to the World Community of al-Islam in the West. The organisation would 
go through more name changes, being called the American Muslim Mission 
and the American Society of Muslims until eventually it became known simply 
as the W.D. Mohammed community. Mohammed also divested himself of his 
father’s business empire, and eventually handed over control of all mosque 
properties to each congregation. He did not wish to be in charge of a business, 
he said; he wanted to be a religious leader (Curtis 2002: 107–127).
There were also some continuities with his father’s NOI. Imam Mohammed 
continued to stress the appeal of the movement to African Americans and cel-
ebrated historical Black achievements in Islamic and US history. The 1970s wit-
nessed a popular Black ethnic revival, and Imam Mohammed participated in 
the movement to honor African American roots by asking his followers to call 
themselves ‘Bilalians’, after the Black companion of the Prophet Muḥammad 
and first prayer-caller of Islam, the freedman, Bilal ibn Rabah. The name of the 
newspaper was also changed from Muhammad Speaks to Bilalian News. Imam 
Mohammed renamed the parochial schools of the movement, calling them the 
Clara Muhammad Schools after his mother, whom he discussed as an impor-
tant African American historical figure (Curtis 2002: 107–127).
All of these changes were called the ‘Second Resurrection’ and Imam 
Mohammed told NOI members that W.D. Fard and his father had intended 
for them to occur all along. Many, if not most NOI members stayed with him 
through these changes. As NOI businesses ceased operations and the entre-
preneurial activities tied to each congregation declined, followers nonetheless 
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expressed palpable excitement over the change and committed themselves 
with fervor to observing Sunnī Islamic religious practices.
But some members rejected Imam Mohammed’s changes, and the most 
important of these dissidents was Minister Louis Farrakhan (b. 1933). Minister 
Farrakhan rose to prominence in the NOI as Elijah Muhammad’s chief spokes-
person after Malcolm X left the movement in the 1960s, and he was rumored to 
have been one of the candidates to lead the movement after Elijah Muhammad 
died. He publicly declared his allegiance to W.D. Mohammed in 1975, but by 
1978, broke with the new leader because of the radical departure from NOI 
teachings (Curtis 2002: 129–135).
Minister Farrakhan set about rebuilding a version of the original NOI based 
on the original teachings. In 1979, Minister Farrakhan established a newspaper, 
The Final Call, and bow-tied Fruit of Islam members could once again be seen 
in urban, African American neighborhoods offering it for sale. He eventually 
purchased Elijah Muhammad’s home in Chicago and the NOI’s largest mosque 
in Chicago, which he renamed Mosque Maryam. He also set about rebuilding 
movement businesses, and the Fruit of Islam became a private security service 
for hire, gaining some contracts to protect public housing programs. A signifi-
cant number of African Americans who lived in neighborhoods affected by the 
drug epidemic of the 1980s praised their performance; the Fruit of Islam sym-
bolised and helped to further Black safety and dignity. Farrakhan also became 
a vocal critic of gang-banging and of how AIDS was disproportionately killing 
Black people. He advocated the practice of a clean living, socially conserva-
tive, and patriarchy as solutions for these social problems, but also blamed 
the US government and racism as the agents behind the problems of African 
Americans (Gardell 1996).
Farrakhan’s NOI was just as uncompromising a critic of the US government 
as Elijah Muhammad’s NOI had been, though Farrakhan still told followers to 
obey US laws and avoid any revolutionary activities. Like Elijah Muhammad’s 
NOI, the new organisation sought ties with foreign Muslim governments, 
including those of Qaddafi’s Libya and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the 
1980s, the group was highly critical of Jewish anti-Black racism. Farrakhan’s 
anti-Semitic comments—and those of other NOI ministers—sparked out-
rage among Jewish Americans, and the Southern Poverty Law Center, a liberal 
American think-tank that tracks racist groups, eventually labeled the new NOI 
a “hate group” (Gardell 1996).
But this public opprobrium did not lessen Farrakhan’s appeal to many 
African Americans. Though his NOI remained a small movement in terms of 
card-carrying members, perhaps numbering in the tens of thousands at its 
height, Farrakhan himself and the movement’s resistance to white supremacy 
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appealed to a far larger number of Black Americans, thousands of whom 
would travel to see Farrakhan speak in various US cities. His greatest success 
in this regard was the 1995 Million Man March in Washington, D.C., where hun-
dreds of thousands of Black men would crowd the nation’s mall not only to 
protest anti-Black racism but also to renew their commitments to themselves 
and other Black men for unity and self-improvement. Farrakhan’s address 
delved into numerology and Freemasonry, but the bulk of the address outlined 
a multi-step program for personal improvement. His leadership of the march 
also represented a turn toward more inter-racial and ecumenical thinking. The 
Unification Church of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon cosponsored the march, and 
Minister Farrakhan addressed people of all races in calling for world peace and 
justice. Quoting from the Qurʾān, he proclaimed that one race is not superior 
to another: “It doesn’t matter what your color is, your race is, with God it is 
righteousness that He is after” (Curtis 2002: 132).
Minister Farrakhan both perpetuated and further interpreted the meta-
physical doctrines of Elijah Muhammad. The Mother Plane, or Mother Ship, 
played an especially important role in Farrakhan’s thought and religious 
experience. In 1985, while in Mexico, Farrakhan described a religion vision in 
which he was transported to the Mother Ship, where he heard the voice of 
Elijah Muhammad. This spiritual vision was interpreted as a sign that God had 
chosen Farrakhan to lead his people in the final days. In the twenty-first cen-
tury, Farrakhan made an alliance with the Church of Scientology, and various 
members of the NOI engaged in a Scientology practice called auditing, which 
focuses on self-knowledge. The two organisations’ interest in science, tech-
nology, and especially extra-terrestrial beings became a common ground for 
cooperation, and demonstrated the seriousness of the NOI’s long history as 
what some students of new religious movements have called “UFO religion” 
(Curtis 2016).
In viewing Farrakhan and the NOI as beyond the pale of Sunnī Islamic 
orthodoxy and US liberalism in the twentieth-first century, critics sometimes 
missed the important changes that Farrakhan introduced to the NOI move-
ment since recreating the group in the late 1970s. While still maintaining the 
NOI’s unique Islamic theology, Farrakhan also introduced traditional Islamic 
Friday congregational prayers at Mosque Maryam. Like W.D. Mohammed, he 
asked believers to celebrate the month of fasting not during Christmas time but 
during the regular Islamic month of Ramadan. He invited W.D. Mohammed to 
NOI events, and members of both W.D. Mohammed’s and Farrakhan’s com-
munities have worked together on various projects, including contemporary 
efforts to insert a strong African American voice into discussions of Muslim 
American identity. The NOI has cooperated across racial lines, especially with 
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other new religious movements, and remains an important religious organisa-
tion and social institution in African America (Gardell 1996).
5 Conclusion
As a movement, the NOI has remained a vital element of the US religious 
scene for decades. During that time, the NOI has changed the course of US 
history through its political activities. Joining many Muslims and the voices of 
African, Asians, and Latin Americans, the NOI rose to prominence as a part of 
a broader wave of opposition to white supremacy and neocolonialism. It was 
also a small, but vibrant new religious movement that developed a unique form 
of Islamic religion practiced by hundreds of thousands of African Americans 
since 1930. Its legacy not only encompasses those who have remained com-
mitted to the religious prophecies of Elijah Muhammad but also those African 
Americans Muslims who have transitioned from the NOI to African American 
Sunnī Muslim communities.
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Chapter 29
The Moorish Science Temple of America
Fathie Ali Abdat
1 Introduction
Scholars of African-American Islam usually view the Moorish Science Temple 
of America as a peculiar religious sect.1 This is understandable given the 
treacherous terrain that must be traversed to understand the Moorish2 Science 
Temple of America (henceforth MSTA). Early source materials on the move-
ment remain scant, its religious creeds tangled in esoteric eclecticism, and 
their followers’ narrations bewilderingly conflict one other. Yet, it remains 
vital to critically examine the MSTA given its significance as one of the ear-
liest pan-American Islamic organisations in the twentieth century, one that 
influenced other communities it came into contact with. Thus, Edward Curtis 
IV, a doyen of African-American Islamic studies, has advocated the need for a 
re-examination of the MSTA through a more critical lens of “cultural history” 
and away from the straightjacket of it being a deviant heretical group (Curtis 
IV 2009). This chapter takes up this challenge by analysing the MSTA at the 
interstices of hagiography and heresiography and historicising how the MSTA 
as a genuine spiritual community reinvented and restyled its orientation over 
the decades through its ebbs and flows in its quest for respectability, relevance, 
and salvation.
1 I am indebted to several individuals for their unwavering support in my study of this religious 
movement. Patrick D. Bowen was extremely generous in sharing his repository of primary 
and secondary source materials on this movement. I also extend my sincerest appreciation 
to Professor Jacob Dorman for rekindling my academic interest in African-American Islamic 
history. Along this journey, I feel humble to have had countless Moorish Science Temple of 
America believers share with me their stories, experiences and histories. In particular, Sharif 
Anael-Bey has been very helpful to me in the writing this chapter.
2 Within the literature of the movement, the term ‘Moor’ is an elastic, amorphous identity-
signifier that concomitantly refers genealogically (to the ancient Biblical community of 
Moabites), historically (to the golden age of Islamic Iberian Peninsula during the Middle 
Ages) and geo-politically (to the modern nation-state of Morocco).
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2 Noble Drew Ali
Most literature on the founding prophet of the Moorish Science Temple of 
America (MSTA), Noble Drew Ali (1886–1929), has either treated his murky 
origins cursorily or hagiographically exaggerated and romanticised his roots. 
Recent fortuitous discoveries of Drew’s pre-Moorish documents have enabled 
historians to reconstruct a more empirical account of the Moorish prophet. 
While tampering with Drew’s legacy could open a Pandora’s box, with unfore-
seen circumstances that would bring no discernible benefit to contemporary 
Moorish-American Sheiks, the MSTA laity deserves knowledge of its genuine 
historical past unencumbered from crudely constructed myths (Wilson 1993).
Newly unearthed census and city records disclosed that dogmatic MSTA nar-
rations on Drew’s genealogical roots were specious. Drew Ali was born Thomas 
Drew on January 8, 1886 in Norfolk, Virginia. By 1898, he was adopted by James 
Washington Drew and Lucy Drew, an African-American couple residing in 411 
Princess Anne Avenue, Norfolk, Virginia (United States Federal Census 1900). 
As a teenager, the illiterate Drew worked as a common labourer, rural farm-
hand, and wharf longshoreman in the southern port city to supplement his 
adopted parents’ wages (Abdat 2014). However, like many black Norfolk labor-
ers, the Drews were paid little, and could not catapult themselves into the 
black bourgeois class.
As such, Drew explored new prospects in other cities plying his trade first as 
a porter in Richmond, Virginia in 1916 and then as a shipyard labourer for the 
Submarine Boat Corporation in Newark, New Jersey, answering America’s call 
in the industrial war effort. On September 12, 1918, Drew reported to a public 
school in Bruce Street, Newark, New Jersey for the Third Draft registration as 
part of the volunteer-conscripted American army in the Great War. A routine 
medical examination revealed “badly burnt” forearm muscles (United States 
WWI Draft Registration Card 1918) and Drew subsequently failed the criteria for 
induction. After World War I, the company folded leaving Drew unemployed.
In large part, between 1916 and 1923, Drew resided in 181 Warren Street, 
Newark, New Jersey together with Louisa Gaines, a married Virginian, in a 
mixed neighbourhood. Drew alternated between working in a barber shop and 
as “street preacher” (United States Federal Census 1920). For the latter, Drew 
attired himself in a loosely fitting multi-colored gown, covered his head with a 
brilliant purple hood and cosmetically redesigned himself as “Professor Thomas 
Drew, the Egyptian Adept Student,” an East Indian from Virginia who ate nails 
and cured blind soldiers. His vast clientele sought him for a wide range of ser-
vices including crystal-gazing, advice on love-affairs, and eastern wisdom such 
as the forgotten eighteen years of Jesus Christ’s life. Swiftly he emerged as black 
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Newark’s leading faith healer amidst the crowded (and competitive) religious 
market place of seers, mystics, palmists, professors and princes who taught 
mystical sciences since the turn of the twentieth century (Dorman 2009). At 
this juncture, Drew was still un-fezzed, unaffiliated to a Moorish lineage, but 
had already fashioned himself as a true Orientalist Muslim. Nevertheless, dur-
ing this phase Drew fell afoul of the law several times, and was arrested for 
illegally peddling medicine.
Despite trumpeting messianic claims of his ability to “bend (prison) 
bars” (Newark Evening News 1916), Newark’s federal penitentiary successfully 
quarantined Professor Drew physically in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Yet, 
prison walls failed to totally circumscribe Muslim teachings in Newark, as 
another enigmatic figure took Drew’s position to further fan the flame of eso-
teric folk Islam in the community. With Drew’s religious preaching in abey-
ance, Abdul Hamid Suleiman (b. 1864-?), a Sudanese immigrant, filled the 
mantle as a charismatic spiritual leader serving Newark’s coloured commu-
nity. Suleiman founded an extremely successful Canaanite Temple, a black 
Mohammedan-Masonic movement that operated in various cities including 
one at the corner of Bank and Rutgers Streets, Newark, a mere three miles 
from his residence (Bowen 2011). In April 1923, the popularity of Suleiman’s 
Canaanite Temple spectacularly nosedived when Suleiman and his assistant 
Muhammad Ali, were charged and arrested by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey for carnal abuse of a follower’s child.
Amidst the leadership vacuum, Professor Drew reinvented himself as a reli-
gious prophet by deliberately suffixing the powerful surname Ali, that concom-
itantly connected him to three important sources of authority in the minds of 
black urban masses: Caliph Alee (599–661), the imagined founding father of 
Masonry and son-in-law of Islamic Prophet Muhammad ibn Abdullah; Duse 
Muhammad Ali (1866–1945), an inspirational pan-Africanist Garveyite intel-
lectual; and the incarcerated Mohammed Ali, local organiser for the Canaanite 
Temple. As Canaanite Temple No. 1 had legally been incorporated in Newark in 
May 1924, Drew embarked on an evangelical crusade elsewhere under a new 
Moorish banner, to re-structure Suleiman’s satellite temples and travelled to 
several Southern cities before establishing his headquarters at Chicago, Illinois 
in 1925.
As Drew’s sense of Islamic-consciousness was stirred through an embodied 
experience with Oriental street healers and Canaanite-Masonic esotericism, 
Drew’s understanding of Islam was imagined-yet-authentic when contextual-
ised through the lens of its gestation. By corollary, Sunnī sceptics who uncriti-
cally vilify Drew for deviating from Muhammad ibn Abdullah’s finality of 
prophethood have somewhat misdirected their accusation, since they have 
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overlooked that Drew’s adoption of the titles ‘Noble’ and ‘Prophet’ were bor-
rowed from Masonic circles, and not ever intended to be an affront to Sunnī 
orthodoxy (Abu Shouk, Hunwick and O’Fahey 1993).
3 Drew’s MSTA, 1925–1929
Though MSTA followers believe the historical process underpinning the estab-
lishment of the MSTA as a religious organisation was forged along an uncom-
plicated linear trajectory, this was a façade. Rather, Drew’s inchoate MSTA 
between 1925 and 1929 underwent capricious and erratic shifts as the founder 
experimented and cobbled together various ideological fragments of his highly 
eclectic movement. The MSTA’s mutable vagaries were clearly reflected as his 
Moorish movement underwent a series of name changes. Initially, Drew for-
mally incorporated the Moorish Temple of Science on 29 November 1926 as a 
civic organisation on 3603 Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, to “uplift fallen 
humanity” and “teach men and women to become better citizens” (Ali 1926).
Structurally, Drew was inspired by Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement 
Association (UNIA), hence modelling the MSTA along Garveyite lines of ancil-
lary units like the Moorish Manufacturing Corporation, the Moorish Guide 
and the Sisters National Auxiliary (Haddad and Smith 1993). Drew perspi-
caciously linked his incipient organisation to Garvey’s by embedding the 
popular UNIA leader in the trope of John the Baptist, a forerunner who proph-
esised Drew’s advent. Theologically, Drew looked to Abdul Hamid Suleiman’s 
Canaanite Temple novel blueprint of a black Islamic Masonry (Bowen 2014). 
Though Drew substituted Suleiman’s Mecca with Morocco as the main cos-
mological centre of spiritual power, Drew appropriated Suleiman’s taxon-
omy that bifurcated Islam for blacks and Christianity for whites. This unique 
Mohammeddan-Masonic nexus premised on a romanticised pan-African and 
pan-Islamic genealogical identity anchored the MSTA ideology.
In compiling his main religious scripture, the Circle Seven Koran (hence-
forth CSK), Drew leveraged on his experience as an Oriental Asiatic Scientist 
in Newark as fodder.3 In Chapters 1 to 19 of Drew’s Koran, he drew heavily from 
Levi Dowling’s The Aquarian Gospel of Jesus the Christ (1908), an esoteric 
3 The term ‘Asiatic’ is a nuanced racial-religious term often found in African-American Muslim 
communities in the twentieth century (for example, the Nation of Islam, Five Percenters, 
and the MSTA). While ‘Asiatic’ groups occasionally claim ties of affiliation with ‘Asian’ com-
munities (such as the Japanese, Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese) in some cases, the term ‘Asiatic’ 
is divorced from ‘Asian’. See N. Deutch, 2001, “The Asiatic Black Man: An African American 
Orientalism,” Journal of Asian American Studies, 4:3, 193–208.
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theosophical text emphasising Christ’s itinerant travels and encounters with 
other world religious figures, symbolising humankind’s quest for universal 
spirituality. For Chapters 20 to 44 of CSK, Drew included sections from Unto 
Thee I Grant (1925) published by the Ancient and Mystical Order Rosae Crucis, 
a Rosicrucian group propagating moralistic, puritanical lives to achieve happi-
ness and liberation in their worldly-state (Curtis IV 2002).
While Drew was aware of mainstream Islamic tenets from Ahmadiyya 
Muslim literature produced out of South Wabash, Chicago, and evangelical 
censures from Satti Majid, a Sudanese missionary, the Moorish leader warily-
but-pragmatically steered clear of Islamicising his movement, maintaining a 
hesitant embrace of orthodox Islam at best (Abu Shouk, Hunwick and O’Fahey 
1993). Instead, Drew favoured a metaphysical disposition of Islam based on 
universal principles of “love, truth, peace, freedom, justice and equality” 
through a conversion to “Islamism” where neophytes swapped Christianity 
and blackness for a Moorish-American nationality, symbolised by taking on 
surnames of El and Bey (Ali 1928).
Yet the path towards forging a monolithic, pan-national movement was 
fraught with uncertainties. In January 1928, Drew and several aides travelled 
to Havana, Cuba to attend the 6th Pan American Conference to represent 
the nascent community.4 Nevertheless, prospects for a successful National 
Convention were hamstrung by a series of Temple fiascos. Between April to 
June, 1928, leaders in Pittsburgh Temple No. 5 and Richmond Temple No. 6 
were arrested for practising bigamy, unlicensed medicine selling and seditious 
teachings (Bowen 2013). As authorities raided the temples, Drew retreated 
to Mexico and on his return, convened a special meeting to legally rename 
the movement as the “Moorish Science Temple of America” on 21 May 1928 
to shield against allegations of conspiratorial subversion. The metamorpho-
sis into a more patriotic-leaning organisation was completed a month later as 
the MSTA was formally re-incorporated as a religious organisation on 20 July 
1928 that not only taught “loyalty to the nation and the deepest respect for law 
and order” but also dismissed notions of a “pilgrimage to some other country” 
(Ali 1928).
Following Drew’s desperate organisational reshuffling, he travelled to 
Arkansas, Philadelphia, and West Virginia visiting his congregation to revive 
flagging Temples and appeal for financial assistance. To amplify his reach, 
4 Though details of Drew’s participation in this Cuban conference remain doubtful, a very 
interesting shipping record recently was discovered by Moorish-American followers that 
definitely verified that Drew Ali boarded the S.S. Northland vessel on 25 January 1928 to sail 
from Havana, Cuba back to the United States.
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Drew placed monthly articles in the Chicago Defender advertising an impend-
ing Moorish conclave featuring a parade led by pilgrims decked in Eastern 
regalia and updates of economic accomplishments. The efforts bore fruit 
such that by August 1928, Drew churned out the first edition of the Moorish 
Guide newspaper. Eventually, the momentum climaxed in the MSTA’s First 
National Convention spanning five days from 15 to 20 October 1928 marking 
the apex of Drew’s ascent as a respectable national religious figure as thou-
sands of devotees from seventeen temples in fifteen different cities turned out 
(McCloud 1994). In turn, Chicago’s politicians and businessmen gravitated 
closer to Drew, attracted by his mesmeric influence over his members. Drew, 
who had endorsed the candidacy of African-American city alderman Oscar De 
Priest during the Convention, contributed to the latter’s achievement as the 
first person of African descent from a Northern state to serve in the House 
of Representatives, earning Drew an invite in the victory celebrations in 
November 1928. In February 1929, Drew urged his followers to successfully re-
elect Louis B. Anderson as Alderman in the 2nd Ward.
Paradoxically, the MSTA’s exponential growth to 7,000 neophytes within a 
year proved too exhilarating for its own stability (Bowen 2017: 201–202).5 As the 
MSTA raked in huge revenues from membership fees, newspaper subscriptions 
and sales of medicinal products, this lured in shady characters who cultivated 
ties only for associations with adventure, fortune and opportunism. Amidst 
accusations of financial embezzlement, lascivious philandering and seces-
sionist intrigues, Drew extricated top-brass Sheiks in Detroit, Chicago, and his 
Supreme Business Manager. This triggered first a Detroit Temple gunfight on 
12 March, 1929 wounding two Moors and two police officers and then two days, 
a heinous assassination of the former business manager. Following the slay-
ing, police officials raided Moorish temples, arrested Drew and hauled in other 
leaders for questioning on charges of being an accessory to homicide. At this 
juncture, the Chicago Defender radically revised their portrait of Drew from an 
authentic religious figure to a menacing charlatan. Still, faithful Moors rejected 
the demonisation of their prophet’s moral credibility, instead demanding the 
police release Drew.
Though attorneys secured Drew’s release temporarily on bail, the prophet 
passed away suddenly on 20 July 1929 in his home from tuberculosis bron-
chopneumonia, suspending criminal investigations and leaving bereaved fol-
lowers despondent. Noble Drew Ali’s elaborate funeral service orchestrated 
over a few days in late July 1929 proved the final occasion when different 
5 Bowen arrived at this figure after meticulous calculations of early Moorish Guide temple 
numbers, financial membership fees and accounts by contemporary MSTA historians.
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Moorish Sheiks, Governors, and Adepts were united in grief. While Drew’s apex 
proved fleeting, prematurely cut short by his death, the MSTA’s exhilarating 
promises of connecting to a romanticised, Islamic-Moroccan community vis-
à-vis uplifting message of socio-economic empowerment have transcended 
the founder’s death by compelling many in the African-American community 
to question and re-evaluate long-held assumptions about the compatibility 
of their racial identity with their existing Christian, Jewish, or Sunnī Islamic 
faith-systems.
4 The Moorish Silver Age, Japan, and World War II, 1929–1945
Following Drew’s demise, historians of black American Islam like C. Eric 
Lincoln downplayed the movement’s significance in the black community, cit-
ing its inevitable collapse owing to its fissiparous tendencies (Lincoln 1994). A 
rigorous scrutiny however disclosed that the MSTA edifice did not come crash-
ing down. In fact, the supposed “collapse” myopically ignored the re-flowering 
of Moorish Islam characterised by an exponential proliferation of more than 
sixty MSTA Temples and an expanded membership with amplified politi-
cal consciousness. Ironically, Drew’s death in 1929 decentralised power and 
control beyond Chicago, prompting a mushrooming of Moorish theologians, 
whose textual revisionism of Drew’s pre-1929 apocrypha in the rapidly chang-
ing 1930s and 1940s socio-political environment, ushered in a second ‘Moorish 
Silver Age’ from 1929 to 1945 (Abdat 2015). This phase produced an inexhaust-
ible reservoir of diverse Moorish-American modalities whose temples oper-
ated unique Moorish dispositions, each with different trajectories and only 
loosely held together by wildly charismatic leaders.
Undoubtedly, turbulent events from 1929 to 1931 between feuding Moorish 
leaders compromised Moorish unity. The leadership was riven with internecine 
squabbles in which politics and policies were inextricably fused. After Drew’s 
obsequy, Supreme Grand Sheik Edward Mealy El (1870–1935), the most obvious 
candidate to inherit Drew’s position based on organisational hierarchy, toured 
various Temples and embarked on a letter-writing campaign to Sheikhs and 
Adepts to desperately shore up the demoralised movement (Mealy-El 1931). 
Concurrently, Charles Kirkman-Bey (1896–1959), Drew’s translator, colluded 
with other Sheiks to vote Mealy-El out of power during the contentious 2nd 
Annual Convention on September 1929. This decision provoked Ira Johnson 
Bey (1879–1950), Drew’s Pittsburgh-based enforcer, to kidnap Kirkman-Bey 
and seize leadership documents on 21 September 1929. But the scheme went 
awry, escalating into a deadly shootout between sixty Moors and the CPD.
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Throughout a protracted trial, lines of demarcation between diverse 
Moorish factions were clearly drawn. Kirkman-Bey, who took on the title 
Supreme Grand Advisor and Moderator (SGAM), filed legal suits against rivals 
who claimed to be Reincarnated Prophets for heretical innovation. Though the 
Circuit Court of Cook County legally awarded Drew’s organisation to the SGAM 
in June 1935, such that he spearheaded the largest Moorish group, it was impos-
sible for the SGAM to keep thousands of Moors dispersed across the nation’s 
cities under effective control as they fluidly transcended boundaries across 
different Moorish factions, or independently carved out their own Moorish 
variant. The maddening confusion was exacerbated by followers’ overlapping 
fealties, shape-shifting leaders, and non-exclusive relations between temples.
Apart from the SGAM, John Givens-El, Drew’s former chauffeur, led a 
Reincarnated Moorish Temple faction whose followers distinguished them-
selves by being heavily bearded and perpetually fezzed. This group of Moors 
subscribed to the centrality of Drew’s spirit entering Givens-El who fainted 
while working on the Prophet’s car but mysteriously “had the sign of the star 
and the crescent in his eyes and they knew right then he was the prophet 
reincarnated into his chauffeur” (Marsh 2000: 35). After this religious 
epiphany, Givens-El fashioned himself as Noble Drew Ali II—‘Mohammed 
Reincarnated’—but then found himself confined to a mental asylum for sev-
eral years for his role in the leadership imbroglio. From behind prison bars, 
he successfully built up a significant puritanical faction with thousands of 
disciples in Chicago, Illinois, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Augusta, Georgia, 
Newark, New Jersey, and Baltimore, Maryland (Vale 1934: 20).
The third aspirant, Mealy-El, failed to make much headway in his challenge 
to unseat Kirkman-Bey. His letter-writing campaigns to convince Sheiks of 
his legitimacy and organisational credentials as Drew’s rightful heir vis-à-vis 
Kirkman-Bey’s duplicity fell on deaf ears until he passed away in 1935. Despite 
the struggles, Moorish-American relationships relatively stabilised after 1931 as 
each leaders grudgingly accepted their rivals’ influence without directly con-
fronting each other again.
In the 1930s and 1940s, all Moorish groups felt compelled towards exegeti-
cal revisionism owing to the rapidly changing domestic and international cli-
mate. The bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941 necessitated Moorish 
theologians to re-read, reinterpret, and refurbish Drew’s 1920s doctrines to 
make sense of the turbulent events for their respective congregation. Noble 
Drew Ali’s esoteric New Age wisdom had racially positioned the Japanese, 
alongside Egyptians and Arabians, amongst the divine Asiatic nations in the 
Circle Seven Koran. But Drew could not possibly have foreseen the permeat-
ing influence of Japan’s Black Dragon Society propaganda, which cajoled 
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black organisations in the 1930s including the MSTA to embrace pro-Japanese, 
“black messianic” nationalistic proclivities in the event of a Japanese inva-
sion of America (Allen, Jr. 1994). The Moorish faith-system became easily 
impregnated with external ideologies and influences demonstrating its porous 
boundaries.
Conversely, there was a need to determine MSTA’s degree of patriotism 
towards America, since Drew’s original attitudes had capriciously oscil-
lated from brief seditious flirtations in 1928 to overt American fealty by 1929. 
Confronted with Japanese agent provocateurs’ propagandistic formulations 
of a rigid pan-Asiatic international order antagonistic towards Washington, 
Moorish-American theologians could no longer depend on Drew’s anachro-
nistic 1920s matrix of a double consciousness of constitutional adherence to 
America and a mytho-genealogical Asiatic brotherhood with the Japanese. 
Moorish-American theologians had to challenge the tired norms and cultural 
hangovers from the past.
All Moorish groups flirted with pro-Japanese revisionism, differing only 
in the degree and extent they acted on their beliefs. Kirkman-Bey’s Temples 
quickly gravitated towards the draping of a Japanese pan-Asiatic blueprint over 
Drew’s Asiatic Muslim core. Ever since 1936, his Hartford Moors hosted repre-
sentatives from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce to propagate Japan’s pro-
gram for the new Asian order. In Bartholomew County, Indiana, Ruben Frazier 
Bey, a rural farmer adorned his living room with tapestry embroidered with a 
Black Dragon and Japanese scripture, transforming his home into a safety zone 
so “when the Japanese start bombing the United States, we will run up our flag 
and they will know we are their friends and won’t bomb us [for those] who 
knew the symbols” (FBI MSTA File 1940).
In Flint, Michigan, Moors keenly awaited Drew’s return and even took Major 
Satohata Takahashi, a Japanese agent provocateur, to be the prophet reincar-
nated. This influenced Flint Moors such as Rhodes-Bey to look towards the 
Japanese for survival in 1942 since they would provide nourishment as well as 
long-term job security believing the benevolent Japanese would “take over the 
plants here in Michigan and give them [to] the Moorish Science Temple and 
that everybody would have to work for us” (FBI MSTA File 1942). This position 
was hardly surprising considering the Moorish Voice constantly expounded on 
the genealogical-racial compatibility between Moors and the Japanese Army, 
demanding the former shape their glorious destiny alongside Japan, rather 
than remaining fatalistically passive awaiting Allāh to reverse the status quo. 
Ironically, within this Moorish-Japanese alliance Japan was repositioned above 
other Asiatics (including Moors), relegating the latter to a subordinate position 
within the Asiatic hierarchical order of races (Folsom-Bey 1942).
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The authorities’ fears regarding the MSTA’s treasonable proclivities height-
ened considerably from 1942, with increasingly frequent reports. In April, 
two Moorish leaders were arrested for coaxing African-Americans in Yazoo, 
Humphrey, Belzoni, and Milestone, Mississippi, not to register for Selective 
Service. Three months later, Father Prophet Mohammed Bey’s Moors were 
arrested in Kansas City, Missouri, for evading Selective Service prompting 
the FBI Office to begin a thorough investigation of the different MSTA lead-
ers. Once confronted with FBI interrogations and a wave of arrests, almost 
instantaneously for survival, the movement made a sudden volte face mor-
phing into a more conservative orientation of Moorish Science emphasising 
fealty to America. Kirkman-Bey bowdlerised Japanese leanings, as the Moorish 
Voice now printed articles showing the compatibility of being a faithful 
Moorish-American while concurrently serving the United States armed forces.
Reincarnationist Moors compromised with Selective Service officials. In 
November 1941, Eddie Stephens-Bey, a Reincarnationist Moor reported to 
Fort Dix, New Jersey military training camp brazenly refusing to wear a neck-
tie, swap his fez for an army helmet, consume army chow, or trim his beard, 
earning him a two-week confinement (Galveston Daily News 1941). Eventually, 
a middle ground was reached after Reincarnated Moorish leaders granted 
Private Bey dispensation to relax orthodox religious prohibitions concerning 
food and the fez; however, his beard was not to be shaved completely but sim-
ply trimmed over lightly with clippers. By 1943, even the Reincarnated Moors 
Americanised their faith system when George Johnson Bey, dramatically trans-
formed from a seditious anti-American propagandist into a patriotic collabo-
rator by furnishing testimony in a federal district court clearly elucidating links 
between Ashima Takis, Japanese agent provocateurs, and leaders of other sedi-
tious black movements who allied themselves with the Axis Powers to produce 
a revolution by 1944. By irrevocably distancing themselves from more seditious 
groups, the MSTA averted a similar fate.
In the short run, though shrewd Moorish re-orientation towards American 
fealty judiciously prevented a similar fate to other repressed, incarcerated 
religious groups, in the long run this conservative bent only served to discon-
nect them from the pulse of black urban America which became increasingly 
livid with the racial hypocrisy of white America by the 1950s. Ironically, the 
Moorish ‘decline’ lay not so much in 1929 with Drew’s death but rather due 
to the softening of the MSTA into passivity marked by a growing penchant for 
white mainstream American acceptance. Concomitantly, Moorish volatility 
during this post-Drew period caused several MSTA leaders to depart the fold 
and embrace Sunnī Islamic orthodoxy such as Professor Ezaldeen (ex-James 
Lomax Bey) and Sheikh Nasir Ahmad (ex-Walter Smith Bey), both of whom 
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created and spearheaded their own African-American Sunnī Islamic commu-
nities. This elucidated how even so-called heretically deviant groups like the 
MSTA possessed latently, creative energies to spawn and re-invigorate Sunnī 
Islamic vitality in tempestuous times.
5 Beyond the Wars: The MSTA, Civil Rights, and Black Power, 
1945–1975
After the war in 1946, Kirkman Bey used the occasion of the 19th Annual 
Convention held in 1032 Orleans St, Chicago, Illinois to take stock of the exist-
ing state of his movement only to discover a bleak outlook. Officials inspected 
illegally printed materials from fissiparous rogue Moorish sects. Nevertheless, 
its response was feeble, merely to read platitude Moorish regulations concern-
ing fraud. Forward-thinking Sheiks from Cleveland, Ohio suggested plans for 
business expansionism but Chicago officials brusquely dismissed such plans. 
Most alarmingly, ultra-reactionary, lackadaisical Temple leaders contributed 
little to a movement in dire need of theological reinvigoration such that 
Kirkman-Bey caustically impugned thirty-six elderly Adepts in the Moorish 
National Home as “useless deadheads” (Kirkman-Bey 1946).
The conservative transmogrification towards American jingoism was deep-
ened during a celebration of Drew’s birthday in 1949 when the Moorish con-
tribution to American valour in World Wars I and II was embellished. A heroic 
portrait of Kirkman-Bey was constructed in the Chicago Defender as a fear-
less war veteran who saw action with the 92nd Division in France in World 
War I, where he was wounded by bomb fragments in a bloody Argonne forest 
battle. This set the stage for the MSTA to embrace a conservative placid disposi-
tion, steering clear of the civil rights dynamic challenges to Jim Crow’s racist-
institutions of the 1950s and 1960s since this potentially invited authorities’ 
repression as gleaned from their 1940s’ seditious adventurism.
For Reincarnated Moors, continuing their conservative stance was under-
standable given the desperate need for stable leadership. In 1945, Givens El 
(Reincarnated Drew Ali II) passed away, creating a leadership vacuum. The 
faithful first pinned their hopes on the incarcerated Ira Johnson Bey, who rein-
vented himself as Allah El, but this semi-divine figure remained manacled 
away in prison despite his retinue’s repeated petitions to release their leader 
citing medical grounds. Hoping to soften the authorities’ stance, Allah El 
proclaimed a pacifist stance prohibiting his followers to participate in wars, 
instead ‘nationalising’ as peaceful, civic-minded Moors but to no avail, as he 
died blind on 5 December 1949. Temporarily, the baton was passed to Sidney 
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Rosson El, the National Grand Sheik in Chicago, but soon he made way for 
George Johnson Bey, Allah El’s son, who re-emerged in 1949 to briefly reen-
ergise the movement before controversially abrogating the puritanical incli-
nations of the Reincarnated community, bringing about heated theological 
debates and a power struggle before he passed away in 1951.
As leadership in the Reincarnated community frequently changed hands in 
the 1950s, they distanced themselves from the civil rights momentum that took 
shape in the mid-1950s. A Reincarnated Moorish publication, Moorish Review, 
lambasted the civil rights movement as an unnatural, a “diabolical scheme” 
to appease African-Americans at best and perpetuate slave-mentality at worst 
(Jones-El 1956: 3–4). Also, they were wary of the white political machine’s latent 
intrigues and influence on the civil rights movement, that merely paid lip ser-
vice to African-American salvation and hopes. Rather, the Reincarnated Moors 
banked their hopes externally—and rhetorically—on the Islamicisation of 
Africa and America in the 1960s while dismissing white American destiny as 
unpropitiously heading towards disaster in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis of 
1956, foreshadowing the precarious scenario of being “left alone as the last big 
Western power in the sea of Asia” (Jones-El 1956: 2).
1959 proved a dramatic turning point for the fortunes of the MSTA. As 
Malcolm X propelled Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam (henceforth NOI) 
towards unprecedented growth, Kirkman-Bey passed away in January of 1959. 
Moorish leadership was thrust into the hands of F. Nelson Bey, who persisted 
in alienating them from the civil rights movement, by instructing Moors to be 
more civic-minded through active participation in communal activities. Still, 
the passivity lingered as he insisted no evangelising be done, while permit-
ting members to leave the community. This prompted large number of Moors 
to exit the Temple doors, swapping their fezzes and turbans in exchange for 
the NOI’s bowties and the angrier pro-black ideology offered. On 6 January 
1961, Elijah Muhammad replied in a letter to Ferrell-Bey, a Chicago Moor urg-
ing “all that believe and follow prophet Ali [Drew] to follow me and you will 
be successful” in a symbolic transfer of influence from the MSTA to the NOI 
(Muhammad 1961).
J. Blakeley-Bey, who succeeded F. Nelson Bey as SGAM in 1963, recognised 
the need to position the MSTA vis-à-vis the NOI’s black separatism and civil 
right movement’s integrationist goals. However, Blakeley-Bey’s energies were 
expended untangling messy knotted rivalries. Lacking a strategy to stem the 
flow of heretics, the SGAM fatalistically drew on Drew’s messianic return to 
salvage the movement reminding that Drew exhorted “I am going to drive the 
Moors back home to Islam if I have to cut their heads off” (Blakeley-Bey 1964: 
1). Despite garbing Drew in proto-Black Power prophetic garb, this proved 
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merely rhetorical as it sought only to deal with internal enemies while avoid-
ing larger national, African-American issues.
In 1967, upon witnessing the series of federal civil rights legislations suc-
cessfully passed, Blakely-Bey vacillated hesitantly towards civil rights. But this 
attitudinal shift was laboriously slow towards a phenomenon that was already 
on the wane. On one hand, the SGAM entertained notions of racial integra-
tionism through a future of expanded white Moorish membership, revealing 
that while the religion may currently be strange to Caucasians, it was not a 
“closed book” (Hopkins, Jr. 1967: 16). To justify this revisionism to a more 
racially inclusive one, Blakeley-Bey re-emphasised the Moorish faith’s underly-
ing esoteric Theosophical roots, “we co-exist with everyone because we are a 
religion of love” (Blakeley-Bey 1967: 1). On the other hand, the authenticity of 
promised bi-racial membership was questionable, given this was only permis-
sible narrowly within the confines of the Temple doors rather than through 
mass civil protests outside the Temple. Paradoxically, it was Blakeley-Bey’s own 
arcane and millenarian belief in a rigid racial-religious dichotomy between 
black Asiatic Islam and white Protestantism that hamstrung his own innuen-
does about racial integrationism: “give the Europeans the time, and they will 
force us back out [of Christianity]. They’ve got 34 years to do it before the big 
change comes. The big change is the millennium” (Blakeley-Bey 1967: 16). Bey’s 
precarious oscillation between integrationism and separationism only bewil-
dered Moorish adherents who perceived his shifts as a sacrilegious bastardisa-
tion of Moorish tenets.
In stark contrast, the Reincarnated Moors retained their distrust of civil 
rights movements’ methods and aims. Instead, they began syncretically exper-
imenting with select Sunnī Islamic beliefs that seamlessly dovetailed within 
Moorish religious principles without compromise. In January 1967, the com-
munity announced that Drew’s birthday uncannily coincided with Ramadan. 
It highlighted Ramadan’s significance being the holiest month of the Islamic 
lunar calendar but concomitantly assured that Ramadan was not be imposed 
onto his Moorish community and the spiel was only meant for “enlightenment” 
(Reynold-El 1967). Reincarnated Moors from the 1960s grew acutely aware 
of the distinct advantages of allying themselves to orthodox Islam given the 
religio-political significance of weaving themselves to the centre of traditional 
Islam. Over the next few decades, various Moorish groups have continued to 
carve open a Sunnī Islamic space within Moorish Temples.
As Black Power militancy emerged in the mid-1960s, a hodgepodge of 
‘ronin Moors’ previously affiliated to diverse sects pushed aside theological 
differences to band together from 1965 to 1972. Aghast at the staid MSTA of 
the 1960s, and the failure of civil rights legislation to meaningfully impact 
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African-Americans, this Moorish ecumenical, activist group was influenced by 
Black Power’s rallying call for black empowerment to organise their own 37th 
Annual Convention of MSTA in September, 1965 calling for Moorish activism 
to be at the vanguard of developing model African-American communities.
At the Convention, Joseph Jeffries El excoriated the civil rights move-
ment to preserve the bio-religious and national purity of the Moors, “We 
Moorish-Americans do not ask for social equality integration because we, as a 
clean and pure nation descended from the inhabitants of Africa, do not desire 
to amalgamate or marry into the families of the pale skin nations of Europe” 
(Jeffries-El 1965: 1) Integration was undesirable from a religious perspective 
since divine Moors do not serve “the Gods of their religion” (Jeffries-El 1965). 
By transplanting Drew’s words from the Circle Seven Koran and layering it onto 
the 1960s socio-political climate, El effectively transformed Drew into a Black 
Power prophet, who prophesised the failure of civil rights integrationism and 
forewarned his posterity against the dangers of racial integration. While reject-
ing Black Power methods of militancy, Jeffries-El was inspired by the NOI’s 
ten point-program called “What the Muslims Want” and by the Black Panther 
Party’s ten-point-program called “What We Want Now!” and “What We Believe” 
(Bloom and Martin 2013). El crafted a similar ten-point Moorish manifesto 
called “Let My People Go” designed to build positive African-American com-
munities. Hence, Jeffries El organised a plethora of businesses and community 
programmes ranging from heading a government-aided housing construction, 
moving company and a management company (Tomasson 1973). In September 
1967, constructive Moorish empowerment was demonstrated as Brooklyn 
Moors played peacemaker between Mayor Lindsay, besieged policemen and 
black rioters on the streets of Brownsville, Brooklyn. MSTA leaders walked into 
the crowds, talking to angered residents, and cajoling them to discuss matters 
on MSTA premises with officials where they held a joint news conference with 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) demanding the end of police brutality.
Rufus German Bey, (1909–1984), another charismatic ronin Moorish leader, 
based himself in Baltimore, Maryland since 1927. Disenchanted at the pas-
sive religious orientation, he distanced himself from Chicago’s headquar-
ters, instead favouring a more pro-active evangelising Moorish mission for 
incarcerated African-Americans. Beginning in 1956, German-Bey started the 
first Moorish Preparation Centre at Lexington, Kentucky Federal Prison and 
expanded it to over sixty Preparation Centers mainly in Baltimore, Maryland 
and Washington, D.C. During these crusading visits, German-Bey invited 
incarcerated African-Americans to Islamism over cake and pastries, initi-
ated their proclamation of Moorish-American nationality and celebrated 
Moorish holidays.
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Still the Moorish turn towards Black Power empowerment was complex, 
given Moors publicly maintained an aversion to black cultural pride as un-
Moorish averring that “there is no dignity in black pride because there is no 
Negro, black, or colored people attached to the human race. I do not believe 
in black pride, but in human dignity and in the pride of Allah’s creation” 
(McGee-Bey 1968: 4). In addition, the Moorish distaste for Black Power’s mili-
tant, confrontational strategies was reasonable for it went against the grain of 
Drew’s advice for civic-minded Moorish members to adhere to all laws.
Yet, the relationship between Black Power and Moorish Science was a 
dynamic two-way process, as several Black Power nationalist groups borrowed 
motifs and elements from MSTA. Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmad leader of two 
Washington-based Black Power movements, the Blackman’s Volunteer Army 
of Liberation and Blackman’s Development Center, prepared for a future race 
war between his mercenaries and ‘whitey’ to create an independent cen-
tral and southern African utopian state called the United Moorish Republic 
(Mac, Jr. 1971). Jeru-Ahmad’s local UMR ameliorated social and economic ills 
in underprivileged black communities through community security patrols, 
anti-riot programs, vermin extermination businesses and job skills training. In 
fact, he envisioned migrating his adherents to Westmoreland County to build 
a utopian rural community of 500 citizens of the UMR, where he would also 
establish a Moorish University of Science and Technology (MSUT) as a “port of 
embarkation” (Delano 1971: 17) for trained black technicians to transfer their 
knowledge and skills to aid emerging nations in Africa.
In the post-war years, the MSTA was forced to reconfigure itself in complex, 
pretzel-like directions in response to civil rights and Black Power develop-
ments. Though these contortions further weakened the glue holding the dis-
parate Moorish groups together, this generation of Moorish leaders’ creative 
policies have benefitted under-privileged, black urban micro-communities 
near the MSTA temples by serving their economic, spiritual and psychological 
needs.
6 Paper Terrorists, 1975–2000
As Black Power momentum waned by the mid-1970s, so too did the MSTA’s 
fortunes flag. The pro-active Moorish ecclesiastical unity of the late 1960s 
proved ephemeral, succumbing to internal fissures over theological fault-
lines and to the popularity of Elijah Muhamad’ s ubiquitous black Muslims. 
Faced with such strains, the MSTA underwent another metamorphosis in 
orientation. Following decades of misreading by American authorities as a 
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cult devoid of authenticity, the Moors over-reacted as Kirkman-Bey’s faction 
reclusively turned inwards, while Reincarnated Moors embraced a hyper-legal 
anarchism in a desperate attempt to foist their Moorish identity upon various 
state and federal documents at expense of transgressing the law (Mubashir 
2001). Unfortunately as a result of the latter, contemporary Moors have been 
pejoratively and unfairly stereotyped as criminalised Islamic “paper-terrorists” 
(Hanson 2015) bent on finagling the American legal system.
The roots of the Moorish legal anarchism traced back to the teachings of 
C.M. Moseley Bey, an independent, Cleveland-based Moorish renegade in the 
1950s and 1960s whose followers evaded taxation based on the Moorish-Masonic 
text, The Clock of Destiny. Its more modern equivalent evolved from the 
Baltimore Reincarnated Moorish Temple, following a public fallout between 
the Dingle El siblings (Richardson and Timothy Dingle El) and R. German 
Bey in 1972. In 1975, Richardson Dingle-El (1910–1992) proclaimed himself as 
‘Reincarnated Prophet Noble Drew Ali III’ while his brother Timothy Dingle-El 
(1923–1980) declared himself as ‘Supreme Grand Resurrector’ (Dingle-El 
2006: 76–77) after publishing his own religious corpus, The Resurrection of the 
Moorish Science of Temple of America. Together with Clarence R. Reynolds El, 
they established a Moorish School of Law and History, Incorporated, No. 13 
(henceforth MSHL) that attracted a group of college graduates who meticu-
lously researched American laws, modernised the movement’s outlook and 
reinvigorated Baltimore Temple membership (Amenu-El 2008).
In the early 1970s, the MSHL successfully removed erroneous labels issued by 
the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles (MDMV) such as ‘negro’ or ‘black’ 
by re-registering the Moors’ licenses. From 1974 to 1976, the MSHL attempted to 
extend their reach out by petitioning the Black Caucus to discuss their inter-
pretation of President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, but 
their request for official meetings were brushed off. The MSHL believed ex-
slaves had never been legally raised to the status of persons, nor had they been 
properly compensated for their involuntary servitude as intended by Lincoln, 
such that African-Americans were fleeced of constitutional rights, including 
a restitution from the government as compensation to colonise and develop 
“model communities” for Moors (Amenu-El 2008: 60). Instead, they proposed 
‘resurrecting’ the executive will of Lincoln’s Proclamation and the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the United States constitution with twenty sections.
Rebuffed, they stirred local tax protests such that arrests of felonious Moors 
charged for filing tax-withholding statements and violation of property laws 
began surfacing in newspapers in Baltimore and Philadelphia in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. While such cases mystified court officials, this turn towards 
legalistic anarchy should be contextualised as the by-product of earlier 
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Selective Service officials’ politicisation of Moors to the Kafkaesque maze of 
world of acts, laws and statutes in the 1940s and 1950s as well as Washington 
officials’ brusque dismissal of the MSHL in the 1970s. This snowballed into a 
mutual misunderstanding where court officials grew increasingly indifferent 
to Moors’ religious traditions, despite the Moors’ legal defiance stemming from 
the government’s own policies in the first place. Curiously, the Reincarnated 
Moors’ hyper-legalistic anarchy represented a rupture from Drew’s insistence 
on adherence to all laws in the past and myopic oversight on the larger impli-
cations of tarnishing the Moorish faith in the future.
For German-Bey, dissociation from the Reincarnated Moors gave birth to 
a phase of Panglossian growth for most of the 1970s, before strategic miscal-
culations abraded initial optimism. By 1978, his prison-proselytisation proj-
ect bore fruit as healthy numbers of incarcerated Moors filed prison-initiated 
court suits demanding their rights for a spiritual co-ordinator, religious litera-
ture and prayer arrangements in Baltimore’s State Penitentiary (Hyer 1978). In 
the same year, German-Bey successfully organised a National Convention in 
the Hopkins Room of the Civic Centre in Baltimore, Maryland, commemorat-
ing the 50th Golden Jubilee Anniversary of the MSTA transferring the focal 
point of Moorish activism from Chicago to Baltimore (Oishi 1978). Buoyant, 
German-Bey legally re-styled his Baltimore Temple No. 13 as the bona fide and 
de facto Temple No. 1, but this only expended his energy and resources in a 
protracted legal imbroglio from 1978 to 1982 (Way-El 2011).
To complicate matters further, the boundaries between past-criminality 
and present-disciplined Moorish lifestyle were amorphously fluidic such that 
the Moorish faith-system became criminalised. Jeff Fort’s (b. 1947) conver-
sion to the MSTA elucidated the cross-fertilisation of organised crime net-
works and Moorish faith systems, giving birth to Imam Malik Kaaba El’s El 
Rukn Moorish Science Temple in the 1980s. Not only did the literal translation 
from Arabic, El Rukn and Kaaba, into English—‘foundation’ and ‘black stone’, 
respectively—provided a powerful double-barrelled symbolic connection, 
projecting the El Rukns retrospectively back to its street roots as well as spiri-
tually coupling his movement to the site of orthodox Islam’s holiest shrine, 
Moorish tropes and motifs were skilfully scrambled into a complex code used 
over the telephone to communicate with associates beyond prison walls. For 
example, MSTA’s core principles were encrypted with secret meanings—‘love’ 
represented one, one hundred, or one thousand, ‘love-truth’ meant two, two 
hundred, or two thousand, and ‘justice’ meant weapon—and used in vari-
ous numerical combinations to be deciphered by associates, as Fort operated 
a major narcotics ring while ensconced in a federal penitentiary in Bastrop, 
Texas (Blau and O’Brien 1991).
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Though the El Rukns evolved to Sunnīfy their doctrines by 1985, their crimi-
nal activities continues to taint MSTA’s reputation as fezzed pseudo-Muslims 
involved with drugs, racketeering, witness intimidations and occasional stray-
ing into international terror when accepting a multi-million dollar contract 
from Moammar Gadhafi’s Libyan government (Possley 1987). The demonisation 
of MSTA’s reputation was perpetuated by arrest of other controversial Moorish 
leaders in the early 1990s such as Jerry Lewis-Bey, a St. Louis Sheik impris-
oned for a decade long murderous criminal enterprise that handled cocaine 
traffic. In 1993, Clarence Rodney Hampton-El (1938–2014), a Brooklyn-born 
Moor’s highly publicised arrest for conspiring to bomb several buildings in 
New York reinforced the MSTA’s standing in the public as a grotesquely menac-
ing organisation (Clines 1993). The underlying lesson gleaned was the sheer 
fluidity through which these protagonists symbiotically intertwined their 
personae between Moorish Science, Sunnī Islam, international jihadist incli-
nations and altruistic community-activism as well as between boundaries 
of legality.
7 Conclusion
In the 1990s and 2000, Moorish synonymity with unbridled “paper terrorism” 
returned, where Moors claimed immunity from American laws owing to an 
imagined Moorish sovereign status (Nelson 2011). This phenomenon now 
rooted from nefarious leaders’ surreptitious pseudo-Moorish teachings. In 
the mid-1990s, Malachi York and his Ansarullah community’s alchemic trans-
mogrification into Moorish cultic movements, the Yamassee Native American 
Moors of the Creek Nation and the United Nuwaubian Nation of Moors, intro-
duced the bogus notion of a tax-free Moorish haven (Moser 2002). York’s ideas 
was fetishised further by Verdiacee Turner, a dreadlocked Louisiana-based 
‘Washitaw Empress’ who spuriously sold her followers gobbledygook Washitaw 
documents ranging from driver registration plates, registrations, birth certifi-
cates and passports promising to insulate holders from being sued and taxed.
In the 2000s with the advent of the Internet, cyber Moorish Prophets 
brought such insidious doctrines to a much wider public audience. In particu-
lar, Tej Tarik Bey, a Harlem-based Moor have extensively used the online pulpit 
of websites and YouTube sermons to propagate his Moorish sovereign doc-
trines. Mainstream Moors have lampooned Tarik-Bey for confusing Moors and 
infuriating authorities but sadly, such fallacious teachings continues to gain 
traction among both Moors and non-Moors, oblivious of Drew’s insistence on 
MSTA members’ obeisance for legal statutes. Usually desperate for an escapist 
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route out of financial ruin, these naïve Moorish paper terrorists usually end 
accused for tax fraud, illicit trespassing into vacant houses, filing bogus liens 
and lawsuits against officers and prosecutors.
Though the media has caricaturised the MSTA as criminalised fanatics 
and membership diminishing, all is not lost. Other black religious national-
ist groups like the NOI, Five Percenter Nation and Ansarullah Community 
continue to pay homage to Noble Drew Ali as their ideological progenitor for 
being the Original Asiatic Muslim. Black hip hop artists such as Nas, Wu Tang 
Clan, Mos Def, and Nick Cannon have all referenced Noble Drew Ali’s ideas, 
Moorish-tropes and iconography in their lyrics, thus popularising and preserv-
ing the memories of the religious innovator to millions of consumers. The few 
thousand contemporary Moors need not worry about the future, all they need 
is to reach back to their own past- and live out the highest, purest form of 
Moorish principles of “learning to love, instead of hate.”
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Chapter 30
The Ansaaru Allah Community
Susan J. Palmer
1 Introduction
The Ansaaru Allah Community (also known as the Ansarullah Community) 
was one of the African American Muslim movements to emerge out of the 
new, indigenous forms of Islam in America in the 1960s. This movement might 
best be understood within the context of America’s twentieth century Black 
‘cultic milieu’; the esoteric ‘underground’ of spiritual/philosophical concepts, 
debating circles and private practitioners that was percolating in the rebel-
lious salons of the major American cities (Campbell 1972). Within this eclectic 
milieu, various Black messianic spiritual movements took root and evolved 
into successful NRMs, such as the Moorish Science Temple, the Nation of 
Islam, and the Five Percent Nation of Gods and Earths (McCloud 1995). Marcus 
Garvey’s “Blackosophy” of the early 1900s (Moses 1987; Simpson 1978), and the 
Black Nationalist and Civil Rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s also con-
tributed to the formation of these African-American NRMs.
The Ansaaru Allah Community (AAC) was an African-American communal 
society that flourished in Brooklyn, NY from 1973 to 1992. ‘Ansaaru Allah’ refers 
to the ‘helpers of Allāh’, and the daily life of the members was centered on 
their mosque on Bushwick Avenue. This intentional community, which might 
be described as utopian, millenarian and messianic, dominated the neigh-
borhood around Brooklyn’s Bushwick Avenue for over nineteen years. The 
Ansaars published a newsletter, The Nuwaubian Village Bulletin, and hundreds 
of ‘scrolls’ (small booklets) co-authored by their messianic founder with his 
plural wives. These scrolls were sold in the bookstore on Bushwick Avenue and 
distributed in the streets of New York and other major cities by the Ansaar mis-
sionaries, known as Propagators.
On the surface the AAC appeared to be an expatriate community of African 
fundamental Muslims. The men wore Sudanese robes and turbans, and the 
women wore long white gowns and burkas. But a reading of the AAC litera-
ture indicates that the Qurʾānic verses and aḥadīth are intertwined with ufol-
ogy, theosophy and New Age racialist creation myths. A study of the forty-year 
history of this movement reveals that the founder, Dwight D. York (b. 1945), 
has founded not just one, but an elaborate series of at least seven spiritual 
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movements. Dr Malachi Z. York (as he is known by his disciples) has been 
creating, debriefing, renaming and reorganising his various spiritual groups 
since 1967. Each time a group goes underground and resurfaces under a new 
name, York’s disciples reappear in new exotic costumes on the streets of New 
York and other American cities. His movement has operated under the follow-
ing names: Ansaar Pure Sufi (1967); Nubian Islamic Hebrew Mission (1968); 
Nubian Islamic Hebrews (1969); Ansaaru Allah Community (1973–1992); Holy 
Tabernacle Ministries (1992); United Nuwaubian Nations of Moors (1993); and 
Yamassee Native American Moors of the Creek Nation (1993).
Confronted with this enigma, the obvious questions for an academic study-
ing Dr York’s volatile career would be these: “Why the dramatic divagations? 
What is the purpose or meaning of these radical changes in this African- 
American movement? What is the larger social significance?” The goal of this 
chapter is to try to answer these questions. Much of this study is inspired by 
my years of fieldwork with the Ansaaru Allah Community. My research on 
Dr Malachi York’s movement involved several stages. In the late 1980s I began 
to collect the Ansaaru Allah literature that was being peddled on the streets of 
Montreal, Toronto and New York by the Propagators. Most of my information 
was gathered from intermittent participant observation in Nuwaubian meet-
ings over a period of ten years at the group’s esoteric bookstores where they 
hold their weekly Question & Answer sessions. These took place in Brooklyn, 
Philadelphia, London (UK), Atlanta, and at Tama-Re, their commune and 
Egiptian (sic) theme park in Georgia.
In June 2004 I participated in the ‘Savior’s Day’ festival and pilgrimage, trav-
eling by bus with the disciples from Brooklyn to Tama Re in Georgia. There 
I conducted interviews with various pilgrims and with the ‘Triad’ (the three 
top administrators at Tama Re). On another trip to Georgia I interviewed 
some of the group’s cultural opponents, Sheriff Howard Sills, a local journal-
ists Rob Peecher, and Jacob York, the alienated son of Dr Malachi York (a.k.a. 
Dwight York). I worked closely with a New York documentary filmmaker, 
Paul Greenhouse, who was in the process of making a film on the movement. 
I also did fieldwork through occasional attendance at the Sunday Question & 
Answer sessions held at Tents of Kedar and All Eyes on Egipt (sic) bookstores 
in Brooklyn, Philadelphia, London, and Atlanta.1
It is not unusual to find rapid, startling transformations in new religions, 
as Robert Ellwood (1973), Roy Wallis (1984), and Eileen Barker (2013) have 
noted. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of a new religious movement 
is its instability or mercurial nature. As ‘baby religions’, NRMs pass through 
1 For more on my fieldwork experiences with this group, see Palmer 2010.
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developmental stages of rapid growth. Charismatic prophet-founders are still 
in the process of defining their roles and personae, and their revelations are 
still in the primitive oral phase, hence fluid. Myths, doctrines and rituals begin 
to unfurl as the prophet and his/her core group set in place the building blocks 
of a future religion. Millenarian expectations change course, and dress codes, 
dietary habits (and even sexual mores) will be tried on, worn out, and then dis-
carded. In Dwight York’s movement, however, these divagations are even more 
rapid and extreme than usual.
York’s critics will offer quite different reasons from his disciples. Historians 
of religion might compare York’s pedagogical methods to those found in gnos-
tic currents through the European history of heresy. An additional interpreta-
tion can be found the sociology of new religions. But before exploring these 
interpretations, it is necessary to focus on Dwight York’s career and the devel-
opment of the Ansaaru Allah Community.
2 The Enigma of Dwight York’s Identity
There is ample information on the internet about Dr Malachi Z. York the god, 
but very little data on the man, Dwight York. He was an enigmatic and complex 
personality, to say the least. The biographical data in this chapter is from four 
sources: the 1993 FBI report; The Ansar Cult by Bilal Philips (1988); interviews 
with members, ex-members and relatives; and hagiographies of York found in 
his books or ‘scrolls’. Over forty years of directing his rapidly mutating spiri-
tual movement, York has assumed various charismatic titles. In the days of the 
Ansaaru Allah Community, orthodox Sunni leaders denounced York as a ‘Mahdī 
pretender’ who blasphemed Allāh and perverted Islam. Today, for his prison 
wardens, he is Inmate #17911, and serving a 135-year sentence in the ‘supermax’ 
security federal prison in Florence, Colorado—known as the ‘Alcatraz of the 
Rockies’—on charges of child molestation and financial misconduct. Sheriff 
Howard Sills of Eatonton, Georgia, who assisted in the FBI’s military-style raid 
on York’s “compound” in 2002 described York as “the most heinous criminal 
in the history of the United States” (Palmer 2010). Journalists (predictably) 
tend to portray York as “cult leader” and a “con artist” who exploits the gullible 
members of his “black militant,” “quasi-religious” sect (Osinski 2007).
His supporters, however, insist that he is an innocent man who was framed, 
silenced, and brought down by a conspiracy of disgruntled ex-members who 
colluded with the ‘White Power Structure’. For his disciples, he is still their 
Master Teacher, the Savior, come to awaken the sleeping African Americans, 
to help them break the ‘Spell of Kingu’, to arm them with ‘Right Knowledge’. 
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York’s lawyer, Attorney Malik Zulu Shabazz of the New Black Panther Party, 
describes his client as “a great leader of our people … a victim of an open con-
spiracy by our enemy” (Palmer 2010). Thus, one finds conflicting portraits of 
Dr York, but his enemies and supporters do have one thing in common: passion.
It is difficult to get a sense of Dwight York from the 450-odd booklets, 
authored or edited under various noms des plumes. The curious reader will 
encounter a bewildering choice of esoteric topics culled from seemingly 
incompatible sources, including mystical Islam, ‘scientific’ theories in UFO 
lore, American Blackosophy, Edgar Cayce’s writings, US Patriot conspiracy 
theories, and Black Freemasonry. A better sense of Dr York may be gained from 
watching the man in action: by viewing his speeches filmed at his Savior’s Day 
appearances in Georgia during the late 1990s, or in the Brooklyn mosque in 
the 1980s.2 On film he appears as a robust middle-aged man—handsome, con-
fident, relaxed—and his discourse is riveting. Yet he does not behave like a 
conventional religious leader. He does not formulate doctrines, relate parables 
or explain ideas in a coherent fashion. Rather, he shakes the very foundations 
of belief. He mocks mainstream religions and attacks orthodox doctrines, 
Christian, Muslim and Jewish. He plays his audience, who roars with laugh-
ter and shout out responses as he relentlessly punctures their preconcep-
tions, challenges social conventions, and assaults their deepest conceptions of 
‘Reality’. “Don’t believe me! Do your own research! Check it out for yourself!” is 
the leitmotiv that runs through all his discourses.
York’s rhetorical style resembles other twentieth century religious and 
mystical teachers: George Ivanovich Gurdjieff, Jiddu Krishnamurti, Bhagwan 
Shree Rajneesh, and Marshall Herff Applewhite, to name but a few. By playful 
use of language, they point to the ineffable, mysterious nature of direct spiri-
tual experience. They inspire their audiences to wake up, seize the moment, 
to ‘become your own master’. Like these better-known spiritual teachers, Dr 
York’s discourse is self-consciously metaphorical and filled with paradox and 
humor. But unlike these Caucasian spiritual teachers and Indian gurus, Dr 
York is a Black man who speaks to African Americans. His rhetoric is steeped 
in Black Nationalist ideas borrowed from Marcus Garvey, Noble Drew Ali, 
Elijah Muhammad, Stokely Carmichael, and the other inspirational, revo-
lutionary ideologues. However, York’s peculiar brand of racialism does not 
correspond with the ‘fundamentalism’ of the Nation of Islam or the politi-
cal activism of the Black Panthers. Rather, it is closer to the ancient, esoteric 
schools of Gnosticism. Dr York has forged theories and myths of race, not to 
build a church or to bring about a social revolution, but rather to function as 
2 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qb9SkJypVi4. Accessed 25/09/2018.
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pedagogical devices to awaken his disciples from ‘sleep’. In Is There Eternal Life 
After Death? (York n.d.) one of his more succinct statements, he declares his 
mission as follows: “I have devoted my visit to this planet to the resurrection of 
the mentally dead, which I affectionately refer to as ‘mummies’.”
For future historians studying the “alternative altars” (Ellwood 1979) of 
Black History in America, Dwight York will occupy an important place in its 
gallery of messiahs, prophets, philosophers and social activists. Each leader 
proposed creative practical solutions to the socio-economic problems of his 
or her people. Many forged their own original theodicies, in trying to make 
sense of a people’s four hundred years of suffering since the slave trade came to 
the Americas. The result has been to imbue the African American experience 
with an uplifting moral and spiritual significance, and Dwight York is acutely 
conscious of his place in this gallery. He recreates the ongoing narrative of the 
Black Jeremiad in America (Pitney 2005) in such a way as to reinforce his own 
charismatic claims. In The Holy Tablets this becomes quite apparent:
But they all knew a savior was coming. Some thought it was Marcus Garvey 
who wanted to go back to Africa. Others thought Noble Drew Ali, oth-
ers thought it was Elijah Muhammad or his teacher, W.F.D. Muhammad. 
Others thought it was Clarence 13X, even others thought it was Martin 
Luther King, some said it was Rap Brown or Stokely Carmichael from 
the 60s. Or Eldridge Cleaver or Bobby Seale, some thought it was Ron 
Karenga or Leroi Jones … Others think it is Minister Louis Farrakhan or 
Yahweh ben Yahweh or Ben Ammi Carter. And even others think it is 
themselves, and the list of saviors goes on … from the early 1900s all the 
way up to 1970 A.D. when something new started happening. A teaching 
unlike any other started spreading.
York n.d.: 1640–1641
Dr York firmly plants his message within the social context of 1960s America: 
the race riots, the rise of the Black Panthers, and the struggle for social justice 
and the beginnings of Black Pride. As he explains in The Holy Tablets (York 
n.d.) “This made way for the first part of our liberation … what I have to give 
would liberate the mind of the Nubian Nation and the physical will follow.” 
York portrays himself as a spiritual seeker during the tumultuous period of 
Black nationalism in the 1960s in Harlem and New York, and he shows a keen 
interest in the ‘spiritual politics’ of the era. One example is the NOI’s interne-
cine struggles and disputes over the succession following the death of Elijah 
Muhammad; a situation York was quick to capitalise on. York’s writings reveal 
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his awareness of new currents in the Black nationalist/spiritual milieu, as well 
as his ability to incorporate these currents into his movement.
Like other prophets (Master Fard, Father Divine) Dwight York’s birth and 
origins remains shrouded in mystery. York claims he was born in the Sudan on 
26 June 1945. The FBI report gives the same date, but states his birthplace was 
in Baltimore, Maryland. Bilal Philips (1988), an orthodox Sunni heresiologist 
and “countercultist” (Introvigne 1995: 32) insists that York was born in 1935, but 
revised his birth date in order to bolster his charismatic claim to be the great-
grandson of the Sudanese Mahdī, whose rebirth was prophesied to occur in 
the West exactly one hundred years later; his point being that York wanted to 
fit the ḥadīth that proclaims a reformer or mujaddid will be sent every hundred 
years, in order to support his messianic claims (Phillips 1988: 1).
Little is known about Dwight York’s father. York announced in 1973 that his 
true biological father was Al Haadi Abdur Rahman al Mahdi, the grandson 
of the famous Mahdī Muḥammad Aḥmad (1845–85) who led an uprising 
against the British in Sudan. York confesses in his Rebuttal to the Slanderers 
(1989) that he was a teenaged gangster and became a “youthful offender.” The 
1993 FBI report states that in 1964 Dwight York was charged with statutory 
rape, of possession of a “dangerous weapon” and of resisting a police officer. 
York received a three-year prison sentence on 6 January 1965 but was paroled 
on 20 October 1967 (FBI Report 1993).
York encountered Muslim missionaries during his stay in prison and con-
verted to Islam. On his release in 1967, he began to attend the Islamic Mission 
of America, Inc. mosque on State Street, NY, founded by a West Indian, Sheikh 
Daoud Faisal, who became his only living spiritual teacher. Sheikh Daoud (1891–
1980) had set up two temples attracting African Americans in Philadelphia and 
in Harlem and was reported in the newspapers as having 100,000 followers. 
His mission was to establish a peaceful Muslim community, a theocracy under 
the laws of Allāh. To this end, he purchased the Talbot Estate in East Fishkill, 
Duchess County, NY. This became a famous spiritual retreat for Black Muslims, 
called Medina Salaam. Sheikh Daoud condemned the Nation of Islam for their 
unorthodox recognition of W.D. Fard as divine and embraced a more orthodox 
Sunni Islam. In 1967 he insisted that members of his mosque carry ‘Sunni iden-
tification cards’ to prove that they were not affiliated with the Nation of Islam. 
When York left the State Street Mosque to found his own Muslim movement, 
he maintained a warm relationship with his old mentor, Sheikh Daoud, and 
after his death in 1980, York continued to carry a State Street Mosque identity 
card in his wallet along with his Moorish Science Temple of America card. One 
finds reprints of these cards in many of his books.
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After his release from prison, York supported himself by peddling incense, 
African perfumes, and body oils on the streets of Harlem and Brooklyn, where 
he engaged passers-by in philosophical discussions. He assimilated a wide 
range of esoteric teachings, through street conversations, reading, and attend-
ing the sermons at local mosques and temples. In the late 1960s York began 
to preach his original racialist theory. His theory rejects the revelations of 
Noble Drew Ali and Elijah Muhammad concerning the true identity of African 
Americans as ‘Asiatics’ (Gomez 2007). York argues that that his people origi-
nated from the Sudan region of Africa. His disciples today define themselves 
as ‘Nuwaubians’ (as opposed to ‘Nubians’); a term that refers to the masses 
of African Americans still sleeping under the ‘Spell of ‘Kingu’ (a figure from 
Mesopotamian mythology, sometimes associated by York with the biblical 
Leviathan), not yet awakened to ‘Right Knowledge’. Starting with the ancient 
kingdom of Nubia in Sudan, York traces the lineage of his people back to the 
Sumerian and Egyptian civilisations, and even beyond that, to the stars. He 
finally expounds the ‘ancient astronaut’ theory proposed by Zecharia Sitchin of 
the Anunnaki, angelic extraterrestrial astronauts who arrived from the planet 
Rizq, colonised our planet, and built the first great civilisations of Sumeria and 
Egypt (Sitchen 1976).
In 1967 Dwight York enlisted friends to join his first spiritual circle, Ansaar 
Pure Sufi. He adopted the title Isa Abdullah and set up a center at 2525 Bedford 
Avenue in New York. They wore black and green tunics and adopted the sym-
bol of the Crescent, the Star of David, and the Ankh, all intertwined (Phillips 
1988: 1–6). In 1968 York changed the name to Nubian Islaamic Hebrews and the 
dress code switched to African robes (dashiki) and the black fez. His ‘Nubians’ 
were identified by a small bone in their ears and a nose ring. At that point, York 
assumed the new title of imām Isa and began expounding his racialist myth of 
the ‘Canaanites’ whose pale skin was the result of the Curse of Ham (Palmer 
and Luxton 1998: 353).
3 The Ansaaru Allah Community
Between 1973 and 1992, York claimed to be ‘the Mahdī’ and presided over a 
large Islamic community in Brooklyn known as the Ansaaru Allah Community. 
This phase began with his journey in the summer of 1973 to the Sudan, where 
he sought out the descendants of the famous Sudanese Mahdī, Muḥammad 
Aḥmad (1845–1885). Imitating the custom of pilgrims to Africa from the Nation 
of Islam, York had his photograph taken standing before the Mahdī’s tomb at 
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Khartoum University. He met members of the Mahdī’s family and had his pho-
tograph taken in their company (York 1978: 3–4). He claimed he was initiated 
into the Order of Al-Khiḍr and also into a Sufi Order of Khalwatiyya (Gardell 
1996: 226) which prepared him for his role as the mujeddid (reformer). York 
reports that this initiation took place at the junction of the White Nile and the 
Blue Nile in Egypt, where he experienced a mystical visitation. He describes his 
encountered with Archangel, Al-Khiḍr (the Muslim version of the Archangel 
Michael) who had guided Moses. He describes Al-Khiḍr as the “Highest of all 
Angels” (York 1980: 11–12). York also claims he beheld the 24 Elders of St John’s 
Revelations (York 1986a).
Upon his return to New York in 1973, York declared that he was a direct 
descendant of the Sudanese Mahdī, since he was born in June, exactly one 
hundred years after his great-grandfather, and that he had acquired a degree in 
Islamic law during his stay in Sudan. He then claimed to be the Return of the 
Mahdī by adding the title ‘Mahdī’ to his honorific name (al Imām Isa Adbullah 
Muhammad al Mahdi) and published a new book, Muḥammad Aḥmad the 
Only True Mahdi (1976). York then renamed his movement the Ansaaru Allah 
Community and discarded most of the Jewish features of the Nubian Islaamic 
Hebrews. He rationalises this development in one of his scrolls: “I opened the 
seal in 1970, as prophesied. I founded this community exactly one hundred 
years after the foundation of the Ansaru ALLAH Community … in Sudan by 
Muḥammad Aḥmad Al Mahdi, my great grandfather. There is no co-incidence!” 
(York 1986b: 79). York’s followers changed their attire to the long white robes 
and turbans of the Sudan.
3.1 The Expansion of the Ansaar Movement
The Ansaar Allah Community expanded rapidly in the Bushwick Avenue 
neighborhood, acquiring thirty buildings to set up a mosque, a large communal 
residence with a home school, a bookstore, two recording studios, several res-
taurants, a grocery store, and a laundromat. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms began its investigation into 
the AAC on the mid 1980s for suspected arson, for harbouring criminal fugi-
tives, for welfare fraud, and for purchasing and stockpiling illegal weapons. The 
FBI investigators estimated that around five hundred people were living in the 
Ansaar community during its peak in Brooklyn. One ex-member who became 
an FBI informant claimed York had as many as 2000 to 3000 followers across 
North America during the 1970s (FBI Report 1993). Men wore the long white 
robes and turbans, women wore white dresses and face veils, and the Ansaar 
literature projected an image of a rigorous, conservative Islam. York even tried 
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to legitimate his new title by applying for a new passport on 7 October 1987 
under the name Isa Al Haadi Al Mahdi. He was immediately arrested for pass-
port violation but was released on probation.
The AAC sent out missionaries to Baltimore, Cleveland, Atlanta, Newport, 
Virginia, Washington DC, and Philadelphia. They established teaching centers 
in their chain of bookstores, known as the Tents of Kedar, and held classes 
in esoteric philosophy and Blackosophy and Question & Answer meetings. 
By the 1980s Ansaaru Allah Communities had established centers in Canada 
(Montreal and Toronto), in the UK in the London suburb of Brixton, in Port of 
Spain, Trinidad, and in the Jamaican Islands (Palmer 2010). In 1983 York pur-
chased a lodge on eighty acres of woodlands in the Catskills for $145,000. He 
called it Camp Jazzir Abba and it became a summer retreat for AAC families. 
In 1988 York retired from his role as imām at the Brooklyn mosque, delegating 
a new imām, and in 1989 he began to spend most of his time at Camp Jazzir, 
where he organised military training drills and survival workshops.
3.2 Social Organisation
There were two levels of membership in the AAC. The majority of York’s disciples 
were short-term associate members who wore the appropriate garments and 
symbols, read the scrolls, and participated in the Sunday afternoon Question 
& Answer class/discussions. The more committed members would eventually 
move into the local commune housed above, or next door to, the bookstore, 
to work as ‘peddlers’ and ‘propagators’ on the streets. But the great majority 
of these ‘Muslims’, ‘Hebrews’, or ‘Moors’ would defect during the group’s next 
convulsion as it morphed into a new spiritual phase. Many Ansaars who left 
moved on to join more mainstream branches of Sunni Islam, notably Warith 
Deen Muhammad’s, World Community of Al-Islam in the West.
But at the core was a more loyal and intimate group of disciples. These were 
York’s Ministers (teachers), his Propagators (missionaries), his muhajid (body-
guards and security force), and his ‘wives’ or concubines. York’s seeming dis-
organised and rapidly mutating movement was held together by an internal 
secret Masonic order. Male disciples belonged to the Order of Melchesidek, 
and females to the Eastern Star. Based on the highly disciplined, hierarchical 
structures found in Freemasonry, these secret Orders were a stable force of 
authority amidst the transitory phases of York’s more ephemeral groups.
3.3 Gender Roles and Family Life
The Ansaar literature advocates polygamy, but only for the top leaders. As York, 
(a.k.a. Imām Isa) explains in Hadrat Fatimah, Part Two (York 1988: 23–24), ide-
ally, a man should have four wives: the Domestic Wife; the Companion Wife; 
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the Educated Wife; and the Cultured Wife. Each wife specialises in certain 
tasks and possesses unique desirable qualities: The Domestic Wife does cook-
ing and laundry, the Companion Wife listens to her husband’s problems and 
offers friendship, the Educated Wife’s job is “to be an encyclopedia of facts 
for her husband” and to educate the children, and the Cultured Wife creates 
money-making schemes for her husband, has knowledge of the arts and cul-
ture, and “is naturally talented at pleasing him sexually” (York 1988: 23–24). 
Of course, this model of Muslim polygamy is outside the norms of orthodox 
Islam, and elicited criticism; that York was running a “cult” (Philips 1988).
York’s family, his male executives and bodyguards lived in apartments with 
their own biological families near the mosque on Bushwick Avenue. Most 
of York’s female disciples lived with their husbands in the Brooklyn neigh-
borhood, but York’s wives and concubines lived in his house or in adjoining 
women-only apartments. They worked in the publishing office or in Passion, 
the recording studio. They spent their days researching material, co-authoring, 
typing, editing, printing and publishing the scrolls (under York’s supervision) 
and handling mail orders and deliveries. Some of York’s wives presided over 
the children’s boarding school as teachers or administrators.
Women in the AAC appeared to lead a segregated life, apparently relegated 
(at least in the Ansaar literature), to the domestic role. But in fact, the women 
were the executives who ran the movement behind their veils. They were the 
administrators who controlled the finances, ran the school, and handled the 
newsletter and the publishing press.
On joining the community, the new brothers and sisters would fill out a form 
and have their photographs taken. Husband and wives and unmarried couples 
were separated and lived in same-sex quarters. The sisters slept three to six 
in one bedroom, each with their own mat and bag of belongings, sharing one 
bathroom. The brothers were sent out to be Propagators and slept on shelves 
or on the floor in same-sex “barracks” (Phillips 1988). New members gave their 
money and furniture to the community. Clothing was shared also. Contact 
with outsiders, with former friends or blood kin, was forbidden. Outsiders 
were regarded as Kaafirs (unbelievers), and secular society was Dunyaa (the 
lower, material realm) (Phillips 1988).
Mothers and pregnant women applied for public assistance. Welfare 
checks were turned over to the whole community. One of Phillips’ informants 
described a woman who “was complaining that she had to turn over her whole 
check to the community, and sometimes she needed personal money to do 
things. So, she took some out secretly because it was hers. That’s how they had 
to do it.” One disciple notes, “Isa justified this dependency on welfare by saying 
that during the time of slavery all black people got a certain amount of mules 
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and after slavery it stopped, so this is a way of the white people paying black 
people back” (Phillips 1988: 151).
In 1989 two lavish weddings were held in the AAC to celebrate the marriage 
of two second-generation girls to men from the Middle East. One of them was 
Afifah, York’s eighteen-year-old daughter. She married As Sayyid Kamal Ahmad 
Hassib, the Arabic teacher in the community, in a ceremony in the mosque 
that blended Islamic and Jewish symbols and featured a procession under held 
canopies (Osinski 2007: 60–61). After that, there were no more wedding cere-
monies. Members were told to choose their own ‘mates’ in an informal fashion. 
York sometimes assigned mates for his men. On occasion, he would choose 
people who were completely inappropriate and match them together as a joke 
(interview with Jacob York and the author in Atlanta, GA, August 2003).
Children played a central role in the AAC, for the salvation of the commu-
nity depended upon them. There were over one hundred children living in the 
AAC (Philips 1988: 152). Ansaar children were separated from their parents, 
attended the Ansaar home school, and slept in the children’s quarters of the 
commune. One woman interviewed by Philips described how she decided 
not to join the AAC because she disagreed with the way they restricted the 
members’ contact with their own parents outside the AAC, and with the way 
they separated children from their parents inside the community. The Ansaar 
children were raised to speak Hebrew, Arabic and ‘Nubic’ (a language created 
by Dr York, a blend of Arabic and Ebonics), but they spoke no English. They 
could be seen by their parents and visitors chanting the Qurʾān daily in the AAC 
mosque (Palmer 2010).
York placed a great deal of emphasis on what he called “genetic breeding.” 
Predicting an apocalypse in the year 2000, he urged Ansaar parents to make 
haste and procreate the 144,000 Nubian children who would “rapture” their 
parents as the reign of Shaytan (the Devil, associated with the “Paleman”) 
winds down (York 1990). He warned his people that, because they are “sub-
liminally taught that light skin is more attractive, they will tend to choose a 
light-complexioned mate, and produce children who, in four generations will 
have straight hair.” “The Paleman,” York warned them, “will try to pick apart 
our genes and take what is beneficial to him … and incorporate it into himself.” 
That is why the Paleman is resorting to “sperm banks, fertilized egg banks and 
DNA banks” (York 1992a: 12).
Phillips’ informants report that men were denied access to their wives or 
mates unless they brought in sufficient funds. If successful, they would be 
given an appointment in the ‘Green Room’. The AAC’s practice was to per-
mit intimate relations between mates once every three months or so in the 
Green Room, also known as ‘Eden’ (a room decorated with murals of a tropical 
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plants and jungle scenes). Many of Phillips’ informants complained of how 
their sex life was controlled by Imām Isa, and of how he would seduce his dis-
ciples’ wives. It is interesting to note that the United Nuwaubian nation’s “fac-
tology” website in 2008 offers an apology for the Green Room called “Green 
Room Blues”:
Resurfacing is the history of one of our schools (Islam). Green rooms 
were lodgings for couples who achieved a certain criterion, to spend a 
night therein. We lived communally and genders were separated. A few 
faultfinding former fellows feel, ‘oh, the embarrassment … they wanted 
to control our sex lives!’ Followers joined the Ansaaruallah community to 
grow spiritually, advance the cause and were always free to leave.3
As for the men, York’s close friends and relatives tended to become Ministers. 
Most of them had wives, and their role was to preach, teach, and preside over 
Question & Answer meetings held on Sunday afternoons at the far-flung book-
stores located in the crowded black ghetto areas of the major cities in America 
and the West Indies. Below the Ministers were the Propagators, who were fun-
draisers and missionaries. They were sent out every day to work on the street as 
peddlers and propagators of ‘Right Knowledge’. They sold exotic-scented oils 
and incense on the street. Besides tableeghing (tabligh in mainstream Islam, 
means the communication of a message or revelation, interchangeable with 
dawah or propagation of faith) the Propagators sold Dr York’s esoteric books 
and handed out flyers to spiritual seekers and pedestrians of African descent, 
seeking to engage them in philosophical discussions about Right Knowledge.
3.4 The Appeal of the Ansaaru Allah Community
On the basis of interviews with members at the Atlanta, Philadelphia, and 
Brooklyn bookstores, and informal conversations with participants in the 
Tama Re festival in June 2004, as well as four of my students’ interviews with 
ex-members in Montreal (Palmer 2010: 59–68), it is possible to gain some 
insights into the appeal of the Ansaaru Allah Community. Sifting through the 
data, we found that there were three main motives for conversion to this radi-
cal, racialist new religion:
1. The appeal of Black Nationalism. Several informants describe their quest 
for a new racial identity uncontaminated by white stereotypes of the 
‘negro’ or the ‘coloured person’ in America;
2. The quest for the ‘true Islam’;
3 See www://factology.com/20020921.htm#york. Accessed 28/01/2008.
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3. The need for moral reform. Many informants claimed they chose the 
AAC’s strict communal life based on cleanliness and prayer, away from the 
temptation of drugs, wine, recreational sex and idle materialistic pursuits.
4 Conflicts and Controversy
For the first few years of its existence, the AAC was noncontroversial. The group 
moved into impoverished, drug-ridden Brooklyn, Philadelphia and other cit-
ies, and quickly established order and cleanliness. The AAC’s security force or 
mujahim (sic) (mujahideen is the term for Islamic guerrilla fighters in main-
stream Islam) formed a vigilante team to protect the neighbourhood from 
shoplifters and armed robberies. They managed to rid Bushwick Avenue of 
drug dealers. In the first news reports that came out about the group, both the 
Mayor and the Brooklyn police went on record commending the AAC for the 
good work they were doing in the Bushwick community (interview with Paul 
Greenberg, documentary filmmaker).
By the late 1970s the AAC was under investigation by the FBI. A network of 
interest groups began to form in the mid-1970s, to share information regard-
ing the AAC. Among them were the orthodox Muslim missions, the NYPD, the 
Welfare Office, the IRS, the INS, the FBI, the ATF, and, most importantly, dis-
gruntled ex-members who were beginning to form their own, informal net-
works. The 1993 FBI report records the various complaints received from these 
different interest groups. This report cites fifteen confidential informants and 
calls for a “full domestic terrorism investigation” of the AAC (FBI Report 1993: 
2). The “criminal connections” of the AAC are mentioned, and the report notes 
that many of York’s disciples are ex-convicts or parole violators. The 1993 FBI 
Report portrays the AAC as a criminal enterprise disguised as a religious com-
munity in order to harbor thieves, murderers and escaped convicts. Its appar-
ent success was only due to the vigilantism, intimidation and “protection 
racket” of York’s private militia (FBI Report 1993).
A handful of York’s former disciples, who had held high positions in the 
AAC, became its most vociferous critics. Several women launched pater-
nity suits against York, and two of his former wives were to file child sup-
port actions against him (Osinski 2007: 142–53). Several male defectors from 
the AAC became FBI informants. Siddiq Muhammad Redd had joined 1970, 
and worked for eight years as York’s driver, accompanying him to Baltimore, 
Washington DC, and Trinidad to open branches of the AAC. After eleven years 
of service, Redd left the AAC in 1981, claiming it was not “true Islam” (Osinski 
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2007: 69). Siddiq’s name appears as Saadik Redd in the 1993 FBI Report, where 
he is quoted describing the harsh living conditions inside the AAC. He claims 
he shared barracks with other men in an abandoned house with no heat or 
hot water or beds. He noted that the conditions in York’s house were “totally 
opposite from how the people lived.” He described York as an irresponsible 
womaniser: “He would meet a person and their wife and sleep with their wife 
just to show he had control over you” (Phillips 1988: 140–149).
The vigilante peacekeeping activity of the AAC’s muhajim is interpreted in 
this report as a “protection racket.” FBI’s informant ‘T-C’ claimed that in the 
summer of 1990 the AAC “muscled their way into a security contract with a 
number of local businesses and used force against the security company 
already under contract” (FBI Report 1993). On apprehending a shop-lifter the 
AAC guards would not call the police, but beat up the culprit themselves. T-3 
also claimed that the AAC raked in $5000 to $6000 a week in protection pay-
ment from intimidated storeowners (FBI Report 1993). Ironically, just as the 
FBI Report was being complied, the AAC was simultaneously receiving con-
gratulations from Ed Koch, New York’s mayor in the 1980s, for purging the 
streets of crime and drugs. At the time, it was under investigation by the New 
York Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for suspected arson, for harbouring criminal 
fugitives, for welfare fraud, and for purchasing and stockpiling illegal weapons 
(FBI Report 1993: 6–12).
The Welfare Office was investigating the possibility of welfare fraud. FBI 
informant ‘T-9’ claimed that all the women in the AAC commune were on pub-
lic assistance. As soon as one woman would become pregnant, T-9 claimed, all 
the other women would take a specimen of her urine to the women’s center 
in Manhattan to obtain a letter verifying their pregnancy. By this means, every 
single woman was able to apply for welfare as an unwed mother, each using a 
different, fake address. These checks would be cashed and handed over to the 
AAC to support the commune (FBI Report 1993).
A criminal investigation was launched in 1979 into the murder of Horace 
Green (Wagonner 1979). Green had antagonised the Ansaars by lobbying to 
halt what he feared as the AAC’s “takeover” of his neighbourhood in Brooklyn. 
On the morning of 19 April 1979 he was shot with two bullets in the head as he 
went to open the daycare center that he managed on Hart Street, near the AAC 
mosque (Anon. 2002). Suspicion fell upon Roy Savage, known as Hasim the 
Warrior who (according to FBI informants T-5 and T-4) was part of the muja-
him. But Savage’s guilt was never proven, and the murder remains unsolved to 
this day.
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An arson investigation was launched after a series of fires broke out near 
the AAC mosque on Bushwick Avenue, between 1976 and 1991; five fires which 
just so happened to facilitate the AAC’s expansion in the area. According to 
the FBI Report, “it is common knowledge that many buildings in the areas in 
Brooklyn … had mysteriously burned [and] York would subsequently purchase 
these properties at city auctions” (FBI Report 1993: 6). An ATF investigation 
into illegal firearms possession was also launched. In 1983 York had bought 
an 81-acre camp near the town of Liberty in Sullivan County, NY, for Camp 
Jazzir Abba. The AAC constructed six bungalows and huge house built around 
a double-wide trailer and proceeded to hold summer camps for AAC families. 
Armed guards and dogs manned the gate of Camp Jazzir Abba. Inspectors 
were sent in to check on building codes and land use violations (interview with 
Jacob York in Atlanta, GA, August 2003).
An AAC newsletter from that period advertises workshops in survival skills, 
in preparation for impending disasters. It features a photograph of military 
training exercises with rifles. In October 1983 the NYSP received complaints 
of gunfire coming from Camp Jazzir Abba in Sullivan County, New York. The 
FBI informant T-2 claimed he had seen many guns and thousands of rounds of 
ammunition at the Camp Abba Jazzir (FBI Report 1993: 9–11). In May 1989 the 
BATF began to investigate the guns purchased at various guns shops on Long 
Island, by two of York’s disciples, who gave the AAC address and were accom-
panied and driven away by Dr York (FBI Report 1993: 8–10). The BATF reported 
that nineteen assault rifles, one M1 and over four thousand rounds of ammuni-
tion were purchased in May to June 1989. The FBI Report features a list of the 
guns purchased in the New York area—seven Ruger mini-14’s, four twelve gage 
shotguns, and one .22 caliber rifle—all purchased within a four-month period.
4.1 The Muslim Counter-Cult Opposition
In 1979 Dwight York formed a music group called Doctor York and the Passion 
and began to perform in the nightclubs and dance halls of New York, an activ-
ity explained in his writings as a “sacrificial missionary” (Phillips 1988: 13). 
According to filmmaker Paul Greenwood, “the notion of an imām working 
as an entertainer was offensive to some orthodox Muslim leaders, as was the 
Ansaar custom of soliciting funds on trains.”
By the late 1970s a counter-cult movement had formed among Orthodox 
Muslim groups in the Brooklyn area, whose opposition to the AAC was based 
on theological concerns, in particular York’s messianic, prophetic claims. 
These Muslim heresiologists included Abdullah ibn Ridn Al-Bidaah, Director 
of the General Aministration for Qur’aans in Ridh, Dr Ahmad Muhammad Jalli, 
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Assistant Professor of Islamic theology at Omdurman University in Sudan, Dr 
Maneth Al-Johani, Secretary General, World Assembly of Muslim Youth. They 
denounced the group as “a dangerous anti-Islamic cult operating in America” 
(Phillips 1988: Appendix III). Bilal Phillips, an Islamic scholar and counter-
cultist, wrote a book, The Ansar Cult in America dedicated to “exposing the 
falsehood of heretical movements disguised under the cloak of Islam” (Phillips 
1988). Initially, York weathered this criticism with aplomb. He denounced Bilal 
Phillips and other orthodox Sunni leaders in his scrolls, while freely appropri-
ating passages from their sacred literature.
In 1989 Dr York launched a counterattack against Bilal Phillips and his 
Muslim critics. Writing as Al Mahdi As Sayyid Isa al Haadi, he published The 
Ansar Cult. The Truth about the Ansaruallah Community in America. Rebuttal 
to the Slanderers (1989). In this York denounces all previous translations of 
the Qurʾān, claiming only his nineteenth translation to be the supreme Code 
of the Qurʾān. He condemns mainstream Muslims for hiding the “fact” that 
Muḥammad was Black. He dismisses the first three Khalifs as “usurpers” and 
rejects Abū Bakr as Muḥammad’s successor, arguing that since all the prophets 
of the Bible and the Qurʾān were Black and Muḥammad was Black, since his 
friend and successor, Abū Bakr was White, this means that the lineage of Islam 
was compromised from the beginning (Phillips 1088: 181–82). Next, York traces 
the true line of succession back to his grandfather, the Sudanese Mahdī (whose 
birthday he shared), which proves that he, Dwight York, was the one and only 
legitimate successor to Muḥammad. He even challenges the leadership of the 
Nation of Islam by proclaiming that he, Al Mahdi, was ‘The One’ whom Elijah 
Muhammad of the Nation of Islam had come to herald.
In 1992, Dr York suddenly rejected Islam, and denounced all Muslims. He 
produced a book 360 Questions to Ask The Orthodox Sunni Muslims (1992d) 
attacking Islam. Reverting to his former Hebrew themes, York announced he 
was now “The Lamb, Liberator of Women.” Women were told to take off their 
veils and modest robes. They were to be allowed to wear shorts, drive cars and 
preach in the mosque, now called “the tabernacle.” An explanation for this 
unexpected volte face was provided by York’s estranged son, Jacob York:
Then Dad wrote [360 Questions to Ask The Orthodox Sunni Muslims]. This 
got a negative reaction from the Muslim community. He already had a lot 
of New York mosques opposing him. This was after the assassination of 
a Jewish journalist by a Muslim. The same man came to see Dad the day 
before and asked him to come downstairs and talk to him. But Dad never 
went, because he was changing his clothes and kept getting delayed. 
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There were always a lot of people waiting to talk to him. Then, the next 
day he heard this guy had murdered a Jew. He concluded that someone 
had taken out a contract on him as a heretic, that if he’d gone downstairs, 
it would have been him who was killed. He was anti-Muslim after that.
interview with Jacob York in Atlanta, Georgia, August 2003. See also Palmer 
2010: 68
Here, Jacob refers to the 5 November 1990 assassination of Meir Kahane, 
founder of the Jewish Defense League, by a Muslim terrorist, Sayid Nosair. 
Nosair was acquitted of Kahane’s murder but was later tried and convicted for 
his role in the 1993 WTC bombing (Juergensmeyer 2003: 59). After his close 
encounter with an assassin, York debriefed the Anssaru Allah Community and 
changed his movement’s name to The Holy Tabernacle Ministries, reverting 
to his earlier Hebrew motifs. He got rid of the crescent and adopted the Star 
of David as the main symbol. He discarded his titles of Imām and Mahdī, and 
called himself Rabboni or ‘The Lamb’.
In 1993 York’s movement adopted the title, the United Nuwaubian Nations 
of Moors (UNNM). They sold all their properties in Brooklyn, and the executive 
leaders relocated to 475 acres of farmland in Georgia and began constructing 
an Egyptian village to be the Mecca in the West. They began to call themselves 
the Yamassee Native American Moors of the Creek Nation and claimed their 
sacred territory in the state of Georgia (called ‘The Land’) was a ‘Sovereign 
Nation’. Upon arriving in Georgia, York’s followers began to refer to their Master 
Teacher by his tribal name, as Maku or Chief Black Eagle. They now belonged 
to the Yamassee tribe, and it became fashionable to dress in cowboy gear, or in 
Plains Indians dress (Osinski 2007: 122).
4.2 The Issue of Plagiarism
Dr York has been accused of plagiarism by many, including journalist William 
Osinski, and the Muslim heresiologist, Bilal Phillips. Even York’s his own son, 
Jacob, said in our interview. “My Dad was [a] reader. In the early days he wrote 
for days at a time—but he used to plagiarize a lot.” Jacob then told a story to 
prove his point:
He was given Zecharia Sitchen’s The Twelfth Planet by a brother who 
came in and said, ‘You’ve got to read this book!’ So, he stayed up all night 
reading it. The next day, he sent the brother and his whole family off on 
a mission to the Trinidad mosque to get him out of the way so he could 
steal the book. He gave it to his secretary and told her to incorporate it 
into the philosophy. He would give books and ideas to his all-girl research 
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team, and they would cobble it all together. He would then look it over, 
edit it—and it would come out in the next publication.
In new religious movements the line between inspirational influences and 
plagiarism can be very tenuous. It appears reasonable to assume that many 
mystics and prophets undergo a period of apprenticeship perusing esoteric 
writings and attending the discourses of spiritual masters, and that these influ-
ences may be evident in their theology.
Inspired prophets do not consider themselves subject to the mundane 
rules of copyright that govern the material plane. Dr York complains that the 
“Holy Books” have been adulterated and “plagiarized,” and that his mission is 
to restore the revelations of the Eloheem to their original form. In The Bible 
Mastery Series he complains:
Both of these so-called holy books [Bible and Koran] that you hold in 
your hand today, were plagiarized and taken from ancient tablets such as 
the Enuma Elish (which can be found in The Holy Tablets), as a guide for 
you by Tammuz, one of the Eloheem (Elo-Heem, Aramic/Hebrew—these 
beings) assigned to you.
York reveals that each “copy” of the “ancient tablets”—the Torah, then the New 
Testament, and then the Koran—“was getting further away from the original 
written truth,” and that the true versions of these original “tablets” can be 
found only in The Holy Tablets.
Gomez offers a sensitive analysis of plagiarism in his discussion of Noble 
Drew’s process of “innovation, reciprocation and appropriation”: “Noble Drew 
certainly initiated some ideas, but he just as certainly borrowed other concepts 
and was influenced by the whirl of events around him. The line of demarcation 
[that separates] original from recycled ideas … are not always evident” (Gomez 
2005: 215). In his broader discussion of mutual influences among Black social 
movements in the early nineteenth century, Gomez observes, “the congruency 
of perspective among the various movements allowed for the absorption of 
multiple influences without necessarily compromising the integrity of the 
core beliefs and practices.”
These insights would apply to Dr York’s use of source material. Dr York 
clearly pays homage to his gifted predecessors, but he cannot be dismissed as 
a mere copyist, for he has developed his own synthesis of earlier doctrines. On 
occasion he uses these disparate influences in the most inspired ways. While 
his sources are recognisable, his evocations are not dry or stale. He rewrites the 
past in order to revitalise it for the present.
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5 Interpreting Dr York’s Movement
As the account above of Dr Malachi Z. York’s forty-year movement demon-
strates, this charismatic prophet has founded, renamed, or debriefed an exotic 
series of at least seven Black spirituality movements. Over the years, York’s 
disciples have experienced corresponding shifts in their racial identity. They 
have defined themselves as black Jews or Muslims, as ‘Brown’ Moors, as the 
‘Red’ Indians, and even as the ‘Green’ descendants of extraterrestrials whose 
skin turned rusty as they entered our atmosphere. Dr York has guided his dis-
ciples along a convoluted path full of surprises. They have tried on and dis-
carded the ‘masks’ of Hebrews, Egyptians, Moors, Muslims, Yamassee Indians, 
Freemasons, and Shriners.
York’s critics and supporters have given four reasons that account for these 
radical changes: 1. they are a marketing strategy; 2. they are signs of a fake reli-
gion; 3. they are a pedagogical device; 4. they are a test of loyalty; and 5. they 
are part of a survival strategy. A sixth interpretation can be found in the sociol-
ogy of religion, in Colin Campbell’s model of the cultic milieu (Campbell 2002 
[1972]). Hostile ex-members tend to interpret Dr York’s eclecticism and experi-
mentation as a marketing strategy aimed at Black youth. A former Ansaar, 
Abdul-Muta’aal, explained the group’s change of name to Nubian Islamic 
Hebrews as a “psychological ploy”:
[Its purpose was] to attract people, black people, anyone seeking 
Islamic knowledge, also to attract black Jews. The title of the organi-
zation has changed and will keep changing as a psychological ploy to 
attract people and replenish those who leave. There was a time when 
the … African drum was a symbol … and when the steel drum became 
the … symbol to accommodate people coming from the Caribbean. He 
took on titles like the Lion of Judah because a lot of these people were 
Rastafarians formerly. He packaged himself wisely. He just reorganized 
his presentation.
Phillips 1988: 165–66
A similar explanation was provided by Dr York’s estranged son, Jacob York, who 
claimed the purpose of the changes was to raise funds: “This was just a way to 
make people spend money. Every time he changed the religion, people would 
have to buy new clothes, new books, new oils. He was a great marketer.”
York’s critics claim the changes demonstrate the essential phoniness and 
illegitimate nature of York’s religion. Journalist William Osinski portrays York as 
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a salesman who, in order to “sell his utopia,” needed to “find a new way to dress 
up.” “Packaging is everything,” Osinski writes: “like any successful businessman 
launching a new venture, York test-marketed” (Osinski 2007: 105). An FBI agent 
expresses the opinion that, “York was a criminal who was simply trying to use 
race as a smokescreen for his plan to make Tama Re the base for expansion of 
his criminal empire” (Osinski 2007: 215). Phillip Arnn, a researcher with the 
Watchman Fellowship (a Christian fundamentalist organisation) called the 
Nuwaubian nation “almost a caricature of a cult” (Osinski 2007: 177).
York’s disciples posit a more sophisticated interpretive framework and explain 
the radical transitions in their movement as a pedagogical device. They claim 
the Master Teacher has intentionally guided them through the world’s great 
religious traditions in order to educate them, and to cultivate an ‘overstanding’ 
of all the world’s religions. This notion is expressed in an HTM publication:
We, the Nubian people, went through a religious metamorphosis. In the 
1960s to the 1970s our spiritual guide Rabboni … took us through the reli-
gion of Christianity … Also in the 1970s he taught us about African, 5%, 
Hebrews and Islamic doctrines which was the time of knowledge. During 
the 1980s he educated us about Egyptology and Islam, which gave us wis-
dom. Now in the 1980s there is no faith in any foolishness, only truth and 
wisdom you couldn’t possibly overstand! He has taught us that he took 
us through all these phases in order to create an immunity from all the 
garbage that we have been taught all of our lives by the evil one. We had 
to live through it to make it.
York 1992b
They claim this teaching method encourages skepticism. As one disciple put 
it, “When I talk to a Jew or a Christian, I can really talk, because I have lived 
through their experience. So, I can’t be fooled.”
A fourth explanation is presented by Dr York himself; that the starting trans-
formations in his movement are tests of loyalty. He elaborates on this point:
At first, many people joined the mission because it was the style: to be 
‘black’ and cultural. I drew many hypocrites—phonies who just wanted 
to ‘play Muslim’. They didn’t want to work to build a nation. They just 
wanted to dress in African clothing, play drums and listen to me speak. 
I called them the ‘first fruits’. In nineteen seventy and two AD, after 
returning from Sudan I drew a literal line in the masjid floor, and said: 
those who wanted their ‘culture’, but did not want to sacrifice to build for 
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the future were excluded. The mission was then carried on by those who 
were willing to work for perfection.
York 1992b
In 1993, after York relocated the group to Georgia, his disciples explained the 
new “cowboy” theme as a test of loyalty: “in order to get everybody away from 
doing their own thing; those that truly followed the Lamb wherever he may 
lead them, trusted in him and wore western clothes and even listen to country 
western music, simply because he asked them to” (York 1992b).
A fifth explanation of York’s modus operandi is to analyze it as a survival 
strategy. It is interesting to note that when faced with a serious level of opposi-
tion, York’s characteristic response has been to flee and hide. Instead of con-
fronting his enemies, or pursuing legal courses of self-defence, York tends to 
resort to mythic solutions to conflict. When the AAC in Brooklyn met with cul-
tural opposition from the network that included the welfare office, the police, 
the FBI, the BATF, ex-members and Muslim leaders, York withdrew to Camp 
Jazzir Abba in the Catskills. There he waxed apocalyptic, the group bought 
guns and established a survivalist training camp. By the 1990s the ATF had 
become too intrusive, and the AAC was the subject of a police investigation 
into the murders committed by his former bodyguard, Hasim the Warrior, and 
York’s life had just been threatened by a Muslim assassin. York responded to 
this pressure in his characteristically chameleonesque fashion. He discarded 
his ‘Muslim’ persona, changed his title, his costume, and assumed a ‘Hebrew’ 
identity. This established a precedent for how York and his followers would 
respond to conflict in the future by changing shape, recasting their corporate 
image, and assuming new titles and new disguises.
A sixth explanation for York’s eclecticism and mutability may be found in 
the micro-sociology of NRMs. If we look closely at York’s cultural background, 
and if we scrutinise the ecological niche that sustained his ephemeral spiritual 
groups, we come face to face with the ‘cultic milieu’.
5.1 The ‘Cultic Milieu’
The British sociologist Colin Campbell (1972) coined the term “cultic milieu” 
to describe the spiritual underground of esoteric teachings, pseudo-scientific 
theories and “forgotten knowledge” found in most post-industrial societies. He 
argues that it is in this fertile milieu that “cults” take root, sprout up, and begin 
to grow:
The cultic milieu can be regarded as the cultural underground of society … 
it includes all deviant belief systems and their associated practices  … 
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Unorthodox science, alien and heretical religion, deviant medicine … the 
world of the occult, and the magical, spiritualism and psychic phenom-
ena, of mysticism and new thought, of alien intelligences and lost civi-
lizations  … these heterogeneous assortment of cultural items can be 
regarded as one entity—the cultic milieu.
Campbell 2002: 53–54
The cultic milieu tends to thrive during periods of revolution and social fer-
ment, and it is oppositional by nature. It is a zone where proscribed, forbid-
den knowledge can be accessed; a place where countercultural ideas, theories, 
speculations can be presented, discussed, mutated and exchanged by spiritual 
seekers and leaders of ad hoc groups who come and go. But the cultic milieu 
is not a ‘cult’ per se, but rather a “society of seekers” (Campbell 2002: 65). The 
sole thread that unites these denizens of the cultic milieu is a shared rejec-
tion of the paradigms, the orthodoxies, of their societies. Their ideas are con-
sidered ‘unscientific’, hence unacceptable to the social, cultural and political 
mainstream, although some ideas (like reincarnation) may eventually become 
fashionable and mainstream (Campbell 2002: 61).
The ‘White cultic milieu’ is well-known to scholars of Western esotericism. 
It is accessible to the public through New Age fairs, bookstores, practitio-
ners and their websites. But the ‘Black cultic milieu’ is barely visible to White 
New Agers, or to the general population—and it has been virtually ignored 
by the anti-cult or “cult-awareness” groups (such as the Citizen’s Freedom 
Foundation, Cult Awareness Network, American Family Foundation, and the 
International Cultic Studies Association). Historians of Black History, how-
ever, are quite familiar with this milieu, and have described it in considerable 
detail (but without referring to Campbell’s 1972 model). George Eaton Simpson 
(1978) and Essien-Udom (1962) each describe the rich matrix of Black occult-
ism in Harlem that contributed to the education of many prophet-founders, 
such as Noble Drew Ali, founder of the Moorish Science Temple of America. 
Michael A. Gomez describes how he was nurtured in the cultural environment 
of Harlem in the early 1900s:
The black diasporic experience had become an ontological question of 
the first order, such that religion, ideology, political discourse, and cul-
tural production were all called upon … to achieve some degree of over-
arching, perhaps totalizing, resolution … it was into such a tempestuous 
swirl of intense self-examination and energetic reconfiguration that 
Noble Drew Ali entered.
Gomez 2005: 214
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Characteristics of the ‘Black cultic milieu’ have also been described by 
Jeremiah Wilson Moses (1988) who notes the “ideological proximity of 
Christian, Islamic, Hebraic, and atheistic black nationalism  … and the mes-
sianic rhetoric characteristic of these movements” (Moses 1988: 185).
5.2 Dr York and the ‘Black Cultic Milieu’
The Moorish Science Temple of America was established in 1913 in New York 
by Timothy Noble Drew (1886–1929) who called himself Prophet Noble Drew 
Ali and claimed to be the last in a line of prophets stretching from Buddha, 
Confucius, and Zoroaster (Ahmed 1991: 18). Noble Drew Ali said he was com-
missioned by the king of Morocco to awaken American Blacks to their true 
identity, and offered them his own translation of the Holy Koran, also known 
as Circle Seven; which, on closer examination, turned out to be the plagiarised 
text of The Aquarian Gospel of Jesus, authored by Levi H. Dowling (1844–1911).
Dwight York had been a member of the MSTA in his youth and carried a 
Moorish Science Temple of America ‘passport’ in his wallet. Since the earliest 
stages, Dr York and his followers have defined themselves as ‘Moors’ and worn 
the fez. York reprinted (or ‘translated’) Noble Drew’s (already plagiarised text) 
The Holy Koran: Circle 7 (n.d.) to be sold in the Tents of Kedar bookstores. His 
preface notes that “Prophet Noble Drew Ali prepared these lessons through the 
guidance of Allāh” and recommends they be read as “a great source of inspi-
ration.” Photographs of Noble Drew are featured, but Dr York’s photograph 
appears on the front and last page of the book.
Dr York also drew on the Black Hebrew prophets’ materials. Black Jews claim 
to be the Ethiopian Jews, the Falashi, whose names were taken away during 
slavery, and who are the true descendants of some of the original tribes of the 
ancient Hebrews of the Torah (Simpson 1978: 268–269). Prophet F. S. Cherry 
was the founder of a Black Hebrew association that lasted between 1919 
and 1931, and after him at least eight Black Hebrew NRMs arose in Harlem. 
According to Bilal Phillips, “these groups were given to splintering, disappear-
ing and reorganizing” (1988: 2–3). Dr York founded his Nubian Islamic Hebrew 
Mission in 1968, and the photographs of Ben Ammi Carter and Yahweh Ben 
Yahweh, both leaders of the more successful Black Hebrew movements in the 
late twentieth century, soon appeared in York’s scrolls.
York also borrowed heavily from his mentor, Sheikh Daoud, and from the 
Nation of Islam. He quotes from the writings of Elijah Muhammad and appro-
priates his creation myth of the evil scientist, Yacoub, who bred the first White 
babies through a laboratory experiment on the Island of Patmos. York does not 
denounce Elijah Muhammad, rather, in The Holy Tablets, he acknowledges the 
Messenger as “the third Elijah sent to prepare the way for myself, Malachi … 
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the Elijah for this day and time” (n.d.: 1642). Thus, he is suggesting that he is in 
the role of Jesus Christ in relation to the Messenger, who stands in the place 
of John that Baptist. York elaborates on this claim in Malachi: I Will Send you 
Elijah, a scroll that reprints many of Elijah Muhammad’s sayings (York c.1993). 
York begins by apologising to the NOI for a statement he made in a previous 
scroll that offended them, and explains he was merely talking about “Do for 
Self.” Then he claims to have discovered, through listening to old tapes of Elijah 
Muhammad’s sermons from the Savior’s Day Gatherings of the 1950s and 
1960s, prophecies of a coming Elijah who could be none other than himself, 
Dr Malachi Z. York.
Dr York also demonstrates a knowledge of the lessons of Clarence 13X of the 
Five-Percent Nation, for he actually reprinted the latter’s teachings and sold 
them the Tents of Kedar bookstores, entitled The Book of the Five Percenters 
(1991). This book contrasts the Five Percenters’ “distorted lessons” with the 
original NOI version and then abrogates both see York’s “Real Meaning by the 
Reformer” (Knight 2007: 202). York’s goal in this publication appears to be to 
merge the Gods and the Ansaars under his own leadership: “We are establish-
ing the greatest black nation on the planet earth … guide by ALLAH Himself … 
by way of me … Let’s work together. United we are an undefeatable force” (York 
as Al Mahdi As Sayyid Isa al Haadi 1993: 625).
York may have based his three pillars of “Right Knowledge, Right Wisdom 
and Right Overstanding” on Afrika Bambaataa’s “fifth element” of the Zulu 
Nation, or vice versa. It is often difficult to know who borrowed from whom. 
Certainly, Afrika Bambaataa’s anti-doctrine of “Sound Right Reasoning” mean-
ing “factology” as opposed to blind beliefs is quoted in the Zulu Nation and 
the Nuwaubian Nation alike (Chang 2005: 90). It is also possible that Dr York 
“grafted” his three “Rights R’s” from Clarence 13X’s “Supreme Mathematics.” 
The Ansaars, in turn, have influenced the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE). 
Michael M. Knight, in his study of the Five Percenters, finds “a massive amount 
of [Ansaar] literature has smuggled ideas and motifs into the NGE” (Knight 
2007: 203). Many of York’s linguistic breakdowns resonate with Five Percenters, 
such as “gospel” as “ghost spell”; understanding as “overstanding” (a Rastafari 
term), and prayer for “undertakings” as “overtakings.”
Sun Ra’s legacy has influenced York’s movement, according to Ian Simmons 
(2009), writing for the Fortean Times. A jazz musician, composer and mystic 
who toured with his jazz band, Arkestra, Sun Ra preached a radical gnostic 
philosophy (Sun Ra’s “equation”) that combined Kabbala, Rosicrucianism, 
channeled revelations, Freemasonry, and Black Nationalism. His “equation” 
inspired many eminent jazz musicians to join his commune in Philadelphia. 
Elements of Sun Ra’s Afrofuturism and Egyptian imagery are found in Dr York’s 
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scrolls, and the notion of the “Mothership” can be traced to Sun Ra (Petsche 
2016: 12, 15).
5.3 The Ansaaru Allah and Islamic Movements in America
Paradoxically, much of the appeal of the Ansaaru Allah Community was that 
it appeared to embody the “real Islam” or the “true Islam.” Visitors to the thriv-
ing Ansaar village in Brooklyn between 1973–1992 would see veiled women in 
the streets, men in flowing white robes and children chanting Arabic verses 
from the Qurʾān in the mosque. In many of the interviews cited in Philip’s 1988 
book, as well as those conducted by this researcher, disciples said they joined 
because they felt the AAC was the “true” or “real” Islam. Of course, on deeper 
acquaintance with Dr York’s teachings, the heretical elements that Bilal Philips 
(1988) points to become apparent.
Over the forty-odd years of its existence, the Nuwaubian movement has 
established its own ecological niche within the Black cultic milieu. It began 
with the formation of small, experimental ‘cult-like’ groups, like Ansar Pure 
Sufi and the Nubian Hebrew, that were eclectic, syncretic, and short-lived. 
Next, its fluid boundaries commenced to harden into a sect-like formation dur-
ing the Ansaaru Allah Community phase. For Campbell, a sect is distinct from 
a cult, because “their belief in a revealed truth leads to a believer-nonbeliever 
distinction, rather than the notion of degrees of seekership prevailing in the 
cultic milieu in general” (2002: 64). Dr York began to reshape his movement 
into a ‘sect’ when he attacked the credentials of his rival prophets. One of his 
scrolls, The Truth: Who do People Say I Am? (York 1992c), features photographs 
of twenty Black spiritual teachers, interspersed with disclaimers like: “We 
need the whole truth, not half-truths or opinions or spookism or myth or the 
paleman’s religion.” Photographs of Clarence 13X, Marcus Garvey, Ben Ammi, 
Yahweh Ben Yahweh and Minister Farrakhan are displayed with the caption, 
“These people can’t save us. They don’t know the way. They speak well, but they 
get nothing done. They complain, but that’s all. No more lies, no more games!” 
Once Dr York revealed himself as Al Mahdi, he offered one, exclusive path to 
salvation, as is typical of a ‘sect’.
But in 1992 York suddenly debriefed the AAC and rejected Islam. He dis-
solved the sectarian boundaries of his movement, and it quickly subsided back 
into the Black cultic milieu. The Holy Tabernacles Ministry (HTM) emerged, 
drawing on the wide range of materials available in this rich, fermenting com-
post heap of forgotten knowledge. The HTM was characterised by a rampant 
eclecticism and syncretism, embracing Hebrew motifs blended with ancient 
Egyptian, Babylonian symbols, ufology and Masonic lore.
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All this borrowing did not necessarily imply that the HTM was opening up 
to other study groups or movements in the Black cultic milieu. Rather, it was 
appropriating their ideas and withdrawing inward, away from its competi-
tors. As the HTM’s boundaries expanded, they also commenced to crystallise, 
so that by 1993 when York changed the name of his movement to the United 
Nuwaubian Nation of Moors, it had become a self-contained ‘spiritual super-
market’ offering access to an eclectic range of doctrines, myths, theories, and 
rituals that had been appropriated from other groups.
A study of other Black nationalist NRMs indicates that as they mature, many 
of them seek to purify and solidify their own religious tradition (Lee 1996). As 
Colin Campbell (2002 [1972]: 55) explains, “the continuing pressure to syncre-
tization” is a unifying force, counteracting the fragmentary tendencies cause 
by enormous diversity in cultural items. One finds this “pressure to syncreti-
zation” in The Commandment Keepers, founded by Wentworth Matthew in 
the 1920s in Harlem. This NRM started out as an eclectic Jewish-Christian syn-
thesis, but Matthew applied twice to be a member of the New York Board of 
rabbis, and after his death his scrupulously Jewish orientation toward black 
Judaism was carried forward by the current rabbi of the Beth Shalom B’nai 
Zaken Ethiopian Congregation in Chicago. A similar “pressure” can be noted 
after Warith Muhammad assumed the leadership of the NOI upon his father 
Elijah Muhammad’s death in 1975. Warith Muhammad proceeded to purge the 
movement of Christian apocalyptic rhetoric, of UFO lore, and of anti-white 
sentiments in order to lead his congregation back into mainstream Sunni 
Islam (Lee 1996).
But York’s movement has behaved quite differently. To use an agricultural 
metaphor, most of the ‘Black’ NRMs take root in the matrix of the Black cul-
tic milieu, but then they tend to grow like saplings, and sprout up vertically 
towards a self-contained maturity. York’s ephemeral groups, however, behave 
more like rhizomes (for example, potatoes or strawberries). Lacking firm stems 
or ‘trunks’, they reach out their tentacles or tubers, pulling up their shallow 
roots to drift horizontally, sprouting up as new plants, nurtured in the rich soil 
of the Black cultic milieu. For over forty years, York has continued to borrow 
from many sources and his movement waxes ever more eclectic as it matures. 
To facilitate this nomadic process, York must periodically fold up his tents, 
debrief his schools, and contradict his own (exoteric) teachings; behavior that 
might appear to outsiders as being counterproductive.
Dr York’s critics have interpreted his erratic behavior as ‘proof’ of the insin-
cerity of his vision. But for his disciples, Dr York’s cryptic style of teaching 
points to an underlying message. This message corresponds to the Gnostic 
720 Palmer
revelation of the mystical Self; a Self that, for African Americans, has been 
long suppressed by slavery, racial stereotyping, self-hatred and prevailing igno-
rance. Kurt Rudolph begins his classic book, Gnosis: The Nature and History of 
Gnosticism, by observing that this ancient religion “was known almost exclu-
sively through the work of its opponents” (Rudolph 1987: 9). By reading the 
heresiological literature of Christian apologists, he notes, “we receive but a 
weak and distorted reflection” of this ancient religion of the Gnostics.
Randolph might be describing the current situation regarding the Dr York’s 
disciples. To date, the public has received their information through stigma-
tising news reports about the ‘Nuwaubian nightmare’; the ‘quasi-religious 
sect’ founded by a ‘black militant’. In the only two book-length studies of Dr 
York, one by a Muslim heresiologist (Bilal Phillips) and the other by a journal-
ist (William Osinski), the word “cult” and “evil” appear in their titles. York’s 
chameleon-like strategy is perfectly consistent with the inner goals of his secret 
mystery school: to lead his disciples on a winding journey backwards in time, 
unpeeling layer after layer of false or incomplete identity, towards their origins 
as godlike beings, utterly alien and inaccessible to the laws and limitations of 
the Paleman during the reign of Shaytan (Satan). Thus, the external forms of 
York’s movement are consistent with his underlying spiritual message, which 
is a Gnostic revelation of the mystical Self: the Self that has been obscured by 
the miasma of racial stereotyping, self-hatred and self-forgetfulness in which 
the so-called Black man in America has been enmired.
6 Conclusion
The question of what place Dr York’s movement has within the larger phenom-
enon of Islam in America might be examined through the lens of different dis-
ciplinary perspectives. In historical perspective, the Ansaaru Allah Community 
appears to be the largest, most long lasting and highly-developed Islamic-style 
utopian commune in American history. From a theological perspective, it 
stands out among the other Black Muslim groups as the most eclectic and 
heretical. In sociological perspective, its ephemeral quality and the rapid diva-
gations of its social structure might be analyzed as an unique and effective 
survival strategy for a NRM nourished by the Black cultic milieu. York created 
for his followers a self-contained spiritual supermarket of Black nationalist 
products. This meant that the spiritual seekers who join his movement could 
sample a wide selection of esoteric lore and ritual practices. They could ‘try on’ 
different charismatic racial identities. They could study the teachings of Elijah 
Muhammad or Clarence 13X through Dr York’s reprints without ever having to 
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venture outside the boundaries of their Nuwaubian culture. York’s critics have 
debunked his ‘Black Muslim’ movement, pointing to his heretical ideas and 
manipulative marketing strategies. They have a point, but they have missed 
something deeper and more complex; a gnostic philosophy and a secret mys-
tery school.
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The Druze—one of the most misunderstood and understudied sects of 
Islam—is found today mainly in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. The Druze— 
a term that is considered a misnomer for the sect and is rejected by many 
members of the faith (Abi Khuzam 1995: 48, 276; Zahr al-Din 1994: 34)—have a 
distinct set of beliefs and practices, and their manuscripts (wisdom books) are 
a collection of epistles and correspondences among eleventh century Muslim 
scholars and theologians whom they call luminaries. The influence of the 
Qurʾān, as well as Greek, Persian, and Indian philosophies and theologies are 
apparent in Druze manuscripts and beliefs. This chapter provides an overview 
of the sect’s ethnic origins, history, religious tenets, scriptures, and rituals, as 
well as the Druze’s theological and philosophical views about the absolute and 
life after death.
2 Ethnic Origins
Historians have debated the ethnic origins of the Druze. Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad 
ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. AH 310/923 CE)—a prominent and influential Muslim 
historian—tells us that an Arab tribe by the name of Taym Allāh travelled from 
Arabia into the valley of the Euphrates (Hitti 1928: 21) before migrating into 
Wadi al-Taym in Lebanon, where ‘the call’ to the Druze faith emerged. Philip 
K. Hitti explains that most of the Druze Arab tribes trace their origin to south-
ern Arabia, and not to the Hijaz tribes, which migrated to the Levant during 
the Muslim conquests, suggesting that the ancestors of the Druze migrated 
from Arabia prior to Islam (Hitti 1928: 21–22). As such more modern schol-
ars like Anis Obeid writes: “ethnically, the Druze are Arabs … [who] migrated 
mostly from southern Arabia at different times in history” (Obeid 2006: 9). 
Mahmud Shaltut describes the Druze as “Muslims, muwaḥidūn (monotheists), 
and muʾminūn (believers),” whose roots go back to the twelve Arab tribes that 
arrived in Mount Lebanon during the reign of the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Manṣūr 
(r. 136–158 AH/754–775 CE) to help ward off Byzantine infiltrators at the 
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northern frontiers of the Islamic empire (Zahr al-Din 1994: 75, 78, 91–109). 
When the Druze community was first formed in the eleventh century, these 
Arab tribes accepted the call to the new faith (Abu-Izzeddin 1984: 11). The cen-
ter of the propagation of the Druze faith occurred in Wādī al-Taym, at the foot 
of Mount Hermon, a region that is said to be one of the most Arab regions in 
Syria (Abu-Izzeddin 1984: 12).
3 Historical Background
The emergence of the Druze faith occurred in 408 or 409 AH/1017 or 1018 CE 
during the reign of the sixth Ismāʿīlī-Fāṭimid ruler al-Ḥākim bi Amr Allāh 
(r. 386–411 AH/996–1021 CE) who sent missionaries from Cairo to what is today 
Lebanon to spread the preaching of a fresh call to monotheism (al-daʿwa 
al-tawḥīdiyya) (Halabi 2015: 16). Al-Ḥākim was fifteen-years old when he inher-
ited the Fāṭimid Caliphate that stretched over a vast geographical area from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea including Damascus, Mecca, and Yemen. 
His reign, which lasted for twenty-five years, witnessed internal political and 
religious turmoil in addition to external threats from the ʿAbbāsids in East 
(Baghdad), the Ummayads in the West (the Andalus), and the Byzantines in 
the north (Abi Khuzam 1995: 34–35). Despite all the upheavals that marred the 
Fāṭimid Caliphate, al-Ḥākim continued on the path of his Fāṭimid ancestors 
promoting free thinking in philosophy and the sciences. Among his greatest 
achievements was the establishment of an institution of higher learning called 
Dār al-Ḥikma (House of Wisdom) in 395 AH/1005 CE. Students who attended 
this institution were able to study philosophy, science, Islamic religious 
thoughts, languages, and literatures (al-daʿwa al-Fāṭimiyya al-tawḥīdiyya) 
(Abu Salih 1981: 53). At the same time when philosophy and the sciences were 
flourishing in the Fāṭimid Caliphate, tenth-century Cairo also witnessed the 
rise of a variety of religious schools and movements, among them was the 
Ḥākimite Call (al-daʿwa al-Hākimiyya), also called the Monotheist Call (daʿwat 
al-tawḥīd) leading up to what is known today as the Druze.
The main theological principles of daʿwat al-tawḥīd was 1. the attempt to 
reconcile the differences between the competing Islamic schools of thought 
by emphasising on the importance of both the esoteric and exoteric interpre-
tations of the Qurʾān and 2. the belief that al-Ḥākim was the ‘Awaited Imām’ 
who comes in the end time to spread justice and prepare people for the Day of 
Reckoning (Abi Khuzam 1995: 39–43). The new call to monotheism originated 
in tenth-century Cairo, where the anticipation of the coming of a new era was 
running high. In this era, according to Druze scholar Sami Nasib Makarim,
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truth was to be revealed and the knowledge of the unity of God was to be 
disclosed to those who had been preparing themselves for this moment 
since the beginning of man … Since the beginning of humanity man had 
been striving for the moment when true knowledge was to be divulged, 
free from all superficial, material, anthropomorphic, and ritualistic impli-
cations, and free from all allegorical, symbolic, cabalistic and superfluous 
interpretations.
Makarim 1974: 15
On 30 May 1017, al-Ḥākim announced the beginning of the new era calling 
upon the people to do “away with corruption of delusion and conformity … to 
be free to express themselves, and to be liberated so that they might have the 
courage to distinguish between truth and falsehood” (Makarim 1974: 16–17). 
Reaching such a state is “compliance with God’s will, the real law of nature 
that governs the universe” (Makarim 1974: 16–17), which is monotheism; the 
acknowledgement of the singularity of God (tawḥīd).
The beginning or foundation of the Druze faith, according to Abbas Halabi, 
can be attributed to three figures who took on preaching the daʿwa, the new 
call to monotheism: a Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlī preacher named al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥaydara 
al-Farghānī al-Akhram, Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī, and Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī 
al-Darazī (also known as Nashtakīn al-Darazī) (Halabi 2015: 16).1 Al-Akhram 
organised the first movement and preached the divinity of al-Ḥakīm in 1017 
at the encouragement of al-Darazi (Abi Khuzam 1995: 48). Two months into 
preaching the daʿwa, al-Akhram was assassinated and replaced by Ḥamza 
ibn ʿAlī who took “over the guidance of the movement and bestowed on the 
Tawḥīd Call (daʿwat al-tawḥīd) its final divine theological status” (Halabi 2015: 
16). The assassination of al-Akhram was perhaps a response from preachers of 
the daʿwa in Cairo who rejected the divinity of al-Ḥākim and who wanted to 
put an end to this erroneous teaching before it becomes weaved in the theol-
ogy of the new daʿwa.
In 1017, Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī was proclaimed an imām, started teaching God’s 
unity, and called upon the people to accept the divine daʿwa. Ḥamza sum-
moned all the missionaries in Cairo, supplied them with his knowledge, and 
gave them instructions to guide them in their missionary works. These mis-
sionaries were assigned destinations to spread the new Call to tawḥīd. Among 
1 Samy S. Swayd tells us that the Druze religious establishment revolves around the figures of 
al-Ḥākim bi Amr Allāh, Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī, and Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Samūqī, “all of whom left little 
information about themselves or the motivation behind their social and religious activism.” 
See Swayd (1998: 19).
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these missionaries was al-Darazī who was jealous of Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī’s appoint-
ment by al-Ḥākim bi Amr Allāh (Zahr al-Din 1994: 27) and believed that he, 
rather than Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī, should be appointed imām. Al-Darazī, accepting 
Ḥamza’s imāmate reluctantly, started propagating the new daʿwa resorting 
to “unscrupulous methods, such as intimidation, threats, and other coercive 
means” to induce people to join his following (Makarim 1974: 19; Zahr al-Din 
1994: 29). He pursued this method of preaching in the hope that he wins 
al-Ḥākim’s favor and eventually the imāmate (Makarim 1974: 19). Al-Darazī 
was successful in this endeavor as he was able to win many followers although 
many people disapproved of the way he converted individuals to the new Call.
Sami Nasib Makarim tells us that the people who disapproved of the way 
al-Darazī conducted his missionary work refused to join the Call and, believing 
that al-Darazī represented the whole movement, called those who joined him 
‘the Druze’ (al-Durūz). On the other hand, the people who joined the Call under 
the leadership of Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī were known as the Muwaḥidūn, or Unists 
(Makarim 1974: 19–20). Problematically, al-Darazī’s own followers declared this 
man a heretic, thus many Druze today despise being named after him. As both 
Samy Swayd and Sami Nasib Makarim emphasise, the character of al-Darazī 
in the Druze teachings and scriptures reveal him to be “the first [Druze] apos-
tate … the deviate … and the great heretic” (Swayd 2006: xxxii; Makarim 1974: 
19). Among the deviations committed by al-Darazī, according to Marshall G.S. 
Hodgson, are his teachings that “exalted ʿAlī over Muḥammad—imāmate 
over prophecy—and identified ʿAlī (and therefore all the imāms, including 
al-Ḥākim) with the demiurge” (Hodgson 1962: 8).
According to Swayd, the term ‘Druze’ does not occur in Druze manuscripts 
and is rejected by “all learned members of the community” (Swayd 2006: xxxii). 
Yet, while most Druze agree that the name is a misnomer, there have been 
little to no efforts by Druze leaders to officially change or remove the label. It 
is common, however, and highly preferable by Druze leaders and scholars to 
refer to the sect as al-Muslimūn al-muwaḥidūn (Muslim Unists), al-muwaḥidūn 
al-Durūz (Druze Unists), ahl al-tawḥīd (People of monotheism), and maslak 
al-tawḥīd (the Tawḥīd Path).2
In a 1962 article, Hodgson provides a different account on al-Darazī and his 
relationship to the Druze origin. He tells us that Syrian Druze tradition “recalls 
2 See, for example, Salih Zahr al-Din, Tārīkh al-Muslimīn al-Muwaḥidīn ‘al-Durūz’, 2nd ed. 
(Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Markaz al-‘Arabi lil Abhath wa al-Tawthiq, 1994); Anwar Fu’ad Abi 
Khuzam, Islām al-Muwaḥidīn (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Yamama, 1995); Yusuf Salim al-
Dubaisi, Ahl al-Tawḥīd ‘al-Durūz’, vol. 2 (n.c: n.p., 1992); and Sami Nasib Makarim, adwāʾ ‘ala 
Maslak al-Tawḥīd ‘al-Durziyya’ (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Sadir, 1966).
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other men as their chief converters.” He further adds that Ḥamza’s letters 
“reduce the likelihood that al-Darazī preached personally in Syria, or at least 
he was the leading spirit locally there” (Hodgson 1962: 6). Indeed Druze sages 
consider Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī as the sole founder of the Muwaḥidūn or Druze faith. 
The new Call to tawḥīd came to an end in 436 AH/1043 CE after Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī 
announced “the closing of the gate” (iglāq bāb al-daʿwa) to new converts (Zahr 
al-Din 1994: 35), which has continued to be in effect until today.
4 Society, Culture, and Politics
For centuries, the Druze have lived among Christians (largely in Lebanon), 
Sunni and Shiite Muslims (in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan), and Jews (in Israel). 
It is important to mention that Druze scholars need to take into consideration 
nowadays that the Druze are no longer confined to the Middle East, nor are 
mere immigrants in their host countries. In fact, many Druze who are born and 
raised in Europe and the Americas consider themselves native of these societ-
ies with little or no attachment to the Middle East. Today, the Druze number 
approximately one million worldwide and their largest communities are in the 
Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan) in addition to scattered com-
munities in Latin America, North America, Australia, and West Africa (Swayd 
2006: xxxiii; Miles 2019: 22). Due to their contribution to the Druze faith and 
to the societies they live in, the Druze of the diaspora expect and deserve to be 
acknowledged, rather than marginalised, in any serious work on the sect.
The structure of the Druze society is dualistic. Within the Druze community 
there are two types of dualism: 1. communal (religious) and 2. familial (politi-
cal). The communal consists of the initiated and the uninitiated (Swayd 2006: 
xxxiii). The initiated, known as the ʿuqqāl, or ‘the enlightened’, are considered 
sages and keepers of the religious tradition. Druze theosophy figures into the 
daily lives of this group as the initiated must follow strict dress, dietary, behav-
ioral, and lifestyle codes. For instance, the ʿuqqāl must dress modestly and 
strictly adhere to a traditional dress code, speak in low voices, refrain from 
the use of profanity, and avoid smoking, drinking alcohol, and other practices 
deemed undesirable (Khuri 2004: 13–14). They are also required to attend the 
weekly scriptural readings on Thursday nights. From the earliest days of the 
faith, the ʿuqqāl included women in its ranks (Betts 1988: 16). The uniniti-
ated, who are considered the ‘ignorant’, or juhhāl, meaning secular and igno-
rant of their own faith, “protected the secrecy and sanctity of their religion 
through their loyalty to one another” (Betts 1988: 16). The secrecy of Druze 
theology, Robert Brenton Betts writes, “has served to reinforce communal 
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separateness” (Betts 1988: 17). Although the juhhāl are not permitted access to 
“knowledge of the mysterious secrecies” of the holy books, they are required 
to follow a strict code of moral and ethical behavior (Betts 1988: 17). The 
secrecy of the tradition compelled the Druze to adhere to an exclusivist theol-
ogy. For example, since the closing of the daʿwa in 434 AH/1043 CE, “no lon-
ger could one be admitted into the faith” (Miles 2019: 22). Also, missionary 
activity, open public performance of rituals, open worship, and marriage out-
side of the community are all prohibited (Betts 1988: 17; Khuri 2004: 26). The 
familial division is rather political in which the Druze are historically aligned 
with one of the two most politically influential families: the Junblat-Arslan 
division. According to Swayd, “[m]any Druze believe that familial dualism is 
a constructive stimulus for the lasting health of the community, providing 
access to more opportunities and resources than would otherwise be avail-
able” (Swayd 2006: xxxvii).
Despite their minority status, the Druze have played a key role in the mod-
ern history and politics of their respective countries. For instance, in 1925, the 
Syrian Druze led a revolt against French presence in the region and the leader 
of the revolution, Sultan Basha al-Atrash (d. 1982), “came to be lionised not 
just as a Druze hero but as a champion of Syrian nationalism writ large” (Miles 
2019: 29). Betts writes that the Druze “were to be increasingly accepted as par-
ticipants in the fight for independence from European domination, and as a 
result they were steadily drawn out of the cocoon of their self-imposed iso-
lation into ever-increasing contact with the highly politicised society around 
them” (Betts 1988: 89).
Since Syria’s independence in 1947, the Druze have been prominent support-
ers of Syrian governments and regimes regardless of ideological backgrounds 
(Miles 2019: 33). Although they pursued a neutral position in the ongoing civil 
war in Syria, many Druze supported the uprisings (Miles 2019: 37) and, at the 
same time, were attacked on theological grounds by Islamic extremists like 
ISIS and al-Nusra Front who consider the Druze ‘heretics’ and ‘infidels’ for hav-
ing abandoned orthodox Islam (Miles 2019: 36–37).
In Lebanon, under the leadership of two important families, the Junblat and 
the Arslan, the Druze “led the fight for independence in Lebanon” (Fallah 2002: 
28). During the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), Druze leader Kamal Junblat 
(d. 1977) formed an alliance among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Lebanese 
Muslims, and leftist groups in the fight against the Western-supported 
Christian-Maronite forces (Miles 2019: 330). In Israel, the Druze live as a mar-
ginalised minority but military service is mandatory for (male) members of 
the faith. This has been the Jewish State policy—initiated at the request of the 
Druze leaders—since 1956 (Miles 2019: 32).
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5 Scriptures
The Druze scriptures, referred to as Kutub al-Ḥikma, or Books of Wisdom, 
are six in number and consist of one hundred and eleven separate pieces or 
epistles and communications. These epistles are assigned to various min-
isters, among them is Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī. Anis Obeid tells us that Ḥamza wrote 
around thirty epistles during the first three years of the daʿwa (Obeid 2006: 
96). Some of these epistles, according to David R. W. Bryer, are not “specifi-
cally Druze,” but they are included because they are connected to al-Ḥākim bi 
Amr Allāh (Bryer 2005: 30). Among the writers of Druze epistles, Muhammad 
Kamil Husayn suggests, is the great Ismāʿīlī scholar Ḥamīd al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 
ʿAbdallāh al-Kirmānī (d. 411 AH/1021 CE) (Husayn 1962: 93).3 The Druze scholar 
Kais M. Firro considers al-Kirmānī’s writings among the “early non-Druze 
sources [that] were predominantly hostile” to the daʿwa (Firro 1992: 13).
It is unclear who collected the one hundred and eleven epistles, edited their 
texts, compiled them in order, and divided them into volumes. It is also unclear 
when this compilation occurred. Some scholars suggest that a Druze theolo-
gian by the name of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Tanūkhī was the founder of the Druze 
canon. For example, Obeid tells us that the epistles remained in the custody of 
trusted leaders and notables and passed from one generation to the next until 
they were compiled in the six books more than four centuries later through 
the efforts of al-Tanūkhī (Obeid 2006: 97). Other scholars have suggested Bahāʾ 
al-Dīn (one of the daʿwa propagators), a figure generally accepted by the Druze 
community, as the founder of the Druze canon (Bryer 2005: 34). While Obeid 
tells us that the compilation occurred four centuries after the advent of the 
Druze faith (Obeid 2006: 97), other scholars have suggested an earlier date 
(Bryer 2005: 35).
The content of the Druze scriptures is difficult to decipher or understand 
due to its esoteric nature. The privilege of understanding its meaning is 
reserved only to those who are “acquainted with Arabic esoteric terminology 
and with the way esoteric beliefs were written” (Makarim 1974: 4). The Italian 
traveler Giovanni Mariti (d. 1806) writes:
3 Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī takes the credit for refuting the divinity of al-Ḥākim. He was sum-
moned to Cairo by al-Ḥākim and was asked to refute the heresies and innovations that were 
propagated along with the new daʿwa. Al-Kirmānī refutes al-Akhram’s claim of al-Ḥākim’s 
divinity in an epistle titled al Risālah al-wāʿiẓa, where he writes that al-Akhram was the 
leader of the movement that propagated the divinity of al-Ḥākim. See, for example, Abi 
Khuzam (1995: 53–54).
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Even if their books can come into our hand, we can only understand the 
rules and general precepts of this religion, all the more so as the religious 
figures have an exclusive control of the religious matters, communicat-
ing amongst themselves only some points and keeping the more special 
mysteries secret, even to the rest of the Druze people, thus also inducing 
doubt and ambiguity in the souls of the curious.
Mariti 1787: 17; qtd in Branca 2000: 96
The Druze usually read their scriptures on Thursday night of each week and 
members are invited to attend the readings. It is also a common practice that 
the sages ask certain members to leave the room in the middle of the read-
ings, indicating that the next reading is of higher level and is intended only 
for those who are acquainted with the esoteric meaning of the text. The one 
hundred and eleven epistles can be found today in libraries around the world, 
including the British Museum, Cambridge, Manchester, Moscow, Munich, 
St Petersburg, Paris, Turin, Uppsala, Berlin, Vienna, the Bodleian Library, and 
the Vatican (Branca 2000: 108).
6 Theosophy
The Druze have a distinct set of beliefs and practices, and the influence of the 
Qurʾān as well as Greek and Indian philosophy is apparent in the Druze scrip-
tures and faith.4 The Druze is an esoteric faith that “differs in many respects 
from traditional Islam” (Makarim 1974: 4). It is a “gnostic faith based on a 
philosophical background” (Makarim 1974: 4). The conceivers of the Druze 
faith were theologians who had studied in the Fāṭimid-Ismāʿīlī schools of dār 
al-ḥikma and dār al-ʿilm (the House of Wisdom and the House of Science), 
where religion, medicine, logic, mathematics, philosophy, history, and lan-
guages were taught. Kais M. Firro tells us that although Druze doctrines can be 
traced back to Ismāʿīlīsm, the new daʿwa was “to place the Druze order outside 
the orthodox Ismāʿīlī creed” (Firro 1992: 10). For example, the radical change 
4 The Druze today follow the same beliefs and doctrines that were developed in the fifth cen-
tury AH/eleventh century CE. Sami Nasib Makarim, Maslak al-Tawḥīd (Beirut, Lebanon: N.p., 
1980), 30.
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the Druze teachings introduced was the abolition of the hereditary system 
of the imāmate and the replacement of the Ismāʿīlī messianic idea by “the 
final triumph of Unitarianism [unity of God; al-tawḥīd], in which a last cycle 
of divine manifestations would occur before a Last Judgment” (Firro 1992: 10). 
The Druze teachings call for the strict, uncompromising oneness of God and 
the Druze concept of creation “followed Neoplatonic philosophy in its Ismāʿīlī 
interpretation and terminology” (Firro 1992: 11). Based on these philosophies, 
the Druze explain their worldview of the absolute, good and evil, and life 
after death.
God in the Druze doctrine is not above or beyond existence, God is exis-
tence itself. He5 cannot be separate from or outside it since it represents time 
and space, and if it is outside God, then it exists parallel to God. This notion 
of the separation between God and the existence is not accepted in the Druze 
doctrine because it represents a plurality: God and the universe. Plurality is 
“only possible within space and time. How then can God be one when there 
is something outside Him?” (Makarim 1974: 41). Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī tells us: “[God] 
does not occupy a definite place, for He would be limited to it … There is no 
place where He is not, or else His power would be deficient. He is neither first, 
for this would imply a notion related to a last, nor is He the end, for this would 
make Him have a beginning” (Makarim 1974: 41).
Evil, according to Druze teachings, “does not lie in matter”; rather, it lies 
in the heart of those who deflect from their real purpose, which is the union 
with ‘the One’. Selfishness and one’s own ego separate the human from his real 
purpose, away from his “true nature” and from the “unity of the universal idea 
of man.” Evil is a “product of metaphysical egotism” where one separates from 
the unity of being. Good or love, on the other hand, is the feeling of union 
with the One Who compromises all being (Makarim 1974: 50).
The Druze follow five main articles of faith. The first article of faith is tawḥīd, 
hence their name muwaḥidūn (monotheists). Druze scholars translate the 
term tawḥīd to mean “unity,” “unicity,” “unification,” or “unism” (Swayd 1998: 
33). The second article of faith is veneration (taqdīs). The Druze venerate all 
the previous prophets and believe that each preached the word of God but 
in different times. The Druze also believe in five luminaries (ḥudūd) who are 
spiritual in origin. The third article of faith is the belief in reincarnation, the 
transmigration of the soul. Unlike in some Hindu traditions where the belief 
in the transmigration of the soul from humans to nonhumans is prevalent, the 
5 The Druze reference to God in masculine term is only a function of language and does not 
relate to theology.
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Druze believe in the transmigration of the soul from humans to humans only. 
The fourth article of faith is the belief in the process of initiation, in which a 
person must be of strict moral character in order to be initiated and to earn 
a place among those who are permitted to participate in reading and inter-
preting the scripture and perform certain rituals. The fifth article of faith is 
erudition (ta’arruf), which means that the initiate must be able to read and 
understand the scriptures (Swayd 1998: 33–36).
There is a consensus among Druze scholars that Druze practices and behav-
ior are, to some extent, identical to those found in Ṣūfism, and that the lat-
ter presents similarities to the Druze faith. The Druze implementation of Ṣūfī 
practices and behavior has led Druze and non-Druze scholars to identify the 
sect as an intrinsic aspect of Islamic orthodoxy. If we take Ṣūfism and the 
Druze faith in their historical manifestation, we find that Druze and Ṣūfī roots 
and methodologies are derived from the esoteric (bāṭin) dimension of Islam. 
Throughout their historical developments, Ṣūfī movements and the Druze fol-
lowed the esoteric path of Islam, a practice that led to a profound relationship 
between the Druze and the Ṣūfīs as well as other Islamic esoteric sects.
The Druze teachings stress the implementation of the Islamic pillars not in 
their literal implications or allegorical interpretation but in their real meaning. 
Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī developed these pillars from their literal implications to their 
real meanings “to relieve the true believer from their ritualistic constraint and 
from their literal and inner implications, not from their real significance,” and 
only those who adhered to tawḥīd are able (or must strive) to realise their true 
significance (Makarim 1974: 90–91). Makarim tells us that the Druze scriptures 
give the pillars a meaning other than their literal and allegorical connotations 
because the Druze faith “developed in its approach both Islam and īmān … into 
the larger concept of tawḥīd, [that is], the knowledge of God’s unity” (Makarim 
1974: 91).
While each of the Islamic pillars is given either an exoteric or esoteric mean-
ing by various sects and movements in Islam, Swayd writes, Druze sources 
speak of a third level of interpretation, that of “the esoteric of the esoteric” 
(Swayd 1998: 37). The true significance of the pillars, according to Druze teach-
ings, goes beyond both the exoteric and esoteric. For example, the Druze fulfill 
the ritual act of performing the prayer (ṣalāt) by being truthful. Truthfulness, 
or speaking the truth (ṣidq al-lisān), is the first Druze act of worship. The pil-
lar of almsgiving (zakāt) is fulfilled in the performance of the second Druze 
act of worship referred to as brotherliness, the protection of brothers (ḥifẓ 
al-ikhwān). The third Druze act of worship is that of abandoning the worship 
of idols (tark ʿ ibādat al-awthān). Idols or awthān does not mean literally deities 
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or gods, but it refers to sin or evil. Thus, this act commands the believers to be 
vigilant at all times against committing evil. This act of worship corresponds 
with the Islamic pillar of fasting (ṣawm) (Swayd 1998: 37–38).
The fourth act of worship in the Druze faith is al-barāʾah min al-abālisah 
wa al-ṭughyān, or fleeing from devils and oppression. Here, the believer is 
commanded to flee from one’s evil nature, to defeat oppression wherever it is 
encountered. Evil in the forms of oppression “must be fought vehemently in 
order to purify the self” (Swayd 1998: 39). This act of worship corresponds with 
the Islamic pillar of ḥajj, or pilgrimage. The Druze fifth act of worship is declar-
ing the unity of God (tawḥīd al-Bārī). This act of worship corresponds with 
the first pillar in Islam, the shahāda. It reflects the literal meaning of tawḥīd: 
“There is no god but Allāh, and Muḥammad is His messenger” (Swayd 1998: 
39–40).
The Druze teachings stress the importance of two additional acts of worship 
to be undertaken by the believers. They are contentment (al-riḍāʾ) and sub-
mission (al-taslīm). Al-riḍāʾ, as the sixth act of worship, corresponds with the 
Islamic duty to fight in God’s cause, or jihād. For the Druze, the duty to fight or 
perform the jihād is not understood literally but it is the struggle to know God’s 
Oneness. In other words, for the Druze, “the meaning of jihād is purely spiritual 
and reflects a vertical relation between the believer and God” (Swayd 1998: 40). 
The seventh and last act of worship in the Druze faith is the act of submission 
(taslīm) to the One God. Also, according to Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī, submission “entails 
holding fast to one’s contentment” by proclaiming submission to the Code of 
Faith in the following three phrases: 1. “surrender his soul, his body, his posses-
sions, his children and everything he owns;” 2. “contentment with God’s deeds 
and submission to Him are indeed the end of both learning and teaching;” and 
3. “obedience is the true worshiping of God” (Swayd 1998: 40–41).
Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī teaches that man’s ultimate happiness can be achieved if he 
is “in conformity in his reason, soul, words and actions with God’s Will.” Ḥamza 
ibn ʿAlī calls this divine will the “all-inclusive ʿaql that contains the whole of 
creation.” God’s Will, or al-ʿaql, is the cause of all cosmic principles and the 
source of all material beings (Makarim 1974: 51). It is the source of all existing 
being and also their purpose. Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī teaches that al-ʿaql is the matter 
(hayūlā) of all things, “perfect, in substance and potentiality, and complete in 
actuality and form” (Makarim 1974: 44).
In a Druze manuscript entitled al-Sharīʿa al-Rūḥāniyya fī ʿulūm al-laṭīf wa 
al-Basīṭ wa al-Kathīf (henceforth al-Sharīʿa), the author dedicates a whole 
chapter to al-ʿaql (al-Sharīʿa al-Rūḥāniyya: 20–137), and discusses the relation-
ship between al-ʿaql and the passionate soul (al-nafs). The author states that 
al-ʿaql is superior to al-nafs and, therefore, guides it. In al-Sharīʿa, the term 
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al-ʿaql appears 111 times in a range of 117 pages. It is also preceded by the word 
Mawlānā (Our Master), or Mawlānā al-ʿaql (Our Master the Intellect). The 
author writes: “Oh passionate soul, be cautious of the contaminated world 
around you and turn to the assistance of … your Master al-ʿaql … You should 
know that everything you observe and experience is eternal in the world of 
your Master al-ʿaql” (al-Sharīʿa al-Rūḥāniyya: 25).
The author adds that the abode of al-ʿaql is a place of wealth, peace, pride, 
and happiness. The opposite to the abode of al-ʿaql is the natural world (ʿālam 
al-ṭabīʿa), which is a place of poverty, misery, insecurity, and chaos. Al-nafs, 
after observing both abodes, can choose to join either one. Al-nafs, however, 
cannot exist in both abodes simultaneously because man cannot be rich and 
poor, happy and miserable, secure and fearful at the same time (al-Sharīʿa 
al-Rūḥāniyya: 43). Al-ʿaql, therefore, guides and teaches al-nafs to feel the one-
ness of God (waḥdat Allāh). By doing so, al-nafs enters paradise (al-janna), the 
abode of al-ʿaql, and delivers itself from ignorance. The ultimate goal of al-nafs 
is to reach the eternal happiness. This happiness, being al-ʿaql, is “the cogni-
sance of divine knowledge itself” (Makarim 1974: 84).
According to Al-Sharīʿa, the position of al-ʿaql to al-nafs can be compared 
to that of the sun and the moon. As long as the sun sends its rays, the moon 
keeps glowing. But, when the earth comes in between them, the earth’s 
shadow eclipses the moon and causes darkness. Similarly, al-ʿaql sends its 
light to al-nafs. Only the corruption of al-nafs may prevent al-ʿaql’s light from 
reaching al-nafs. Moreover, al-ʿaql is the reflection of its perfection. If al-nafs 
loses this reflection, it will lose its essence, and once al-nafs loses its essence, 
it ceases to exist (al-Sharīʿa al-Rūḥāniyya: 45–55). Moreover, the author of 
Al-Sharīʿa writes:
Oh nafs, when it becomes clear to you that light comes from al-ʿaql and 
darkness from the body, then you should not mourn your separation 
from your body. The latter can do nothing but distracts you from reach-
ing the permanent truth [revelation or Kalimat Allāh]. You should rather 
regret your separation from al-ʿaql, because you would lose its abundant 
benefits and its assistance to you in reaching your needs.
al-Sharīʿa al-Rūḥāniyya: 65
Thus, the more al-nafs seeks the assistance of al-ʿaql, the more it nears the 
truth, and the more it detaches itself from al-ʿaql, the more it loses guidance 
and power.
It is important to mention that in the classical Ṣūfī doctrine, al-nafs occu-
pies a lower state, and it is the cause of blameworthy actions, sins, and base 
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qualities. The Ṣūfīs have referred to their struggle with al-nafs as “the greater 
Holy War” (Schimmel 1975: 112), following Muḥammad’s statement to followers 
after returning from battle. The Qurʾānic expression “al-nafs al-ammāra bil sūʾ,” 
or “the soul that commands evil” (Qurʾān 12:53), has prompted Ṣūfīs and Druze 
to blame al-nafs for evil doings. However, the Druze, like any other groups who 
highlight the nafs verses in the Qurʾān, believe that al-nafs can purify itself and 
become muṭma  ʾ inna (Qurʾān 89:27) “at peace,” if it assists itself with the guid-
ance of al-ʿaql. Thus, for the Druze, al-ʿaql surrounds, guides, and manages all 
things with the assistance of the divine power. It is also a sparkling light and 
the eternal world. Al-ʿaql, which is the source of every action, exists in every 
age and epoch. It is man’s guide to the pure doctrine of Unitarianism (tawḥīd). 
Ismāʿīl ibn Muḥammad, the second Druze luminary, says of al-ʿaql:
From His pure Light and by His divine Omnipotence, God originated the 
ʿaql without any means nor any exemplary form. He made it contain all 
things at once. Within it He bound all creatures and made it the source of 
all things which He had originated. He confirmed it with His godly power 
and divine influx, and thus He safeguarded it from any imperfection. He 
made it present in all ages and times and made it the cause of all things. 
God originated a sparkling light that guides us. He made it a source from 
which real knowledge issued, and by which spiritual forms develop. It is 
the all-inclusive ʿaql, and the first being that precedes all beings. It is the 
beginning and the end: from it all things come forth, and to it all things 
go back.
Makarim 1974: 44–45
Thus, the excerpts mentioned above tell us how perfect and central al-ʿaql is 
in the Druze faith. However, there is another side to al-ʿaql: the imperfect one. 
Unlike the Muʿtazilites who believed that al-ʿaql is an all-time perfection, the 
Druze assert that al-ʿaql, at one point in time, had become deflected from what 
it had been created for, deviating from its original course. By its very nature, 
al-ʿaql is in constant union with God. This perfect oneness of God made al-ʿaql 
realise its own perfection. Taking joy and pride of itself, al-ʿaql abandoned the 
love of the whole to the love of its own self. This deviation rendered al-ʿaql 
weak and remote from God (Makarim 1974: 45). To prevent al-ʿaql from look-
ing inward at itself, God created disobedience, darkness, arrogance, and igno-
rance, all from al-ʿaql’s obedience, light, humbleness, and wisdom. At that 
point, al-ʿaql admitted to its shortcomings and weaknesses, and asked God to 
create an entity to assist it in regaining its perfection (Makarim 1974: 46–47).
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Al-ʿaql is so important in the Druze doctrine that the Druze sages have made 
it the intermediary in their daily religious discourses and prayers. For the Druze, 
al-ʿaql is a perfect entity that occupies a supreme status, namely, the imām. 
The Druze give al-ʿaql a hundred names but only a few are known and men-
tioned regularly among Druze sages and scholars. Some of these names are: 
the Muḥammadan Truth (al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya), the Intellect (al-’aql 
al-kullī), the Perfect Human (al-insān al-kāmil), the Will or Volition (al-irāda), 
and the embodiment of the divine will (al-irāda al-ilāhiyya). According to the 
Druze doctrine, al-ʿaql can be given all the perfect attributes and descriptions 
except one: the divine description (Abi Khuzam 1995: 119). From its essence all 
things come to life, and all things end with it. It is very likely that the Druze 
adopted this notion of al-ʿaql as a primary source for all things from Ismāʿīlī 
thought (Al-Kirmani 1967: 167).
7 The Doctrine of Reincarnation
The Druze are strong believers in the doctrine of reincarnation (naskh 
al-arwāḥ). For the Druze, this doctrine is rooted in the Qurʾān (al-Atrash 1974: 
187–188; al-Basha 1982: 205; Tali‘ 1980: 44) and is not a deviation from Islamic 
teachings. For instance, the Druze scholar Anwar Abi Khuzam argues that any 
belief based on Qurʾānic hermeneutics, despite the disagreement about its 
interpretation among the various Islamic sects, remains within the circle of 
Islam (Abi Khuzam 1995: 296). Therefore, the Druze believe that their belief 
in the doctrine of reincarnation does not make them less Islamic but it distin-
guishes them from other Islamic sects and schools.
Abi Khuzam tells us that the Druze belief in reincarnation has a psychologi-
cal dimension. This belief stems from the human rejection to the idea of death 
and separation from this world. Reincarnation provides a theoretical solution 
that guarantees a permanent return to life with the possibility of better liv-
ing conditions. However, the main reason for the belief in reincarnation in 
the Druze faith is tied to religious doctrines that are metaphysical in nature. 
The study of metaphysics was a prime subject among Muslim philosophers 
and theologians who dealt with the issue of Divine Justice. For the Druze, the 
belief in reincarnation allows Divine Justice to take its course as it provides the 
human soul with the chance to experience life more than once (Abi Khuzam 
1995: 297).
The doctrine of reincarnation in the Druze faith may have emerged out of 
theological debates on the issue of God’s justice. For example, some theologians, 
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like the Muʿtazilites, believed that God is bound to be just, while others—chief 
among them is Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111)—argued the opposite (Abi 
Khuzam 1995: 298). The issue that prompted the debate was an allegory put 
up by al-Ghazālī as to whether it is just for God to assess the faith (īmān) of a 
Muslim who died in infancy and another who passed away after living a long 
life. The conclusion based on the allegory is that the degree of īmān in the old 
person is higher since he worked all his life on increasing it while the child had 
a lesser degree of īmān since his life was short. The question posed: What is the 
guilt of the child if God had already decreed that he should die in infancy thus 
denying him an equal chance to increase his īmān? According to Abi Khuzam, 
Druze sages believe that the doctrine of reincarnation provides a solution to 
this problem since the passing through many lives gives human beings equal 
opportunities to increase their īmān (Abi Khuzam 1995: 298–299). Abdallah E. 
Najjar writes that the doctrine of reincarnation
makes ultimate, human accounting before man’s Creator fair, rational 
and just … The one life conception is obviously inequitable, for human 
beings are not offered equal opportunities in one life so they can grow, 
consider and perform … One life with its evident handicaps in time and 
fortune does not offer a suitable criterion of judgment and evaluation. 
How are the babies and the immature in years to be judged without any 
score in merits or demerits or sufficient knowledge and understanding?
Najjar 1973: 94
It is worth mentioning that Druze sages do not see in reincarnation an escape 
from God’s judgment. Instead, they assert that on the Last Day, every soul will 
be held accountable. This belief in the Last Day and the accountability of the 
soul keeps the Druze within the realm of Islam, according to Abi Khuzam, and 
distinguishes them from other believers in reincarnation, such as in Hindu 
traditions where the soul faces a different destination. The Druze are against 
the belief that the human soul upon death may migrate to nonhuman form—
animal, plant, or rock. Najjar tells us that the Druze believe “categorically in 
the passage upon death of the soul from the dead human body to a newborn 
human baby and to nothing else” (Najjar 1973: 88). The Druze belief that rein-
carnation “occurs among all humans at all places and times,” but only a minor-
ity remembers previous lives (Bennett 2006: 87). In a study on the belief of 
reincarnation in the Druze faith, Anne Bennett finds that the Druze reincar-
nation is a social phenomenon that enhances sect unity and identity despite 
the fact that it is “not uniformly accepted” among the Druze. Bennett writes, 
“there is … no blanket agreement among Druze regarding reincarnation. There 
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are many who are skeptics about the phenomenon and dismiss it outright” 
(Bennett 2006: 87). Druze sages emphasise that the belief in the Last Day and 
the accountability of the soul is at the core of the Druze beliefs, and whoever 
denies them is not from the people of monotheism (laysa min ahl al-tawḥīd) 
(Abi Khuzam 1995: 299–300).
8 Sages and Shrines
Of the most important Druze practices is the veneration of sages. The sages 
are the ‘mystics’ of the Druze society, and they are at a higher state than their 
Druze brethren. They are known as the ʿuqqāl (wise, sages) and are distin-
guished by their dress, appearance, and way of life. According to Druze tradi-
tion, the sage is a person who not only reaches a degree of spiritual knowledge, 
but he is the one upon whom God has sent upon enlightenment to relieve him 
from ignorance. Their role is social rather than political. For instance, the com-
munity turns to them for guidance, reconciliation, and blessing. Although the 
sages live the mystic life, they live among people in villages and rarely lead a 
life in isolation (Abu Muslih 2002: 28).
The Druze sages detach themselves from all worldly desires, meditate most 
of the time, some practice celibacy, and dedicate their lives to worshipping 
God. They are constantly reading the scripture and strictly follow its teachings 
and guidance. Their mystic life does not prevent them from working in jobs 
such as farming, tailoring, and hand copying the scripture. If they happen to 
have more money than they need for themselves, they donate it to charities. In 
the sage, the people see and feel the presence of divine power. These are the 
signs of a person becoming special or sacred (Abu Muslih 2002: 28).
The Druze sages are considered special people to their community and to 
others as well. They are so sacred and special to the extent that Druze and, 
in some cases, non-Druze visit them for guidance, blessing, or simply out of 
curiosity. After their death, the community buries the sage in his house and 
turns the latter into a shrine. In the shrine, a tomb is erected over the sage’s 
body and writings are carved on the tomb. Traditionally, the writings are verses 
from the Qurʾān and statements praising the buried sage. All the tombs are 
similar in size and shape. A picture of the sage may be hanged on the wall, and 
Persian rugs are scattered all over the shrine. Thus, the sage’s house becomes a 
sacred place, where people visit regularly to pray at, touch, and kiss the tomb, 
light candles, drink or wash from what they consider sacred water and oil, 
and donate money to maintain the shrine or to be distributed among Druze 
orphans. Before leaving the shrine, the visitors carry with them a piece of 
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cloth, believing that it would protect them against evil or would bring good 
luck charms.
The Druze visit the various shrines regularly and all year round. There 
are more than seventy-seven shrines, which are found in nearly every locale 
where the Druze live. Shrines are erected for male and female sages as well. 
For instance, there are a number of shrines for woman sages, and they are as 
popular and important as those for male sages. It is also common for the Druze 
to visit shrines of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious figures (Abi Khuzam 
1995: 285). There is no special month or time for visitation. At any day of the 
year, the typical visitors at the shrine range from engaged or newly married 
couple, to those who just had a new baby, to people starting their own busi-
nesses. They all come asking for the sage’s blessing. The belief is that the soul 
of the sage is still around and can hear their prayers and wishes. The visits 
may be as short as a few minutes, or they may last for days, if there are rooms 
to accommodate for overnight visitors. In recent times, the shrines have been 
turned into recreational areas for visitors. It has become very popular today 
that families bring their food and barbecues and, after visiting the tomb and 
paying their respect to the sage’s soul, these families spend the whole day in 
the surrounding area of the shrine where they slaughter sheep, eat, play cards, 
backgammon, or volleyball, and dance, sing, and take naps.
The most recent sage to pass away was Shaykh Abū Ḥasan ʿĀrif (d. 2004) 
from the Shuf Mountain, southeast of the Lebanese capital Beirut. He had a 
state funeral that was attended by dignitaries from all religious sects and domi-
nations in Lebanon, in addition to politicians and government officials. His 
funeral was broadcast on satellite television stations all over the Arab world. 
Thus, the sacredness of this sage was acknowledged and respected by Druze 
and non-Druze alike all over the region. After his death, his house was turned 
into the most recent shrine with a tomb in a room that is skillfully and sacredly 
built. The dead sage lies under ground, but the tradition lives on.6
9 Conclusion
Since its inception in the eleventh century, there have been attempts to portray 
the Druze sect in a negative light. In the formative years of the Druze daʿwa, 
some Ismāʿīlī scholars, like al-Kirmānī, were hostile to the new movement 
(Firro 1992: 13). In modern times, some scholars, travelers, and Orientalists 
6 For further discussion of Druze shrines and sages, see, for example, Abu Muslih (2002); Firro 
(2005); Makarim (1990).
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have suggested that the Druze are descendants of a French Comte de Dreux, 
who disappeared in the mountains of Lebanon in the thirteenth century (Betts 
1988: 25; Hitti 1928: 15). Others have advanced the claims that the ethnic origin 
of the Druze is not Arab but Persian (Hitti 1928: 18–23). Some speculated that 
the Druze represented remnants of a lost Jewish tribe (Obeid 2006: 10).
As this chapter has demonstrated, the ethnic origins of the Druze can be 
traced to Arab tribes, according to prominent historians like al-Tabari. Their 
Arab origin is obvious today in the dialect spoken by the Druze, which “is one 
of the purest of the Arab dialects” (Obeid 2006: 10). The teachings of the Druze 
faith are rooted in Islam as the Druze are staunch believers in the oneness of 
God, in the authenticity of the Qurʾān as the word of God, and in Muḥammad 
as God’s messenger. Arguably, the sect’s esoteric interpretation of the Islamic 
doctrines drives the Druze to be more radical in applying the Islamic pillars. 
Their belief in reincarnation, whether they take this doctrine literally or meta-
phorically, provides them with the tools to argue for God’s justice. For Druze 
sages, the Druze is a philosophical school within the realm of Islam, not a sepa-
rate religion.
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Yezidism is a syncretic product of the Near Eastern non-dogmatic milieu, 
having its own unique characteristics and sharing certain aspects with other 
non-dogmatic trends. The Yezidis1 or Yazidis (Arab. yazīdīya, Kurd. ēzdī) form 
a separate ethno-religious group, which have preserved its complex ethno-
religious identity through the centuries, in the historical motherland and else-
where on the territories of the habitat—both in the hostile environment and 
in safe and benevolent societies, having remained a closed, esoteric society.
The Yezidis are found scattered over a vast area: the northern part of Iraq 
(north-west of Mosul and Jebel Sinjar [Ĉīyā Šangālē], west of Mosul), Syria 
(Siruj, Birjak, Klis, Afrin, Amuda, and Qamishli), Eastern Turkey, Armenia 
(the districts of Aragatsotn, Artashat, and Talin, as well as the city of Yerevan), 
and Georgia (the city of Tbilisi). There are also relatively new communities 
in Russia (Krasnodar kraj and other regions) and Europe (Germany in the 
main, but also other countries such as Sweden), which are the result of eco-
nomic migration (from Armenia and Georgia, largely to Russia), persecution, 
and military conflicts (from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). Indeed, almost the entire 
Yezidi population of Turkey, based previously in compact settlements in the 
rural centers of Tur-Abdin, Nisibin, Diarbekir, Mush, Sasun, and Bitlis, as well 
as on the upper shores of the Tigris river, has moved to Syria, Germany, or other 
Western-European countries. The main religious center of the Yezidis is situ-
ated in the valley of Lalish in the Sheikhan region (North Iraq), where the sanc-
tuaries of most of the Yezidi saints and holy men are located. The seat of the 
Yezidis’ spiritual leader, the Prince (or mīr), is in the nearby village of Ba‘dre. 
The Yezidis speak a local variant of Northern Kurdish (Kurmanji), which they 
1 On the early encounters and history of the community, as well as the historiography of the 
subject, see: Guest (1987); Arakelova (2006a; 2011a); and Açikyildiz (2014). On the Yezidi 
religion, rites, rituals, and textual tradition, see: Furlani (1936); Drower (1941); Kreyenbroek 
(1995); Kreyenbroek and Rashow (2005); Asatrian and Arakelova (2014); and Arakelova 
(2015a).
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call ēzdīkī (‘the Yezidi language’). The community usually leads a sedentary 
lifestyle, but also includes nomadic clans.
It is virtually impossible to determine any precise population figure for the 
Yezidis for at least two reasons: 1) the sparsity of information on the territo-
ries inhabited by the Yezidis (particularly in Iraq); and 2) identity problems, 
for example the Yezidis have often been grouped together with other religious 
or ethnic groups (the Qizilbash and the Kurds) when population counts have 
taken place (Arakelova 2001a: 320–321). The total number of Yezidis, therefore, 
can be estimated only approximately: around 200,000 in Iraq, 80–100,000 in 
Syria, 45–50,000 in Armenia, 20–25,000 in Georgia, 10–15,000 in Russia, and 
45–50,000 in Western Europe; all in all, this totals some 450–500,000 people.2
2 Formation of Yezidism as a Separate Ethno-Religious Group
The formation of the Yezidis as a separate ethno-religious group took place 
from the eleventh to the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries (the fifth to the 
seventh-eighth centuries AH) in the region of Sinjar in Northern Iraq. The new 
community was shaped on the basis of the Adawīyya Ṣūfi order, whose leader, 
the Ṣūfi murshid and shaykh ʿAdī bin Musāfir later became approached in the 
Yezidi legendary history as founder of the first Yezidi community and deified 
in the Yezidi tradition as incarnation of God (see below).
The consistent dissociation from the local Muslim milieu and the gradual 
closing of the newly shaping community, with its further shift to endogamy, 
was occurring amid the very colorful religious scenery of Mesopotamia. 
Different versions of Islam and Christianity resided alongside Old Iranian reli-
gious elements tightly interlaced with Gnostic ideas and substrate heathen 
beliefs, while the still strong cult of the Omayyads coexisted with other, rather 
marginal religious-political movements. This eclectic atmosphere led to differ-
ent and often contradictory elements being incorporated into the Adawīyya 
Ṣūfi order. Many of them can be found in Yezidism, having been either bor-
rowed from diverse trends of the syncretic religious landscape of the time or 
inherited directly from the Adawīyya. Followers of the Ṣūfi murshid Sheikh 
ʿAdī, came from diverse groups and, ultimately, this led to the development of 
a fundamentally new syncretic religious teaching that lacked a set doctrinal 
2 The data is from Asatrian and Arakelova (2014: vii); recent mass migration from Iraq and 
Syria caused by ISIS’ persecution of the Yezidis in the Middle East is not taken into consider-
ation here.
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basis. Thus, the Yezidi religion can be defined as a product of the Near-Eastern 
non-dogmatic milieu, which is deeply rooted in a form of Ṣūfism, but has had 
multiple elements superimposed onto it as a result of being exposed to the 
then-Mesopotamian religious landscape (Guest 1987: 15–28; Kreyenbroek 1995: 
45–68; Arakelova 2006a).
Some elements of Yezidism are extremely specific, even unique, which 
makes them the main markers of the Yezidis’ particular self-consciousness 
(Arakelova 2010: 6–17). The group’s identity is based, ante omnia, on following 
a non-proselytising religion, called Sharfadin (Arab. Šarfadīn or Šaraf ad-dīn, 
literally ‘the honor of religion’). The peculiarities of this religious system are 
limited not only to its syncretism, in which elements are borrowed from, or 
shared with, other doctrines; they also include the particular features that are 
solely characteristic of the Yezidi faith. For instance, its followers are defined as 
belonging to the Ezdikhana (Ēzdīxāna): the esoteric community of the Yezidis. 
The specific parameters of belonging to this community are determined by 
Farzē brātīyē (“The Canon of Spiritual Guidance”; lit. ‘Brotherhood’), which can 
be said to define the character of the Yezidi tradition. The Yezidi community 
confines itself to three major proscriptions: the prohibition of marriage with 
adherents of a different faith, providing purity of religion; the prohibition of 
marriages between representatives of different castes, providing caste purity; 
and the following of the basic precepts of the religion, aimed at preserving the 
faith’s traditions. Breaking these rules is seen as a dreadful sin; a Yezidi who has 
ignored at least one of those prescripts is considered an apostate and must be 
expelled from the community (Ankosi 1996: 12–15).
The caste of a Yezidi determines the role of the follower in the Ezdikhana. 
The clergy (tariqat, Arab. tarīqa, meaning ‘[spiritual] path’) includes the casts 
of the sheikhs or shaykhs (šēx, Arab. šayx) and the pīrs (Pers. pīr ‘elder, saint’), 
and their families. The other community members are the laymen—mirīd 
(Arab. murīd, meaning ‘disciple’). This structure also determines the system 
of spiritual guidance within the community, which is very specific (and even 
includes members entitled ‘brother/sister of the hereafter’ (Asatrian 1999–
2000: 79–96; see also Nicolaus 2016). Of course, the structure elaborated here 
is a simplification of the hierarchy of Yezidi society, which includes other titles 
like Kochak, Faqir, Qawwal, Farrash, and Kebani that are meaningful within the 
spiritual aspect of Yezidism and are functionally significant (within the con-
texts of the temple service and the organisation of religious festivals, for exam-
ple). It has been argued that in diaspora in particular, coordination between 
the three basic castes—the sheikhs, pīrs, and mirīds—is absolutely necessary 
(see Kreyenbroek 1995: 125–137). Spiritual tutorship is a crucial element within 
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an esoteric group that protects its secret knowledge zealously from strangers, 
as is the case with the Yezidis. The system is supposed to guarantee cultural 
and religious preservation and self-awareness.
In the early stages of the development of the faith, affiliation with the com-
munity could lead to initiation into the esoteric group. At present, however, due 
to the ethnic vector of the Yezidi identity, it is presupposed that members will 
be born to Yezidi parents (although membership is not necessarily guaranteed 
for descendants; they must still follow the above-mentioned prescriptions.3
Deprived of their own sacred scriptures, this closed community has devel-
oped through centuries a rich and multi-genre lore, which has fixed its religious 
traditions and represents the most reliable source for research into the group. 
The texts were predominantly recorded in the twentieth century in Armenia;4 
their dating seems to be virtually impossible, though some features and con-
texts allow to distinguish between earlier and later texts (see, for example, 
Rudenko 1982; Arakelova 2008a). The so-called ‘holy books’ of the Yezidis—
Kitēbā Jalwa (‘The Book of Revelation’) and Mashafē Raš (‘The Black Book’)—
can be considered late forgeries (compiled, most probably, in the eighteenth 
century and recorded in the nineteenth century), rather than authentic origi-
nal texts, although they definitely reflect the group’s genuine religious and folk 
traditions, nonetheless (Marie 1911; Bittner 1913). While containing much less 
information about Yezidi sacred knowledge than the elements of religious lore, 
these short texts have gradually become part of tradition, and are now treated 
as holy writings by the Yezidis themselves.
3 The One God and the Yezidi Triad
Although sometimes classified as polytheistic, the Yezidi religion is based on 
the idea of one god and his three incarnations, with the so-called ‘folk pan-
theon’ being represented by Yezidi deities, saints, holy patrons, and deified 
personalities. The Yezidis themselves approach their faith in a monotheistic 
3 Historical analyses of various ethno-religious communities have shown that their develop-
ment involves a clearly expressed drive for ethnicity (Arakelova 2010).
4 The first sample of the Yezidi lore was recorded at the end of the nineteenth century and pub-
lished with the Russian translation by the Armenian scholar Solomon Egiazarov (Egiazarov 
1891: 221–227); the same text was republished with the German translation in 1900, by the 
Hungarian Orientalist Hugo Makas (Makas 1900: 37–38). Then, only around eighty years 
after, voluminous collections of the Yezidi lore, recorded also among the Yezidis of Armenia, 
appeared in in Moscow and Yerevan (Celil and Celil 1978a, 1978b).
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way, as expressed in the following creed, which is called Šahdā dīnī (‘symbol 
of faith’):
Šahdā dīnē min ēk Allāh, …
Silt’ān Šēxadī pādšē mina, …
Silt’ān Ēzdī pādšē mina, …
 Tāwūsī malak šahdā ū īmānēd mina …
Haqa, xwadē kir, [am] ēzdīna,
Sar nāvē Silt’ān Ēzdīna.
Al-h’amd lillāh, am ži ōl ū tarīqēd xō di-řāzīnā.
The testimony of my faith is one god,
Sultan Sheikh ʿAdī is my king,
Sultan Yezid is my king,
Malak-Tāwūs (The Peacock Angel) is the Symbol [of Faith] and my faith.
Indeed, by god’s will [we] are Yezidis,
We are called by the name of Sultan Yezid.
God be praised, we are content with our religion and our community.
Kreyenbroek 1995: 226
The Yezidi triad comprises of the following: Malak-Tāwūs, the Peacock Angel 
(featuring in the Yezidi imagination as a bird, a peacock, or a cock, or some-
times even a dove); Sheikh ʿAdī (Šeyx ‘Ādī; i.e., Sheikh ʿAdī bin Musāfir), a his-
torical figure and founder of the proto-Yezidi community, represented as an 
old man); and Sultan Yezid (Silt’ān Ēzīd, a youthful character). All three char-
acters are considered manifestations of god (xwadē, xwadī, or xudā, the term 
deriving from New Pers. xudāy).5
Yezidi ideas on xwadē are quite hazy. There are just a few references to him 
in Yezidi religious knowledge; his will is said to be realised through his manifes-
tations. For the Yezidis, xwadē is an utterly transcendent figure, which, together 
with his function as demiurge, makes him equivalent to the ‘one God’ of the 
dogmatic religions, to a certain extent. However, despite being creator of the 
Universe, xwadē is considered completely indifferent to its fate; he is figured as 
not concerning himself with worldly affairs. Thus, xwadē is a typical example 
of a deus otiosus: an impartial and removed god.
5 There are also other variations used to designate god: xudāvand, rab(b)ī, and Allāh (the latter 
mostly in Arabic formulae). Moreover, in some religious songs, the term ēzdān (from New 
Pers. yazdān—“god”) appears (Asatrian and Arakelova 2014, Part 1: 1–7).
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The emergence of the triad in the Yezidi doctrine, with its ubiquitous pres-
ence and multiple functions, seems to have led to the figure of xwadē being 
moved aside. Xwadē even seems to be a kind of a tabooed element due to 
his absolutely sacred nature; in the Yezidi liturgy and oral tradition, there is 
only one religious text dedicated (or, rather, addressed) to xwadē directly: 
Madh’ē Xwadē (‘Glorification of God’ or ‘Praise to God’. See the two variants 
of the text with English translations in Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 4–6). It 
is Malak-Tawus (Malak tāwūs, Malakē tāwūs, or Tāwūsē/ī malak—that is, the 
peacock angel) who appears to be not just the most important character of 
the Yezidi triad, but also the very essence or raison d’être of the whole reli-
gion. He dominates over all the major and minor divinities in the pantheon. In 
one variant of the Yezidi Symbol (or Statement) of Faith, he features directly 
after xwadē:
Min ša’datīya īmānā xwa
Bi nāvē xwadē ū Tāwūsī malak dāya.
I attest that my faith is given
In the names of god and Malak-Tawus.
Dewrēš 1993: 11
As such, Malak-Tawus is clearly the main marker or distinguishing feature of 
Yezidism, lending a unique character to this syncretic religion. No other reli-
gious group in the region follows a comparable figure, including some of the 
dogmatically related, extreme Shīʿa sects, in which a similar image of a peacock 
angel has but a marginal level of representation, for example the Mandaeans 
and the Ahl-i Ḥaqq (see Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 30–32; Arakelova 2015b: 
120–123; Drower 1941).
Malak-Tawus also provides an eponym for the Yezidis: they are referred to 
as milatē Malak tāwūs—‘the nation (or tribe) of Malak-Tawus’. In the Yezidi 
text known as ‘The Black Scripture’ or Mash’afē řaš (Arab. Kitāb al-aswad), 
Malak-Tawus is identified with Azrail, the messenger of death and one of the 
four archangels nearest to god (Malēkī xalq kird nāvēna ‘Azra’īl; awīš Malak 
tāwūsa kī gawra hamūyāna—“[God] created an angel and gave him the name 
Azrail; that was Malak-Tawus, who [is] the leader of all”; Li siřī Ādam … milatī 
li sar arz paydā dibī, li pāštir milatī ‘Azrā’īl, ya‘nī Malak ţāwūs kī yazīdīya paydā 
dibī—“From the essence of Adam  … the people will emerge on earth from 
which later the people of Azrail, that is, Malak-Tawus, will be born, which is 
the Yezidi folk” (Bittner 1913: 24–28; see also Eliseev 1988: 59–74). The genesis 
of this specific image, his depiction as a peacock, and his identification with 
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evil can be traced to the Islamic apocryphal tradition and the early Ṣūfi idea 
of the apologia for Satan (Massignon 1922: 869; Soane 1926: 100; Elâhî 1966; 
Schwartz 1971: 211; Wilson 1989–90: 45; Arakelova 2001a: 321–323; Arakelova 
2001b; Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 26–29). In fact, Sharfadin, the Yezidi reli-
gion, should be regarded here as an allegory; a substitute for the taboo name 
of Malak-Tawus, positioned as the supreme deity of the Yezidis (Asatrian 
and Arakelova 2014: 29–30). Moreover, it is the ambivalence of the image of 
Malak-Tawus—and particularly his identification with the Fallen Angel—that 
led to the Yezidis acquiring the epithet “devil worshippers” (Arakelova 2011b: 
35–36).
The two other representatives of the Yezidi triad, Sheikh ʿAdī and Sultan 
Ezid, represent quite a different phenomenon: that of the deification of his-
torical personalities. Sheikh ʿAdī bin Musāfir (465–555/557 AH) (in the Yezidi 
tradition, Šīxādī, Šēxādī, Šīxāndī, or Šēx[ē] A’dī [Ādī])6 was the founder of the 
Adawīyya Ṣūfi order, which became the backbone of the future Yezidi commu-
nity. The veneration of this historical personality, with his well-documented 
biography as a Ṣūfi master, within the Ṣūfi tradition led to his deification by 
the Yezidis, who honor him as the founder of the first Yezidi community and 
a representative of xwade. Sheikh ʿAdī also provides another eponym to the 
community, as the members are also referred to as ‘adabī (Arab. ‘adawī: ‘fol-
lowers of Sheikh ʿAdī’) and šarqīs (from ‘adawīyē šarqī, which means ‘Eastern 
Adawīyya’).
The third character in the holy triad, Sultan Ezid (25–64 AH) (in the Yezidi 
tradition, Si/ult’ān Ēzīd),7 is known as the lord of people and their worldly life, 
which is the essence of the Yezidi faith (Kreyenbroek 1995: 95–96). Sometimes, 
he is even associated with Malak-Tawus himself. Historically speaking, Sultan 
Ezid, the second Umayyad caliph (61–64 AH), was venerated in the early com-
munity and also later in the tradition, most probably as a result of the then-
common trend of venerating the Umayyad dynasty. In time, Sultan Ezid’s 
name came to provide the main eponym for the Yezidi community, most prob-
ably as the result of an overlap between an endo-ethnonym and a pejorative 
exo-ethnonym in the Shīʿa milieu (Arakelova 2008b: 199–201). According to the 
Yezidi tradition, Sultan Ezid broke away from Islam and adopted the religion of 
Šahīd bin-ǰarr, the son of Adam (Spät 2002: 27–56); that is, Yezidism. It should 
6 For more details on this character, see Guest (1987: 15–16); and Asatrian and Arakelova (2014: 
37–44).
7 For more details on this character, see Arakelova (2005); and Asatrian and Arakelova (2014: 
45–50).
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also be noted that in some marginal trends, Sultan Ezid is not identified with 
the historical Umayyad caliph at all.
All the three representatives of the so-called triad are often interchanged 
with each other, with their domains and functions overlapping in various reli-
gious contexts. All three appear as the creator, as representatives of a credo, as 
articles of faith, as providers of eponyms, and as Yezidi saints.
4 Folk Pantheon: Deities and Patron Spirits
Apart from the triad, the Yezidis’ folk pantheon includes numerous minor 
deities, guardian spirits, saints, and holy men, who patronise diverse spheres 
of human activity or personify natural phenomena. Most of the deities who 
are thought to control natural phenomena are believed to heal the diseases 
caused by the spheres that are under their command. The effects of healing are 
typically ascribed to sanctuaries, shrines, and certain sheikh-connected clans 
(Arakelova 2001a). The names of deities, spirit guardians, and saints commonly 
feature the caste-related titles sheikh (šēx), pīr (p’īr), and dervish (dawrēš). All 
the figures in question are, in fact, predominantly performative entities that 
are deprived of a constant dogmatic basis and are, in the main, essentially ele-
ments of ritual. Many of them have legendary graves in the Lalish Valley, which 
seems to be the only sign of ‘canonisation’ by the tradition.
‘The Thunderer’ as a denotatum is represented in several characters or, 
rather, acts under different names. The actual thunder god is Māma-(Mam)
řašān (or Mahmad-řašān, lit. ‘pouring, darting Mahmad (Muhammad)’; appear-
ing sometimes with the epithet ‘lion’ (Šēr Mahmadē řašān or Šēr Mahmad 
řašān). Šēx A’brūs is the lord of lightning, A’bdī Řašō (or A’bd Řaš) is the god of 
thunder and lightning, and Bā-raš is the spirit of the hurricane. Mama-řašān 
is, however, the most generic indication. Mama-řašān controls harvesting and 
his feast is celebrated in spring. In a drought, when the rain needs to be sum-
moned, the Yezidis use special formulas; traditionally, each village owned a 
special ritual cup, ‘Mama-řašān’s cup’ (K’āsā Mama-řašānē), with the name 
of Mama-řašān inscribed inside it in Arabic letters, which was employed dur-
ing the ceremony for calling the rain (Asatrian and Arakelova 2004: 234–242; 
Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 54–61; see also Kreyenbroek 1995: 109, 115).
Šēx Mūsē-sōr, ‘the Red Sheikh Mūs (Moses)’, is another atmospheric deity, 
who controls the winds and the air. Glorified as Sōrē Sōrān (the attribute sōr 
[‘red’] underscoring sanctity), he is addressed to send wind in fair weather dur-
ing threshing work for winnowing. In addition, the sheikhy families from Ōǰāxā 
Sōrē Sōrān, a branch of the Adani sheikhy clan (who, traditionally, claimed 
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to originate from Šēx Mūsē-sōr), are known for their ability to cure diseases 
caused, according to the popular mind, ‘by the wind or air penetrating into the 
body’, those of the lungs and joints, such as rheumatism.
The deities of the sun and the moon—Sheikhs Shams (otherwise Šēx Šams, 
Šēx Šims, Šēšims, or Šēšim) and Faxr ad-Din (or Farxadīn,/Faxradīn)—are rep-
resented by two brothers. These deified historical personalities were the sons 
of ʿAdī II (Guest 1987: 20–21), the third person to lead the Adawīyya community. 
Their deification is by no means explained by their historical roles, particular 
contributions to community life, or any personal merits. In the case of Sheikh 
Shams, the reference of his name to the sun (Šams = Arab. ‘the sun’) deter-
mined his identification with the deity. Sheikh Shams is considered the third 
manifestation of Malak-Tawus, corresponding to the Angel Israfil (Raphael). 
His figure is particularly significant in the folk pantheon. He is endowed with 
specific characteristics: his epithet bīnāyā ĉavā (‘the eyes’ light’) is a metaphor 
for ‘godhead’, according to the Yezidis. Among his other epithets are the fol-
lowing: masabē mina, ‘the essence [lit. “confession, doctrine”] of my religion’; 
ĉirā dīnī (‘the light of the faith’); the qibla (‘pivot’); qawatā dīn (‘the power of 
the faith’); xudanē ma’rīfatē ū ark’ān ū nāsīna (‘the master of spiritual knowl-
edge’); mōrā Šēx Šims (‘the owner of the seal’); ĉirā bar sunatē (the torch of the 
[Yezidi] community); and ĉavē xwadē (God’s eye). Moreover, Sheikh Shams is 
accredited power over hell and the Sirāt bridge (Celil and Celil 1978a: 33–34). 
According to tradition, he has twelve children, corresponding to the twelve 
months of a year. The polyvalence of the sun allows the character to penetrate 
into numerous domains, even those formally belonging to other deities. The 
special attitude of the Yezidis to the sun (and, thus, the special place of Sheikh 
Shams in the folk pantheon) is also confirmed by the fact that Sheikh Shams’ 
name is mentioned in Yezidi lore more frequently than that of any other deity 
(Arakelova 2002: 57–67; Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 67–69).
To move on to Faxr ad-Din, the only reason why he was deified as the ‘moon’ 
seems to be his blood-brother relation to historical Sheikh Shams. In the folk 
tradition, the sun and the moon are two celestial siblings. The hymn dedicated 
to Faxr ad-Din, the Qawlē Malak Farxadīn (Celil and Celil 1978a: 329–337), does 
not even allude to his connection with the moon; in the tradition, however, the 
moon is called Māngā Malak Farxadīn (‘The disc of the Angel Faxr ad-Din’). 
His role as that of the moon deity can be observed, although indirectly, in the 
ritual of healing from ‘lunar disease’: kēma hayvī or hīvē lēxistī (lit. ‘the [state of 
being] moonstruck’; Arakelova 2001a). Malak Faxradīn (Faxr ad-Din) or A’zīz 
Malak Faxradīn—that is, (Saint) Angel Faxr ad-Din—is identified in the Yezidi 
tradition with Turail (or Nurail), the seventh avatar of Malak-Tawus. He is con-
sidered the creator of Yezidi religious lore, or Qawl-ū-bayt (Tamoyan 2001: 148), 
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and the qawwals (reciters) are known as Jēšē Malak Faxradīn: ‘the armies of 
Malak Faxradīn’ (Kreyenbroek 1995: 218–219).
Two deities probably representing the same denotatum are Pīrā-Fāt, the 
foremother of the Yezidis, and Xatūnā-farxā, the patroness of pregnant women 
and infants. Pīrā-Fāt is the patroness of women in labor and newborn babies: 
she protects them from the evil demoness Āl (Asatrian 2001; Arakelova 2003). 
Pīrā-Fāt is thought to have saved the seed from which the Yezidi people origi-
nated from annihilation; she is credited with having preserved it for several 
hundred or thousand years. Xatūnā-farxā has the similar function of being the 
protectress of infants, but her domain focuses on the so-called čilla: the initial 
forty days of life (Asatrian 2007; Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 72–77).
Two other important figures are the dual deities of livestock—Mamē-Šivān 
(or ‘shepherd Mam’ and Gāvānē Zarzān (‘herdsman Zarzān’)—who play cru-
cial roles in the Yezidi religious worldview. When farmers put their animals to 
pasture, these deities are addressed using the following formula: Am pištī ta, 
Mamē-Šivān, dičin bar vī pazī; pišti ta, Gāvānē Zarzān, dičin bar vī dawārī; am 
pištī ta, Mamē-Šivān, paz xway dikin, am pištī ta Gāvānē Zarzān, dēwēr xway 
dikin (“Relying on you, Mamē-Šivān, we follow that flock (of sheep); relying on 
you, Gāvānē Zarzān, we follow the herd (of cows); relying on you, Mamē-Šivān, 
we go after the small animals; relying on you, Gāvānē Zarzān, we go after the 
cattle” [Davrešyan 1977: 74]). Their significance is evident particularly in the 
number of rituals and feasts related to them (Davrešyan 1977: 73; Aristova 1986: 
75, Asatrian 2002: 83), although Mamē-Šivān seems to be somewhat more 
important than Gāvānē Zarzān, probably because the Yezidis are primarily 
sheep breeders. Indeed, the shepherd deity’s name provides the eponym for 
the Mamē-Šivān clergy family (Kreyenbroek 1995: 111–112). The deity is also con-
sidered the earthly twin of the constellation of the Ram. Its shrine in Lalish, the 
‘Wishing Pillar’ (stūnā mirāza), is believed to have the power to fulfill followers’ 
desires, if they place their palms upon it.8
A more universal religious figure is Xidir-Nabī (or Xidr-Navī—‘Prophet Xidr’; 
Arab. al-Xiḍr, Pers. Xizr or Xezr), who appears in the beliefs of numerous peo-
ples in the Near East and Central Asia. Often identified with the Prophet Elijah, 
Xidir-Nabī is a character with a double name in many traditions, including the 
Yezidi one—he is also referred to as Xidirnabī-Xidiraylās or simply Xirdaylās 
(Papazyan 1986; Krasnowolska 1998: 141–60; Celil and Celil 1978b: 308). For the 
Yezidis, he is one of the sons of Sheikh Shams and is usually represented as 
a celestial warrior: as mērē gāz-gēdūkā (‘the man of mountains and gorges’) 
8 For more details about both the livestock deities, see Arakelova (2003); Asatrian and 
Arakelova (2004: 256–259); and Asatrian and Arakelova (2014: 80–82).
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or haspē sīyārē bōz (‘rider of a white horse’). He is also patron of the young, 
travelers, and those in love. In these respects, the Yezidi Xidir-Nabī has clear 
parallels with the Armenian popular saint Surb Sargis (St Sergius), who is also 
a celestial warrior and is depicted as controlling storms and as a patron of love 
(Harut‘yunyan 2002). Xidir-Nabī’s festival, an important date in the Yezidi reli-
gious calendar (Šēx K’eleş 1995: 33–34; Davrešyan 1977: 73), is also reminiscent 
of the Armenian Surb Sargis feast. It can be argued, therefore, that this char-
acter of Muslim origin has been shaped as a Yezidi deity by Armenian cultural 
influences (Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 95–97). There is also another figure 
associated with travel in the Yezidi tradition: Šēx A’lī Šams (or Šīxālī-Šamsān), 
the protector of wayfarers, captives, exiles, and all those in strange lands. He 
is addressed mainly via a toast made in his honor (ašqā Šīxālī-Šamsān) during 
festive meals or wakes, or before one takes to the road (Asatrian and Arakelova 
2014: 90–91).
A further character worth mentioning in the Yezidi folk pantheon is Pirā-stēř 
or Prikī stēř (lit. ‘the old woman of bedding’), who, unlike Xidir-Nabī, is unique 
to Yezidi culture. She is described as an old woman that is invisible to the eye 
but lives in bedding (stēř) and roams about the house at night. Her role is to 
look out for the welfare of the whole family (Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 92). 
Šēx-kirās (‘the spirit of the garment’) is a less important, almost forgotten fig-
ure, but is mentioned in Yezidi literature and was probably responsible for the 
process of death or the transmigration of the soul (tanāsux) (Arakelova 2002: 
72–74).
Milyāk’atē-qanǰ (lit. ‘the holy angel’) is the only example of the Deus Phalli in 
all New Iranian folk pantheons. There is just one written reference to this deity 
(Avdal 1957: 93–94) but some elements of the phallic symbol can be traced 
to the Yezidi festival Barān-bardān (‘the releasing of rams’—see Şemîlov 1969; 
Asatrian 1998). This is another character who has almost been forgotten; he 
continues to hold significance, however, in relation to notions of fertility 
(Arakelova 2007; Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 82–86).
Šēx-kirās, the Spirit of the Garment, an almost a forgotten figure, was prob-
ably responsible for the process of death or even transmigration of a soul 
(tanāsux) (Arakelova 2002: 72–74). Other characters of the Yezidi folk pantheon 
include Dawrēš-a’rd or Dawrēšē-a’rd (lit. ‘saint/master/host of the Earth’), who 
is the lord of the Earth (the underworld) and has the function of preserving 
people’s hidden or pawned possessions; Xatā-ǰōt (‘spirit of the furrow’), who is 
the patroness of agriculture; Xudāne-mālē (‘master of the house’), the spirit of 
the household, who lives in fireplaces and protects families’ welfare and moral-
ity; Šēx Mand or P’īr Mandī-gōrā, the lord of graves—a chthonic character who 
has power over snakes and scorpions and carries the epithet šēxē řaš (‘the 
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black sheikh’); Ibrahim-khalil (‘the friend of god’), who is the Yezidi version of 
the Biblical Prophet Abraham and has no specific function but is mentioned in 
the prayer said before an ordinary meal; Jin-tayār (‘the flying jinn’), who is the 
lord of the genies and cures the mentally ill; and Pīrē-Libinā(n), the ‘builder 
spirit’, who is said to have built many of the sanctuaries in Lalesh and is also 
believed to facilitate marriages.
Important objects of worship for the Yezidis include the avatars of 
Malak-Tawus: ‘Azrail, Dardail, Israfil, Mikail, Jabrail, Shamnail, and Turail (of 
which ‘Azrail, the alleged head of the seven avatars, is usually identified with 
Malak-Tawus, although they are all considered emanations of him; Edmonds 
1967: 4). The category of ‘deity’ excludes most of the figures within the system 
of saints—for example, the historical personalities that are associated with 
the Adawīyya order. Of particular note here are Sheikh Abū Bakr (Šēxōbakr), 
Sajjad ad-din (Siǰdīn, characterised as qāsidē řuhē mirīyā or ‘psychopomp’, who 
is responsible for escorting the souls of the dead to the underworld), and Nasr 
ad-din (identified with the angel of death—a divinised person who used to 
be the executor under Sheikh ʿAdī and killed everyone who opposed him), 
who are not considered deities (Asatrian and Arakelova 2004; Asatrian and 
Arakelova 2014: 51–108).
5 Other Specific Features of the Yezidi Religious Syncretism
The Yezidi tradition has also preserved elements of animal worship (partic-
ularly that of the dog, the snake, the chameleon, and the rooster) and plant 
cults (the onion and the mandrake). Celestial bodies are another essential 
aspect of folk beliefs—the Milky Way (Kurmanji Rīyā kādizīyē—’the road of a 
straw reaper or thief ’), Venus (Stayrā sibē—the morning star), Sirius (Galāvēž; 
lit. ‘([the star] bringing people to perdition’), and the constellations of Libra 
(stayrā Mēzīn), Pleiades (Pēwir), and Aries (Barān) all have connotations in 
the Yezidi tradition, as do lunar eclipses, rainbows, earthquakes, thunder, and 
lightning (Arakelova 2006b; Arakelova 2014; Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 
109–120).
The Yezidi religion also has other distinguishing features, such as the coex-
istence of conflicting ideas adopted from different traditions, which have 
been retained due to the absence of a strict doctrine in Yezidism. For exam-
ple, there are three legends related to the Yezidis’ origins. As explained in the 
Black Scripture (Bittner 1913: 28), and stated by the Yezidi sheikhy tradition, 
unlike all other peoples (who originated from Adam and Eve), the Yezidis had 
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only a primeval father, Adam; Eve played no role in their genesis. Yezidi leg-
end explains that Eve once claimed that children were produced by her alone 
and that Adam had no part in creating them. In order to test Eve’s claim, she 
and Adam placed their seeds in separate jars. When, nine months later, they 
opened Eve’s jar, they found serpents, scorpions, and poisonous insects, while 
in Adam’s jar, there was a beautiful, moon-faced child. They called the boy 
Šahīd bin-ǰarr (‘Šahīd, the son of the pot’). He later married a hūrī and became 
the forefather of the Yezidis (Spät 2002). This version of Adam and Eve’s story, 
which is clearly apocryphal but has Biblical origins, coexists with the legend of 
the Yezidi seed preserved by Pīrā-Fāt, the foremother of the Yezidis. The latter 
version parallels the common mythologeme of the preservation of the primor-
dial seed in the Iranian tradition (Asatrian 2007). The third ethno-genetic myth, 
though a marginal one, goes back to a plot of the Iranian epic Shahnameh; it 
is, however, not related to any of Shahnameh versions in Kurmanji, but rather 
stands as a separate sujet (Arakelova 2017).
A similar example of a contradiction is that the Abrahamic idea of the 
“hereafter” (Arakelova and Amrian 2012) coexists in Yezidism with a belief 
in reincarnation (tanāsux), which is similar to that held by the shibboleths 
of the non-dogmatic Near-Eastern milieu, some extreme Shīʿa sects (ɣulāt-i 
šī‘a), and the Mandaeans (see Arakelova 2015b). Indeed, despite its unique 
character, Yezidism has a number of striking similarities with other syncretic 
religious systems, first of all, with such extreme Shīʿa groups as, for example, 
the Ahl-i Ḥaqq and the Zaza Alevīs (Kreyenbroek 1995: 53 et seq.; Arakelova 
2004; Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 121–123). Dogmatic Shīʿa elements are also 
present, particularly in the religious folklore, all being either nominally pre-
sented in the texts or adapted to the Yezidi Weltanschauung (Asatrian and 
Arakelova 2016).
Some aspects of the Ṣūfi heritage can be noted, although, in many cases, 
they are reinterpreted in accordance with Yezidi tradition (Arakelova 2008a; 
Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 128–129). Among the latter, especially interest-
ing are such outstanding Ṣūfi figures as Husseyn al-Ḥallāj (c. 244–309 AH) 
and Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya (95/99–185 AH) Both are honoured with separate 
hymns—Qawlē Husēyīnī Halāj and Qawlē Rabi‘a al-‘Adawīya—in the Yezidi 
religious lore, and being approached in the tradition as proper Yezidi saints 
(Arakelova 2001b; Celil and Celil 1978b: 29; Kreyenbroek and Rashow 2005: 
196–200). Moreover, in the text, Rābiʿa, a prominent woman saint, is engaged 
in dialogue with another Ṣūfi master, Bayazid Bisṭāmī’ (188–262 AH) (Sheikh 
Bāzīd). Incidentally, despite the absence of the clearly articulated women’s 
role in the tradition, apart from the case of Rābiʿa, there is another sample 
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dedicated particularly to a woman in the Yezidi lore. Bayt’ā Gilāvīyē is a lament 
for a noble woman, recited during a funeral rite for a woman of a high social 
status (Arakelova 1999/2000).
Some Yezidi legends and cosmological myths, including mythological fig-
ures and rituals are pervaded with gnostic content (see, for example, Spät 2002; 
Arakelova 2002: 72–74; Arakelova 2014, Asatrian and Arakelova 2014: 124–127; 
Rodziewicz 2014, 2016). Various common features and parallels exist at a range 
of levels—both basic ideas and marginal elements are shared. It is perhaps 
because of the religious idiosyncrasies and contradictions, having emerged 
and developed as a result of the complete dissociation of Yezidism from Islam 
and clear rejection of Islamic roots, that the Yezidis have been viewed as her-
etics or devil worshippers, being persecuted by the wider Muslim community 
throughout history. Two of the most severe episodes of Yezidi persecution 
were perpetrated by the Ottomans (see, for example, Çelebi 1991: 169–171) and 
the Young Turks, who, apart from the Christians (Armenians and Greeks), also 
targeted the Yezidis.
6 Conclusions and Current Status
Yezidis remain among the most vulnerable groups in the Muslim milieu. 
The present-day Near-Eastern conflict and the ‘forced conversion campaign’ 
mounted by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant on Yezidi-inhabited ter-
ritories has resulted in a whole range of crimes being committed against this 
ethno-religious group: tens of thousands have been killed, are missing, remain 
in captivity (physical and sexual slavery), or have been forced to convert to 
Islam. Places of Yezidi religious and cultural significance have been systemati-
cally destroyed. The peak of these atrocities was the Sinjar massacre of early 
August 2014, when several thousand Yezidis were killed in the Sinjar area in 
Iraq’s Nineveh Governorate (see the detailed report in OHCHR and UNAMI 
2016). In Turkey, in the recent past, dozens of the Yezidi villages near the 
Turkey-Syria border have been destroyed or taken over by their Muslims neigh-
bours, predominantly Kurds (see Andrews 1989, 119).9
Among the latest trends noticeable in the Yezidi communities of Armenia, 
Georgia and Russia is the adoption of Orthodox Christianity or Neo- 
9 Among numerous recent reports on the issue, see, for example, “The pro-Kurdish Peace 
and Democracy Party deputy Ayla Akat Ata gives the figure of 400 Yezidis currently living in 
Turkey,” Ekurd Daily, 19 April, at https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/4/turkey4996.
htm, accessed 15/07/2020.
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Protestantism, the former being more typical of Russia and Georgia, while 
the latter, of all the three states. This obvious process allows some represen-
tatives of the Yezidi authorities to speak about the crisis in Yezidism caused 
by globalisation processes and, as a result, rapid transformations in the tradi-
tional world outlook among the younger generations. Recent researches based 
on field work among the proselytes point to the absence of a role model in 
the Yezidi religion, as a main factor of the conversion (Arakelova 2016, 2018). 
The mentioned trends will definitely spread, resulting in transformations 
of the Yezidi identity and shaping of new, syncretic identities.
Principally new challenges Yezidism is facing in the modern period—mass 
resettlement, forced conversion to Islam and return to Yezidism/attempts to 
reintegrate to the Yezidi community, formation of new communities in the 
countries with less traditional societies (primarily in Western Europe), conver-
sion to Orthodox Christianity and Neo-Protestantism in the traditional Yezidi 
communities of the South Caucasus and Russia, and so forth—inevitably lead 
to major transformations in Yezidism as integral phenomenon. It will gradually 
acquire new specific characteristics, giving birth to new syncretic identities.
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The modern Bahāʾī Faith claims over five million adherents (Langness 2013) 
and has a global presence with National Spiritual Assemblies in almost every 
country in the world. It is an independent religious tradition accepting finan-
cial support from none but members and eschewing political involvement. The 
Bahāʾī Faith is, however, rooted in the millennialism of the nineteenth century 
Shīʿa Islam of Iran, although most Bahāʾīs today are not of Muslim heritage 
and may even be unaware of its Islamic roots. The relationship of the Bahāʾī 
Faith to Shīʿa Islam is comparable to that of the historic link between Judaism 
and Christianity, in so far as the founders of the related Bābī and Bahāʾī Faiths 
were born into an Islamic society, and most of their early followers were 
born Muslims, but their religion superseded Islam. Unlike Jesus, however, 
Bahāʾuʾllāh, founder of Bahāʾī, was clear that he was founding a new religion, 
one which replaced that of the Bāb, which in turn had abrogated Islam.
2 Origins of the Bahāʾī Faith
The earliest stirring of what would become the Bahāʾī Faith can be traced back 
to the Shaykhi School of Shīʿa Islam in Iran and Iraq, named after its founder 
Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-Aḥsāʾī (1753–1826). This was a religiously 
conservative movement with an emphasis on eschatology and an allegorical 
interpretation of Quranic descriptions of the end of days. The second leader of 
the Shaykhi School, Sayyid Kāẓim al-Rashtī, did not appoint a successor, argu-
ing the time was too short and that his followers should instead seek out the 
prophesied Mahdī, who was already in the world. Consequently, on his death 
his followers dispersed to find the promised Mahdī. One of these questing 
Shaykis was Mullā Husayn (1813–1849). He took his search to Shiraz where he 
encountered ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī (20 October 1819–9 July 1850).
ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī had been in contact with Rashtī and shared his belief 
that the eschatological prophesies of Shīʿa Islam were soon to be fulfilled, on 
the night of 22 May 1844, he declared his mission to Mullā Husayn and revealed 
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himself to be the Bāb (‘the Gate’), the promised Qāʾim of Shīʿa Islam. The Bāb 
and his short-lived Bābī movement are regarded by Bahāʾīs to be an indepen-
dent prophet and an independent religion; however, they acknowledge the 
Bāb’s central function was that of a herald of a future prophet, referred to as 
‘He whom God will Make Manifest’. The Bāb began by declaring the imminent 
return of the Twelfth Imām and sending out his followers to proclaim the news. 
In 1848, a conclave of the Bāb’s followers met at Badasht to abrogate the laws 
of Islam. Many of the laws revealed by the Bāb in his central book the Bayān, 
have been argued (Saiedi 2008) to be impossible to implement, because they 
are dependent upon the appearance of ‘He whom God will Make Manifest’, 
who would be able to affirm or abrogate them. Thus, it follows that the pur-
pose of the Bābī laws was simply to break with Islamic tradition and create a 
context for a further Revelation. The Bābī movement was put down brutally 
and the Bāb executed by firing squad. After his death, the nominal headship 
of the movement fell to Mīrzā Yaḥyā Nūrī (1831–1912) whose leadership proved 
ineffective and ultimately caused the community to disintegrate into factions.
3 Bahāʾuʾllāh
Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Nūrī (12 November 1817–29 May 1892) known as Bahāʾuʾllāh 
was the older half-brother of Mīrzā Yaḥyā Nūrī, he had accepted the claims 
of the Bāb in the late summer of 1844 (Momen 2007), and attended the 
Conference of Badasht. He was a prominent and respected member of the Bābī 
community. After the death of the Bāb in 1850, Mīrzā Yaḥyā, known as Azal, 
became the publicly acknowledged leader of the Bābīs. It has been suggested 
by Juan Cole in his piece on Bahāʾuʾllāh in the Bahāʾī Encyclopaedia (Cole 
1995) that Bahāʾuʾllāh, who had been corresponding with the Bāb through his 
younger half-brother, may have been the real leader of the group. Cole goes on 
to say, “Azal was acknowledged by many prominent Bābīs as a ‘Mirror’ and a 
first among equals. There is no evidence that the Bāb appointed him as a lega-
tee or vicar, and there were many Mirrors” (Cole 1995). After a brief sojourn in 
Karbalāʾ, Iraq, Bahāʾuʾllāh returned to Iran in 1852, in his absence some fanatical 
Bābīs had plotted an attempt on the life of the Shah and despite Bahāʾuʾllāh’s 
condemnation of the plot and innocence of involvement, he was arrested and 
imprisoned in the Siyah-Chal, the Black Pit dungeon. It was in this prison he 
underwent an intense mystical experience. On his release from prison and after 
a period in Baghdad, Bahāʾuʾllāh spent several years as a Ṣūfi in Kurdistan.
In response to the pleas of Bābīs concerning the shambolic leadership of his 
increasingly reclusive half-brother, Bahāʾuʾllāh returned to Baghdad in 1856 and 
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took on much of the administrative leadership of the community. The positive 
impact of his work led to a resurgence of the Bābī movement, and ultimately 
a demand from the Persian government for the extradition of Bahāʾuʾllāh to 
Persia. The Ottoman authorities refused but instead, for reasons which are not 
clear, removed Bahāʾuʾllāh to Constantinople. Before he left Baghdad on 21 April 
1863, Bahāʾuʾllāh and his entourage stayed for twelve days in the Najibiyyih gar-
dens, it was there that Bahāʾuʾllāh declared to a small group of his companions 
that he was He whom God will Make Manifest, the messenger promised by the 
Bāb. Bahāʾuʾllāh travelled from Baghdad to Constantinople between 3 May and 
17 August 1863, accompanied by a large group including family members and 
followers. After three and a half months in Constantinople, he was ordered to 
depart for Adrianople. It was while he was in Adrianople that the schism with 
his brother Azal became absolute after several attempts by Azal’s supporters 
to kill Bahāʾuʾllāh.
In 1866, Bahāʾuʾllāh made his claim to be Him whom God will Make Manifest 
public (MacEoin 1989), as well as making a formal written announcement to 
Azal referring to his followers for the first time as the “people of Bahā” (Smith 
2008). Whilst in Adrianople Bahāʾuʾllāh wrote extensively, including letters to 
political and religious rulers, announcing his station and mission, demonstrat-
ing the intended universality of his message outside the Muslim world. The 
discord between Bahāʾuʾllāh and his followers and the rump of the Bābī move-
ment loyal to Azal caused the Ottoman authorities in July 1868 to exile both 
factions, Bahāʾuʾllāh to the prison city of ʿAkkā (Acre) and Azal to Famagusta 
in Cyprus. Bahāʾuʾllāh and his family arrived in ʿAkkā at the end of August 1868, 
the first years there were very hard and marred by the tragic death in 1870 of 
Bahāʾuʾllāh’s son, Mīrzā Mehdī, at the age of twenty-two when he fell through a 
skylight. After some time, relations between the prisoners and officials and the 
local community improved, so that the conditions of the imprisonment were 
eased and eventually, Bahāʾuʾllāh was allowed to leave the city and visit nearby 
places. From 1877 until 1879 Bahāʾuʾllāh lived in the house of Mazraʿih (Smith 
2008). In 1899 Bahāʾuʾllāh moved to his final home a small mansion at Bahjí. 
He had fourteen children by his three wives including four daughters, five of 
his sons predeceased him. Bahāʾuʾllāh died of a fever in ʿAkkā on 29 May 1892, 
at the age of seventy-four.
4 ʿAbdu’l-Bahā and Shoghí Effendí
Before his death, Bahāʾuʾllāh appointed ʿAbbās Efendī (23 May 1844–28 
November 1921), his eldest son, as leader of the community and inspired 
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interpreter of His Revelation. Known as ʿAbdu’l-Bahā, he communicated 
with the community he led through letters, referred to as tablets and through 
lectures. He visited the West to two occasions, the first time from August to 
December 1911, when he visited the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland, 
and the second time between April 1912 and June 1913, when he visited Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, and Hungary, 
meeting his growing number of Occidental supporters and answering their 
questions and concerns. This meant that issues such as the role of women were 
pushed to the fore and the Bahāʾī message took on aspects of Western social 
thought (Osborn 2014: 22). Several younger members of (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā’s fam-
ily were sent to England to complete their educations and acquire linguistic 
skills. Between March 1916 and March 1917, ʿAbdu’l-Bahā wrote fourteen let-
ters to the Bahāʾī’s of Canada and the United States known collectively as The 
Tablets of the Divine Plan (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1991 [1916–1917]). These instructed his 
North American followers to spread the Bahāʾī teachings around the world, an 
indication of how important he understood his Western followers to be. With 
no surviving son, ʿAbdu’l-Bahā passed the leadership of the community to his 
grandson and amanuensis Shoghí Effendí Rabbání.
Shoghí Effendí Rabbání (1 March 1897–4 November 1957) was born in ʿAkkā 
and educated at the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of 
Beirut) and Balliol College, Oxford (Khadem 1999). He learned of the death of 
his grandfather in London and returned to Palestine to discover that his grand-
father’s will instructed the Bahāʾī community to “turn unto Shoghí Effendí … 
he is the sign of God, the chosen branch, the Guardian of the Cause of God … 
He is the expounder of the words of God and after him will succeed the first-
born of his lineal descendants” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1990). Under the Guardianship 
of Shoghí Effendí the unique Bahāʾī Administration was set up, this included 
the establishment of local and national bodies, the regulation of published 
material and large scale coordinated missionary activity. Throughout the 
period of the Guardianship the Bahāʾī Faith evolved into fast growing interna-
tional community, stressing modernity and social reconstruction, books with 
titles such as Bahāʾuʾllāh and the New Era (Esslemont 1923) and Bahaism: the 
Modern Social Religion (Holley 1913) being used to teach the new religion across 
the globe.
The death of Shoghí Effendí in 1957 caused some tensions, as the will of 
ʿAbdu’l-Bahā had clearly stated the Guardianship was a hereditary office whose 
incumbent would lead the community alongside an elected legislative body, 
the Universal House of Justice, an institution described by Bahāʾuʾllāh in the 
Kitáb-i-Aqdas. When Shoghí Effendí died without an heir there was potential 
for discord. However, in 1951 Shoghí Effendí had appointed a number of men 
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and women to the International Bahāʾī Council, a body which existed to assist 
him in specific tasks and to be the forerunner of the Universal House of Justice. 
In 1961, the appointed International Bahāʾī Council was reconstituted as an 
elected body and their final task was to set up the election of the Universal 
House of Justice which took place in 1963.
5 A ‘World Religion’ from 1957
The Universal House of Justice (henceforth UHJ) is elected every five years by 
the National Spiritual Assemblies (henceforth NSAs) which are in turn elected 
annually by unit conventions of grass roots members. Where more than nine 
Bahāʾīs are resident in a locality a Local Spiritual Assembly (henceforth LSA) of 
nine members is elected; unit conventions, local and national assemblies are 
open to all members, only the UHJ is restricted to males. As well as the elected 
institutions, there is an appointed stratum of administration which also func-
tions under the guidance of the UHJ, this comprises of Counsellors and their 
appointees at local level, there is no clergy and apart from the members of the 
UHJ all functionaries are expected to be self-financing and in employment.
After the death of its last hereditary leader a period of significant expan-
sion and development took place. The community had been rooted in Iran 
and spread into Iranian expatriate communities, gradually including Jews, 
Zoroastrians, Sunni Muslims, and others. From the 1890s small groups of 
Bahāʾīs developed in the West, the most significant of these was that of the 
USA. In response to the expansion plans of Shoghí Effendí Bahāʾīs from both 
the Middle East and the West undertook ‘pioneering’; moving to places hith-
erto without a Bahāʾī community and striving to set up groups. By the 1950s the 
two cultural contexts of the Bahāʾī community came together in missionary 
activity, the post Islamic Iranian Bahāʾīs and the occidental Bahāʾīs seeped in 
the alterative religious milieu of Europe and the USA began to establish Bahāʾī 
communities in several parts of the non-Muslim ‘developing world’, initially 
among the Western-oriented urban minority (Smith and Momen 1989: 68). 
Throughout the 1960s the Bahāʾī Faith gained adherents throughout the devel-
oping world and beyond. Bahāʾī teachers learned to adapt their message and 
missionary techniques to largely uneducated workers, transforming the social 
base of the community. In the well-established and largely white American 
community, converts began to be drawn from Native American and African 
American demographics.
The mission work was exceptionally successful in some areas, bringing about 
massive cultural change in the worldwide community, however, this change 
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was not without problems. The infrastructure was not in place to enable reten-
tion of such an influx of new believers, many of whom “were poorly educated, 
and many lived in rural and tribal areas with which effective communication 
was difficult to sustain” (Smith and Momen 1989: 72). Around the same time 
the revolution in Iran also effected the spread of the Bahāʾī Faith. The revolu-
tion brought about significant persecution of Bahāʾīs in the homeland of the 
Faith and furthermore curtailed the sending of funds abroad. This was a signif-
icant blow as the Iranian community had funded much missionary work and 
supported communities in poorer countries. The Iranian government, rather 
strangely for Shīʿa Muslims, seemed oblivious of the positive impact of perse-
cution and martyrdom, and Iranians fleeing the revolution bolstered numbers 
across the worldwide community with emotive stories of persecution gaining 
much publicity.
To address the ability to attract people to the Faith but the failure to retain 
them a new strategy was implemented, the concept of the ‘training institute’ 
was introduced by the Universal House of Justice in the mid-1990s. Its purpose 
is to assist individuals to deepen their understanding of the Bahāʾī teachings, 
and to gain the spiritual insights and practical skills they need to carry out the 
work of the community. The Institute process is based on the use of mate-
rials developed in Columbia by The Ruhi Institute, which is directed by the 
Columbian NSA. The Institute produces a sequence of books, referred to as 
the ‘Ruhi Books’ which are studied in small groups led by a facilitator who has 
completed the sequence. There are training materials for different age groups 
and a range of support resources including songbooks and colouring sheets. As 
well as the Ruhi Book, in study circles Bahāʾīs are encouraged to participate in 
‘core activities’, including children’s classes and devotional meetings. It must 
be stressed that these activities are neither compulsory nor restrictive and 
individuals are encouraged to continue and develop other activities, though 
there is anecdotal evidence that the study circles have come to dominate the 
community at the expense of other activities. At the present time, the Institute 
process does not appear to have been subjected to academic scrutiny, making 
it impossible to assess the effectiveness of the strategy.
6 Bahāʾī Beliefs and Practices
In common with Muslims, Bahāʾīs have a linear view of history, throughout 
which prophets, or Manifestations of God, bring books and laws to found and 
govern divinely inspired communities, each revelation building upon the last 
in a process described as ‘Progressive Revelation’. Bahāʾuʾllāh is held to be the 
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‘promised one of all ages’, the universal manifestation of the unknowable deity 
and the founder of a new cycle of revelation. Some of the basic beliefs of the 
Bahāʾī Faith can be summarised as a list of principles extrapolated from the 
writings of the founder that concern the nature of religion. All religions, accord-
ing to the Faith, are ultimately one: “It is the outward practices of religion that 
are so different, and it is they that cause disputes and enmity—while the real-
ity is always the same, and one” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1969: 120). Thus, religion must be 
a source of unity: “religion must be the cause of unity, harmony and agreement 
among mankind. If it be the cause of discord and hostility, if it leads to separa-
tion and creates conflict, the absence of religion would be preferable in the 
world” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1976 [1956]: 247). Furthermore. religion is evolutionary, 
revealed to suit the place and time but receptacles on a single universal truth: 
“There is no distinction whatsoever among the Bearers of My Message. They 
all have but one purpose; their secret is the same secret” (Bahāʾuʾllāh 1983: 78).
The understanding of this universality must be made through the inde-
pendent investigation of truth, which Moojan Momen postulates in an article 
intended for the Bahāʾī Encyclopaedia (Momen n.d.) “is to be found in embry-
onic form in the Shīʿī prohibition of taqlīd, blind imitation, in matters of the 
principles of religion.” As ʿAbdu’l-Bahā phrases it, “God has created in man the 
power of reason, whereby man is enabled to investigate reality. God has not 
intended man to imitate blindly his fathers and ancestors” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1982: 
291). This emphasis on reason is further enhanced by the insistence of the har-
mony between religion and science, which are described by ʿAbdu’l-Bahā as 
“two wings” which will facilitate the development of the intellect and spirit 
(ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1969: 143).
Other principles deal with the nature of humankind, stressing the one-
ness of religion reflected in the oneness of humanity. This is the basis for the 
emphasis on equality: “as to religious, racial, national and political bias: all 
these prejudices strike at the very root of human life; one and all they beget 
bloodshed, and the ruination of the world. So long as these prejudices sur-
vive, there will be continuous and fearsome wars” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1978: 249). Sex 
equality and equal opportunities for women and men in education and train-
ing are also stressed: “Until the reality of equality between man and woman is 
fully established and attained, the highest social development of mankind is 
not possible” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1982: 76). The abolition of the extremes of wealth 
and poverty is also desirable, “O Ye Rich Ones on Earth! The poor in your midst 
are My trust; guard ye My trust and be not intent only on your own ease” 
(Bahāʾuʾllāh 1990: 41). World unity is promoted, with peaceful consultation as a 
means for resolving differences: “The shining spark of truth cometh forth only 
after the clash of differing opinions” (ʿAbdu’l-Bahā 1978: 87). The ideal is for 
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universal peace and the establishment of a world parliament, where all world 
leaders will come together to “consider such ways and means as will lay the 
foundations of the world’s Great Peace amongst men” (Bahāʾuʾllāh 1983: 249).
To facilitate unity great emphasis is put on universal education, “Unto every 
father hath been enjoined the instruction of his son and daughter in the art 
of reading and writing and in all that hath been laid down in the Holy Tablet” 
(Bahāʾuʾllāh 1993: 38). In the interests of universal communication the need for 
an international auxiliary language is highlighted: “It behoveth the sovereigns 
of the world … or the ministers of the earth to take counsel together and to 
adopt one of the existing languages or a new one to be taught to children in 
schools throughout the world, and likewise one script” (Bahāʾuʾllāh 1978: 22).
It is in the daily practices of Bahāʾīs that the origins of the Faith in an Islamic 
context are most clearly preserved. Bahāʾīs are required to declare their faith, 
pray in a specified manner at specific times, give alms based on property held, 
fast, and make a pilgrimage to sacred sites. It is widespread practice in some 
Bahāʾī communities to issue cards to new believers, which outline the beliefs 
being accepted, the following statement is on the card issued by the NSA 
of Australia:
I wish to become a member of the Bahāʾī community. I accept Bahāʾuʾllāh 
as the Bearer of God’s Message for this Day and will endeavour to follow 
His teachings and the Bahāʾī way of life. I also accept the authority of the 
institutions which administer the affairs of the Bahāʾī community.
There are three daily obligatory prayers, any one of the three may be used but 
must be done so in accordance with any specific directions with which they 
may be accompanied, for example facing the qibla and prostrations. Bahāʾīs 
are required to fast by refraining from food and drink between the hours of 
sunrise and sunset during the Bahāʾī month of Alá, (Loftiness). The Bahāʾī fast, 
therefore, takes place over nineteen days, from 2 March to 20 March inclusive. 
Bahāʾīs are subject to the law of Ḥuqúqu’lláh (the Portion of God): “Should any-
one acquire one hundred mithqáls of gold, nineteen mithqáls thereof are God’s 
and to be rendered unto Him” (Bahāʾuʾllāh 1993: 55) That is, 19% of that portion 
of income which is not essential for living expenses is to be paid, similar to a 
tithe, to support philanthropic causes.
7 Controversies
The teachings of the Bahāʾī Faith might generally be described as progres-
sive, egalitarian, and inclusive, however, in recent years there has been some 
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discussion, particularly in Europe and North America, around the issues of the 
role of women and LGBT rights. The equality of men and women is a basic 
principle of the Bahāʾī Faith and has been expounded as such since its incep-
tion, however, the Universal House of Justice is an exclusively male institution 
and that has raised questions as to how that can be rationalised in a context of 
gender equality (Lee et al 1999).
Despite non-involvement in politics the Bahāʾī Faith has a history of inclu-
sivity of races and opposition to racism. This is particularly true in the US 
where prominent African Americans in such diverse fields as philosophy, for 
example, Alain Locke (1885–1954) (Buck 2005), and jazz music, for example 
Dizzy Gillespie (Shipton 2001), have embraced the Bahāʾī Faith. The inclusiv-
ity in regard to race, sex, and gender has led to some tension over issues such 
as same-sex marriage (Snow 2016). The Bahāʾī Faith has teachings similar to 
those of other Abrahamic faiths around chastity before marriage, faithfulness 
in marriage, and a dislike of divorce and non-heterosexual relations. Whilst 
strongly opposing any form of discrimination on the grounds of sexuality 
the admonishment of Bahāʾuʾllāh—“We shrink, for very shame, from treat-
ing of the subject of boys … Commit not that which is forbidden you in Our 
Holy Tablet, and be not of those who rove distractedly in the wilderness of 
their desires” (Bahāʾuʾllāh 1993: 59)—was further reinforced by both Shoghí 
Effendí and ʿAbdu’l-Bahā to clarify the term ‘boys’ did not refer to pederasty or 
paedophilia but is inclusive of adult homosexual acts. More latterly the UHJ 
has stated:
The Universal House of Justice is authorized to change or repeal its own 
legislation as conditions change … but it cannot abrogate or change any 
of the laws which are explicitly laid down in the sacred Texts. It follows, 
then, that the House of Justice has no authority to change this clear 
teaching on homosexual practice.
Universal House of Justice 1995
The increasing numerical dominance of Bahāʾīs in the developing world may 
render concerns around scholarship and gender politics marginal to the wider 
Bahāʾī community.
8 Persecution
Bahāʾīs have suffered persecution for their beliefs, particularly in Muslim 
majority countries where their understanding of the ministries of The Bāb 
and Bahāʾuʾllāh as fulfilments Shīʿa Islam and consequently ‘prophets after 
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Mohammed’ have led to charges of apostasy. The presence of the Bahāʾī World 
Centre in Israel has led to accusations of complicity with Zionism, despite 
the obvious objection that the Centre predated the foundation of the state 
of Israel.
The tragic situation for Bahāʾīs in Iran is well documented, as since the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran Bahāʾīs have been systematically persecuted as a 
matter of government policy. During the first decade of this persecution, more 
than two hundred Bahāʾīs were killed or executed; hundreds more were tor-
tured or imprisoned, and tens of thousands lost jobs, access to education, and 
other rights solely because of their religious belief. According to Roger Cooper 
in The Bahāʾīs of Iran: The Minority Rights Group Report 51, Bahāʾīs are classi-
fied as “unprotected infidels”, “heretics” and “those whose blood may be shed 
with impunity” making it impossible to seek justice, redress or protection. 
The reaction of the Bahāʾīs to oppression derives directly from the teachings 
of Bahāʾuʾllāh:
Bahāʾīs therefore believe that strategies for achieving lasting social 
change—including strategies for overcoming violent oppression—must 
pay attention to both the material and spiritual dimensions of change, 
including the transformation of hearts among both the oppressors and 
the oppressed. In this regard, oppositional strategies that pit one group 
against another, whether violently or non-violently, are not considered 
conducive to spiritual transformation and lasting change. Bahāʾīs thus 
refrain from all divisive form of social action, including involvement in 
partisan political organising and opposition.
Karlberg 2010: 222
There are currently more than ninety Bahāʾīs imprisoned in Iran, including all 
seven members of the Yaran, a now disbanded leadership group which tended 
to the spiritual and social needs of the Bahāʾī community in the absence of 
an NSA.
Economic pressure on Iran’s Bahāʾī community is acute, with both jobs 
and business licenses being denied to Bahāʾīs. Government jobs, including 
not only in the civil service but also in such fields as education and law, have 
been denied to Bahāʾīs since the years immediately following the Revolution. 
Education has been denied, both to in schools and more significantly in univer-
sities, which are effectively closed to Bahāʾīs. Other forms of persecution faced 
by Iranian Bahāʾīs include the monitoring of their bank accounts, movements, 
and activities; the denial of pensions or rightful inheritances; the intimida-
tion of Muslims who associate with Bahāʾīs; the denial of access to publishing 
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or copying facilities for Bahāʾī literature; and the unlawful confiscation or 
destruction of Bahāʾī properties, including Bahāʾī holy places and graveyards.
In Egypt, there has been spasmodic persecution of the Bahāʾīs, since the 
Faith first arrived in Egypt in 1867 and developed through the work of Mírzá 
Abu’l-Fadl-i-Gulpáygání (Mirza Abu’l-Fada’il 1844–1914) at the Al-Azhar 
University, where he taught from 1894, and brought as many as thirty (Momen 
1995) teachers and students to accept the Bahāʾī Teachings. By 1900 there 
were small groups of Bahāʾīs, mainly of Persian heritage, scattered throughout 
Egypt and Bahāʾī texts in Arabic were being published in Cairo. In 1924, the first 
National Spiritual Assembly of Egypt was elected and a year later a provisional 
court in Upper Egypt attempted to divorce three women from their husbands 
because they argued the men were not Muslims and could, therefore, not be 
married to Muslim women (Scharbrodt 200848). This case effectively created 
a legal precedent which separated the Bahāʾī Faith from Islam, particularly as 
the women chose to remain with their husbands. The Bahāʾī community grew 
modestly over the next few decades with some outbreaks of hostility, however, 
in 1960 the passage of Law No. 263 under Gamal ʿAbdel Nasser, which granted 
official government recognition only to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, effec-
tively stripped organisational rights from all who would identify otherwise. 
Bahāʾī rights were further complicated with the inclusion of Article 2 of the 
constitution in 1971, declaring Islamic law to be the source of Egyptian legis-
lation. As such, any religion not recognised as legitimate by Islamic scholars 
cannot be recognised by the state.
There were periodic arrests of Bahāʾīs in the mid-1960s, 1972, and 1985, and 
in early 1987 forty-eight Bahāʾīs had sentences pronounced against them for 
religious activities. The restrictions on Bahāʾīs came to a head in 2006, over 
the matter of identity cards, all Egyptians are required to carry an identity 
card, which states among other things their religious affiliation. Life without 
an identity card is almost impossible. Bahāʾīs are forbidden to misrepresent 
their faith, and this had led to the custom of leaving the field blank, until the 
system was computerised which made inserting anything but one of the ‘three 
heavenly religions’ (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) impossible. In 2008, the 
Court of Administrative Justice ruled that the Ministry of Interior must issue 
identification cards to Bahāʾīs with the caveat that ‘religion’ is left blank, justi-
fied by Egyptian constitutional protections for freedom of religion.
While Iran and Egypt have been the particularly harsh in response to the 
Bahāʾīs, there have been instances of persecution in Afghanistan during the 
Taliban regime, and in several other predominantly Muslim nations. Some of 
the assertions made to discredit the Bahāʾīs by the more imaginative of their 
opponents go beyond the spiteful to the bizarre: for example, “They forbid 
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their women to wear ḥijāb, and they regard mut’ah (temporary marriage) as 
permissible, and they promote the sharing of women and wealth,” claims an 
unnamed author answering the question “Q: What is the ruling on the Baha’i 
ideas and beliefs? What is the difference between them and other Muslims?” 
on Islamway.net (Anon. 2008).
9 Conclusion
In a century and half or so, since its inception in Iran, the Bahāʾī Faith has 
spread throughout the globe, it has been embraced by a diverse community, 
comprising of urban workers, royalty, artists, and the lower classes, all of whom 
have found solace in the teachings of Bahāʾuʾllāh. It is now possibly the eighth 
largest religion in the world. How the role of this latest of the Abrahamic reli-
gions will unfold is not yet clear but its emphasis on unity in diversity makes it 
likely to be of major significance in an ever more globally defined civilisation.
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Ahl-i Ḥadīth (religious movement) 13, 
41–42, 521, 638–50, 654, 656
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Aḥmad, Mirzā Ghulām 13, 124n33, 125, 
637–38, 646–56
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 9, 305, 312–13, 
317–18, 320, 322 
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ʿArabī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn al- (Ibn al-
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Ashʿarī, Abū al-Ḥasan al- 116, 132, 137
Ashirov, Nafigulla 466
ʿĀshūrāʿ (also Ashura) 154, 261, 308, 324, 
446, 454
Asia 51, 162, 235, 417, 506, 616, 661, 671, 
684;   Central 13, 96, 236, 240, 243–45, 
249–51, 291, 351, 359, 366–67, 369, 373, 
377, 405–6, 413, 416, 445, 460–61, 521, 
524, 531, 533–36, 612, 614, 752—see 
also Caspian region; Kazakhstan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; 
Uzbekistan; East 110, 166, 655—see also 
‘Asiatic’; China; Japan; Mongols; South 
Korea; Taiwan;   South 6, 8, 13, 40–42, 
64, 110, 156, 162, 166, 235–36, 256n2, 
257, 267, 269n9, 351, 523, 533, 535, 537, 
591, 637–38, 652–55—see also India; 
Pakistan; Afghanistan;   South-East 39, 
65, 100, 110, 115–17, 130, 170, 404, 532–
35—see also Bangladesh; Indonesia;  
Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore
‘Asiatics’ 676, 680–81, 685, 691, 700—see 
also racialism
Asmar, ‘Abd al-Salām al- 522n6
Assassins 236, 251
assimilation 52, 225, 242, 251, 262, 266, 273, 
525, 623, 700
Assyrian Orthodoxy 614
Asy’ari, Hasyim (Mbah Hasyim) 130–32, 
134, 136–40
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Azerbaijan 100, 179, 291, 468
ʿAzzām, ʿAbdallāh 11, 380–81, 384–85, 
387–88, 390, 495, 498–99, 502–3
777Index
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Ghadīr Khumm 207, 216, 227
Ghannouchi, Rachid 83–84
gharīban (pl. ghurabāʾ, stranger) 339
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Ḥāfiẓi Ismāʿīlism 245, 249n6–7
hagiography 45, 105n12, 152–54, 203, 
673–74, 696
ḥajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) 29, 39, 49, 53, 
68, 118, 132, 265, 289, 355, 432, 460, 474, 
661, 667, 734—see also Mecca; Pillars 
of Islam
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Ḥusayn (ibn ʿAlī) 154, 179, 185, 187, 192, 207, 
281, 295–96, 305, 309–10, 324, 446, 455, 
619
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Ibn Sīnā 549
idolatry 15–16, 29–30, 34, 43, 273, 432–33, 
436–37, 439, 447, 504n7, 521, 733—see 
also paganism; apostasy
782 Index
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Ismāʿīl, Muḥammad ibn 179, 238–40, 736
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Bohras; Dāʾūdī Bohras; Sulaymānī 
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Izz ad-Dīn al-Qassam Brigades 383–85, 
388–90, 395, 397–98
Jadidi movement 521
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Mahdī, al- (Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan, the 
‘Hidden Imām’) 179, 183, 186, 189, 191–96, 
 198, 200, 258, 281, 311, 317, 446, 659— 
 see also dawr al-satr; occultation
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Muslim World League (MWL) 341





Muʿtazilism 1, 191, 264, 337, 486–88, 736, 
738; and Zaydism 7, 205, 211–13, 218, 
227, 231
 muwaḥḥidūn (monotheists) 724, 727–28, 
732
mysticism 12, 40, 31, 34–35, 37, 90–91,  
116, 132, 241, 250, 284, 291, 294, 299,  
515, 519–21, 547–53, 556–61, 563–64, 
568–86, 600–601, 624, 629, 675, 677, 
697, 701, 711, 715, 717, 720, 739, 762—see 
787Index
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Nur ʿAlī Shāh 544—see also Niʿmatullāhī 
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Bahāʾuʾllāh; Muḥammad, Prophet; 
Noble Drew Ali; prophecy; prophetic 
tradition
prophetic tradition 44, 52, 183, 213, 216, 219, 
241—see also progressive revelation
proselytisation—see missionary activity
Protestantism 110n2, 287, 297, 331, 685, 757, 
764
Protocols of the Elders of Zion 81–82, 388—
see also anti-semitism
Putin, Vladimir 465, 469
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school
ṣadr (Ṣafavid official) 196
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ṣalāt (daily prayer) 55, 295, 600, 733—see 
also Pillars of Islam
Saleh, Ali Abdullah 224, 228 
Saljuq sultanate—see Seljuq sultanate 
salvation 26, 28, 50, 55–57, 62–63, 68, 284, 
294, 429, 493, 503–4, 530, 673, 684, 
704, 718
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Šēx Mand 753
Šēx Mūsē-sōr 750, 751 
Šēx-kirās 753 
sexual activity 15, 159, 361, 427, 507, 576–77, 
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Shīʿī, ʿAbū ʿAbd Allāh al- 239–41
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Shīrāzī, ʿAlī Muḥammad—see Bāb, the
shirk—see idolatry
shrine 35–36, 39, 41, 162, 192, 261, 265, 296, 
307–8, 312, 398, 519, 522–24, 528–29, 
531, 533, 535, 689, 739–40, 750, 752—
see also tomb; ziyāra
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ʿAsharī) 7, 179, 181–84, 186–201, 203,  
 208, 210, 213, 237–39, 250–53, 257–58,  
 260, 263–65, 270–71, 279–81, 289,  
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wilāya (leadership) 185–86
women 4, 6, 16, 23, 61, 63–66, 80, 84, 
97, 119, 121–24, 129–30, 139, 147–48, 
151–70, 167, 222, 251–52, 268–73, 284, 
295, 310, 331, 343, 358, 360–62, 368, 
370, 373, 379, 382, 391–92, 416, 427, 
474, 507–8, 534n17, 563, 537, 572, 577, 
620, 658, 662, 664–66, 676, 691, 694, 
702–4, 706–7, 709–11, 718, 728, 740, 752, 
755–56, 764–65, 767, 769, 771–72—see 
also education: of women; equality; 
feminism; gender
World War I 221, 287, 454, 659
World War II 80, 111, 118n10, 341, 385, 572, 
600, 658–59, 679, 683






xwadē (also xwadī, xudā) 747–49, 751
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